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Printed in Luxembourg  
Dear reader 
 
The 15
th edition of the European Competitiveness Report this year addresses some of the pressing 
policy questions of industrial recovery and sustainable competitiveness, in a time when globalization 
has changed both the way firms compete and the way they cooperate. 
 
Daniel Calleja Crespo 
Director General 
DG Enterprise and Industry 
Today we are experiencing a difficult test. Recovery from the crisis is taking longer than expected 
and looks less certain than a year ago. The economic slowdown and shrinking public and private 
spending confront European enterprises with hard choices. Their successful integration in the global 
value chain and competitive positioning in international trade and investment flows has gained new 
importance for restoring and sustaining our growth model. 
In this context, understanding the challenges and opportunities of the global value chain is central 
for a better targeted industrial policy. Increased internationalization of industrial production gave 
birth to new concepts such as 'domestic content of exports', and the related policy objectives to 
achieve its optimization. The latter is increasingly seen today as an important measure of industrial 
competitiveness, together with traditional measures based on exports of final products. Today, en-
terprises' value chain  performance  becomes  as  important  as  their  export  performance.  For  in-
stance, an SME that is well positioned in the export value chain as a subcontractor or supplier of in-
termediate goods and services to an exporter might be better off and faster growing than an SME 
who is a direct exporter;  but one who adds only a small portion of value to the inputs it buys for ex-
port. 
The report contributes to this debate with new empirical information on the long-term evolution 
trends of the global value chain and their consequent implications for industrial policy. Building on 
the concept of the domestic value of exports, the report also looks at the energy content of exports; 
in order to draw lessons for the role of energy efficiency for competitiveness. It shows that EU coun-
tries have been able to export more and at the same time have been leaders in the worldwide re-
duction of energy used per export unit, thus reducing their exposure to energy price increases.  
Equally important in present day competition is the potential of FDI flows to generate growth and 
employment in times of domestic investment slowdown, also in the medium and long term. This 
report has a special focus on the EU as a FDI destination and source. It adds empirical insights to the 
debate about the spill-over benefits and perceived risks of foreign ownership of the European indus-
trial base. The findings are important for the better understanding of and response to the risks of  
relocation and hollowing out of Europe’s industrial base due to investment outflows to high-growth 
markets.  
Last but not least, the 2012 report looks at how globalization has changed the way firms cooperate, 
and the advantages and limitations of business networks (as compared to clusters). It looks at the 
EU's neighbourhood policies as a source of competitive and value chain gains and argues that glob-
alisation starts at our doorsteps and that the low-hanging fruits of globalization have not yet been 
fully harvested.  
I believe you will enjoy the report. But I also hope that it will inspire you to give feedback on its find-
ings and policy implications. The economic and societal challenges faced by us today call for new and 
better targeted industrial policy at EU level. This cannot be achieved without a broad debate. I would 
be grateful if you would share your thoughts and ideas with us, at:  
http://forums.ec.europa.eu/competitiveness 
 
Daniel Calleja 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The 2012 report seeks 
to identify opportuni-
ties to make European 
industries more com-
petitive by maximising 
the benefits of globali-
sation 
The 2012 edition of the European Competitiveness Report provides new empirical 
evidence for understanding the drivers of industrial competitiveness and the oppor-
tunities and constraints faced by European enterprises in the post-crisis recession.  
The focus of this year report is on maximizing the benefits of globalization. It studies: 
  the development of global value chains and their impact on the value added 
of exports;  
  energy efficiency as a determinant of export performance; 
  the potential of FDI flows; 
  the role of business networks; and  
  the potential of European neighbourhood policies for reaping the benefits of 
globalisation.  
These topics are important because many of the drivers of and the challenges to the 
recovery of industrial demand and employment are to be found outside Europe. The 
new industrial markets outside the EU are key to European competitiveness, particu-
larly in the context of the recovery. More importantly, however, they are crucial for 
European industrial competitiveness in the long term. This is because the emerging 
industrialised economies are increasingly competing with Europe not only in tradi-
tional exports but also in knowledge-intensive industries. Fast-growing new industrial 
powers outside Europe present European firms with both challenges and opportuni-
ties. These have either not been fully studied or their implications for European in-
dustrial policies have remained ambiguous. 
 
The single market and, 
especially, the expan-
sion into markets out-
side the EU have made 
EU economies more 
open and more special-
ised. Demand from 
non-EU countries for 
EU exports is thus a 
powerful driver of re-
covery. The actual im-
pact, however, differs 
from one EU country to 
another. 
 
Economies affected by 
the pre-crisis real es-
tate bubble are under-
going painful adjust-
ment and deleverag-
ing. The resultant drop 
in internal demand 
cannot be fully offset 
by demand from out-
side the EU.  
The report starts by putting the stalled recovery into the context of Europe's external 
trade performance. It argues that even though trade plays an important role in the 
recovery from the crisis, exports alone will not lead the EU out of the current crisis. 
The opportunity to rely on foreign demand can be very important in the short term 
when domestic demand is particularly weak but in the long term sustainable growth 
will be generated through technical progress and productivity growth. It is in that 
sense that the modernization of the industrial base and the removal of institutional 
impediments to entrepreneurship can be seen as crucial for the European enterpris-
es' competitive performance in and outside Europe. 
The recession began when accumulated speculative bubbles in the US and certain EU 
Member States finally burst. These overpriced assets, and the related distortions of 
allocative efficiency, are typical for long periods of stability such as 1993-2007. In 
countries affected by the bubble (e.g. Spain and UK), the subsequent crisis is fol-
lowed by a long period of slow deleveraging that explains the difficult recovery. In 
these countries the bursting of the bubble and the deleveraging of firms and house-
holds is a process of painful adjustment. Countries that did not accumulate internal 
imbalances in the period 2000-07 (e.g. Germany), the contraction in GDP is almost 
entirely due to shrinking intra-EU exports of goods and services and to postponed 
investment given the uncertain business conditions of the EU. Consequently, the 
recovery is expected to be faster in countries in the former group as uncertainty 
fades away. In the future recovering exports to fast growing economies outside the 
EU will certainly contribute compensating for weaker domestic and EU demand in 
both groups of countries.  
The analysis of export specialization trends of EU member states also sheds light on 
the impact on recovery of the different patterns of export specialization. In the last 
two decades the EU member states increased their openness in terms of share of 
exports relative to GDP. For EU-15 Member States the Single market explains only 
part of this increase in the early 1990s. After that the share of exports to the EU re-
mains relatively stable: the export expansion is mainly outside the Single market. This 
expansion is accompanied by increased specialization in exports of manufactures or Executive Summary  
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services. Even if manufacturing and services are increasingly interrelated, traditional 
manufactures exporters like Germany or France specialize further in this direction. 
Meanwhile, UK, Denmark, Greece and Ireland display a notable increase in the export 
of services.  
The study also looks at how competitiveness is fostered by the institutional and reg-
ulatory environment. It is argued that structural and institutional reforms may not 
offer quick-fix solutions but given the current fiscal constraints they appear plausibly 
as a key element of a cost-effective policy response for a way out of the crisis. In the 
longer term growth depends on the ability of an economy to adopt and develop new 
ideas. In turn, this ability depends crucially on having the right institutional and regu-
latory environment. 
 
Outsourcing of produc-
tion is important driver 
of cost optimisation 
and new market pene-
tration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hence EU industries’ 
positioning and per-
formance in the global 
value chain, measured 
through their domestic 
content of exports be-
comes as important 
guide to policy-making 
as the traditional 
measures based on 
export of finished 
goods.  
 
The share of the do-
mestic content of EU 
exports is slightly low-
er than that of US and 
Japan, but the differ-
ence reflects the high-
er reliance on foreign 
inputs of EU-12 ex-
ports.  
 
 
 
China's share in EU 
exports is increasing, 
but less rapidly than its 
share in US and 
A clue to maximizing the competitive gains from globalization is the understanding of 
the value chain positioning and performance of EU industries. This report studies 
trends in the internationalisation of production and the related challenges and op-
portunities  for  EU  industrial  policy.  Thanks  to  globalisation  and  improved  cross-
border transport and technological progress, outsourcing production is now an im-
portant driver of cost optimisation and new market penetration. Different parts of 
firms’ production processes are now located in different parts of the world, chosen 
according to the comparative advantages of the locations and their sales potential. 
The internationalisation of industrial value chains has resulted in a sharp increase in 
trade in intermediate and semi-finished products. The related challenges, risks and 
opportunities for industrial performance have significantly changed the way firms 
compete. Today, their positioning in the global value chain — i.e. their value-chain 
performance — is becoming a more important measure of competitiveness than the 
traditional emphasis on export performance measured through market shares and 
comparative advantages. 
How can EU industrial policy help European firms achieve the best position in global 
value chains? This question is especially important for small businesses (SMEs), which 
– for a number of well-documented reasons – cannot easily find their way to the 
world markets. 
This report tries to inform policy-making by shedding light on how industrial value-
chain competition develops, and what influences firms’ decisions to outsource. It 
uses a new way of measuring vertical specialisation — the import content of ex-
ports, derived from the recently-launched World Input-Output Database (WIOD) — 
to analyse vertical specialisation patterns. According to the findings, the import share 
of EU 15, Japan and the US is about 10-15 %, while for the EU 12 it is significantly 
higher, rising to 34% during the boom period and brought down by the crisis to 30%.  
The analysis of the foreign value of EU exports shows that China's role is growing. 
From 1995 to 2007 the share of imports from China in the EU exports expanded from 
below 1% to about 10% for EU 12 and from 5% to 15% for EU 15. In fact, from the 
mid-1990s, China's share in EU-15's exports grew faster than EU-12's share. Chinese 
manufacturers captured even larger shares (about 20 %) of US and Japanese exports. 
During the crisis, only China managed to increase its share of exports from the EU, US 
and Japan. Imports from China increased in all major economies during the trade 
slump. The chapter in question shows that China's share in European, US and Japa-
nese exports has grown mainly at the expense of domestic suppliers. The increased 
use of foreign imports, including those from China, in European exports has made EU 
firms more competitive on the world markets. 
The chapter looks at four sectors which form the backbone of the EU's industrial 
base: chemicals, transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment and machin-
ery. The share of trade in parts and components in each of these sectors offers new 
insights into the challenges of recovery. During the trade slump, trade in parts and 
components declined more sharply than trade in finished goods, probably because of Executive Summary  
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Japan's exports.  
 
 
 
 
Offshoring seems to be 
mainly cost-driven. 
Upstream quality 
gains may provide a 
viable alternative to 
cost-driven relocation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pro-active industrial 
policy may consider 
FDI promotion and 
support for the opti-
mal positioning of the 
SMEs in the global 
value chains, as well as 
better-targeted in-
struments to encour-
age investment in in-
tangibles and in pro-
cess and marketing 
innovations 
some multiplier effect and inventory adjustment higher up the value chain. The three 
sectors other than chemicals depend largely on the supply of parts and components, 
which grew fast in the pre-crisis years and was severely interrupted by the trade 
slump. This could partly explain why recovery in these sectors is so difficult and is 
taking so long.  
Finally the chapter uses survey data to analyse determinants of the decision by firms 
to offshore as well as their choice of destinations. It finds that, other things being 
equal, larger companies or those with higher revenue per employee are more likely 
to offshore their production. Consequently, any industrial policy that helps compa-
nies grow would also improve their positioning in the global value chain. The evi-
dence shows that offshoring might be primarily cost-driven. First, more sophisticat-
ed products seem less likely to be offshored. Second, offshoring firms tend to spend 
less on R&D than non-offshoring firms, but are more likely to upgrade their products 
more  often.  This  finding  might  mean  that  in-house  R&D  and  specialisation  in 
knowledge-intensive products is an alternative to offshoring to lower-cost locations. 
The report also considers whether relocation may be driven by excessive regulatory 
costs in the source country, but does not find empirical evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. 
The findings of this chapter are important for policy-making in three ways. First, 
they provide useful input for an EU policy that would allow industry to reap the bene-
fits of the global value chain. Pursuing policies that increase openness to trade helps 
local companies to become part of global value chains and thus become more pro-
ductive. This is important since more than two thirds of EU imports consist of inter-
mediate products which boost EU industry competitiveness and productivity. 
Second, off-shoring could help European industry maximise cost/quality gains with 
regard to finished goods. This would require a policy mix that increases the EU's 
share  of  exports  of  finished  goods  from  its  trading  partners,  especially  the  fast-
growing new industrial powers. 
Third, the chapter’s insights are important since the EU aims to maximise the domes-
tic value of its exports. Case studies show that most of the value is created at the 
beginning and end of the value chain. Industrial policies should therefore look at the 
knowledge-creating upstream parts of the value chains and at process and marketing 
innovations in the downstream parts of those chains. 
This goes beyond the mere increase of market shares in goods and services. It in-
cludes targeted promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI), support for the opti-
mal positioning of SMEs in the global value chains, and new instruments to encour-
age investment in intangibles and in process and marketing innovations. 
 
In addition to the do-
mestic content of ex-
ports, the reports stud-
ies their energy con-
tent and presents new 
empirical evidence on 
how energy efficiency 
contributes to export 
competitiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The report goes deeper into the structure of the value-added of exports to examine 
in particular how energy efficiency contributes to external competitiveness.  
Energy is an important component of production costs and competitiveness. The 
prices of energy commodities, particularly oil, have risen sharply in the last decade. 
Some of the causes are structural — such as globalisation and the increasing de-
mand from developing countries, limited fossil fuels resources and overall increasing 
exploration costs — and tend to lead to permanent energy price increases. The re-
current energy price hikes and volatility seen in the past were often due to cyclical 
factors. These included the considerable rigidity of energy demand in the short term, 
the failure to fully anticipate its fast growth (as evidenced by low levels of explora-
tion  investments  and  lack  of  spare  capacity),  or  concerns  related  to  geopolitical 
events. 
 Executive Summary  
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Energy efficiency gains 
are seen in almost all 
Member States. 
 
 
 
 
The EU leads in reduc-
ing the domestic ener-
gy content of exports, 
outperforming the USA 
and Japan.  
 
 
 
 
The EU is also leading 
the internationalisa-
tion and cross-border 
flows of eco-
investment and eco-
innovations.  
 
 
Eco-innovating firms 
are, on the whole, 
more successful than 
conventional innova-
tors.  
 
 
The report provides 
new empirical confir-
mation of the effec-
tiveness and efficiency 
of the EU's sustainable 
industrial policy and its 
importance for the 
overall competitiveness 
of European firms. 
Rising energy prices and volatility directly affect businesses', production costs, their 
economic activity, external accounts and competitiveness. The competitive losses 
are greater for countries or sectors that are less energy-efficient, more specialised in 
energy intensive products or more energy-dependent. These include countries that 
depend heavily on imported fossil fuels and where low-carbon (i.e. nuclear and re-
newable) sources account for only a small share of the energy mix. 
Global competition and the cross-border integration of production chains  call for 
improved energy efficiency and offer new business and energy-saving opportunities. 
As a result, energy efficiency improvements can be observed in almost all countries 
over the period 1995-2009. In Europe, the EU-12 economies improved significantly 
their initial low levels of energy efficiency and the European Union as a whole con-
solidated its overall lead in terms of energy efficiency. 
In general, over the period 1995-2009, EU countries were able to export more and at 
the same time significantly reduce the energy embodied per unit of exports, in par-
ticular the part of energy that is sourced domestically. The EU has a higher share of 
foreign-sourced energy in its total exports (34% for the EU-15 and 28% for the EU-12 
in 2009) relative to Japan (33%) — a country that is also heavily dependent on im-
ported fossil fuels. The figure for the US is much lower (around 18% in 2009). Emerg-
ing economies such as Brazil, Russia and especially China are becoming increasingly 
important sources of the energy embodied in exports of advanced economies. 
The European economies have been leading the world in reducing the domestic 
energy content of exports. For the EU-12 this was primarily due to a significant drop 
in the energy incorporated domestically in manufacturing exports. For the EU-15, the 
most important contribution came from the drop in the domestic energy content in 
service exports. This has helped mitigate the adverse effects on competitiveness and 
terms of trade arising from the increase in the relative price of energy. 
An index decomposition analysis shows that, from 1995 to 2009, manufacturing in 
the European Union moderately increased its gross output while at the same time 
keeping its energy use fairly constant thanks to continuous technical improvement. 
Japan, like the EU, is a world leader in energy efficiency in manufacturing but did not 
improve its technical efficiency over this period. Manufacturing output and technical 
efficiency both improved in the US, but less than in the EU. 
Manufacturing output increased and technical efficiency improved in almost all EU-
27 Member States, but their individual performances vary significantly. The highest 
increases in manufacturing output were seen in the EU-12 countries and Ireland, and 
these were also the countries that tended to achieve the greatest improvements in 
technical efficiency. There was a shift towards less energy-intensive sectors in the 
EU-12 Member States, with only a few exceptions. 
Looking  at  how  eco-innovation  affects  competitiveness,  the  report  finds  that  EU 
firms introducing new products with energy-saving features tend to be more suc-
cessful innovators, particularly in the case of manufacturing firms. Controlling for 
other determinants of innovation success in the market, these eco-innovators sell 
more new products than conventional innovators, and this may give them an im-
portant competitive advantage. 
Overall, EU firms are world leaders in the increasing cross-border ‘eco-investments’ 
in clean and more energy-efficient technologies and products and services.  For in-
stance, EU firms account for almost two thirds of the FDI by multinational enterpris-
es (MNEs) worldwide in renewable energy in the period 2007-2011. They are also 
global frontrunners in other eco-technologies (such as engines and turbines) used to 
provide environmental goods and services. However, international competition is Executive Summary  
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increasing, including from MNEs based in the emerging economies. To remain com-
petitive, EU firms need to focus on exploiting the business opportunities offered by 
global environmental and societal goals and challenges. 
 
FDI inflows bridge in-
vestment gaps and 
lead to spillovers and 
technology transfer 
 
Outward FDI positions 
EU firms in the global 
value chain 
 
 
The EU maintains its 
lead in inward and 
outward FDI but is los-
ing its attractiveness 
as an FDI destination 
 
 
This is  mainly due to a 
decline intra-EU flows. 
Inflows from outside 
the EU are dominated 
by advanced econo-
mies (the US, Switzer-
land, Norway) but 
emerging economies 
are gaining relative 
weight. 
 
 
 
The report finds that 
the major drivers of 
inflows have been the 
single market, the sin-
gle currency and cost 
advantages in the case 
of west-east flows.  
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of fis-
cal incentives is not 
confirmed empirically; 
the impact of unit la-
bour costs and tax 
rates differs between 
countries.  
 
 
This yearʼs report attaches primary importance to the potential of Europeʼs foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policy for fostering industrial competitiveness. It examines 
the EUʼs positioning as a source and destination of cross-border capital flows and the 
implications for the competitiveness of European firms. 
The European Union is a major player in global FDI, both inward and outward. This 
reflects both the potential of the Single Market and the ability of EU companies to 
successfully compete in EU and non-EU markets.  
In the most recent years, however, the EUʼs share of global inward FDI has declined 
significantly. The crisis meant a severe drop in intra-EU flows:  European firms were 
less able and less willing to invest in the EU market. Consequently, FDI from non-EU 
countries became more important. Companies based in developed countries, mainly 
the US and Switzerland continued to dominate this picture, but FDI inflows from 
emerging economies also gained in importance. Analysing the structure of inward FDI 
in the EU, relatively strong foreign presence can be observed in some manufacturing 
industries, such as the chemical industry and petroleum refining.  
EU firms are the most important direct investors in the world. However, since 2008 
European multinationals have curtailed their FDI activities. In outward FDI there has 
been a shift from intra-EU to extra-EU flows. Low growth in the EU as a whole during 
the economic crisis may lead many European MNEs to seek investment opportunities 
in fast-growing emerging markets outside the EU.  Nevertheless, extra-EU outflows 
continue to be highly geared towards developed markets, particularly to the US and 
EFTA countries. EU MNEs seem to be more globally competitive in manufacturing 
industries (e.g. chemicals,  machinery and vehicles)  than in service industries. The 
overall trends in the EUʼs outward FDI mostly reflect  the EU-15 pattern. However, 
over the last decade, there have been several signs that the EU-12 is gradually catch-
ing up. Investments by EU-12 companies is concentrated within the EU and dominat-
ed by the service sector.  
The crisis-induced decrease in inward FDI to the EU raises some important questions. 
What are the main factors influencing companiesʼ decisions about investing in the 
European market? How can the European market be made more attractive? A num-
ber of factors can be distinguished: 
  institutional factors, including the legal and administrative system and interna-
tional agreements; 
  economic factors, such as market size or labour costs and skills; 
  business facilitation, such as investment promotion; 
  local factors at the level of individual firms 
The empirical analysis shows that the driving forces behind inward FDI in the EU are 
cost advantages, the euro and EU membership. The impact of unit labour costs and 
corporate taxes on bilateral FDI stocks differ from country to country. In particular, 
the rate of corporate taxes seems to be a key factor in the EU-12 countries, and in 
the case of greenfield investments in the EU-27. In addition, the analysis shows that 
rising unit labour costs in some EU-15 countries are a major factor in slowing the 
growth of inward FDI stocks, and it confirms the importance of having a well educat-
ed workforce.  
In general, countries seem to benefit from hosting multinational companies. Their Executive Summary  
10 
 
Since FDI can help 
boost the  competi-
tiveness of European 
firms the EU must de-
sign policies for at-
tracting FDI and max-
imising its benefits. 
presence can bring in finance, technology, skills,  management techniques and good 
practices, and may ensure market access. The empirical analysis shows that foreign 
affiliates do a lot to boost productivity in EU manufacturing industries. The anaylsis 
shows that backward linkages (effects from foreign companies to local suppliers) are 
more  important  than  horizontal  spillovers  for  productivity  growth.  The  empirical 
analysis of EU-10 countries suggests that the presence of foreign firms helps to cre-
ate jobs in the local supply industries. FDI spillovers via backward are greatest for 
innovative local firms and especially for those that do not export. This would lead to 
the conclusion that foreign firms act as catalysts encouraging domestic suppliers to 
introduce technological innovations. The review of the home country effects of out-
ward FDI shows that the effects on productivity in the home country are mostly posi-
tive. 
The empirical analyses provide a basis for some policy conclusions. It has been shown 
that the best way to promote internationalisation through outward FDI is not to pro-
vide subsidies and targeted support, but to promote a competitive business envi-
ronment, which ensures that resources are reallocated to the best performing firms. 
It is also crucial to provide conditions which allow small firms and small MNEs to 
grow. To attract FDI into the EU it is essential to improve cost competitiveness, but a 
well functioning internal market and the single currency remain key factors. When it 
comes to promoting investment policy-makers in different Member States could use-
fully learn from one other about their most successful practices. 
The analysis of the impact of FDI suggests that industrial policies should contribute to 
increase spillovers from MNEs on local enterprises, in particular through networks. 
Also crucial for maximising the benefits of inward FDI are policies that facilitate tech-
nology transfer between MNEs and local firms and that help companies in building 
their capabilities.   
 
Globalisation is also 
changing the way 
firms cooperate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clusters and networks 
offer additional bene-
fits from inter-firm 
spillovers.  
 
 
 
 
Networks enable EU 
SMEs to reach critical 
mass, share infor-
mation and enlarge 
their industrial scope 
 
 
 
 
Globalisation changes the way firms compete, but also the way they cooperate. It 
also shifts the pattern of their cooperation from clusters to networks. Networks not 
only help firms reap the benefits of FDI, as described above, but are also a good way 
for firms to adapt to globalisation. 
This report looks at non-price and non-contractual interactions that are tending to 
grow  among  independent  companies,  such  as  the  formation  of  clusters  and  net-
works. In the case of clusters — firms carrying out similar activities in the same geo-
graphical area — the linkages arise automatically from the interplay of market forces. 
In the case of networks, however, it is up to the firm to establish linkages with other 
companies without being formally absorbed into their organisational structure. 
Clusters have long been an object of academic study and an instrument of industrial 
policy for regional and national authorities. Networks of firms, however, have been a 
more elusive topic — not very easy to identify and not attracting policy recommen-
dations.  But  globalisation  and  the  new  organisational  structures  that  firms  are 
adopting in its wake have increased policy-makers' interest in networks and in their 
usefulness as a policy tool. The important question is to what extent networks can be 
used to enhance the performance of cluster-based policies and to support SMEs in 
the process of internationalisation. 
Networks spring from autonomous decisions of companies that decide it is in their 
best interest to be inside the network rather than outside it. Unlike clusters, net-
works do not need to be concentrated in a specific area. In fact, a group of compa-
nies that cooperate in a region may decide to set up closer links with other groups in 
more distant areas. There may be several reasons for these moves: a lack of critical 
mass in the original region; sharing information with other companies for the pur-
pose of entering new markets; enlarging the firm's industrial scope. Such needs are 
felt more acutely by SMEs, for whom the cost of access to suitable information on Executive Summary  
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international markets can be exorbitant. 
Faced with globalisation, SMEs have an incentive to identify emerging activities that 
will give them a new competitive advantage. Cooperation within a network may be a 
sensible strategy for preventing the decay of their traditional specialisation. In Italy, 
for example, the Romagna Creative District is a network focusing on communication, 
art, design, architecture, theatre, music and literature. It aims to connect and share 
the resources of individuals and companies for the purpose of achieving new creative 
projects and spreading them across the Romagna Region. In Germany, the Eastern 
Ruhr Industry Network in another example of efforts to boost competitiveness in 
regions undergoing industrial change. In this case, the network brings together  firms 
in traditional manufacturing sectors. 
Public authorities may share with firms an interest in building more effective and 
widespread networks. In this case, alongside financial incentives, regional and na-
tional  governments  have  at  their  disposal  ‘in-kind’  instruments  such  as  providing 
structures to  collaborate. Which instruments to choose  depends on the activities 
policy-makers want to encourage. 
Generally speaking, the rationale for public policy intervention rests on externality or 
information asymmetry or on other market or regulatory failures. There is an argu-
ment for promoting clusters in terms of the positive externalities that an agglomera-
tion of industries may well foster. The case for supporting networks is less straight-
forward and crucially depends on the activities that networks are engaged in. For 
example, accessing new markets and developing new products demand very precise 
information and close cooperation that could be best achieved through a common 
network. If there is going to be any kind of public involvement, policy-makers must 
show that it is more efficient to help the network than its individual members. 
The removal of administrative barriers and the access to a common knowledge infra-
structure and collaboration platform could boost network activities in new areas that 
are fundamental to  growth.  Europe-wide network programmes  could be a useful 
complement to cluster-based programmes. 
Finally the report looks at the potential of neighbourhood policies to contribute to 
growth and industrial competitiveness. The opportunities of cross-border investment 
and trade with our neighbours are in a way the low-hanging fruits that have not yet 
been used to their full potential.  
The importance of each neighbouring country for the competitiveness of the EU and 
its Member States varies depending on the form of cooperation between the EU and 
the country in question, how deep and comprehensive the cooperation is, the size 
and structure of the economy of the neighbouring country, its level of development, 
trade and investment flows, any bilateral agreements, and migration between the 
country concerned and the EU. By examining each of these aspects, the chapter en-
deavours to shed light on the challenges and opportunities for EU competitiveness 
stemming from its neighbourhood in the context of globalisation, also reflecting the 
dynamics over time in terms of EU enlargement, the global economic crisis, evolving 
relations across borders, and internal developments in neighbouring states (such as 
the Arab Spring). 
A few large economies dominate the neighbourhood: Russia, Ukraine, Switzerland, 
Norway, Egypt. Without these countries, the region surrounding the EU would be 
significantly less important in terms of GDP and have less than half its current popu-
lation. Oil and gas  production plays a central role in a small number of countries – 
Russia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Libya, Norway – while most countries are service-based 
economies, in many cases also with a relatively large agricultural sector. 
Most countries in the neighbourhood suffer from a lack of competitiveness, in many 
cases as a result of being relatively closed economies with weak business environ-Executive Summary  
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ments. Many of them also run high external imbalances – usually deficits, apart from 
the energy exporters listed above which all have persistent trade and current ac-
count surpluses. 
The EU is an important trading partner for all neighbouring countries. From the point 
of view of the EU though, they play rather a modest role as trading partners, for the 
reasons  explained  above.  This  asymmetry  in  the  relative  importance  of  trading 
partners has an impact in bilateral negotiations as any development affecting trade 
relations is likely to have much more impact on the non-EU trading partner than on 
the EU. 
The type of extensive and successful export-led growth strategy witnessed in recent 
decades in other parts of the world, with the potential to diversify and upgrade ex-
ports and integrate economies into global trade networks, has so far had less success 
in the countries surrounding the EU. Most of them have not seen their market shares 
increase on the world market, most likely due to their relatively small shares of man-
ufactured goods in their exports. In addition, several of the neighbouring countries 
are caught in a situation where rents from natural resources prove detrimental to 
export diversification and structural upgrading. 
Outward FDI from the EU to its neighbours exceeds inward FDI from the neighbours. 
Around a fifth of all outward extra-EU FDI from Member States goes to the surround-
ing region, with the exception of 2009 and 2010 when the share was much higher. In 
the opposite direction, more or less a quarter of all inward FDI comes from the sur-
rounding region, a share which however has dropped recently. 
The Southern Mediterranean is an important destination for EU investments, in par-
ticular Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. While in Egypt most FDI has gone into the petro-
leum industry, FDI flows into Morocco have been more diversified. Mainly for histori-
cal reasons and due to its geographical proximity, the EU is in fact the leading inves-
tor in the region. 
Labour migration to EU Member States is high on the agenda of EU policymakers. 
Mediterranean neighbouring countries are a major source of EU immigration, the 
total number of first-generation emigrants from that region ranging from 10 million 
to 13 million, as for various reasons the EU is the main destination for migrants from 
the other side of the Mediterranean. Immigrants from the region represent 20 % of 
the 30 million immigrants in the EU and 6 % of total EU population. The flow of mi-
grants from the region could rise, at least temporarily, against the backdrop of the 
Arab Spring. Migration is obviously linked to local unemployment, economic hardship 
and a lack of options. It can represent the only viable alternative to unemployment, 
and is a natural reaction to social and economic upheaval or internal political con-
flicts. 
Faced with the prospect of ageing and potentially diminishing populations exerting 
serious pressure on their welfare systems and potentially holding back their competi-
tiveness, EU Member States have come to see immigration, not only from the imme-
diate neighbourhood but from further afield as well, as a solution. The Europe 2020 
strategy set out to promote a forward looking and comprehensive labour migration 
policy which would respond in a flexible way to the priorities and needs of labour 
markets. By matching shortages on EU labour markets with the excess labour supply 
outside the EU, Member States could sustain their international economic competi-
tiveness, growth and prosperity. 
Remittances go hand in hand with labour migration. Both have increased over the 
last decades, in many cases generating significant welfare gains in the countries to 
which remittances are sent. Moldova is an extreme case in point as it has the highest 
share of remittances to GDP (23 %), and remittances contribute to developments on 
the labour market there. Other countries with high shares of remittances to GDP are Executive Summary  
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Lebanon and Egypt. However, the economic crisis and ensuing austerity packages 
implemented in many Member States have made it more difficult for immigrants to 
find gainful employment in the EU, and while some of them have returned to their 
countries of origin, most immigrants have adjusted to the economic crisis by reducing 
their remittances. 
The report is structured as follows. The introductory chapter "The External Sector in 
the Recession" sets the scene by studying the role of the external sector in the Euro-
pean industries' recovery and their sustainable competitiveness. Chapter 2 "EU In-
dustry in the Global Value Chain" studies the internationalisation of production and 
the trends in the domestic value of European exports. Chapter 3 "Energy Content of 
Exports and Eco-Innovation" analyses competitiveness in the context of energy effi-
ciency of exports. Chapter 4"FDI Flows and EU industrial competitiveness" examines 
the positioning of the EU as a source and destination of cross-border capital flows 
and the related implications for the competitiveness of European enterprises. Chap-
ter 5 "Clusters and Networks" studies the changes in the way firms cooperate and 
the room for policy support. The concluding chapter 6 "Competitiveness develop-
ments along the external borders of the EU" looks at the potential of neighbourhood 
policies to contribute to growth and competitiveness. 
 Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE EXTERNAL SECTOR IN THE RECESSION 
 
The EU is experiencing a large and long recession, 
both in depth and scope. The recession was preced-
ed by a long period, from the mid-1990s to 2007, 
characterized  by  macroeconomic  stability  and  sus-
tained  growth.  Indeed,  as  in  previous  large  reces-
sions combined with a banking crisis, ‘[t]he crisis was 
preceded  by  a  long  period of  rapid  credit  growth, 
low risk premiums, abundant availability of liquidity, 
strong leveraging, soaring asset prices and the de-
velopment  of  bubbles  in  the  real  estate  sector’
1.   
Within  the  EU,  some  Member  States  became  net 
lenders by a significant fraction of its GDP while oth-
er became large net borrowers. These developments 
distorted  the  financial  position  of  many  European 
countries feeding what today is referred to as exter-
nal imbalances.
2 
This chapter is an overview of the consequences of 
the crisis with a particular emphasis on the external 
sector. When examining the performance of exports 
and imports, it tries to elucidate to what extent what 
it is observed, the external position of EU members, 
reflects a true gain or loss of competitiveness or is 
simply a reflection of the internal imbalances acc u-
mulated during the boom years, and in so doing 
highlights the challenges faced by EU economies. 
1.1.  THE CONTRACTION OF OUTPUT 
The current crisis is unprecedented in that it is deep 
and  it  has  affected  many  economies  around  the 
world, particularly the US and the EU. Although the 
causes  of  the  current  global  economic  crisis  are 
complex, the origins can be linked to growing mis-
priced assets, notably real estate, both in the US and 
some  EU  Member  States.  The  recession  was  trig-
gered by increasing doubts  of the sustainability of 
these prices in the US, undermining the soundness 
of mortgage-backed assets and ultimately dragging 
the  US  financial  sector  into  serious  disruption  to-
wards the end of 2007. The disruption in the finan-
                                                           
1  See European Commission (2009), Chapter 1 ‘Root causes of the 
crisis’ and Chapter 2 ‘The crisis from a historical perspective’. 
See also European Commission (2010b), ‘Surveillance of Intra-
Euro-Area Competitiveness and Imbalances’. On the difficulties 
to deal with these imbalances ex ante, see Wolf (2012). 
2
  In  2012  the  European  Commission  initiated  a  monitoring 
program  called  the  Macroeconomi c  Imbalances  Procedure 
(European Commission (2012)). See the Alert Mechanism Report 
COM(2012) 68 and the in-depth country reviews published as 
European  Economy  -  Occasional  Papers,  DG  Economic  and 
Financial Affairs, European Commission. 
cial sector announced a sharp recession in the US in 
2008 which hit global demand. In addition, the in-
ternationalisation of financial products linked to US 
real estate lending meant that the fall in the US real 
estate  market  affected  financial  sectors  globally. 
Trouble  in  the  US  pricked  the  bubble  in  some  EU 
countries leading to a serious recession on this side 
of the Atlantic. Between 2008 and 2009 the EU suf-
fered a large contraction of economic activity: more 
than 5% of GDP with respect to the peak value for 
the Union as a whole, whereas and in some Member 
States the drop in GDP was well beyond this figure. 
 
Figure  1.1.  The  contraction  of  GDP  in  2007-09 
across Member States 
 
 Source: Eurostat, Annual National Accounts. 
 
The recession is not only deep, it is also prolongued. 
Table  1.1  illustrates  the  duration  of  the  recession. 
Some EU Member States like Greece have been in 
recession for more than two years in a row. Not all 
EU Member States have been equally affected. Fig-
ure 1.1 and Table 1.1 show how heterogeneous the 
experience  has  been  across  Member  States:  from 
Poland, virtually unaffected by the crisis, to the Bal-
tic Republics, with cuts in activity reaching 25% and 
several consecutive quarters in recession. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Table 1.1: An overview of the recession, real GDP during 2007-11; index, 2000=100                            
   2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
27  115.3  115.9  116.6  117.2  117.8  117.5  116.8  114.7  111.8  111.4  111.8  112.1  112.6  113.7  114.3  114.5  115.4          
BE  113.7  113.9  114.6  115.0  115.9  116.3  115.7  113.3  111.3  111.5  112.8  113.4  113.4  114.6  115.1  115.7  116.8  117.1  117.1  117.1 
BG  144.1  146.6  148.5  151.7  154.0  156.1  158.3  158.9  148.9  148.9  149.4  144.7  146.6  148.7  149.9  150.5  151.2  152.0  152.3  152.8 
CZ  136.8  136.5  138.8  140.9  141.6  143.1  143.3  141.0  136.4  134.9  135.4  136.6  137.6  139.0  139.9  140.7  141.4  141.8  141.7  141.5 
DK  111.5  110.9  111.8  112.9  111.4  113.0  111.0  108.3  105.9  103.9  103.8  104.1  104.4  105.6  106.9  106.3  106.6  107.1  106.9  106.8 
DE  109.4  110.1  111.0  111.3  112.5  112.1  111.6  109.2  104.8  105.2  106.0  106.8  107.3  109.4  110.3  110.8  112.3  112.6  113.3  113.1 
EE  166.1  166.8  168.6  167.3  164.2  165.7  164.1  150.3  142.8  137.1  135.3  137.2  136.8  140.5  142.0  145.6  149.6  152.0  153.4  153.0 
IE  141.9  139.6  138.8  143.7  140.3  137.2  137.2  132.5  128.6  127.6  127.0  125.7  127.3  126.4  127.1  125.8  127.2  128.7  127.3  127.0 
EL  132.5  133.3  134.4  134.5  134.6  135.3  135.7  134.6  133.1  131.7  130.9  131.8  129.3  127.6  125.6  122.1  122.3          
ES  125.0  126.0  127.0  127.8  128.4  128.4  127.4  126.0  124.0  122.7  122.3  122.2  122.4  122.7  122.8  123.0  123.5  123.7  123.7  123.4 
FR  112.7  113.3  113.8  114.1  114.5  113.8  113.2  111.5  109.6  109.6  109.7  110.3  110.7  111.4  111.8  112.3  113.3  113.2  113.5  113.6 
IT  108.8  109.0  109.4  108.8  109.3  108.7  107.4  105.5  101.8  101.6  102.0  101.8  103.0  103.5  103.9  104.1  104.2  104.5  104.3  103.6 
CY  125.8  127.4  128.9  130.7  131.8  132.8  133.3  133.5  132.2  130.2  129.5  129.4  131.1  131.2  132.3  132.7  133.0  133.1  131.9  131.8 
LV  175.2  178.9  180.5  181.6  180.3  180.1  169.0  166.0  150.1  148.4  138.2  139.8  141.4  141.5  142.7  144.3  145.9  148.8  151.1  152.8 
LT  166.5  170.8  174.8  177.7  178.1  178.5  176.6  175.6  151.8  150.9  151.4  150.1  150.8  151.7  153.3  156.8  159.2  161.6  163.5  164.8 
LU  131.0  133.5  134.2  135.4  136.5  136.9  135.2  129.5  128.2  125.5  128.3  127.6  129.1  131.0  130.7  132.4  132.6  131.9  133.3  133.6 
HU  127.5  127.4  127.7  128.4  130.2  129.9  128.6  125.9  121.7  120.2  119.1  119.4  120.7  121.2  122.1  122.4  123.2  123.3  123.8  124.2 
MT  111.4  111.2  112.5  113.7  115.4  117.3  117.9  116.1  111.9  113.0  113.9  115.5  115.2  115.5  116.2  118.2  118.4  118.9  119.0  118.3 
NL  113.1  113.7  115.3  116.9  117.5  117.0  117.0  115.7  113.1  111.7  112.6  113.2  113.7  114.3  114.5  115.4  116.2  116.4  115.9  115.2 
AT  115.8  116.4  116.4  117.4  118.8  118.9  117.6  115.5  113.6  112.6  113.4  114.6  114.5  115.3  117.1  118.5  119.4  120.0  120.1  120.1 
PL  128.8  131.0  132.7  135.6  137.5  138.5  139.5  139.0  139.6  140.3  140.9  143.0  143.9  145.5  147.5  148.7  150.3  152.1  153.6  155.3 
PT  108.0  108.0  107.9  109.0  109.0  108.7  108.2  107.0  104.5  104.9  105.5  105.4  106.3  106.6  106.8  106.4  105.7  105.4  104.7  103.4 
RO  146.1  148.6  151.3  155.0  159.9  161.4  161.2  158.4  153.7  151.2  149.9  149.0  148.1  148.6  147.4  148.8  150.4  150.6  152.3  152.1 
SI  132.9  134.6  137.3  137.8  140.0  141.3  141.8  136.4  128.9  128.1  128.5  128.3  128.5  129.9  130.5  131.3  130.9  130.7  130.2  129.3 
SK  145.3  148.9  152.4  161.8  157.9  159.9  161.9  163.7  149.9  151.9  153.9  156.0  157.3  158.6  160.1  161.3  162.6  164.0  165.3  166.7 
FI  123.3  124.9  125.7  127.1  126.5  126.6  126.2  123.1  115.4  114.1  115.7  115.2  116.2  120.0  119.6  121.9  122.2  122.1  123.4  123.5 
SE  121.9  122.5  123.4  125.1  123.6  123.5  123.4  118.7  115.8  115.9  116.0  117.1  119.8  122.2  123.8  126.2  126.7  128.1  129.2  127.7 
UK  120.3  121.7  123.2  124.0  124.0  122.5  120.1  117.3  115.5  115.3  115.5  116.4  116.9  118.2  119.0  118.4  118.7  118.6  119.3  118.9 
Notes: Numbers are indexes relative to 2000 so that it can be appreciated how much the series has grown in the boom years, and compare it with the extent of the contraction. The shaded cells denote a decrease in 
value vis-à-vis the previous quarter. 
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts and own calculations. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Figure 1.2. Number of countries with decreasing GDP vis-à-vis the previous quarter 
 
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts 
 
Table 1.1 also illustrates how many European econ-
omies are slipping into a second recession, this time 
due to the uncertainty surrounding the EU sovereign 
debt crisis which has weakened demand, along with 
the phasing out of fiscal stimulus measures in some 
EU countries and the US. Indeed, apart from coun-
tries that entered the recession with serious struc-
tural public deficits, notably Greece, in some Mem-
ber States the low revenues caused by the sluggish 
economic activity add to the troubles of the financial 
system  notably  its  exposure  to  the  real  estate 
market  triggering  a  fresh  sovereign  debt  crisis
3, 
which is likely to be at the origin of the slowdown or 
even the reversal of the recovery 
Figure 1.2 illustrates this reversal. Most EU countries 
grew for several quarters in a row in 2010 but in the 
course of 2011 it became obvious that an increasing 
number of them were experiencing again a contrac-
tion on a quarter-to-quarter basis. By the last qua r-
                                                           
3   When a the crisis is large enough to drag down an exposed 
financial  sector,  efforts  from  the  government  to  prevent  a 
meltdown  of  the  financial  system  increase  the  risk  that 
private debt e.g. mortgage backed assets in private banks 
balances becomes public via the bail-out of the troubled 
banks. This risk is at the origin of the subsequent sovereign 
debt crisis. This is what happened in Ireland in 2011 and with 
Spain  in  2012  and  it  is  a  classical  feature  of  this  type  of 
recessions (see Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)). 
ter  of  the  year  15  Member  States  reported  a  de-
crease in activity with respect to the previous quar-
ter.  In  this  respect,  although  the  main  stimulus 
measures  in  2009-10  undoubtedly  cushioned  the 
negative impact of the crisis and supported growth 
along  with  the  relaxation  of  monetary  policy,  EU 
economies have struggled to gain momentum as the 
stimulus measures were withdrawn. 
EU Member States have been affected in a different 
way both in terms of the initial contraction and the 
subsequent  (weak)  recovery.  Within  the  EU  large 
capital  flows  accumulated  substantial  imbalances 
along the boom period 2000-07. As a consequence, 
at the end of this period the international financial 
position of some Member States was seriously dis-
torted, either becoming large debtors or creditors. 
On the basis of these flows countries can be classi-
fied basically in four groups.
4  In the first group we 
find countries that were net lenders in this period 
2000-07, like Belgium or th e Netherlands. In a s e-
cond group we have Germany or Sweden that star t-
ed the boom period being bo rrowers and became 
large net lenders. Countries in this group became net 
lenders because others, the third group, became 
large net borrowers. Within the former,   however, 
                                                           
4 
See  the  discussion  section  1.3  in  the  European 
Competitiveness Report 2011. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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we find different underlying reasons to become net 
borrowers. For example, in the case of Greece at the 
origin of its borrowing we find large and persistent 
public  deficits  financed  with  public  debt  mostly 
placed  abroad,  mostly  to  financial  institutions  in 
France or Germany.
5  In the case of Spain or the UK 
the driving force were mispriced domestic assets, in 
particular houses, so it is private institutions leve r-
age (banks and households) what we find behind the 
aggregate net borrowing.
6  Some EU-12 Member 
States like the Baltic Republics suffered from bubbles 
probably associated with the large inflow of cap ital, 
otherwise typical of the rapid   catch -up process in 
which they are immersed (see Figure 1.3); in these 
cases the causality is probably the reverse: the capi-
tal inflows generated the mispriced assets rather 
than the other way around. Finally, Portugal and 
Italy show a remarkably weak growth perfo rmance, 
mostly because of low productivity growth (see T a-
ble 1.3 opposite).  
Each of these groups was affected differently during 
the initial recession, and has different pattern and 
drivers of recovery. There is one aspect, however, in 
which most countries behave similarly: exports are 
recovering  strongly  for  most  countries,  probably 
reflecting an independence of internal developments 
and the healthy condition of many non -EU econo-
mies. In countries affected by serious internal bu b-
bles, the recession can be seen as a correction to 
come back to more realistic asset prices. In these 
economies,  private  a gents  like  households  and 
banks, are immersed in a deleverage process that is 
by definition slow and tough. Indeed, the excess 
investment in mispriced assets (e.g. houses), whose 
prices are only sluggishly returning to normal lower 
levels
7, has left many a gents highly indebted with 
less assets to back their debt (e.g. a large mortgage 
for a house that is not worth the mortgage). 
This argument can be illustrated comparing the UK, a 
net significant borrower, and Sweden, a net lender. 
Figure 1.4 shows how at t he onset of the recession 
GDP reacted similarly in both countries. Underlying, 
                                                           
5
   See the BIS Quarterly Review, June 2010 "International banking 
and financial market developments". 
6 
   The European Competitiveness Report 2010 examines changes 
in  the  behavior  of  investment  in  dwellings  in  EU  Member 
States in the period 2000-07. 
7   There are several reasons why prices may take long to adjust. 
First, households tend to hold the property in the hope that 
the price will recover in the future and in order to minimize 
losses. Second, for analogous reasons, banks tend to refinance 
loans to developers in order to delay the realization of losses. 
Both strategies result in a low number of properties on sold in 
the market, and hence a low pressure on observed prices to 
go down. 
Figure 1.3. The catch-up process of the EU-12 coun-
tries  1994-2007.  Changes  in  relative  income  (EU-
27=100) and initial level of income 
   
Note: Income is expressed relative to the EU-27=100. A negative 
value means that the country has lost income relative to the aver-
age. In other words, it denotes a growth rate below the average 
growth rate. 
Source: AMECO database and own calculations 
however, were quite different reactions of the dif-
ferent  components  of  aggregate  demand.  In  both 
countries investment reacted similarly to the uncer-
tain business conditions. However, the main driver in 
the Swedish recession was the external sector and 
uncertain  business  conditions  as  reflected  by  the 
drop in investment: in five quarters both investment 
and exports had contracted by 20%. In the case of 
the UK it was households' consumption that dragged 
down income: compared to a mild and brief contrac-
tion in Sweden, UK private consumption contracted 
more than double and has not recovered yet.
8 
And yet, there is one aspect that most EU Member 
States have in common with Sweden and the UK: the 
relatively strong recovery of exports. A glance at 
Table 1.7  in the appendix shows a heterogeneous 
behaviour across countries when comparing exports 
and income. This is a recall that the external sector 
can soften the impact of a recession and contribute 
to a recovery but cannot fully compensate for other 
internal factors that ultimately must lead the reco v-
ery. In particular, it is unlikely that a weak internal 
demand can be compensated by external demand in 
medium to large countries. 
                                                           
8   Details of the reaction of different components of aggregate  
demand can be found in Table 1.7 in the appendix. It may be 
noted that this chart would not look very different if UK and 
Sweden  would  be  replaced,  for  example,  by  Spain  and 
Germany, so it does not seem that belonging to the euro or 
not is making any significant difference as far as the recovery 
is concerned. The development of internal imbalances seems 
to have played a more important role. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Figure 1.4. The recession: A comparison of Sweden (blue) and the UK (red); indexes, 2008Q1=100 
 
Note: Exports include goods and services 
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts. 
 
1.2.  EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The  evolution  of  employment  and  unemployment 
reflects the way the crisis is shared among all actors 
in the economy. In Table 1.2 we can see that at the 
EU level employment, compared to some Member 
States, has remained remarkably stable, with a con-
traction  of  3%  between  mid-2008  and  the  end  of 
2010.
9  But  this  aggregate  relative  stability  masks 
considerable  heterogeneity  at  the  Member  State 
level. For instance, in countries  such as Belgium or 
Germany the crisis has hardly affected the level of 
employment whereas in countries such as Spain em-
                                                           
9   A  more  detailed  description  of  recent  trends  and 
development  can  be  found  in  the  European  Commission's 
Labor  Market  Review (available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/europea
n_economy/labour_market_en.htm). 
ployment was still contracting going into 2012, down 
14% on the peak value in the last quarter of 2007. 
Institutional  differences  and  the  accumulation  (or 
not) of internal and external imbalances are key to 
understanding  the  labour  market  performance 
across Member States. In particular, Member States 
affected  by  an  oversized  construction  sector  are 
among those most affected by large contractions of 
employment  (see  Figure  1.7  below)  and  large  in-
creases in unemployment. The reason is that in the-
se countries the construction sector has to be down-
sized so the changes in employment are permanent 
–  labour  hoarding  only  makes  sense  to  preserve 
firm-specific  human  capital  when  the  downturn  is 
perceived to be temporary. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Table 1.2. An overview of the recession: Employment in 2007-11; index, 2000Q2=100 
   2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
27  106.7  108.4  109.5  109.2  108.7  109.7  110.5  109.6  107.6  107.9  107.9  107.3  106.0  107.2  107.8  107.3  106.6  107.7  108.0  107.4 
BE  105.4  105.4  106.3  107.8  107.8  107.1  108.2  108.2  107.2  106.9  106.9  107.9  108.2  107.6  108.7  110.4  108.0  110.1  108.8  110.0 
BG  109.4  113.3  115.2  115.0  114.3  117.0  118.6  116.8  113.4  114.6  114.0  110.2  104.8  107.0  108.0  105.1  100.5  102.2  105.0  102.8 
CZ  104.0  105.0  105.6  106.1  105.9  106.9  107.1  107.5  105.5  105.3  105.0  105.0  102.9  104.1  104.8  104.8  103.8  104.7  105.1  104.7 
DK  102.2  102.8  102.6  101.7  102.5  104.4  105.1  104.5  101.9  101.5  101.7  99.1  98.0  98.7  99.0  98.1  97.3  98.3  98.8  97.8 
DE  102.0  103.6  105.0  105.3  103.9  104.3  106.5  106.7  104.4  104.7  104.7  106.6  104.8  105.5  106.2  106.8  106.6  108.2  109.0  109.6 
EE  112.8  114.6  115.4  113.6  114.1  114.7  115.6  114.0  106.8  104.5  104.1  101.2  96.3  97.2  101.8  104.0  103.2  105.1  109.9  107.5 
IE  124.5  125.7  128.5  127.7  127.5  125.9  126.4  122.2  117.4  115.7  114.7  112.7  110.7  110.8  110.5  108.7  107.5  108.2  107.6  107.7 
EL  109.3  110.7  111.3  110.7  110.5  112.3  112.5  111.6  109.9  111.0  111.3  109.7  108.4  108.6  107.9  105.3  102.7  101.9  100.1  96.5 
ES  129.9  132.0  132.8  132.6  132.1  132.2  131.7  128.5  123.5  122.6  122.1  120.6  119.0  119.5  120.0  119.0  117.4  118.4  117.5  115.1 
FR  108.8  110.4  111.5  110.9  111.1  112.0  112.6  111.6  110.6  111.2  111.4  110.0  110.1  111.2  111.7  110.5  110.3  111.4  111.7  110.6 
IT  109.2  111.1  111.7  111.2  110.5  112.4  112.1  111.4  109.5  110.7  109.9  109.3  108.5  109.7  108.8  109.4  109.1  110.2  109.5  109.4 
CY  126.1  128.7  129.1  130.7  128.7  130.1  129.6  130.7  127.7  129.9  129.3  129.5  128.4  131.2  130.5  130.7  128.3  129.1  126.3  125.6 
LV  113.7  115.9  118.2  120.5  118.9  118.6  117.8  113.6  109.2  104.3  101.6  99.2  97.3  99.4  102.2  101.3  100.7  102.8  104.8  105.2 
LT  107.2  109.8  110.9  108.0  107.2  108.2  109.0  107.0  101.9  100.8  100.9  98.1  94.3  94.2  96.2  97.3  95.1  97.7  97.8  98.0 
LU  112.5  111.2  113.8  113.0  109.9  115.5  112.8  110.5  117.7  120.5  120.1  119.3  120.8  120.9  122.1  122.3  125.3  122.2  124.2  122.8 
HU  102.5  103.5  103.6  102.6  100.9  101.5  102.9  101.8  98.8  99.6  99.2  99.2  97.5  99.1  100.2  99.8  97.9  99.9  101.1  100.9 
MT  107.1  110.2  110.0  109.6  109.8  111.7  113.7  111.8  111.7  111.8  112.1  111.7  112.6  113.6  115.0  114.1  116.6  116.4  117.9  116.2 
NL  105.4  106.9  107.7  107.6  107.4  108.4  109.0  109.1  108.7  108.3  108.2  107.5  104.7  105.4  105.7  105.7  105.0  105.3  105.6  105.9 
AT  105.8  107.9  109.4  107.7  107.4  109.6  110.4  109.4  107.4  108.8  109.8  108.9  107.3  108.7  110.6  110.5  108.6  110.5  112.1  111.1 
PL  103.3  105.4  107.3  108.0  108.0  109.2  111.3  111.3  109.4  110.3  111.5  110.7  108.5  111.3  112.7  111.9  110.6  112.5  113.3  112.7 
PT  102.1  102.4  103.3  103.3  103.4  104.2  103.5  103.1  101.7  101.2  99.8  99.8  99.5  99.3  98.9  98.6  97.5  97.8  97.2  94.9 
RO  88.0  91.7  93.2  89.2  88.9  92.0  93.2  89.8  88.4  91.2  92.8  88.3  87.6  92.4  92.5  88.8  89.1  90.2  90.5  88.7 
SI  106.7  110.4  111.8  109.7  109.1  111.0  114.5  112.3  107.8  109.3  110.8  109.7  108.0  108.2  107.8  107.5  103.7  105.0  105.8  104.6 
SK  111.7  112.2  113.5  115.0  114.6  115.2  118.5  118.1  114.5  114.0  113.4  111.6  109.4  110.8  111.8  112.1  111.7  112.8  113.3  112.5 
FI  101.4  106.1  106.7  104.3  103.8  108.1  107.9  105.3  102.7  104.8  104.0  101.1  100.0  104.2  104.4  101.7  100.7  105.0  105.1  102.6 
SE  107.4  110.0  112.4  110.0  109.3  111.6  113.0  109.9  107.8  109.1  109.5  107.3  106.8  109.8  111.7  110.0  109.7  112.4  113.8  111.4 
UK  105.3  105.8  106.7  107.2  106.9  107.0  107.1  106.8  105.7  104.7  105.1  105.1  104.0  104.5  105.7  105.3  105.1  105.1  105.3  105.4 
Notes: The numbers are indexes relative to 2000 illustrating the degree of growth in the boom years, and to compare it with the amplitude of the contraction. The shaded cells denote a decrease in value vis-à-vis 
the previous quarter. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly data.Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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From the institutional point of view, differences can 
also be linked to distortions induced by labour mar-
ket  regulations.  For  instance,  unemployment  rose 
much less steeply in the US than in the EU Members 
States badly hit by the crisis, where labour regula-
tions are more stringent and tend to result in wage 
rigidities in a way or another. And it is not only the 
degree of stringency but also the distorting nature of 
certain institutions. For instance, within the EU, the 
Spanish labour market stands out for its dual nature, 
with overprotected stable contracts on one side and 
workers on fragile temporary contracts on the other 
side.  This  explains  the  overreaction  of  unemploy-
ment because adjustment tends to be in terms of 
employment  (reduction  of  temporary  workers)  ra-
ther than wages (influenced by the stable workers).
10 
On the positive side,  as this is  a demand-driven re-
cession, it is likely that after the recovery, in the me-
dium to long term, the labour market will recover its 
trend previous to the crisis (see Table 1.3). Currently 
some Member States are undergoing a large restruc-
turing to bring down some oversized sectors, notably 
the construction sector. But  large structural (se c-
toral) readjustments in the longer-term are not likely 
to follow unlike what happened in the 1980's when 
entire industrial sectors, notably heavy industries, 
underwent a severe restructuring. The exception to 
this rule is probably Irel and and Spain where the 
bubble grew out of attracting a considerable number 
of foreign workers (see table 1.3) and increasing 
notably the activity rate. In this countries the labor 
market is likely to slow down for some years to 
come. 
1.3.  THE SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE 
In the short-run, however, some industries, notably 
those producing consumer durables and equipment 
goods, are bond to suffer still a long period of weak 
demand. Indeed, the sectoral dimension of the crisis 
does not reveal exceptional patterns with the excep-
tion of the construction sector in countries affected 
by a real estate bubble. Indeed, if in absolute terms 
this crisis is exceptional for its size, in relative terms 
the  pattern  of  the  downturn  across  sectors  is  the 
usual one in which durable consumption and equip-
ment goods have suffered the largest contractions in 
activity.
11  On their side, services and non -durable 
                                                           
10   For the dual labour market see chapter 3 in Employment in 
Europe  2010  (European  Commission  (2010a)).  For  a 
comparative analysis between France and Spain see Bentolila 
et al. (2011). 
11   If anything, the sector of motor cars and machinery played a 
more important role in the 2008-2009 crisis. A comparison of 
consumption goods have been less affected, both in 
terms  of  value  added  and  employment,  because 
there are smaller items (relative to the household's 
budget) and basic needs that cannot be postponed 
as durable goods can be.
12 This pattern is reflected in 
Figure 1.7 where it is clear that industry, and in pa r-
ticular manufacturing, is bearing a disproportionate 
share of the burden of the crisis across all EU Mem-
ber States. 
As mentioned, the one remarkable supply -side fea-
ture of this crisis is the oversizing of the construction 
sectors in countries affected by a real estate bubble. 
Table  1.5  shows that in the boom period 2000-08 
construction  was  almost  the  only  economic  sector 
that experienced substantial growth, and it did so in 
those countries that were most affected by the bub-
ble. The only exception is Ireland and Denmark. In 
the case of Denmark, the difficulty to attract workers 
limited the growth of the sector.
13 
                                                                                       
the sectoral composition of the downturns in 2008-2009 and 
previous  downturns  can  be  found  in  section  2.1  "Sectoral 
performance  in  the  current  crisis"  of  the  Product  Market 
Review 2009. 
12   In bad times households tend to postpone the purchase of 
durable  goods,  typically  large  and  expensive  items  such  as 
cars and some electric appliances that do not need replacing 
in  the  short-term.  Analogously,  liquidity-  and/or  credit-
constrained  firms  tend  to  postpone  investment  decisions 
when  business  conditions  are  uncertain.  This  is  a  well-
documented  empirical  regularity  in  normal  business  cycles 
but  also  in  recessions:  see  Hall  (2005,  table  2.4)  for  a 
summary of the behaviour of sectors in recessions in the US 
in 1948-2001. 
13   As a matter of fact, in most countries the construction sector 
grew  labour-intensively  with  productivity  dropping 
significantly.  In  that  sense  Denmark  was  an  exception  and 
productivity in fact grew. See the discussion in chapter 1 in 
European Competitiveness Report 2011. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Table 1.3. Real GDP, productivity, and components, changes 1998-2007 
 
 
1998-2007  1998-2007 
Country 
Real GDP per 
head  Real GDP  Population 
Real GDP per 
hour 
Average 
hours 
Employment 
rate 
Activity 
rate 
European Union  21.4  25.3  3.2  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Belgium  17.9  22.8  4.1  12.7  -1.3  1.8  4.1 
Bulgaria  76.4  63.6  -7.2  51.9  0.6  3.7  11.3 
Czech Republic  46.1  46.5  0.3  51.3  -4.3  1.0  -0.1 
Denmark  15.3  18.7  3.0  10.3  2.6  1.1  0.7 
Germany  15.5  15.8  0.3  16.9  -5.2  0.7  3.5 
Estonia  89.8  82.9  -3.6  ..  ..  4.9  6.7 
Ireland  44.0  69.3  17.5  27.3  -4.6  3.1  14.9 
Greece  38.6  43.2  3.3  28.4  -2.1  3.2  6.9 
Spain  23.2  39.1  13.0  4.8  -4.2  8.6  12.9 
France  14.4  21.5  6.2  16.2  -6.2  2.7  2.2 
Italy  10.0  14.8  4.3  4.9  -4.4  5.9  3.5 
Cyprus  22.2  41.1  15.4  14.8  -2.7  1.2  8.1 
Latvia  109.9  98.2  -5.6  ..  ..  9.6  9.5 
Lithuania  85.6  76.5  -4.9  63.7  4.7  10.2  -1.7 
Luxembourg  38.9  57.0  13.0  17.7  12.8  -1.5  6.3 
Hungary  40.1  37.2  -2.1  36.4  -5.3  1.1  7.3 
Malta  17.0  24.2  6.2  15.6  -3.2  0.0  4.7 
Netherlands  19.7  24.8  4.3  16.4  -2.4  0.7  4.6 
Austria  20.5  25.4  4.1  18.7  -3.4  0.0  5.1 
Poland  44.5  43.9  -0.4  47.7  -1.8  0.6  -0.9 
Portugal  11.8  17.0  4.7  14.7  -4.4  -3.3  5.4 
Romania  60.0  53.2  -4.3  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Slovenia  45.7  48.4  1.8  ..  ..  2.8  4.8 
Slovakia  54.1  54.2  0.1  51.6  -5.1  1.7  5.4 
Finland  33.5  37.1  2.6  24.7  -2.9  5.2  4.8 
Sweden  30.2  34.5  3.4  25.6  -2.7  2.1  4.3 
United Kingdom  27.0  32.4  4.3  25.9  -3.6  0.9  3.7 
Note: Changes in real GDP per head are decomposed in two ways. The first is to disentangle changes in GDP from changes in population. 
The second decomposition examines the individual effect of changes in productivity, the number of hours, the employment rate and the 
activity rate. 
Source: AMECO database and own calculations. 
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Table 1.4. The sectoral structure of European economies, share of value added in GVA, 2008 
      EU-27  BE  BG  CZ  DK  DE  EE  IE  EL  ES  FR  IT  CY 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  1.7  0.7  7.2  2.3  1  0.9  3  1.6  3  2.5  1.8  2  2.3 
B-E  Industry (except construction)  19.7  17.9  21.8  31.2  19.5  25.9  19.8  23.5  12.7  17  13.6  20.4  9.3 
C  Manufacturing  15.8  15  :  24.3  12.8  22.2  15.4  21.2  9.1  13.9  11.3  17.6  6.9 
F  Construction  6.9  5.8  9.3  6.8  6  4.2  9.9  7.2  6  13.6  6.6  6.4  13.2 
G-I  Trade, transport, accomodation  19.4  20.7  20.8  20.2  19.7  16  22.7  15.4  29.5  23.1  18.4  20.3  24.1 
J  Information and communication  4.6  4.2  6  5.1  4.3  3.9  4.7  2.4  3.7  4.1  5  4.4  4 
K  Financial and insurance activities  5.2  5.3  6.4  4  6.1  3.8  4.3  10.3  4.4  5.4  3.6  5.3  7.8 
L  Real estate activities  10.4  9.5  9  6.6  9.9  12  10.2  9  12.2  6.8  13.7  12.8  9.9 
M-N  Professional, scientific and technical activities  10.2  12.9  4.6  7.2  7.7  11.7  8.3  9.5  5.8  7.3  12.5  8.6  6 
O-Q  Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities  18.3  21.1  12.4  14.4  22.5  17.1  14.7  18.4  18.2  16.7  21.4  16.5  19.6 
R-U  Arts, entertainment and recreation; and bodies  3.4  2  2.6  2.2  3.3  4.5  2.5  2.6  4.5  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.7 
                                            
      LV  LT  HU  MT  NL  AT  PL  PT  SI  SK  FI  SE  UK 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  3  3.6  4  1.5  1.7  1.6  3.7  2.4  2.4  4.1  2.7  1.7  0.7 
B-E  Industry (except construction)  15.1  21.5  25.5  17.5  19.5  22.7  24.1  17.3  25.3  28.7  24.6  21.5  15.4 
C  Manufacturing  10.8  17.6  21.6  15.5  12.8  19  17.7  13.7  21.3  22.4  21.5  17.1  10.2 
F  Construction  10.1  11.2  4.9  4.8  5.9  7.1  7.7  7.3  8.4  10  7.3  5.2  7.6 
G-I  Trade, transport, accomodation  26.9  28.2  18.7  22.9  19.3  22.4  25  23  20.9  22.5  17.2  18.2  18.7 
J  Information and communication  4.2  3.4  5.2  5.4  5  3.3  4.1  3.8  4  4  4.8  5.3  6.2 
K  Financial and insurance activities  4.9  3.3  4.1  4.5  5.7  5.4  5.3  7.7  4.7  3.3  2.8  3.9  8.9 
L  Real estate activities  8.4  6.9  8.3  6.2  8  9  6.1  8.3  7.3  6  10.8  9.3  8.4 
M-N  Professional, scientific and technical activities  7.6  5.7  8.2  7.4  12.3  8.9  6.9  6.6  8.9  7.1  7.5  9  11.9 
O-Q  Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities  16.5  14.6  18  18.6  20.3  16.9  13.9  21  15.5  12.1  19.2  23  18.9 
R-U  Arts, entertainment and recreation; and bodies  3.3  1.7  3  11.2  2.4  2.7  3.4  2.7  2.6  2.2  2.9  2.9  3.2 
Note: The shading emphasizes sectors with higher weight in overall economic activity within the country. 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts aggregates and employment by branch (NACE Rev.2). 
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Table 1.5. Changes in the sectoral structure of European economies, changes in share of value added in GVA, 2000-08 
NACE     EU-27  BE  BG  CZ  DK  DE  EE  IE  EL  ES  FR  IT  CY 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  -0.6  -0.6  -5.4  -1.3  -1.5  -0.2  -1.8  -1.8  -3.6  -1.7  -0.7  -0.8  -1.5 
B-E  Industry  -2.3  -4.0  0.6  0.3  -1.6  0.7  -1.8  -10.3  -1.3  -3.8  -4.2  -2.2  -2.9 
C  Manufacturing  -2.7  -3.7     -1.6  -2.6  -0.1  -1.6  -11.1  -1.8  -4.0  -3.9  -2.5  -2.8 
F  Construction  0.9  0.6  4.2  0.2  0.5  -1.1  4.0  0.0  -1.2  3.3  1.6  1.3  4.4 
G-I  Trade, transport, accomodation  -0.3  1.5  -0.1  -2.6  -0.5  -0.1  -1.7  0.6  2.3  -0.5  0.2  -1.6  -2.8 
J  Information and communication  -0.1  0.3  2.9  0.8  0.1  -0.3  -0.3  -0.9  -0.1  -0.4  0.1  0.1  -0.6 
K  Financial and insurance activities  0.4  -0.8  4.0  1.2  1.4  -0.6  0.3  2.9  -1.2  0.8  -0.9  0.5  0.4 
L  Real estate activities  0.7  0.0  -4.2  0.0  0.0  1.1  -2.6  2.0  0.8  0.6  2.0  1.9  0.4 
M-N  Professional and scientific activities  0.5  1.9  0.5  1.5  1.2  0.8  3.5  3.0  1.5  1.1  1.2  -0.1  0.8 
O-Q  Public administration, education, etc.  0.5  1.3  -3.5  0.3  0.5  -0.3  0.5  4.5  1.7  0.7  0.5  0.9  1.6 
R-U  Arts, entertainment and recreation  0.0  0.0  1.2  -0.5  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.0  -0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1 
                                            
      LV  LT  HU  MT  NL  AT  PL  PT  SI  SK  FI  SE  UK 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  -1.5  -2.7  -1.9  -0.8  -0.8  -0.3  -1.2  -1.2  -1.0  -0.4  -0.8  -0.3  -0.3 
B-E  Industry  -3.5  -2.2  -1.6  -6.8  0.4  -1.0  0.8  -3.0  -2.8  -0.2  -3.4  -2.7  -4.9 
C  Manufacturing  -3.6  -1.2  -1.3  -6.2  -1.8  -1.1  0.5  -3.4  -3.1  -1.5  -4.1  -4.2  -5.0 
F  Construction  3.3  5.2  -0.4  0.2  0.2  -0.6  -0.1  -0.9  1.7  2.8  1.0  0.9  1.1 
G-I  Trade, transport, accomodation  -1.1  1.6  2.0  -4.8  -2.0  -0.5  -0.8  -0.1  2.1  -0.3  0.0  1.1  -1.9 
J  Information and communication  -1.6  -1.3  0.4  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.7  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.1  -0.2 
K  Financial and insurance activities  1.8  1.3  0.4  -2.0  -0.4  -0.2  0.3  2.1  -0.2  1.1  -1.6  -0.6  3.7 
L  Real estate activities  0.4  0.0  -0.6  0.6  -0.2  0.7  -0.5  0.5  -0.6  -2.1  1.0  -1.0  0.3 
M-N  Professional and scientific activities  2.2  1.8  1.5  2.2  1.0  2.1  0.5  0.8  1.8  0.9  2.2  1.2  0.5 
O-Q  Public administration, education, etc.  -0.5  -3.1  0.2  2.4  1.7  -0.1  0.6  1.2  -0.6  -2.3  1.1  0.9  1.7 
R-U  Arts, entertainment and recreation  0.4  -0.7  -0.2  8.3  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.5  -0.7  0.1  0.3  0.3  -0.1 
Note: Figures are the difference in the share of the sector in gross value added between 2008 and 2000. The shading emphasizes sectors with larges changes, either shrinking (red) or expanding (blue) relative to 
other sectors within the country. 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts aggregates and employment by branch (NACE Rev.2). 
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These patterns are obvious at the EU-27 level (Figure 
1.5). During the crisis it is industry, and in particular 
manufacturing, that has taken the brunt of the con-
traction,  although  presumably  to  recover  after-
wards. Construction, on the contrary, is undergoing 
a  severe  adjustment  process  in  some 
Member States so that its contraction will probably 
be more persistent. The disruption of economic ac-
tivity  and,  in  particular,  of  manufacturing,  has  an 
obvious impact not only on trade and transport but 
also on professional services, much of whose output 
goes into the industry.  
 
Figure  1.5.  The  sectoral  profile  of  the  contraction  in  the  EU-27:  Real  value  added  per  sector;  index, 
2008Q1=100 
 
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts by 10 branches. 
 
Finally,  the  double-dip  pattern  shown  in  Table  1.1 
above at the aggregate is also reflected at the sec-
toral level. Figure 1.6 shows the number of sectors 
that report at any given month a contraction with 
respect to the previous month. By the beginning of 
2012 the index was 40% meaning that only 30% of 
sectors  reported  an  increase  in  activity  while  70% 
were contracting (and hence 30  70 = 40). 
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Figure 1.6. A qualitative-quantitative assessment of the relapse. The diffusion index 
 
Note: The diffusion index is defined as the difference between the percentage of manufacturing industries that are expanding and of those 
that are declining. The index ranges from -100 to 100. ‘Expanding’ and ‘declining’ mean positive and negative growth rates respectively. 
The total number of industries used in the calculations is 93 (defined in terms of the 3-digit level of NACE Rev. 2). For more details see the 
European Union Industrial Structure 2011. 
Source: Short-term Industrial Outlook, April 2012, DG Enterprise and Industry, European Commission. 
 
1.4.  THE DISRUPTION OF TRADE 
This crisis has been described as unprecedented be-
cause of its simultaneous depth and scope. In turn, 
the scope is reflecting an increasingly interconnected 
world. Below it is shown that European economies 
are particularly open and integrated.  
In the boom period 2000-07 preceding the recession 
many EU Member States were not directly affected 
by  internal  imbalances.
14  These countries were a f-
fected by two transmission mechanisms. One is e x-
posure to private or public debt in troubled econ o-
mies.  The other is trade linkages and the corr e-
sponding uncertainty about business conditions that 
spreads across borders because our interconnected-
ness. Figure 1.9 relates the initial drop in consum p-
tion with the drop in exports at the onset of the cr i-
sis. Countries far away from the vertical axis like 
Denmark, Spain, Romania or the UK are countries 
with  internal  imbalances  where  consumption 
dropped simultaneously to exports and investment. 
Countries close to the axis like Germany, 
                                                           
14   The Alert Mechanism Report COM(2012) 68 monitors internal 
imbalances  looking  at  changes  in  deflated  house  prices, 
private  sector  credit  flow,  private  sector  debt,  general 
government  debt  and  a  3  year  average  of  unemployment 
rate. This chapter is primarily concerned with private sector 
debt and in particular with households' leverage. 
Sweden or France can be interpreted to be affected 
only  indirectly  through  trade  linkages  and  general 
uncertainty to the first group of countries and the 
overall uncertainty about business conditions.
15 
Openness is an important part of the explanation 
of the diffusion of the crisis. However, it could also 
become a component of the recovery. EU countries 
not affected by internal imbalances may act as a 
locomotive for growth in the rest of the UE at least 
in the short-term. Strong growth in other regions of 
the world in particular emerging economies in Asia 
and South America, which are growing more rapid-
ly and have been much less  affected by the crisis, 
may as well boost external demand for EU cou n-
tries, depending on their trade orientation. That 
may explain the positive evolution of exports in 
2010-11, strongly growing in all EU Member States 
with the sole exception of   Greece and Finland.
16 
However, this effect is not sufficient to compensate 
for  the  unfavourable  evolution  of  domestic  d e-
mand. Therefore while exports are indeed recover-
ing swiftly and vigorously, income recovery remains 
elusive in many Member States. 
                                                           
15   Table 1.7 in the appendix to this chapter details the reaction 
of the different components of GDP as well as net exports for 
all EU Member States. 
16   See Table 1.7 in the appendix and the Short-term Industrial 
Outlook,  July  2012,  DG  Enterprise  and  Industry,  European 
Commission. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Figure 1.7. Changes in employment per Member State by economic activity, percentage change 2008-11* 
 
* Data for 2011 not available for three countries: UK uses 2009 while Ireland and France use 2010. 
Note: Each category corresponds to the NACE rev. 1.1 sections: Agriculture, A and B; Industry, C, D and E; Construction, F; Services, from G 
to P; Manufacturing, D. 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Openness and the disruption of trade by the crisis, 2008-09 and Figure 1.9. The initial drop in con-
sumption compared to the drop in exports, 2008-09 
 
 
Figure 1.8. 
Note: The disruption of trade index is the reduction in the share of imports in aggregate demand m with positive sign and corrected by the 
corresponding contraction of GDP y, that is, –[(m' – m) –(y' – y)]. Openness is exports as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: AMECO database and own calculations. 
Figure 1.9. 
Note: The Baltic States are not represented in the chart for the sake of readability; their figures are beyond the lower limits of both axes. 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
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Box 1.1. External demand, long-term growth and competitiveness 
In times of recession, when internal demand is weak, it makes all sense to rely on external demand to accelerate the 
recovery. Indeed, there is some consensus in the economics profession that short-term increases in aggregate de-
mand  including increases in external demand, the demand for exports of an economy  can increase the domestic 
product in the short-term even beyond the obvious increase in income due to increasing sales abroad. Indeed, via 
some chain or multiplier effect, the increase in income may be even larger than the demand stimulus.
17 In that sense, 
strong growth in other regions can be excellent news for mature economies in the short term and for export-led 
catching-up economies in the medium term. 
In  the  long-term,  however,  and  for  advanced  economies  without  natural  resource  endowments,  only  technical 
change can sustain growth of income per head. From this longer-term perspective, the connection between trade and 
growth has less to do with the mere exchange of goods and services and more with competitive pressures as well as 
the exchange of ideas that comes along with trade. Empirical evidence is elusive but points in that direction: openness 
increases the exposure to foreign technology, equipment goods, management techniques, and so on. Competitive 
pressures provide the incentives to adopt these technologies and help the market select the most productive firms.
18 
Openness often comes hand in hand with mobility of persons: engineers visiting providers, students completing their 
curricula abroad, migrants that leave and eventually return with new ideas.
19 If the institutional setting is the right 
one,
20 technologies are adopted, new businesses are started that introduce new processes and commodities, and so 
on. 
This distinction between the short and the long term is important. External demand can help recover in the short-
term when internal demand is comparatively weak. In the long-term, however, growth is only possible through open-
ness and structural reforms that change the ability and incentives to adopt and develop new technologies. 
                                                           
17   Incidentally, the belief that the multiplier is larger than unity constitutes the ground on which fiscal stimulus are justified. If the 
government narrows to increase public expenditure, and income increases more than proportionally, there is room to boost demand 
in the short-term and, at the same time, increase revenues enough to pay back the debt. This is the classical so-called Keynesian 
approach to fighting recessions. 
18   This is an old ide a recently partially formalized in Melitz (2003). Although the paper focuses on the (static) gains from trade 
liberalization, it is easy to see how these competitive pressures will also provide incentives to adopt and develop new techn ologies 
sustaining (dynamic) long-run growth. For an overview of this literature see Bustos (2010), Lileeva and Trefler (2010) or Constantini 
and Melitz (2008) among others. 
19   See, for example, Legrain (2008) for a description of the development of the electronics industry in  Taiwan and its connection with 
Taiwanese migrants in the US. 
20   See the 12 pillars of competitiveness mentioned in the Global Competitiveness Report 2012, World Economic Forum. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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1.5.  TRENDS IN THE EXTERNAL SECTOR OPENNESS 
The external sector in Europe is characterized by a 
notable  degree  of  integration.  In  this  open  land-
scape, four countries stand out. Among the medium- 
and small-sized countries of the EU-15, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Ireland are very open economies. In 
the case of Belgium and Netherlands, historical rea-
sons as well as a small size and a geographical loca-
tion may explain much of this openness. The case of 
Ireland, despite its peripheral  
location, can be explained again on its small size and 
on  recent  trends  that  have  to  do  with  the  English 
language and a tax regime favourable to the estab-
lishment of many foreign services and manufacturing 
corporations  for  their  operations  in  Europe.  The 
take-off of Ireland as a hub for many multinational 
corporations is likely explained by these reforms and, 
in any case, is reflected in an already large 48% in 
1983 to an outstanding 80% before the crisis in 2008. 
Figure 1.10. Exports of goods and services (including 
intra-EU trade) as a percentage of GDP, 2008 
 
Note: The criteria to classify countries is by population. Luxem-
bourg (175%) excluded for the sake of readability of the chart. 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
 
The fourth country in question is Germany and con-
stitutes a notable case. Among the big countries it 
has  a  degree  of  international  integration  which  is 
quite high. As Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12 show, this 
is  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon  that  took-off  in 
the early 1990s. But the underlying drivers of these 
changes are not clear. Below the case of Germany is 
examined in some depth. 
 Figure 1.11. Exports of goods and services as a per-
centage GDP, recent evolution, selected countries 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
Most EU Member States display an increasing trend 
in the value of exports relative to GDP due to the 
increasing globalization of EU economies as well as 
European economic integration itself. After the im-
pulse of the Single European Act, this is mostly re-
flecting increasing integration in world markets.
21  
But this trend has been particularly pronounced in 
four countries within EU-15 Member States. Belgium 
and the Netherlands have been already signalled as 
particular cases. Sweden, on its side, is probably r e-
gaining its place in the international scene after a 
period of poor performance during and after the 
crisis of the 1970s. The case of Germany, however, is 
less easy to explain and is the only one that affects a 
large country; the largest economy of the EU indeed. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.12, larger countries have 
smaller external sectors (as a percentage of GDP) 
because more trade occurs within its borders.
22 For 
example, and to support the assertion above, Sw e-
den has now the degree of openness expected for a 
country of its size. 
Germany, on the contrary, was on the average in 
1995 (see again Figure 1.12) with total exports being 
24% of GDP. Yet, in 2007 and given its size it should 
still be around 25, and nonetheless its exports repre-
sent currently up to 47% of GDP. 
One possible explanation lies in the internationaliza-
tion of the value chain. As a large manufacturer, 
Germany has close ties with some of  its neighbours 
such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.  
                                                           
21   In  the  case  of  goods,  the  share  of  EU  exports  over  total 
exports of all Member States has been quite stable in the last 
20 years. See the discussion in section 1.6 below. 
22   The larger an economy, the larger the variety of goods, and 
hence the less need for trade. In the limit the planet has zero 
trade with the rest of the universe, at least so far; this point 
was famously made in Krugman (1978). Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Figure 1.12. Changes 1995-2007 in openness relative to the size of the economy 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
 
However,  evidence  remains  elusive:  trade  in  inter-
mediate goods, commodities used to produce other 
commodities,  has  not  grown  faster  than  general 
trade. The share of exports of intermediate goods to 
total exports has remained  remarkably  stable over 
this period (Table 1.6).
23 It grows in absolute term s 
hand in hand with the general level of openness. The 
so-called  internationalization  of  the  value  chain 
                                                           
23   Actually the share is stable not only for Germany but for the 
EU  as  a  whole  as  well  (See  Chapter  2  in  European 
Competitiveness Report 2010). 
seems to be an absolute, not a relative, phenome-
non.  
In  short,  the  increasing  internationalization  of  the 
German economy remains to some extent a puzzle. It 
is not even clear that it is a positive development: 
see the controversy that followed the Bazaar effect 
suggested in Sinn (2006).  Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Table 1.6. Share of exports of intermediate goods to total exports 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
  Austria  57.1  55.5  56.4  55.9  55.2  55.4  52.7  55.2  56.2  56.6  57.1  55.8  57.8 
  Belgium  51.6  51.9  53.5  50.8  48.6  49.7  51.5  52.7  54.3  55  56.5  54  57.6 
  Czech Republic  61.2  61.2  62.8  61.4  60.6  61.1  60.6  58.7  57.1  56.7  56.7  54.1  53.8 
  Denmark  38  38.2  39  37.9  37.6  38.8  39.8  39.9  41.8  41.3  40.4  41.4  39.8 
  Estonia  56.6  60  51.9  54.7  58.9  59.2  56.7  58.7  62.7  61.7  60.9  59.2  59.6 
  Finland  60.8  61.2  60.5  58.8  59.3  60.1  63.5  59.7  60.8  60.4  59.3  62  68.7 
  France  49.9  49.8  50.4  48.6  47.7  47.5  47.8  48.6  49.5  50.3  50.8  48  49 
  Germany  49.7  49.2  50.7  48.8  48.5  48.9  49.5  49.7  50.7  50.6  51.1  47.3  48.9 
  Greece  45  45.8  53.1  51  49.6  48.1  50.9  51.6  56.2  55.8  56  51.4  54.2 
  Hungary  54.7  53.7  54  53.3  51.3  52.9  51.5  52.7  51.3  47.4  46.7  43.4  46 
  Ireland  58.2  58.5  61.2  59.2  57.6  55.6  54.1  55  53  55.3  56.3  53.9  54.4 
  Italy  47.4  47  48.2  47.9  47  48.2  48.8  49.9  50.9  51.2  51.5  49.4  51.8 
  Luxembourg  ..  70.7  68.8  63.1  63.4  66  70.1  68.2  71.8  71.7  74  68.9  73.1 
  Netherlands  54.9  51  53.3  52.1  52.8  53.8  53.7  56.8  58.3  57  59.3  56.8  58.6 
  Norway  61.3  60.1  66.4  61.9  63.5  65.3  69.3  70.8  72.5  74.3  72.5  67.5  70.7 
  Poland  48.1  49.6  52.9  52  52.7  55  55.2  54.2  54.8  55.3  53.1  47.2  50.8 
  Portugal  42.5  44.3  46.8  46.2  48.4  50.1  51.5  50.6  53.4  54.1  53  51.5  56 
  Slovak Republic  59.3  57.8  58.6  59.5  59.5  58  58.9  57.7  53.1  49.7  49.8  48.3  49.5 
  Slovenia  50.4  52.2  53.5  53.8  52.9  53.8  54.8  54.2  56.4  54.6  55.1  51.4  55.2 
  Spain  47.9  47.8  49.2  48.6  47.6  47.9  48.7  50  51.1  51.9  54.2  49.2  52.3 
  Sweden  58.8  57.1  56.8  57.9  57  54.8  57.3  56.2  57.9  58.7  60.3  58.1  60.2 
  United Kingdom  46.5  46.7  46.8  46.4  46.3  46.2  47.2  48.2  49.9  48.7  49.6  48.2  47.9 
 
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database. 
 
Figure 1.13. The international of value chains: Openness and exports and imports of intermediate goods 
 
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade database and AMECO database, Commission services. 
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Figure 1.14 suggests that through trade the country 
is strongly specializing in manufactures but no single 
trade partner explains this trend. For example, China 
or  Poland  has  become  important  markets  for  Ger-
many but are not yet comparable to France, the US, 
or Italy.
24 The figure shows how exports have grown 
similarly for all trade partners with no overwhelming 
importance of any individual partner. All in  all it 
seems that further research is needed to understand 
the  increasing  internationa lization  of  the  German 
economy. 
Figure 1.14. German exports in current prices, main 
trade partners 
 
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade database. (2006). 
1.6. THE BOOM PERIOD 2000-07 AND IMBALANCES 
The trends mentioned above do not seem to have 
been altered significantly by the events that preced-
ed the recession. Mispriced assets have the  poten-
tial to distort the real economy, for instance divert-
ing capital to mispriced property or stocks instead of 
productive investments. In that sense, the risk is that 
the imbalances not only feed the current recession 
                                                           
24   The picture is slightly different for imports. China has become 
a major source of German imports. In this respect, however, 
Germany  is  no  different  from  many  other  advanced 
economies, and while Chine has become an important source 
of imports (9% total), traditional trade partners still constitute 
the bulk of German imports. 
but also hamper future productivity growth because 
of this inefficient allocation of capital. 
Figure 1.15. The share exports of goods to the EU 
over total exports, selected countries 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
 
If the boom years did not reveal any obvious impact 
of the accumulated imbalances, the subsequent re-
cession and the current sovereign debt crisis do not 
seem to have had impact on external performance as 
measured by the share of exports in world exports.
25   
Figure  1.16  represents  the  international  market 
share for the economies in trouble with Germany as 
a comparison. There is a decreasing trend most likely 
due to a composition effect because of increasing 
globalization.
26  Some other long -term trends are 
also apparent: Italy and the UK are losing market 
share relatively faster than other EU countries, or the 
Spanish share remaining remarkably constant al ong 
this period. Other than that, the build -up of the im-
balances and the burst of the bubble do not seem to 
have harmed the ability of these countries to export. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
25   Of course, this does not mean that trade was not affected by 
the  crisis.  The  implication  is  rather  that  the  EU  was  not 
impacted differently from the average trading country in the 
world. 
26   A decreasing share can be due to poor performance (exports 
growing  more  slowly  than  other  countries)  or  to  a 
composition effect (volume of trade growing because of new 
actors coming in). When all major industrial powers are losing 
trade shares, the composition effect is the only reasonable 
hypothesis:  it  is  developing  countries  joining  international 
trade. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Figure 1.16. Export market shares, selected countries 
 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services 
 
Note: Share of exports of goods including intra-EU trade over total exports. This excludes services; in the light of section 1.4 above, it  
is important to keep this in mind to interpret correctly the series of the UK, IE and EL. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Box 1.2. Competitiveness and public finances: The case of Greece 
Despite current turmoil, Greece performed reasonably well in the years preceding the crisis. After a period of relative 
depression in the 1980s, the country took-off in 1993 for a long period of sustained growth. During the boom years 
Greece had improved by 40% its relative position in the distribution of income in the EU. That was reflecting true im-
provements in standards of living: since the take-off, and before the crisis, Greek GDP per head in purchasing power 
standards had closed significantly the gap with the EU average, and had reached similar levels to Italy by 2007.
27 At the 
same time, the external performance of the country was relatively stable in goods (see Figure 1.16 above) while section 
1.9 discusses the notable performance of the export of services.
28 
Real income growth. Comparison with selected EU-15 Member States 
Source: Penn World Table 7.0, CIC, University of Pennsylvania. 
At the beginning of the expansion period, growth came along with an increase in government revenues almost closing the 
gap with expenditures in a decade. Then, in 2000, the trend is reversed and despite ongoing growth of income govern-
ment revenues as a percentage of GDP start to lag significantly below expenditures that remained constant. With the 
exception of Hungary, no other EU Member State runs so large public deficits in the booming years immediately before 
the recession. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
27  Data for the nominal comparison, is from the AMECO database, GDP a current market prices, EU-15=100. For the PPS comparison, 
Penn World Table. 
28  The reader may also refer to the more systematic analysis of export performance in chapters 3 in the monograph devoted to the 
recovery of trade in the Quarterly Report of the Euro Area 2012-2. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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Public revenues and expenditures in Greece 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
It seems, then that the Greek problem is more related to the ability of the government to raise revenues rather than the 
ability of its industry to exports goods and services.
 29  Alas, if the accumulation of public debt did not seem to affect the 
real economy, it does not seem that the same is true for the uncertainty surrounding the resolution of the crisis as well as 
the drastic measures that try to bring public expenditures and revenues closer. In Table 1.1 Greece appears as the only 
country that has been in recession since the onset of the crisis. 
As for the future, while the country has been successfully growing in these past two decades, catch-up is still partial. If the 
economy seems to keep up the pace of development of the EU, and even improve its relative position, in many respects 
Greece is still well below the EU average. Indeed, despite progress, Greece could improve sensibly along a number of di-
mensions (income per head, labour market participation, etc.). Most notably, it is still a much closed economy: for its size, 
exports relative to GDP ought to be around 50% but they represent hardly 25% (see Figure 1.12 above). In the sections 
below it is shown that Greece is at the bottom of the class when it comes to business environment as measured by the 
Doing Business indicators. Improvements in these areas would certainly help the country leap ahead. 
                                                           
29   See Darvas (2010) for a review of the European fiscal crisis in comparison to the US with a special reference to the case of Greece and 
the revenue-side of the problem. See also Henning and Kessler (2012) for a more general comparison of the building of the American 
and European monetary, fiscal and banking area. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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1.7.  THE INCREASING WEIGHT OF EXPORTS OF SERVICES 
Together with increasing openness, a sign of these 
last decades is the growing importance of services in 
international  trade:  financial  services,  civil  constru 
tion, transport, environmental services, and so on.
30 
Exports of services constitute an important share of 
total exports for the EU and as a whole, close to 25% 
for the EU-15 in 2008 after a long period of modeate 
but constant increase. Together with the US, with 
services weighting 29% of total exports, the EU is one 
of the most importa nt providers of services in the 
world. The aggregate figure, however, masks consid-
erable heterogeneity within the EU. Several groups 
can be distinguished. 
Countries like Germany, France, or Italy are tradtion-
al exporters of manufactures. The service  sector co-
tributes relatively little to exports. The fast catch-up 
process of Slovakia, the Czech Republic or Hungary is 
mostly based on FDI inflows that explain i mportant 
increases in exports of manufactures. From these 
countries most exports are goods rather than se r-
vices. Countries like UK, Greece, Ir eland, Denmark 
and Malta stand out for the large weight of services 
in their exports. Furthermore, these countries have 
shown an important increase in the last years. For 
instance, in Greece it has moved from an already 
high 35% in 1995 to close to 55% in 2008.  
The ultimate explanation for these   changes differs 
across countries. The UK is the largest economy of 
the EU where  services have grown to be so i m-
portant, and a glance at  Table  1.5  makes obvious 
that it is closely linked to the expansion of the fina n-
cial sector:  between 2000 and 2008 Financial and 
Insurance activities have gained almost 4 percentage 
points of weight in gross value added, a change that 
reflects the size of a sector that today represents  
lose to 10% of GDP, the highest share in the EU t o-
gether with Ireland. The case of Greece, instead, is 
linked to the transport sector, most likely because of 
the traditional importance of the cabotage industry. 
                                                           
30  The UN Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services 
2010  distinguishes:  Business  services,  Communication 
services,  Construction  and  related  engineering  services, 
Distribution  services,  Educational  services,  Environmental 
services, Financial services, Health-related and social services, 
Tourism  and  travel-related  services,  Recreational,  cultural, 
and sporting services, Transport services, Other services not 
included elsewhere. 
Figure  1.17.  The  weight  of  exports  of  services  in 
total exports; comparison 1995-2008 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services 
It may be worth noting that these notable increases 
in shares reflect real growth of exports of services 
rather than shrinking exports of goods. These four 
services'  exporters  have  experience  large  real  in-
creases of exports of services, in the case of Ireland 
reaching a ten-fold increase in since 1991 (see Figure 
1.17).  This  contrasts  with  more  manufacturing-
oriented exporters like Germany or France where the 
share  of  services  in  exports  is  moderate,  between 
15%  and  25%,  and  has  remained  stable.  In  these 
countries the real evolution of services lags moder-
ately the real increase of merchandise exports, may-
be reflecting poor domestic performance in services. 
At  the  aggregate  EU  level,  the  importance  of  ser-
vices' exports has increased moderately from 20 to 
25% between 1991 and 2011 but it is still relatively 
lower than the US and definitively higher than Japan, 
a classical exporter of manufactures.  
In real terms, aggregate EU changes are aligned with 
those  of  Japan  and  the  US  with  exports  of  goods 
growing at a similar pace to services, an indication 
that the patterns described above do  not reflect a 
general pattern but rather the relative specialization 
of these countries as service providers. 
 
 
 
 Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
 
37 
 
 
Figure 1.18. Some services' exporters. Real growth of exports of goods and services; index, 1991=100 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services 
 
Finally, in the current circumstances it is legitimate 
to ask whether it is goods or services that are more 
resilient along a recession. The answer is that it de-
pends  on  the  services.  In  Figure  1.20  one  can  see 
that  there  is  no  clear  association  across  Member 
States. The UK or Denmark, more focused on finan-
cial services, exports of goods havecontracted more  
 
than trade in services. In Greece,  on the contrary, 
services have contracted more, most likely because 
of the reliance on cabotage and the contraction in 
international  trade  (and  hence  in  international 
transport services). In other countries, the weight of 
business  services  links  more  tighly  manufacturing 
with services. 
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Figure 1.19. Real growth of exports of goods and services in 1995-2008; index 1995=100 and Figure 1.20. The 
contraction of exports: Real percentage change of exports of goods and services in 2008-09  
 
Source: AMECO database, Commission service
   
1.8.  ABOUT THE IDEA OF PERFORMANCE 
Having examined recent trends and developments of 
the external sectors begs the question of whether a 
good external performance is good per se or the re-
flection of a buoyant economy capable to produce 
commodities  demanded  in  the  international  mar-
kets.  Taking  the  increase  in  income  per  head  as  a 
performance index, the correlation with the variation 
in export openness is positive but weak in the medi-
um term.
31 This is most likely due to f actors other 
than exports contributing to growth. This is shown by 
the high dispersion of the  observations in Figure 
1.21. 
Indeed, net exports have an obvious immediate con-
tribution to income in the short term. Hence, as 
mentioned above, a good net export "perfo rmance" 
will soften the impact the recession. In the longer 
term, however, even if it is clear that trade, or more 
generally openness, is essential for growth and d e-
                                                           
31   The literature on the export-led growth hypothesis examines 
whether  exports  induce  changes  in  the  rate  of  technical 
change.  That  is,  the  possibility  that  exports  can  induce 
sustained growth beyond the obvious instantaneous impact 
on income. If this literature is inconclusive, this is reflected in 
this weak relationship observed in EU recent experience. 
velopment, the relationship is less direct than it is 
often  assumed.  As  an  exchange  of  goods  and  ser-
vices it has a direct welfare effect: it allows consum-
ers to access to a larger variety of commodities. This 
is, after all, the main reason why we export: to afford 
imports.  In  the  long-run,  however,  as  discussed  in 
Box 1.1, it is not trade in the narrow  sense of ex-
change (exports for imports) but openness in general 
(including  foreign  investment  and  investment 
abroad,  migrants,  exchanges  of  students,  tourism, 
etc.) that exposes an economy to foreign technology, 
equipment goods, management techniques, and so 
on.  Openness  helps  technologies  to  circulate  and 
provide the incentives to be adopted. Indeed, tech-
nologies are adopted and further developed because 
competitive pressures of foreign firms (both in the 
domestic and foreign market) provide the incentive 
to local firms to improve performance. 
The ability of an open economy to effectively adopt 
and develop new ideas, in turn, is likely to depend on 
the environment created by the level of education, 
the legal system, the quality of administration and so 
on.  This  environment  is  what  the  Doing  Business 
rank is trying to capture. 
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Figure 1.21. Exports and income growth  
 
Note: The change in the weight of exports is the comparison of the average 1995-98 and 2004-08, in % points GDP. The change in the share 
of exports in world exports compares the average 1993-96 and 2005-08 and is adjusted by initial level of income in euros to compensate 
the fact that, mechanically, in countries growing fast, exports tend to grow fast as well.  
Source: AMECO database, Commission services 
 
Box 1.3. Chapters of the Ease of Doing Business index 
The World Bank's Ease of Doing Business attempts to measure some key elements of doing business, from the number of 
days required to start a business to the number of documents needed to export. This is a brief description of the contents 
of each section: 
Starting a Business  Procedures (number)  Paying Taxes  Payments (number per year) 
Time (days)  Time (hours per year) 
Cost (% of income per capita)  Profit tax (%) 
Paid-in Min. Capital (% of income per capita)  Labor tax and contributions (%) 
   Other taxes (%) 
   Total tax rate (% profit) 
Construction Permits  Procedures (number)  Trading Across Borders  Documents to export (number) 
Time (days)     Time to export (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita)     Cost to export (US$ per container) 
      Documents to import (number) 
      Time to import (days) 
      Cost to import (US$ per container) 
Registering Property  Procedures (number)  Enforcing Contracts  Procedures (number) 
Time (days)  Time (days) 
Cost (% of property value)  Cost (% of claim) 
Getting Credit  Strength of legal rights index (0-10)  Closing a Business  Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
Depth of credit information index (0-6)  Time (years) 
Public registry coverage (% of adults)  Cost (% of estate) 
Private bureau coverage (% of adults)    
Protecting Investors  Extent of disclosure index (0-10)       
Extent of director liability index (0-10)       
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10)       
Strength of investor protection index (0-10)       
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Figure 1.22. Ease of Doing Business world Bank, EU Member States 
 
Source: World Bank, Ease of Doing Business database 
 
Figure 1.23. Ease of Doing Business and GDP per head 
 
 
 
Note: The change in GDP per head is adjusted by initial level of income to compensate the fact that countries with a lower initial level of 
income tend to grow faster. 
Source: World Bank, Ease of Doing Business database and AMECO database, Commission services. 
Figure 1.22 shows how spread EU countries are in 
the  Ease  of  Doing  Business  world  rank.  Greece 
ranked  109  out  of  180  ranked  countries,  meaning 
that EU Member States are ranked over the first two 
thirds of the support of the distribution. Below it is 
discussed that this can be seen as room for easy im-
provements.  
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In  Figure  1.23  a  clear  relation  arises  between  the 
Doing  Business  rank  and  the  level  of  income  per 
head. This scatter plot is most likely capturing some-
thing very relevant.
32 The position in the rank entails 
large differences in the level of income per head. It 
should be noted that the relation with growth is less 
obvious. Correcting growth by the initial level of i n-
come (catching-up countries are expected to grow 
faster), the relation with the D oing Business rank is 
quite weak: at most slightly negative and with a large 
dispersion around the mean relation. 
1.9.  CONCLUSIONS 
Europe is the largest trading block in the world. EU 
economies are characterized by a notable degree of 
openness: both within the EU and by a strong inte-
gration in world markets. This chapter suggests that 
a  good  export  performance  is  mostly  reflecting 
something that is going well domestically: a buoyant 
economy  able  to  produce  commodities  that  meet 
the test international markets. For instance, a good 
record of exports of manufactures cannot be possi-
ble without a solid manufacturing base. Another way 
to see it is to consider the connection between trade 
and overall economic performance as conditional on 
many factors, most notably internal factors such as 
the Ease of Doing Business. For foreign new ideas, 
techniques and machines to impact the productivity, 
an economy must provide with the right incentives 
to adopt these technologies, a sound financial sys-
tem  to  fund  new  investments,  or  the  legal  frame-
work that eases the creation of new businesses. 
This is not only a long-term issue. The elusive recov-
ery of income in many EU Member States despite the 
swift recovery of exports during this recession points 
as well in the direction of the weight of internal fac-
tors. To see this, note that countries without internal 
imbalances,  whose  income  is  recovering  from  the 
initial contraction, are also those countries in which 
imports are recovering as fast as exports. Countries 
stagnating  show  a  recovery  of  exports  –  external 
demand is independent of internal developments – 
but not of imports or other components of internal 
                                                           
32   The  disclaimer  implicit  in  the  use  of  the  expression  "most 
likely"  is  due  to  the  possibility  that  this  chart  reflects  the 
reverse  causality:  e.g.  rich  countries  can  afford  an  efficient 
administration. 
demand. It may be worth noting that an immediate 
corollary to this observation is that devaluations are 
only one of the instruments in the policy toolbox to 
fight the consequences of a recession. Both euro and 
non-euro  Member  States  are  witnessing  strong  in-
creases in exports, but some countries see their in-
come stagnate while others are recovering fast, and 
this  in  both  groups.  Factors  other  than  price-
competitiveness seem to be playing a determinant 
role.
33 
The importance of domestic conditions rel ative and 
in combination to external performance has a differ-
ent meaning depending whether we focus in the 
short or in the long term. In the short -term, the de-
nouement of the recession requires internal imba l-
ances to be corrected, in particular leverage by pr i-
vate agents in countries with severe imbalances a c-
cumulated. The role of policy there is to strike a deli-
cate balance between government finances equili b-
rium and stimulus measures to soften the impact of 
the adjustment as much as possible. And of course, 
even if exports alone cannot pull EU econ omies out 
of the recession, they constitute a precious positive 
stimulus. 
In the long-run growth will be enhanced and s us-
tained by a combination of many factors, with open-
ness and a business-friendly environment being two 
key ingredients. In a time when government finances 
are under stress, revising the regulatory environment 
or  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  administrat ion 
alongside an ambitious external trade agenda may 
be seen as cost-effective measures. The large impact 
of the Doing Business rank in the level of income and 
the considerable heterogeneity within the EU su g-
gests that there being room for easy improvement s, 
easy in the sense that most chapters of the index 
concern  regulation  rather  than  expenditures.  Of 
course, it may not be "easy" in the sense that vested 
interests may resist changes, but together with other 
far-reaching reforms, like labour market of tax   re-
forms, they may put the basis for strong growth in 
the forthcoming years. 
                                                           
33   On the limited role of price-competitiveness, see chapters 1 
and 2 in the monograph devoted to the recovery of trade in 
the Quarterly Report of the Euro Area 2012-2. Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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APPENDIX. STATISTICS 
 
 
Table 1.7. Changes in GDP components during the recession 
 
  
2008-2009 
  
   GDP  Consumption  Investment  Government  Exports  Imports 
   Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share 
European Union (27 countries)   -4,31  -1,77  57,08  -12,46  20,81  2,06  20,65  -12,05  40,89  -12,16  40,05 
Belgium   -2,84  0,76  50,83  -8,11  21,54  0,84  22,41  -11,21  83,21  -10,73  80,00 
Bulgaria   -5,48  -7,56  70,38  -17,59  32,97  -6,48  15,63  -11,22  55,46  -20,97  77,95 
Czech Republic   -4,70  -0,38  47,32  -11,49  27,60  3,80  18,54  -10,01  72,67  -11,64  67,85 
Denmark   -5,83  -4,24  49,21  -13,40  20,60  2,54  26,53  -9,77  54,40  -11,64  51,71 
Germany   -5,13  -0,08  55,32  -11,41  18,40  3,32  18,29  -13,62  47,85  -9,23  40,63 
Estonia   -14,26  -15,61  56,41  -37,86  32,13  -1,58  17,73  -18,64  75,45  -32,38  83,83 
Ireland   -6,99  -7,23  48,10  -28,81  23,79  -3,74  16,86  -4,20  84,96  -9,30  72,28 
Greece   -3,25  -1,26  72,34  -15,16  22,63  4,83  17,96  -19,48  24,28  -20,20  38,39 
Spain   -3,74  -4,35  56,90  -16,57  28,86  3,73  19,33  -10,42  26,62  -17,25  32,13 
France   -2,73  0,18  57,01  -9,04  20,48  2,28  23,64  -12,42  27,01  -10,84  28,83 
Italy   -5,49  -1,56  58,42  -11,73  20,65  0,78  20,02  -17,51  28,20  -13,37  27,82 
Cyprus   -1,85  -7,54  71,08  -9,73  22,68  6,83  18,24  -10,68  46,91  -18,58  59,29 
Latvia   -17,73  -22,65  70,03  -37,38  28,50  -9,42  16,80  -14,08  48,86  -33,33  65,75 
Lithuania   -14,84  -17,53  67,96  -39,53  25,90  -1,44  15,88  -12,48  60,72  -28,34  73,32 
Luxembourg   -5,30  1,08  34,70  -13,02  22,95  4,81  15,52  -10,86  177,00  -12,04  150,42 
Hungary   -6,80  -6,24  53,44  -10,98  22,58  -0,63  20,90  -10,23  90,88  -14,77  88,81 
Malta   -2,71  -1,40  64,14  -17,47  15,44  -1,34  21,53  -10,46  90,41  -11,30  91,12 
Netherlands   -3,54  -2,58  45,79  -10,20  20,47  4,84  25,25  -8,08  74,11  -7,99  65,70 
Austria   -3,81  -0,28  52,27  -8,35  21,07  0,25  18,45  -14,34  58,73  -13,82  51,50 
Poland   1,63  2,02  61,93  -1,23  22,62  2,14  17,90  -6,81  41,64  -12,43  45,71 
Portugal   -2,91  -2,33  65,92  -8,61  22,32  4,74  20,41  -10,92  31,94  -10,02  41,32 
Romania   -6,58  -10,08  77,63  -28,09  34,77  3,06  14,49  -6,45  34,66  -20,54  59,19 
Slovenia   -8,01  -0,15  52,39  -23,32  29,21  2,86  17,99  -17,19  69,89  -19,63  72,47 
Slovakia   -4,93  0,18  54,45  -19,69  25,22  6,12  16,69  -15,94  85,88  -18,14  84,78 
Finland   -8,35  -2,73  51,36  -13,26  20,37  1,11  21,13  -21,52  48,61  -16,44  42,36 
Sweden   -5,03  -0,26  47,98  -15,46  20,15  2,16  25,29  -13,83  53,00  -14,26  46,61 
United Kingdom   -4,37  -3,54  63,71  -13,39  17,43  -0,06  21,14  -9,45  28,05  -12,22  30,62 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services, and own calculations Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
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2009-2010 
  
      Consumption  Investment  Government  Exports  Imports 
   Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share 
European Union (27 countries)   2,04  1,02  58,59  -0,19  19,04  0,69  22,03  10,90  37,58  9,76  36,76 
Belgium   2,27  2,48  52,72  -0,72  20,37  0,16  23,25  9,92  76,04  8,67  73,50 
Bulgaria   0,39  0,11  68,83  -18,28  28,74  1,89  15,46  14,73  52,09  2,41  65,17 
Czech Republic   2,74  0,61  49,46  0,10  25,64  0,56  20,20  16,44  68,62  16,04  62,91 
Denmark   1,30  1,88  50,05  -3,76  18,95  0,28  28,89  3,23  52,13  3,49  48,52 
Germany   3,69  0,61  58,26  5,51  17,18  1,68  19,91  13,73  43,57  11,71  38,87 
Estonia   2,26  -1,74  55,52  -9,08  23,28  -1,07  20,35  22,53  71,59  20,56  66,11 
Ireland   -0,43  -0,91  47,98  -25,06  18,21  -3,12  17,45  6,31  87,51  2,71  70,49 
Greece   -3,52  -3,63  73,83  -15,00  19,84  -7,15  19,46  4,20  20,21  -7,25  31,66 
Spain   -0,07  0,77  56,54  -6,31  25,02  0,23  20,83  13,47  24,77  8,89  27,62 
France   1,48  1,36  58,72  -1,16  19,15  1,22  24,86  9,74  24,32  8,78  26,43 
Italy   1,80  1,16  60,85  2,11  19,29  -0,59  21,35  11,59  24,61  12,69  25,50 
Cyprus   1,14  1,26  66,96  -1,71  20,86  0,84  19,85  3,68  42,69  4,90  49,19 
Latvia   -0,34  0,44  65,84  -12,25  21,69  -9,66  18,50  11,48  51,03  11,52  53,28 
Lithuania   1,44  -4,87  65,82  1,00  18,39  -3,29  18,37  17,36  62,39  17,27  61,70 
Luxembourg   2,68  2,13  37,04  2,98  21,07  2,91  17,18  2,84  166,59  4,58  139,72 
Hungary   1,26  -2,17  53,76  -9,67  21,57  -2,09  22,29  14,29  87,54  12,81  81,22 
Malta   2,29  -1,66  65,00  9,85  13,10  0,56  21,83  17,71  83,20  13,67  83,07 
Netherlands   1,69  0,40  46,24  -4,38  19,06  0,96  27,44  10,79  70,62  10,55  62,67 
Austria   2,31  2,17  54,19  0,08  20,08  -0,18  19,23  8,29  52,30  8,02  46,14 
Poland   3,90  3,17  62,16  -0,16  21,99  4,13  17,99  12,09  38,19  13,88  39,38 
Portugal   1,40  2,12  66,31  -4,11  21,01  0,93  22,02  8,79  29,30  5,38  38,29 
Romania   -1,65  -0,43  74,72  -2,09  26,76  -4,42  15,98  14,05  34,70  11,87  50,34 
Slovenia   1,38  -0,68  56,87  -8,31  24,35  1,47  20,12  9,54  62,91  7,16  63,32 
Slovakia   4,18  -0,71  57,38  12,38  21,30  1,12  18,62  16,55  75,93  16,35  73,00 
Finland   3,73  2,98  54,51  2,59  19,28  0,18  23,31  7,82  41,62  7,74  38,62 
Sweden   6,13  3,67  50,39  7,68  17,94  1,88  27,20  11,75  48,09  12,72  42,08 
United Kingdom   2,09  1,24  64,27  3,14  15,79  1,48  22,09  7,37  26,56  8,59  28,11 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services, and own calculations Chapter 1 – The External Sector in the Recession 
 
45 
 
 
  
2010-2011 
  
      Consumption  Investment  Government  Exports  Imports 
   Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share  Growth  Share 
European Union (27 countries)   1,54  0,14  58,01  1,33  18,62  -0,06  21,73  6,32  40,85  3,92  39,54 
Belgium   1,89  0,74  52,83  5,11  19,78  0,80  22,77  4,78  81,74  4,90  78,10 
Bulgaria   1,67  -0,56  68,64  -9,69  23,40  0,55  15,69  12,80  59,53  8,52  66,48 
Czech Republic   1,65  -0,48  48,44  -1,16  24,98  -1,39  19,77  10,96  77,77  7,50  71,05 
Denmark   1,00  -0,51  50,34  0,39  18,00  -1,02  28,60  6,78  53,12  5,20  49,57 
Germany   3,00  1,47  56,53  6,41  17,48  1,39  19,53  8,25  47,79  7,42  41,88 
Estonia   7,64  4,18  53,35  26,79  20,70  1,64  19,68  24,87  85,78  27,03  77,94 
Ireland   0,70  -2,70  47,74  -10,61  13,71  -3,70  16,98  4,11  93,43  -0,70  72,71 
Greece   -6,91  -7,12  73,75  -20,75  17,48  -9,11  18,73  -0,33  21,83  -8,10  30,44 
Spain   0,71  -0,14  57,02  -5,13  23,45  -2,18  20,89  8,97  28,13  -0,14  30,09 
France   1,68  0,38  58,65  2,86  18,65  0,83  24,80  4,90  26,29  4,55  28,33 
Italy   0,43  0,25  60,46  -1,86  19,35  -0,90  20,85  5,63  26,98  0,42  28,23 
Cyprus   0,48  0,16  67,04  -13,78  20,27  -4,66  19,79  3,62  43,77  -4,97  51,01 
Latvia   5,47  4,43  66,35  24,62  19,10  1,29  16,77  12,59  57,07  20,72  59,62 
Lithuania   5,87  6,11  61,72  17,05  18,31  0,37  17,52  13,65  72,19  12,72  71,33 
Luxembourg   1,55  1,82  36,84  7,66  21,14  4,13  17,22  1,73  166,85  3,24  142,30 
Hungary   1,69  0,01  51,94  -5,45  19,24  -0,37  21,55  8,39  98,81  6,32  90,48 
Malta   2,06  3,07  62,49  -13,42  14,07  3,90  21,46  1,01  95,74  -0,97  92,31 
Netherlands   1,17  -1,08  45,65  5,83  17,92  0,19  27,25  3,78  76,94  3,50  68,13 
Austria   3,11  0,61  54,11  5,66  19,64  2,65  18,76  6,70  55,36  6,97  48,72 
Poland   4,35  3,06  61,73  8,26  21,13  -1,32  18,03  7,48  41,20  5,77  43,17 
Portugal   -1,61  -3,91  66,78  -11,39  19,86  -3,86  21,92  7,40  31,44  -5,51  39,79 
Romania   2,45  1,31  75,65  6,31  26,64  -3,53  15,53  9,86  40,24  10,48  57,26 
Slovenia   -0,17  -0,27  55,72  -10,67  22,02  -0,93  20,14  6,81  67,98  4,67  66,92 
Slovakia   3,35  -0,36  54,68  5,69  22,98  -3,53  18,08  10,79  84,95  4,46  81,53 
Finland   2,85  3,33  54,12  4,63  19,07  0,83  22,51  -0,82  43,26  0,05  40,12 
Sweden   3,94  2,12  49,22  5,83  18,20  1,77  26,11  6,76  50,63  6,10  44,69 
United Kingdom   0,65  -1,22  63,73  -1,20  15,95  0,07  21,96  4,59  27,94  1,20  29,89 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services, and own calculations 
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Table 1.8. The average weight of services in total exports 
 
   1991-94  1995-98  1999-2002  2003-06  2007-11 
European Union (15 countries)   21,92  21,18  22,97  24,02  25,56 
Belgium   20,68  17,53  19,78  19,79  22,43 
Bulgaria   6,15  18,96  30,13  32,99  25,55 
Czech Republic   22,28  24,75  18,02  13,89  15,04 
Denmark   27,93  26,60  31,97  34,25  38,35 
Germany   13,45  13,74  13,98  13,93  14,80 
Estonia   29,42  36,10  33,46  31,51  31,14 
Ireland   14,43  15,28  23,52  36,51  46,69 
Greece   33,96  41,18  52,83  54,26  53,70 
Spain   33,26  29,84  32,00  32,15  32,61 
France   23,83  21,61  21,43  21,00  21,30 
Italy   22,42  20,39  19,81  19,61  18,16 
Cyprus      73,67  81,95  83,72  84,50 
Latvia   33,14  37,41  35,07  31,17  31,83 
Lithuania   11,41  19,09  21,47  20,61  17,36 
Luxembourg   59,12  65,00  71,77  74,48  80,26 
Hungary   27,91  25,85  18,58  15,39  17,28 
Malta   37,38  37,91  34,73  40,59  53,18 
Netherlands   21,49  21,01  21,72  21,15  20,67 
Austria   33,58  29,29  27,42  27,26  27,78 
Poland   15,34  19,88  20,11  14,76  16,60 
Portugal   24,43  19,94  21,67  22,95  26,95 
Romania   14,42  15,78  14,81  15,38  17,75 
Slovenia   16,56  19,63  17,78  17,89  19,92 
Slovakia   25,71  19,40  16,31  11,89  9,74 
Finland   15,30  14,10  16,63  18,79  25,19 
Sweden   21,43  19,58  23,30  25,25  29,93 
United Kingdom   25,86  27,54  31,78  36,04  40,44 
Turkey   36,76  42,65  36,79  24,36  21,34 
Iceland   28,42  30,24  33,56  37,09  33,55 
Norway   27,92  26,01  25,03  23,29  22,77 
Switzerland   25,74  25,87  26,17  27,31  30,32 
United States   29,38  28,36  29,20  30,47  30,49 
Japan   11,83  11,74  11,32  12,61  12,85 
Canada   13,61  12,95  12,98  13,48  14,65 
Mexico   15,92  9,84  7,55  6,76  5,51 
Korea   13,43  16,16  15,41  12,99  12,84 
Australia   22,21  23,75  23,14  22,89  20,20 
New Zealand   21,52  24,18  25,77  27,86  22,21 
Source: AMECO database, Commission services. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE EU INDUSTRY IN THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN 
 
On-going  globalisation  has  changed  the  economic 
landscape. Many products used to be produced lo-
cally  from  mainly  domestic  resources.  This  meant 
that most of the value chains or production process-
es were located in the country where firms had their 
headquarters. Technological development has facili-
tated the geographical fragmentation of production 
processes, resulting in the emergence of global value 
chains. Different parts of firms’ production processes 
are now located in different parts of the world, ac-
cording to the comparative advantages of the loca-
tions. This ‘slicing up of the value chains’ has given 
rise to increased trade flows of goods and services in 
the  world  economy.  A  large  share  of  this  trade  is 
intra-firm trade in intermediate goods, conducted by 
multinational  companies.  The  use  of  imported  in-
termediate  goods  in  manufacturing  industries  has 
increased globally, thereby involving more industries 
and countries in the value chains. 
The increasingly important role of global value chains 
for the EU industry is emphasised in the EU flagship 
initiative ‘An integrated industrial policy for the glob-
alisation  era’  which  states:  ‘The  EU  needs  to  pay 
greater attention to the manufacturing value-chain … 
Industry is increasingly dependent on inputs of raw 
material and intermediate goods, and is also crucially 
dependent on the business services industries that 
add value and help to design and market new goods 
and services. This new perspective requires a differ-
ent approach to industrial policy that takes increased 
account of the interlinkages’ (European Commission, 
2010).  This  initiative  identifies  a  number  of  policy 
areas that would help EU firms to reap the benefits 
of globalisation and to compete on global markets. 
The  design  of  appropriate  policies  requires  better 
understanding of the development and prospects of 
global  industrial  value  chains.  This  chapter  tries  to 
respond  to  this  need  by  looking  for  empirical  an-
swers to the following questions: 
  What have been the main changes in industries’ 
value chains since 1995? 
  How  have  the  inter-industry  and  inter-regional 
linkages within the EU and in extra-EU relations 
developed? 
  How  do  these  compare  with  inter-industry  and 
inter-regional linkages in the US, Japan and other 
countries?   
  What was the impact of the 2008/09 economic 
recession on the offshoring decisions of EU firms? 
  What are the effects of the crisis on vertical spe-
cialisation and value chains in industries produc-
ing chemicals, machinery and equipment, electri-
cal and optical equipment and transport equip-
ment?    
What types of firms are more likely to offshore 
parts of their supply chain? 
  What leads firms to offshore and what drives the 
decisions  with  respect  to  the  characteristics  of 
the host and destination country and those of the 
offshoring firms? 
  What are the preferred target countries for relo-
cating  production  for  European  manufacturing 
companies? 
Is offshoring related to framework conditions in the 
different  locations?  These  questions  are  addressed 
by focusing largely on four important manufacturing 
industries,  classified  according  to  NACE  Rev.  1.1: 
chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 
(DG); machinery and equipment (DK); electrical and 
optical  equipment  (DL);  and  transport  equipment 
(DM).  The  first  questions  are  addressed  in  Section 
2.2,  which  analyses  patterns  and  trends  in  vertical 
specialisation across countries. The analyses for the 
four selected industries are preceded by overviews 
of the patterns for total exports, manufacturing ex-
ports  and  services  exports.  Section  2.3  focuses  on 
the changes in trade patterns of the four individual 
manufacturing industries by geography. The analyses 
differentiate  between  the  use  categories  of  prod-
ucts: trade in parts and components is important for 
industries  producing  machinery  and  equipment, 
electrical  and  optical  equipment  and  transport 
equipment, while trade in semi-finished products is 
important  for  the  chemicals  industry.  Section  2.4 
focuses on offshoring decisions at company level; it 
contains analyses of the motives and determinants 
of company strategies with respect to the relocation 
of production. A summary and conclusions are pro-
vided in Section 2.5. 
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2.1.  THE MANY FACETS OF INTERNATIONAL  PRODUCTION 
INTEGRATION 
Many  different  concepts  are  used  in  analysing  the 
internationalisation of production. Examples include 
‘global production sharing’, ‘(international) fragmen-
tation’, ‘slicing up the value chain’, ‘vertical speciali-
sation’,  ‘international  (out)sourcing’,  ‘offshoring’, 
‘global supply chains’, ‘global value chains’, etc. Here, 
an  account  of  the  most  widely  used  categories  is 
given. A rigorous, precise and accurate definition is 
used  as  a  starting  point,  and  other  categories  are 
related to that.‘Offshoring’ and ‘offshore outsourc-
ing’ refer to a company’s decision to transfer certain 
activities that have so far been carried out inside the 
company to either another unit of the firm in a for-
eign location (intra-firm or captive offshoring) or to 
an independent firm (offshore outsourcing). 
Offshoring and offshore outsourcing are sometimes 
referred to as (international) relocation (OECD, 2004; 
UNCTAD, 2004; Kirkegaard, 2005). These and related 
terms are used in rather an unsystematic way in the 
literature — something that needs to be considered 
in any discussion.
34 
‘Offshoring’ is also widely used to denote the reloca-
tion of processes to foreign countries, regardless of 
their links to the relocating company (see, for exam-
ple,  Olsen,  2006;  Bertoli,  2008;  Jabbour,  2010).  In 
this case, attention is focused only on the movement 
of  production  and  related  jobs  between  countries. 
Similarly, some papers make no distinction between 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing: they are usually 
both  referred  to  as  offshoring  (see,  for  example, 
Görg  et  al.,  2008;  Wagner,  2011).  Here  again  the 
emphasis is on the moving of the activities abroad 
from the home country.
35 
Other approaches rely on various trade data to an a-
lyse changes in the structure of global produ ction 
and the increase in trading links across cou ntries. 
One such approach concerns the trade in parts and 
components. Yeats (1997) was the first to use these 
data to try and measure the phenomenon; he called 
it ‘production sharing’. Other studies with the same 
approach include Ng and Yeats (1999) and Kaminski 
and  Ng  (2001).  Trade  in  intermediates  is  a  similar 
concept often used in  empirical analyses on which 
other approaches are based on. International frag-
mentation (e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990) places 
more  emphasis  on  production  activities,  with  frag-
                                                           
34  Bhagwati et al. (2004) drew attention to the problem of the 
lack of a consistent use of definitions. 
35  The  Eurostat  survey  uses  the  term  ‘international  sourcing’. 
According  to  Alajääskö  (2009),  captive  offshoring  is  about 
twice as common as offshore outsourcing in the sample. 
mentation being defined as the splitting of produc-
tion processes into parts that can be done in differ-
ent countries (see, for example, Baldone et al., 2001, 
in  the  European  context).
36  Vertical specialisation 
(Hummels et al., 2001) is based on trade between 
different countries, each specialising in a particular 
production stage. The authors make the connection 
between the fragmentation of production and e x-
ports  by  sector  by  calculating  direct  and  indirect 
(through suppliers) imports that are then incorp o-
rated into the exports of a given country, in order to 
determine that country’s specialisation.  
International ‘trade in tasks’ (reflecting a finer divi-
sion  of  labour  across  countries)  —  as  opposed  to 
trade  in  finished  goods  (e.g.  Grossman  and  Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008) — refers to captive offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing. This approach is used in many 
theoretical models. 
Furthermore,  two  further  concepts  describe  the 
phenomenon of Western European firms concentrat-
ing their offshoring and offshore outsourcing activi-
ties  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (Jacoby,  2010). 
‘Nearshoring’  — as opposed to ‘farshoring’  — em-
phasises  the  geographical  proximity  between  the 
offshoring  and  outsourcing  company  and  its  affili-
ate/partner. ‘Nearsourcing’ is used as an equivalent 
to ‘nearshoring’ (ACM, 2006). For example, in the US, 
‘nearshoring’ is referred to in the context of reloca-
tions to Canada or Mexico (Olsen, 2006). Similarly, in 
Europe, ‘nearshoring’ is usually used in the context 
of offshoring and offshore outsourcing to Central and 
Eastern Europe. A key aspect of nearshoring is the 
fact that global value chains are more regional than 
global  (De  Backer  and  Yamano,  2011).  The  term 
‘backshoring’ or ‘reshoring’ is used when previously 
captive  offshored  or  offshore  outsourced  activities 
are brought back to the original location.  
As  is  obvious  from  the  existing  diversity  of  defini-
tions, the old approaches and the widely-used exist-
ing data are not considered adequate or appropriate 
to grasp all the aspects of this phenomenon. For ex-
ample,  at  the  macro-level,  the  concepts  ‘offshore 
outsourcing’  and  ‘offshoring’  are  differently  con-
nected to foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign 
trade. Offshore outsourcing is usually not connected 
to  FDI,  but  is  usually  connected  to  international 
trade. In the case of captive offshoring, an initial FDI 
project of the vertical type is always involved, and 
later the output is exported to other affiliates and 
sold to the local affiliate of the same company. In 
                                                           
36  In  addition  to  the  economics  literature,  papers  on  these 
concepts  can  be  found  in  the  business,  management  and 
economic geography literature; understandably, the focus of 
these is different. Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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captive offshoring all these transactions remain with-
in the boundaries of the company, in contrast to off-
shore outsourcing. So both flows of FDI and foreign 
trade are involved.  
Table 2.1 – Understanding intra-firm or captive offshoring, outsourcing and offshore outsourcing 
Location of production  Internalised (inside the company)  Externalised  (outside  the  company,  out-
sourcing to an independent firm) 
Home country  Production kept in-house at home  Outsourcing (at home) 
Foreign country (offshoring)  Intra-firm (captive) offshoring  Offshore outsourcing 
Source: UNCTAD (2004). 
Thus neither the available FDI data nor the foreign 
trade data are able to fully cover developments con-
nected  to  offshoring  and  offshore  outsourcing.  It 
must  also  be  emphasised  that  widely-used  meas-
urements based on trade statistics  should be used 
with caution. It could be misleading to use trade sta-
tistics designed to collect trade flows in final prod-
ucts, because of the increase of trade in parts and 
components  or  intermediaries.  For  example,  re-
vealed comparative advantage indicators, specialisa-
tion indices or classification  according to the tech-
nology content of products may give an erroneous 
result  concerning  the  specialisation  and  role  of  a 
given country in the international distribution of lab 
Different methods are applied in this chapter to take 
account of the many aspects of the internationalisa-
tion of production. Section 2.3 builds on the meas-
urement of  vertical specialisation, which is derived 
from a global input-output matrix combining indus-
try-level  information  on  sourcing  structures  with 
detailed  trade  data.  Section  2.4  is  based  on  trade 
data that differentiate between the various end-use 
categories of traded products, which allows the ef-
fects of the crisis to be captured. Finally, Section 2.5 
builds  on  firm-level  data  to  shed  light  on  micro-
economic aspects of the internationalisation process.  
2.2.  CHANGES IN INDUSTRIES' VALUE CHAINS SINCE 1995 
International  linkages  vary  across  industries,  and 
change over time. Not only do countries have to rely 
on imports of products not produced domestically, 
e.g. raw materials, but industries are likely to partici-
pate in the international division of labour, by off-
shoring the production of semi-finished products or 
via inputs of parts and components or assembly ac-
tivities.  This  section  analyses  vertical  specialisation 
patterns  and  the  respective  changes  over  time  for 
EU-27 industries, drawing comparisons with the US 
and Japan in the period from 1995 until recent years. 
Particular  questions  to  be  addressed  are  whether
 
and to what extent the import content of exports has 
changed  over  the  longer  term  and  in  more  recent 
years? Have there been any major shifts with respect 
to source patterns by geographical regions, and are 
there significant differences across countries? Have 
the  industries  examined  in  more  detail  here  faced 
significant changes in vertical specialisation patterns 
compared to overall patterns? 
Methodologically,  the  chapter  builds  on  the  meas-
urement  of  vertical  specialisation  developed  by 
Hummels et al. (2001). It uses a global input-output 
table, which provides a more precise metric of verti-
cal specialisation. The use of a global input-output 
table  allows  for  not  only  differentiating  direct  im-
ports from different countries but also indirect im-
ports from different countries arising from the flows 
of intermediate goods in different parts of the value 
chains.  The data used for this section are the world 
input-output  tables  from  the  World  Input-Output 
Database  (WIOD)  project,  which  have  recently  be-
come available. 
37 
This approach facilitates more detailed analyses of 
changes in the international sourcing stru ctures. By 
using information from the WIOD it is possible to 
analyse the structures of sourcing and vertical sp e-
cialisation. Hummels et al. (2001) recommended a 
widely used measure of vertical integration, which 
has subsequently been extended and made more  
sophisticated. In this study, a slightly more genera l-
ised measure of vertical integration is used, which 
takes full advantage of a global input-output table. A 
global matrix such as this allows the calculation of 
the global Leontief inverse matrix, from which a ver-
tical specialisation indicator can be calculated. Such a 
measure of vertical specialisation is closely related to 
the concept of output multipliers, and therefore also  
to backward (and forward) linkage indicators, cf. Box 
2.1. 
38 
                                                           
37   See the Annex for a short description and www.wiod.org for a 
detailed description of the world inpout-output database. The 
WIOD  project  was  funded  by  the  FP7  SSH  research 
programme 
38   See Stehrer et. al., (2012) for a more detailed description. Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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BOX 2.1 – A GENERALISED MEASURE OF VERTICAL SPECIALISATION  
The most widely used measure of vertical specialisation is the VS measure proposed in Hummels et al. (2001) which pre-multiplies the 
domestic Leontief inverse by the import coefficients matrix and expresses the resulting matrix sum as a ratio to total gross exports.
39 A 
more sophisticated measure, VS1, pre-multiplies the domestic Leontief inverse by the import matrices for each individual partner country; 
the results are then summed together and expressed as a ratio to total gross exports.  
These measures, however, do not take account of all inter-country linkages, i.e. imports from a country might (directly and indirectly) i n-
clude imports from other countries, or even the country under consideration. The availa bility of a world input-output table therefore al-
lows these inter-regional linkage effects to be taken into account. This would suggest an appropriate indicator  – VS2 – using the Leontief 
inverse of the global input-output table times the vector of exports of the reporter country under consideration and summed over all part-
ner countries. This can be expressed as a share of total gross output produced for production of this export vector. Formally, this can be 
expressed as 
   
Let C denote the number of countries and N the number of industries. The vector   denotes an NCx1 vector with country r’s exports 
included in the appropriate elements of the vector and zeros otherwise. The vector   denotes a summation vector (of dimension 
NCx1) with 0 in country r’s appropriate elements of the vector and 1 otherwise, i.e. summing over all partner countries. Similarly,   de-
notes a summation vector of ones of dimension NCx1, summing over all countries. Matrix A denotes the coefficient matrix, i.e. inputs per 
unit of gross output, and I is the identity matrix, both are of dimension NCxNC. The prime indicates the transpose of the respective vectors.  
When examining particular regions or sectors, the summation and export vectors   and    have to be adjusted accordingly (i.e. 
summing up over only those partner countries that are of interest). In case that one is interested in only one particular industry the export 
vector contains exports of this industry only and 0’s otherwise and the summation vector   contains a one for that industry and 0’s 
otherwise. Using gross output associated with the production of the particular exports, i.e.   the sourcing structure to 
produce a particular vector of exports is expressed as a percentage of total production needed for these exports. This can further be bro-
ken down by individual partner countries or groups of partner countries.  
Multiplying the Leontief inverse by the total export vector, including the intermediates, involves a certain degree of ‘double-counting’. One 
possibility to remedy this would be to use exports of final demand goods only. Empirically, it does not make a big difference when ex-
pressed as a share of gross output to be produced, however, and is more akin to the original measure proposed in Hummels et al. (2001). It 
should be noted that this measure is closely linked to the linkage indicators – or, more specifically, to the backward linkage measure – and 
the concept of (simple output) multipliers, which are also based on the Leontief inverse. Therefore, one would expect, first, a country to be 
more vertically integrated the higher its (backward) linkages. If this country’s output should increase (e.g. by assembly of final products), it 
needs more inputs from other countries, and thus its backward linkages are higher and it is more vertically integrated.  
Secondly, this also explains why larger countries tend to be less vertically integrated in the global economy, since large countries source 
relatively more from their domestic economy. Conversely, smaller countries are not able to produce all the inputs themselves and thus 
tend  to  be  more  vertically  integrated.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion,  see  Stehrer  et  al.  (2012a)  and  the  literature  cited  therein.
                                                           
39   The Leontief inverse is used in input-output analysis in order to take into account that the output of a certain industry i needs the 
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2.2.1  International linkages and the foreign content 
of exports 
The aggregate results for EU, US and Japan  are pre-
sented before the four selected industries are ana-
lysed. For the economy-wide analyses, the EU-27 is 
split  into  the  EU-15  and  the  EU-12,  as  the  latter 
group  shows  a  particular  pattern  in  the  European 
division of labour. The EU-15, Japan and the US show 
initial low levels for the foreign content of exports of 
between 5 % and 10 %. In 1995 the figure for the US 
was comparable to that for the EU-15 in 2000. The 
vertical specialisation is higher in the EU-12 countries 
and, even in 1995, the EU-12 countries had a much 
higher  vertical  specialisation  than  the  other  coun-
tries.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  strong  backward 
linkages these countries already had as providers of 
intermediate inputs for (mainly) the EU-15, but was 
also due to the fact that the country group consists 
of relatively small countries. Their integration inten-
sified  even  further  over  time,  peaking  in  2007  at 
about 34 %. 
In the three other countries and regions, the foreign 
content of exports increased to levels of about 14–
16 %. The particularly strong increase experienced in 
the EU-12 countries points to the strong integration 
process with the EU since 1995, generated especially 
by production networks.  
During the recent economic crisis, however, the for-
eign  content  dropped  slightly,  by  1–2  percentage 
points, in three of the regions. As the data end in 
2009, this drop might also have been driven by an 
industry composition effect, since it was particularly 
sectors with stronger production linkages that were 
affected  more  severely  by  the  crisis.  The  decrease 
was  even  stronger  for the EU-12 countries, with  a 
drop of about 4 percentage points. 
Figure 2.1 Foreign content of total exports (%) 
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
Breaking  down  Figure  2.1  by  source  region  shows 
how the sourcing structure at economy-wide levels 
has  changed  over  time.  Table  2.2  provides  infor-
mation on the geographical structure of the foreign 
content of exports across source regions over time 
for the EU, Japan and the US. 
The table shows the foreign content of exports and 
the domestic content highlighted in grey. As shown, 
the domestic content is relatively high in all coun-
tries: it is lowest in the EU-12, standing at 66.4 % in 
2007, and higher for the other economies: around 
85 %. In all cases, the domestic share has decreased. 
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Table 2.2 – Content of total exports, by partner 
   EU-12  EU-15 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009  1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
BRII  3.1  2.8  2.6  2.6  2.1  0.8  0.9  1.3  1.5  1.3 
Canada  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
China  0.2  0.8  2.1  3.4  4.8  0.4  0.8  1.3  2.0  2.8 
EU-12  79.0  70.2  68.4  66.4  70.1  0.6  0.9  1.3  1.6  1.6 
EU-15  13.1  18.4  18.6  18.6  15.7  92.0  88.8  87.8  86.0  86.8 
Japan  0.5  1.1  1.1  1.2  0.9  1.0  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.7 
Korea  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.4 
Mexico  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
USA  1.1  1.9  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.8  2.5  1.8  1.9  1.8 
Rest of world  2.4  4.0  4.7  5.1  4.0  2.8  4.1  4.6  5.2  4.3 
   Japan  USA 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009  1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
BRII  0.5  0.5  0.8  1.1  0.9  0.4  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.7 
Canada  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  1.4  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.4 
China  0.5  0.9  2.2  3.1  3.8  0.6  0.9  2.0  2.7  3.3 
EU-12  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1 
EU-15  1.4  1.7  2.1  2.4  1.9  2.8  3.1  3.4  3.3  2.7 
Japan  93.3  91.3  87.8  84.7  86.2  1.9  1.6  1.3  1.2  0.9 
Korea  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4 
Mexico  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9 
USA  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.5  1.2  89.0  87.5  85.7  84.8  86.3 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. 
Source: WIOD. 
The  financial  crises  had  a  severe  impact  on  global 
trade and thus also on the trend of increased vertical 
specialisation.  In  order  to  analyse  the  long-term 
trends,  the  year  2009  has  therefore  been  omitted 
from the following analysis. In 2007, the BRII group 
accounted for about 10 % or less of the import con-
tent of most countries, with a larger share for the 
EU-15. It is interesting to note that this group — alt-
hough it includes India, which is comparable in size 
to  China  —  does  not  account  for  higher  shares  of 
vertical integration, particularly not where the US is 
concerned.  Canada  is  important  for  the  US,  even 
more so than Mexico. China accounts for about 10 % 
of the foreign content of exports in the EU-12, 15 % 
in the EU-15, 20 % in Japan and about 18 % in the US. 
China has surpassed the EU-12 as a source for the 
EU-15 in recent years. The EU-12 countries are only 
important  as  a  source  for  the  EU-15,  where  it  ac-
counts for about 12 %. On the other hand, the EU-15 
countries  are  very  important  for  the  EU-12,  which 
use a lot of EU-15 outputs to produce their own ex-
ports.  
The EU-15 accounts for about 16 % and 20 % of the 
foreign content of Japanese and US exports. The EU-
15 share of Japanese exports decreased from 1995 
to 2007. The Japanese share of EU-15 and US exports 
decreased from 1995 to  2007, the largest declines 
being recorded for exports to the US. As can be ex-
pected, the US is the main market for Mexico, mak-
ing up about 5 % of its export content, but the figure 
is considerably smaller for the other countries under 
consideration. Finally, US output accounts for about 
13 %  of  the  foreign  content  of  EU-15  exports  and 
10 % of Japan’s. The content of exports from the rest 
of the world (ROW) is particularly high in the EU-15 
and Japan. It should be noted that the ROW includes 
countries like Switzerland and Norway and Turkey, 
which have strong trade relations with the EU coun-
tries. On the other hand, the ROW group includes a 
number of Latin and South American countries, im-
portant for the US, and a host of Asian countries with 
strong production networks, important for Japan.  
The most impressive development has been the rise 
in the importance of China. The Chinese share of the 
foreign content of EU-12 exports increased from a 
negligible figure in 1995 to 10 % in 2007. Its share of 
EU-15 exports increased from slightly above 5 % to 
about 15 %. The increase was even more marked in 
Japan, where China’s share rose from about 7 % to 
20 %, cf. Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3. Geographical structure of the foreign content of exports, 1995 and 2007 
 
  
1995  2007 
  
EU-12  EU-15  Japan  USA  EU-12  EU-15  Japan  USA 
BRII  15.0  10.4  7.3  3.9  7.7  11.0  7.1  5.2 
Canada  0.7  3.3  3.2  13.0  0.8  2.2  1.6  11.4 
China  1.2  5.4  7.4  5.5  10.2  14.5  20.0  17.5 
EU-12  -  7.8  0.5  0.8  -  11.5  1.0  1.2 
EU-15  62.4  -  21.5  25.7  55.3  -  15.9  21.6 
Japan  2.4  11.9  -  17.4  3.5  5.9  -  7.7 
Korea  1.4  3.2  8.4  5.0  2.8  3.1  7.1  3.5 
Mexico  0.2  1.1  0.6  5.3  0.4  1.2  0.7  6.4 
USA  5.3  22.0  19.1  -  4.1  13.4  9.9  - 
ROW  11.4  34.8  32.0  23.4  15.3  37.3  36.8  25.5 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. The columns sum to 100 
Source: WIOD. 
 
The increase in the Chinese share from 1995 to 2007 
may have taken place at the expense of other foreign 
sources or domestic sourcing. Table 2.4 below, which 
presents the  changing  share pattern in percentage 
points, can be used to analyse whether the rise of 
China in world trade and vertical specialisation has 
been at the expense of other countries. 
With a few exceptions, the changes are positive, im-
plying that, in terms of vertical specialisation, partner 
countries did not crowd each other out; instead Chi-
na’s share grew mainly at the expense of domestic 
sourcing in the period 1995–2007. 
The  Chinese  share  of  other  countries  exports  in-
creased until 2007 and continued to grow during the 
crisis (up to 2009, the last year for which data are 
available). However, the overall share of the foreign 
content  of  exports  decreased  between  2007  and 
2009. For example, in the EU-12, domestic sourcing 
increased by about 4 percentage points; in the EU-15 
it increased by less than 1 percentage point and in 
the  US  and  Japan  domestic  sourcing  increased  by 
about 1.5 percentage points, c.f. Table 2.4.  
 
 
Table 2.4 – Changes in the geographical structure of production integration (percentage points) 
 
   1995–2007  2007–09 
   EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA  EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA 
BRII  -0.6  0.7  0.6  0.4  -0.5  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1 
Canada  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.3 
China  3.2  1.6  2.6  2.0  1.3  0.7  0.8  0.7 
EU-12  -12.7  1.0  0.1  0.1  3.7  0.0  0.0  0.0 
EU-15  5.5  -5.9  1.0  0.5  -2.9  0.8  -0.6  -0.5 
Japan  0.7  -0.1  -8.6  -0.7  -0.2  -0.2  1.5  -0.3 
Korea  0.6  0.2  0.5  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.4  -0.1 
Mexico  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1 
USA  0.3  0.1  0.2  -4.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.3  1.6 
Rest of world  2.7  2.4  3.5  1.3  -1.2  -0.9  -0.7  -0.7 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. The columns sum to 0.0 
Source: WIOD 
 
Before  analysing  the  four  selected  industries,  an 
overview is provided of changes in the vertical spe-
cialisation in manufacturing and services. As in the 
case of total exports, the degree of vertical speciali-
sation in the EU-12 is relatively high. This is mostly 
due to the strong backward linkages with industries 
in  the  EU-15.  Starting  at  lower  levels,  the  foreign 
content of exports in EU-15 and Japanese industries 
increased to around 8 % in 2009. The crisis seems not 
to  have  had  as  big  an  impact  on  the  global  value 
chains  of  EU-15  services  as  it  has  in  the  other  re-
gions. A small increase was recorded for the EU-15 
between 2007 and 2009, due to the increased share 
of Chinese production in EU-15 services exports.  Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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The foreign content of Japanese exports, which in-
creased rapidly up to 2007, was severely hit by the 
crisis  and  decreased  by  some  3  percentage  points 
between 2007 and 2009. The decrease can largely be 
explained by the large fall in Japanese services ex-
ports.  Consequently,  the  share  of  services  of  total 
exports also decreased. The largest decreases were 
recorded in the sectors Water transport and Whole-
sale trade and commission trade, NACE codes 61 and 
51 respectively, which account for a relatively large 
proportion  of  Japanese  services.  The  decrease  in 
theforeign  content  of  Japanese  exports  mostly  af-
fected EU-15 and Korean producers, c.f. Figure 2.2. 
40 
Figure 2.2 Foreign content of services exports (%) 
 
Source: WIOD. 
The  foreign  content  of  manufacturing  exports  is 
higher than for total exports and services exports in 
all countries and regions. The largest differences in 
the  degree  of  foreign  content  of  exports  between 
the  total  economies  and  the  manufacturing  indus-
tries are seen in the EU-12 and the US. The strong 
backward linkages between the EU-12 and EU-15 are 
                                                           
40    See also the analyses of energy content in Japanese services 
exports in Chapter 3. 
mainly  due  to  EU-12  manufacturing  industries 
providing intermediate inputs for manufacturing to 
the EU-15. Large multinational enterprises in the US 
manufacturing sector account for much of the for-
eign content of total US exports. Domestic sourcing 
in  Japanese  manufacturing  industries  did  not  in-
crease as much as in the services industries. The in-
crease was more in line with the other regions. Since 
most  of  the  vertical  specialisation  process  takes 
place within manufacturing industries, developments 
over time for manufacturing exports reflect the de-
velopment  over  time  for  total  exports.  Domestic 
sourcing decreased from 1995 to 2007 but increased 
from 2007 to  2009,  with the exception of  Chinese 
sourcing, c.f. Table 2.5.  
When  looking  at  the  four  selected  industries,  it  is 
evident that vertical integration of the EU-12 indus-
tries is higher than that of other countries. This is to 
be expected due to strong production and backward 
linkages in the EU: an increase in the output of a final 
product in an EU-12 country triggers significant de-
mand in other sectors and in EU-15 countries, imply-
ing strong backward linkages. The integration of pro-
duction in the EU-12 industries — indicated by a low 
domestic share in Table 2.6 — is particularly strong 
in electrical products and transport equipment, and 
only slightly weaker in machinery. It is far lower in 
chemicals, whose production relies less on interme-
diates sourced from other countries. The EU-15, Jap-
anese and US industries show fairly similar vertical 
integration patterns, though these tend to be some-
what lower for Japan in most industries. Generally, 
vertical integration is relatively higher in machinery 
and  transport  equipment,  i.e.  industries  character-
ised by larger international production networks. 
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Table 2.5 – Content of manufacturing exports, by partner 
 
   EU-12  EU-15 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009  1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
BRII  3.5  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.3  0.9  1.0  1.5  1.8  1.5 
Canada  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
China  0.3  0.3  2.5  4.0  5.7  0.5  0.9  1.6  2.4  3.3 
EU-12  76.7  66.6  65.0  62.6  66.2  0.7  1.0  1.5  1.9  1.9 
EU-15  14.7  20.9  20.8  20.8  17.7  91.2  87.7  86.4  84.1  85.0 
Japan  0.6  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.3  0.9  0.9  0.8 
Korea  0.3  0.5  0.8  1.1  1.0  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Mexico  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
USA  1.1  2.0  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.9  2.6  1.9  1.9  1.9 
Rest of world  2.6  4.4  5.1  5.6  4.4  3.1  4.6  5.2  5.9  4.9 
   Japan  USA 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009  1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
BRII  0.5  0.5  0.8  1.2  1.0  0.5  0.7  0.9  1.0  0.8 
Canada  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  1.8  2.0  2.2  2.2  1.9 
China  0.5  1.0  2.3  3.3  4.0  0.8  1.2  2.7  3.5  4.5 
EU-12  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 
EU-15  1.5  1.8  2.2  2.5  2.0  3.4  3.8  4.3  4.2  3.5 
Japan  93.1  91.1  87.3  84.0  85.6  2.5  2.1  1.7  1.6  1.2 
Korea  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.0  0.7  0.7  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.6 
Mexico  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.8  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.2 
USA  1.4  1.6  1.4  1.6  1.2  86.2  84.4  81.8  80.7  82.3 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. The table shows the foreign content of exports and the domestic content high-
lighted in grey. 
Source: WIOD 
 
 
Table 2.6 – Vertical integration, 2007, in % 
 
  
Chemical, chemical products  
and man-made fibres  Machinery and equipment 
Electrical and optical equi-
pment  Transport equipment 
   EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA  EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA  EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA  EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA 
BRII  5.0  1.7  1.3  0.9  2.1  1.4  1.1  1.2  1.6  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.7  1.4  0.9  1.0 
Canada  0.2  0.3  0.3  1.8  0.3  0.3  0.2  2.1  0.3  0.3  0.2  1.4  0.3  0.4  0.2  3.3 
China  1.5  1.3  2.1  1.7  2.7  2.5  3.7  3.8  9.6  4.9  4.8  6.3  2.8  2.3  2.8  3.7 
EU-12  67.6  1.1  0.1  0.2  63.7  2.2  0.1  0.3  52.6  2.3  0.1  0.3  59.1  2.8  0.2  0.3 
EU-15  17.4  86.0  3.0  5.4  22.4  85.5  2.4  4.4  21.7  81.3  2.2  3.5  26.8  83.8  3.0  5.3 
Japan  0.6  0.7  82.6  0.9  1.2  1.0  84.8  1.6  2.7  1.4  83.1  1.6  1.7  1.5  86.7  3.1 
Korea  0.4  0.3  0.7  0.4  0.8  0.5  1.2  0.8  2.4  0.9  1.4  1.1  1.3  0.7  0.8  1.1 
Mexico  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.1  1.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  1.7  0.2  0.3  0.1  1.8 
USA  1.3  2.4  1.7  83.6  1.4  1.7  1.7  80.8  2.2  2.4  1.9  78.8  1.6  2.4  1.6  76.9 
RoW  5.9  6.0  8.1  4.7  5.4  4.7  4.8  3.9  6.7  5.0  5.1  4.5  4.6  4.3  3.6  3.5 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. 
Source: WIOD. 
With respect to geographical structure, foreign part-
ners’ shares of exports in the four selected industries 
in  2007  are  presented  in  Figure  2.3.  The  EU-12 
sourced most of their intermediates from the EU-15, 
with  significant  input  also  from  China  in  electrical 
products and from BRII in chemicals. Japan also had a 
slightly larger share than other industries. It is inter-
esting to note that the EU-12 share is no more than 
20 % for these industries, which serves to illustrate  
the EU-12’s strong backward linkages with respect to 
the EU-15, and the EU-15’s weaker backward linkag-
es  with  respect  to  the  EU-12.  The  highest  EU-12 
share  of  EU-15  exports  is  in  transport  equipment 
where there are strong international networks in the 
motor vehicles industry. Intermediates from the US 
and China, especially in electrical products, account 
for large shares of EU-15 industrial exports. Japanese 
intermediates account for a smaller share of EU-15 Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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industrial exports. China, the EU-15 and, to a lesser 
extent,  the  US  are  the  main  sources  for  Japanese 
industries. The large shares of intermediates sourced 
from  the  ROW  should  be  noted.  These  reflect  the 
importance of South-East Asian production networks 
for  Japanese  industries.  The  relatively  high  Korean 
share in Japanese industries illustrates this phenom-
enon. Finally, important shares for the US industries 
can be seen for Canada and the EU-15. The EU-15 
share of US exports is higher than the corresponding 
US share of EU-15 exports. Mexican industries seem 
less  integrated  in  US  industries’  value  chains  than 
their Canadian counterparts. An exception is the rel-
atively high share of Mexican sourced intermediates 
in  US  electrical  products  exports.  The  rest  of  the 
world also provides inputs, with a share of about 20 
% on average. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Geographical structure of the foreign content, by industry, 2007 
 
 
 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. 
Source: WIOD. 
 
 
The change in sourcing patterns in 1995–2007 and 
2007–2009, is similar to that for the total economy 
discussed above. In particular, over the period 1995–
2007, other partners were not squeezed out. Instead 
sourcing from other countries increased with foreign 
intermediates substituting for domestic  intermedi-
ates. On the other hand, domestic share increased at 
the expense of that of other countries over the crisis 
period, with the exception of Chinese intermediates. 
Particularly strong declines were observed in the EU-
12.  Due  to  the  strong  backward  linkages  of  these 
countries and low demand for products assembled in 
the EU-12, the demand for EU-15 components fell, 
c.f. Table 2.7. 
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Table 2.7 – Changes in geographical sourcing patterns (in percentage points) 
 
Chemicals,  
chemical products and man-made fibres 
Machinery 
and equipment 
 
Electrical and optical equipment 
 
Transport 
equipment 
 
  
EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA EU-12 EU-15  JPN  USA  EU-12  EU-15  JPN  USA EU-12 EU-15  JPN  USA 
 
1995–2007 
BRII  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.5  -0.1  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.1  0.7  0.6  0.4  -0.3  0.6  0.5  0.5 
CAN  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2 
CHN  1.3  1.1  1.9  1.3  2.5  2.1  3.2  3.0  9.2  4.2  4.2  5.2  2.5  1.9  2.4  2.9 
EU-12  -9.1  0.5  0.1  0.1  -12.7  1.4  0.1  0.2  -17.6  1.7  0.1  0.2  -13.3  2.0  0.2  0.2 
EU-15  3.5  -6.0  1.2  1.8  5.9  -6.3  1.1  0.6  1.3  -7.3  1.0  0.0  6.9  -7.2  1.0  1.0 
JPN  0.1  -0.1  -10.6  -0.5  0.6  -0.1  -9.0  -1.0  1.5  -0.5  -9.8  -1.8  0.5  -0.2  -7.1  -1.0 
KOR  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.6  0.2  1.8  0.4  0.7  -0.3  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.3 
MEX  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.8  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.7 
USA  0.1  0.5  0.4  -6.1  0.1  -0.1  0.4  -5.9  0.0  -0.5  0.2  -4.6  0.3  0.4  0.2  -6.0 
ROW  2.7  2.8  5.8  2.2  3.0  2.0  2.8  1.4  3.4  1.4  3.0  0.0  2.5  1.9  2.2  1.1 
 
2007–2009 
BRII  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  -0.6  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 
CAN  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.6 
CHN  0.7  0.7  0.3  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.3  4.0  1.4  1.5  1.0  1.1  1.0  0.6  1.5 
EU-12  1.7  0.1  0.0  0.0  4.8  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  2.5  0.1  0.0  -0.1  4.9  0.0  0.0  -0.1 
EU-15  -0.9  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -3.4  1.0  -0.6  -1.0  -3.7  0.5  -0.5  -0.9  -4.1  0.5  -0.8  -0.8 
JPN  -0.1  -0.1  1.8  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  1.6  -0.3  -0.6  -0.3  1.3  -0.5  -0.3  -0.2  2.0  -0.5 
KOR  -0.1  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.4  -0.3  -0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.1 
MEX  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0 
USA  0.0  0.2  -0.2  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4  1.9  -0.2  -0.2  -0.4  3.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  1.6 
ROW  -0.9  -0.5  -1.4  -0.4  -1.5  -1.1  -1.0  -1.1  -1.6  -1.1  -1.1  -1.6  -0.9  -0.9  -0.8  -0.8 
Note: BRII comprises Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia.  
Source: WIOD. 
 
2.3.  EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON TRADE AND INTERNATION-
AL SUPPLY CHAINS 
This section analyses the effects of the 2008 trade 
slump on EU-27 trade structures, compared to other 
major economies such as the US and Japan. Of par-
ticular interest is whether the geographical sourcing 
patterns by industry are different to those before the 
crisis. The analysis allows an assessment to be made 
as to whether the crisis has led to a change in the 
structure  of  vertical  specialisation  in  this  respect. 
Particular  attention  is  paid  to  international  supply 
structures with respect to traded intermediates, and 
in  particular  semi-finished  products  and  parts  and 
components in the industries concerned. 
The analysis will be based on the UN Comtrade data, 
providing exports and imports at the HS 6-digit level, 
which  allows  for  differentiation  by  broad  end-use 
categories (BEC) and NACE industries. The time peri-
od covered is 2005–10. Methodologically, the study 
builds on recent attempts to decompose the trade 
slump (see e.g. Aurújo, 2009; Haddad et al., 2010; 
Levchenko and Lewis, 2009).  
2.3.1  Geographical  evolution  of  trade  structures 
during the crisis 
While  the  crisis  had  a  major  impact  on  all  major 
economies,  the  more  rapid  recovery  of  countries 
such as China has had an impact on its main trading 
partners,  e.g.  Japan.  Figure  2.4  presents  data  on 
changes in the imports of the EU-12, the EU-15, Ja-
pan and the US, by trading partner, as a percentage 
of total trade in 2007. It is immediately apparent that 
the  ‘Chemicals’  and  ‘Electrical  and  optical  equip-
ment’ industries have recovered faster than the oth-
er two industries. In all of the advanced economies 
considered,  imports  in  the  chemical  industries  in 
2010  reached  or  surpassed  2007  levels.  Japan,  in 
particular,  increased  its  imports  dramatically,  with 
those from the EU-15 rising by 34 % and from the US 
by 25 % relative to the initial trade values with these 
partners. Imports from the EU-15 and EU-12 rose in 
all the economies considered — with the exception 
of the EU-15 itself.  
The ‘Electrical and optical equipment’ industry pro-
vides  the  most  striking  example  of  rising  imports 
from China. Not only have exports to China increased 
for almost all reporters and industries, but so have 
imports  from  China.  This  is  exceptional,  given  the 
economic  crisis.  Relative  to  imports  from  China  in 
2007,  they  have  increased  by  59 %  for  the  EU-12, 
19 % for the EU-15, 39 % for Japan and 25 % for the Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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US.  Imports  from  the  EU-12  have  also  risen  quite 
substantially  for  all  reporting  countries.  While  the 
EU-12 is not a major trading partner of Japan and the 
US, and import levels are therefore quite low, intra-
EU-12 trade increased by 30 % and imports from the 
EU-15 by 24 % (see Stehrer et al. 2012b for details). 
The two industries ‘Machinery and equipment’ and 
‘Transport  equipment’  are  both  characterised  by  a 
sharp decline in imports from the EU-15, Japan and 
the US. Imports from the EU-15 decreased in most 
countries by more than 20 %. This has had a large 
impact on the total imports in these industries as the 
EU-15 is a major trading partner of all the reporters 
considered. In relative terms, most of the other ma-
jor advanced economies did not perform any better. 
Imports  from  Japan  decreased  by  25–28 %  for 
‘Transport  equipment’,  and  Japanese  imports  from 
the  US  also  plummeted  by  25–28 %.  On  the  other 
hand, transatlantic linkages remained comparatively 
stable, as EU-27 imports from the US only declined 
by 11–16 %. 
Overall, imports from China rose in all major econo-
mies  during  this  period.  Firms  maintained  their 
sourcing  connections  with  China,  even  though  im-
ports from almost all other major trading partners 
fell. These findings are in line with the results of the 
analyses in the previous section, which showed that 
China  is  essentially  the  only  country  with  growing 
shares in extra sourcing. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Changes in imports (2007–10) of total imports in 2007(%) 
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade; authors’ calculations. 
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2.3.2 Decomposition of  trade by product usage 
This  section  presents  a  more  in-depth  analysis  of 
trade during the crisis  by adding another layer. By 
decomposing the imports of an industry into trade in 
parts and components, semi-finished products, con-
sumption and capital goods, it is possible to take a 
detailed look at vertical changes in trade. Figure 2.5 
provides an overview of the import composition of 
each industry. Trade in parts and components consti-
tutes a major part of total trade in the ‘Machinery 
and  equipment’,  ‘Electrical  and  optical  equipment’ 
and ‘Transport equipment’ industries.  
Particularly in ‘Machinery and equipment’, the trade 
in parts and components was growing strongly be-
fore the crisis, with an annual rate of 19 %, exceeding 
the growth rate in consumption goods (9 %) and cap-
ital  goods  (16 %).Trade  in  parts  and  components 
does not play a role in the chemical industry, where 
semi-finished products are the dominant trade ele-
ment, comprising 67 % of total imports. 
The composition looks similar for EU-27 exports, al-
beit  with  slightly  lower  shares  of  capital  and  con-
sumption goods. 
Figure 2.6 shows the development of EU-27 imports 
by  use  categories.  In  most  industries,  there  is  a 
sharper decline in imports of semi-finished products 
and parts and components than in imports of con-
sumption  goods.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this 
strong decrease in intermediate products. The first is 
that,  as  countries  become  more  vertically  special-
ised, the processing of a product at various produc-
tion stages tends to involve a number of countries. 
For this reason, trade declines not only by the value 
of the finished products which are exported, but also 
by the value of all the intermediate trade flows that 
have been traded to create it (see also Yi, 2009; Ber-
goeing et al., 2004). 
Inventory management of firms is another reason for 
the downturn in trade in intermediate products dur-
ing crisis periods, (Alessandria et al., 2011). As a reac-
tion to the demand shock, retailers and manufactur-
ers not only reduce their orders by the amount of 
the demand shock, but also reduce their inventories. 
This decrease in inventories can be seen in aggregate 
statistics over the recent crisis. Each supplier faces 
not only the demand shock from the customer, but 
also the inventory effect at each production stage. 
The effect is thus aggravated as one moves up the 
supply  chain,  from  end  consumer  to  raw  material 
supplier (Altomonte et al., 2011). The more complex 
the  supply  chains  and  the  more  they  are  spread 
across countries, the more noticeable is this so-called 
‘bullwhip’  or  ‘Forrester  effect’  (Forrester,  1961)  in 
international trade patterns. The decline in interme-
diates in ‘Transport equipment’ has not been quite 
as big as for consumer goods. This is partly explained 
by ‘just-in-time’ production, which leads to minimal 
inventories and therefore a small bullwhip effect. 
Finally, EU-27 trade is analysed with respect to the 
partner  countries  and  use  category.  Trends  before 
the crisis (2005–07) are compared with those during 
the crisis (2008–10).  To do this, annual changes in 
imports in the EU-27 are calculated for each industry, 
use category and partner (Table 2.8). 
Before  the  crisis,  EU-27  imports  of  semi-finished 
chemical  products  from  advanced  countries  in-
creased  much  faster  than  imports  of  consumer 
goods. The opposite is true of trade with the EU-12, 
where trade in consumer goods increased most. This 
indicates that the EU-12 countries strengthened their 
position as a final producer of chemical products. 
‘Machinery and equipment’ registered the strongest 
growth  rates  in  imports  of  parts  and  components. 
The annual growth in EU-27 imports between 2005 
and 2007 is impressive: 62 % for China, 47 % for Ja-
pan, 43 % for Korea, 26 % for the EU-12 and 20 % for 
the EU-15. The role of the US in the EU-27 produc-
tion networks has been decreasing, relatively speak-
ing,  as  imports  of  parts  and  components  grew  by 
‘only’ 10 %. During the crisis, imports of parts and 
components  and  semi-finished  products  fell  more 
than imports of consumption goods. Also, the trade 
in  capital  goods  dropped  significantly  as  firms  ex-
tended their investments. On the geographical front, 
it is clear that there was a similar fall in imports in 
the EU-27, the US and Japan (mostly between 10 % 
and 20 %), while imports from China increased slight-
ly overall. 
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Figure 2.5 – Decomposition of EU-27 imports, by use categories, 2010 
 
Source: UN Comtrade; authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2.6 – Development of EU-27 imports, by use categories (2008=100) 
 
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2.8 – EU-27 imports by partner, industry and use category: import share of partner in 2007, annual growth 2005–07 and 2008–10 ( %) 
   EU-12  EU-15  Japan  USA  BRII  China  Korea  ROW 
   2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10  2007  05-07  08-10 
Chemicals                                                                         
Consumption (33%)  3.3  30.0  10.0  76.4  11.0  -6.0  1.1  5.0  -8.0  8.2  8.0  6.0  0.5  10.0  24.0  1.1  25.0  2.0  0.3  59.0  -50.0  9.0  16.0  5.0 
Semi-finished (67%)  3.4  21.0  -7.0  67.0  14.0  -5.0  2.1  10.0  -3.0  9.0  15.0  -4.0  2.9  27.0  -5.0  2.1  23.0  4.0  0.5  18.0  0.0  13.0  20.0  0.0 
Machinery and equipment                                                                         
Capital goods (45%)  5.2  26.0  -8.0  63.6  19.0  -21.0  6.3  14.0  -21.0  5.6  15.0  -18.0  0.8  28.0  -16.0  7.1  46.0  -4.0  1.5  30.0  -26.0  10.0  22.0  -18.0 
Consumption (10%)  14.4  22.0  -2.0  48.1  6.0  -10.0  1.5  -1.0  -6.0  3.1  9.0  -13.0  0.3  -6.0  17.0  20.9  16.0  5.0  2.2  3.0  1.0  9.5  18.0  -4.0 
Parts and components (44%)  8.8  26.0  -15.0  60.0  20.0  -15.0  6.7  47.0  -12.0  7.3  10.0  -8.0  1.2  29.0  -14.0  5.7  62.0  0.0  0.9  43.0  -11.0  9.4  28.0  -6.0 
Semi-finished (1%)  15.5  19.0  -17.0  55.0  11.0  -10.0  2.4  12.0  0.0  2.9  13.0  -12.0  1.3  16.0  -22.0  13.3  22.0  4.0  0.4  0.0  7.0  9.2  17.0  -2.0 
Electrical and optical eqpt                                                                         
Capital goods (46%)  6.8  11.0  4.0  42.8  2.0  -9.0  4.5  -8.0  -6.0  10.5  12.0  -11.0  1.0  15.0  1.0  19.6  11.0  7.0  3.2  -11.0  -22.0  11.6  0.0  -1.0 
Consumption (11%)  18.9  47.0  4.0  34.9  10.0  -9.0  3.0  3.0  -10.0  6.2  6.0  2.0  0.6  0.0  -15.0  17.6  26.0  -3.0  2.8  34.0  -11.0  15.9  7.0  -1.0 
Parts and components (35%)  7.0  19.0  -2.0  42.2  6.0  -6.0  5.5  -8.0  -17.0  7.7  -2.0  -9.0  0.8  18.0  -2.0  13.5  20.0  10.0  4.6  23.0  10.0  18.6  7.0  -2.0 
Semi-finished (8%)  17.7  21.0  -4.0  47.8  17.0  -8.0  2.8  23.0  -1.0  3.4  11.0  -3.0  1.1  24.0  -7.0  12.8  24.0  3.0  1.1  46.0  10.0  13.2  22.0  1.0 
Transport equipment                                                                         
Capital goods (20%)  4.7  30.0  -15.0  67.7  18.0  -13.0  1.5  23.0  -12.0  10.7  -5.0  -20.0  1.1  29.0  28.0  1.5  23.0  46.0  2.3  -1.0  16.0  10.5  1.0  -12.0 
Consumption (39%)  9.4  34.0  0.0  71.2  10.0  -14.0  7.6  7.0  -21.0  3.5  29.0  -32.0  0.5  13.0  6.0  0.5  26.0  -9.0  3.1  4.0  -26.0  4.2  19.0  -3.0 
Parts and components (41%)  12.8  20.0  -4.0  66.7  13.0  -11.0  3.2  9.0  -6.0  8.4  10.0  -1.0  1.1  16.0  -10.0  1.3  26.0  6.0  0.6  48.0  11.0  6.0  18.0  -7.0 
 
Notes: The first (grey) column for each country is the share of this partner in EU-27 imports in this category in 2007. The second column is the annual growth rate in 2005–07 and the third column is the growth rate 
for 2008–10.  
Source: UN Comtrade; authors’ calculations.Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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‘Transport equipment’ registered a significant drop 
in  imports  of  consumption  goods  from  the  US            
(-32 %), Japan (-21 %) and Korea (-26 %) — far greater 
than intra-EU-27 changes (-12 %). On the other hand, 
overseas  production  network  linkages  remained 
fairly stable or were further strengthened, as in the 
case of China and Korea, while imports of parts and 
components from the EU-15 dropped by 11 %. 
Finally,  Japan’s  traditional  image  as  a  prominent 
player in the ‘Electrical and optical equipment’ mar-
ket seems to be starting to crumble. Even before the 
crisis, EU-27 imports of capital goods and parts and 
components were falling by 8 % on an annual basis. 
This trend continued during the crisis, with the larg-
est drop in parts and components trade (17 %). By 
contrast,  the  importance  of  the  EU-12,  China  and 
Korea  increased  significantly  before  the  crisis,  and 
China  and  Korea  even  increased  their  trade  levels 
during  the  crisis  in  capital  and  parts  and  compo-
nents. China’s role as an assembly country and pro-
vider of consumption goods has decreased in  very 
recent years, whereas its direct integration into pro-
duction networks as a provider of parts and compo-
nents has increased. 
2.4.  OFF-SHORING  DECISIONS  OF  EU  MANUFACTURING 
FIRMS 
This section analyses the decision by European man-
ufacturing  firms  to  move  their  production  to  loca-
tions abroad (referred to as offshoring). There is a 
strong relationship between offshoring and the trade 
in intermediates, analysed in the previous section. If 
firms move production activities to their own or in-
dependent firms abroad, this will inevitably increase 
the  imports  of  intermediates.  However,  offshoring 
may also go beyond a simple substitution of domes-
tic production by imports. If new production facilities 
abroad have larger capacity than the previous activi-
ties at home, this can lead to positive ‘second-round 
effects’  (when  the  new  locations  need  a  higher 
amount of input or support from the home base). 
Offshoring is not only a strategy to cut costs, but is 
also driven by the need to open up new markets and 
to operate close to key clients. 
Against this background, this section investigates the 
following questions: Which types of European manu-
facturing firms offshore their production activities? 
What are the main destination countries for offshor-
ing?  How  is  offshoring  related  to  innovation  and 
company performance? What are the short-term and 
long-term  trends  in  offshoring?  Has  the  2008/09 
economic crisis altered or even halted the trend to-
wards  stronger  fragmentation  of  firms’  global  pro-
duction chains? Or, on the contrary, have companies 
become  more  active  again  so  as  to  better  control 
their cost base at a time when production volumes 
are falling? 
The  data  come  from  the  European  Manufacturing 
Survey (EMS), a survey of product, process, service 
and organisational innovation in European manufac-
turing. EMS data are available for the two periods 
mid-2004  to  mid-2006  and  2007  to  mid-2009.  The 
sample includes firms from the four industrial sec-
tors;  they are studied in more detail below. 
2.4.1 Which firms offshore? 
Around 20 % of all firms in the four manufacturing 
sectors, covered by the 2009 survey, moved part of 
their production offshore to their own or independ-
ent  firms  abroad  in  the  period  from  2007  to  mid-
2009. Germany, the largest  country in the sample, 
has a share of offshoring firms of around 16 % in the 
four manufacturing sectors mentioned above.  
If the two periods — mid-2004 to mid-2006 and 2007 
to mid-2009 — are compared, six out of seven coun-
tries show a decrease in the proportion of firms with 
offshore production. Manufacturing firms were less 
inclined to offshore during the crisis of 2008/09. Eu-
ropean  manufacturing  companies  tended  to  main-
tain production at home and make use of the capaci-
ty at their existing locations, rather than look for new 
offshoring ventures. 
Production offshoring is a strategy favoured by large 
firms  in  particular  (see  Figure  2.7).  In  2007-2009 
some 41 % of the firms with more than 250 employ-
ees  relocated  parts  of  their  production  abroad, 
whereas the corresponding share among small firms 
of less than 50 employees was only 8 %. During the 
crisis, offshoring decreased in all firm size categories. 
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Figure 2.7 – Share of firms with production offshoring, by size category 
 
Source: European Manufacturing Survey 2006, 2009 
 
Firms in the electrical and optical equipment industry 
and automotive and transport equipment manufac-
turers are particularly active in production relocation 
(25 % and 24 % respectively), followed by machinery 
and equipment manufacturers (18 %) and the chemi-
cal industry (14 %). The chemical industry has tradi-
tionally been quite reserved about production relo-
cation, due to the high capital intensity, the high de-
gree of process integration and the low labour inten-
sity of its production processes. As in the case of the 
different sizes of firms, offshoring is decreasing in all 
four sectors. 
2.4.2 Offshoring motives and destinations 
According to the data, cost reduction is the dominant 
motive  for  relocating  production  activities  abroad: 
72 % of all firms with offshoring activities stated that 
labour costs had triggered their offshoring decision. 
Compared to the previous survey, the importance of 
labour  costs  decreased  slightly  (by  4  percentage 
points) (Figure 2.8). 
Market-related  motives,  such  as  proximity  to  cus-
tomers or market expansion, gained far fewer votes. 
The least relevant motives for production offshoring 
were better access to knowledge, and taxes and sub-
sidies in the target country. 
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Figure 2.8 – Main motives for production relocations 
 
 
Note: Multiple answers allowed. 
Source: European Manufacturing Survey 2006, 2009. 
 
Besides  the  all-important  consideration  of  labour 
cost savings, there are usually a host of factors that 
make locations attractive as destinations for produc-
tion offshoring. This is reflected in the high number 
of multiple answers, as shown in Figure 2.8. Besides 
cutting costs, production offshoring also has the goal 
of expanding activities and opening up new markets; 
this is reflected in the proportion of motives related 
to expansion of markets and proximity to key cus-
tomers abroad (which has gained importance since 
the previous survey). 
There  is  also  a  strong  link  between  motives  and 
choice of destination country for production offshor-
ing. Regression analysis indicates that when compa-
nies are striving to reduce labour costs, the EU-12, 
China  and  other  Asian  countries  are  the  preferred 
target regions. The  main difference between Asian 
countries and the EU-12 is that the labour cost mo-
tive is linked to the market expansion motive in the 
case of Asian countries, but not in the case of the EU-
12. The fact that markets in the EU-12 and Eastern 
Europe  can  more  easily  be  supplied  with  exports 
from the home country might account for the lack of 
market and customer incentives in these countries. 
Low transportation costs and access to knowledge, 
by contrast, are motives related to offshoring to the Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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EU-15.  Offshoring  to  North  America  is  significantly 
related to the need to be close to important custom-
ers. 
The EU-12 Member States are the preferred target 
region  for  production  relocations,  accounting  for 
30% of all valid responses from offshoring companies 
(Figure 2.9). Compared to the previous period (mid-
2004 to mid-2006) their share dropped by 7 percent-
age points. 
China is the second most attractive destination, ac-
counting for 28 % of all valid answers in 2009. In con-
trast to the EU-12, China has become more attractive 
than  before.  In  particular  small  and  medium-sized 
companies intensified their production relocation to 
China (from 6 % and 15 %, respectively, to 20 % and 
33 % of all offshoring firms). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the share of firms that moved production 
offshore  to  China  remained  virtually  unchanged  if 
one looks at the whole sample rather than just the 
offshoring  firms,  because  the  overall  propensity  to 
offshore  has  declined.  Relocations  to  the  EU-15 
Member States remained stable, at around 13 % of 
all offshoring firms. The EU-15 countries are still the 
third most attractive region for relocation for Euro-
pean  manufacturing  companies.  They  are  followed 
by other Asian countries excluding China (10 %) and 
non-EU Eastern Europe (8 %). 
Overall, it can be concluded that farshoring to Asian 
countries has gained in attractiveness for offshoring 
firms, while nearshoring to the EU-12 countries has 
decreased noticeably. As a result, production reloca-
tion between EU Member States (intra-EU-27) is de-
creasing while extra-EU-27 relocation activities have 
gained ground. 
 
Figure 2.9 – Target regions of production offshoring, only offshoring firms 
 
Note: Multiple answers allowed 
Source: European Manufacturing Survey 2006, 2009 
 
2.4.3 Characteristics of offshoring firms 
The  empirical  evidence  presented  above  indicates 
that firm size, sector and location of the firm strongly 
determine offshoring decisions. These determinants 
have been analysed further using multivariate analy-
sis to gain a better understanding of which firms off-
shore and which do not.  
The  analysis  shows  the  relationship  between  the 
decision to offshore and each explanatory variable 
included in the regression analysis, holding all other 
explanatory variables constant. The dependent vari-
able of the analysis is a dummy variable that is one if 
the firm offshored production activities to its own or 
independent firms between 2006 and 2009.  
Explanatory variables include first a number of varia-
bles that describe firm characteristics, including firm 
size, revenue per employee as a measure of produc-
tivity, the share of exports on turnover or a dummy 
variable that is one if the firm is a supplier of inter-
mediary goods. Based on the literature, larger, more 
productive firms are assumed have a higher propen-
sity  to  move  their  production  activities  abroad. 
Moreover, an intermediate  supplier may feel com-
pelled to follow customers who move their produc-
tion activities offshore. 
A second set of explanatory variables describes the 
innovation  behaviour  of  the  firm.  These  variables 
include R&D expenditure as  a share of turnover,  a Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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dummy variable that is one if the firm has introduced 
a product innovation in the period 2006-2008, and 
the share of new products on turnover. If more pro-
ductive firms have a higher propensity to offshore, 
then  they  may  also  be  more  innovation  active. 
Moreover,  offshoring  of  production  may  lead  to  a 
new  division  of  labour  within  the  firm,  where  the 
parent company focuses on activities such as R&D, 
innovation and marketing. 
A third set of variables describe the production pro-
cess  of  the  firm.  Two  dummy  variables  indicate 
whether the firm produces simple or complex prod-
ucts consisting of many parts. The baseline case for 
both  variables  is  medium  complex  products.  Two 
other dummy variables show whether the firm pro-
duces single units or in large batches. Here, the base-
line case is small batches. Moreover, three dummies 
are included that gauge the degree of standardisa-
tion in product development. It is assumed that firms 
that produce complex, highly-customised products in 
single production unit may have less opportunity to 
offshore because they rely very much on a close in-
teraction with the customer, and are therefore more 
bound to their location than producers of standard-
ised goods in large batches. 
Finally, the regression includes explanatory variables 
that control for the  sector  and the location of the 
firm to test if the differences in the offshoring pro-
pensity  across  sectors  and  countries  can  be  ex-
plained by the firm characteristics listed above. The 
regression also tests the assumption that the degree 
of product market regulation in a country is related 
to offshoring, i.e. that firms relocate production be-
cause of too much regulation. The variable product 
market regulation provided by the OECD has been 
introduced into the regression. This variable captures 
various  aspects  of  regulation,  such  as  barriers  to 
trade  and  investment,  state  control  or  barriers  to 
entrepreneurship,  in  one  single  number  for  each 
country. 
A probit regression model is estimated to analyse the 
linkages between firm characteristics and the manu-
facturing firm’s probability of offshoring production 
activities. The probit model is given as 
* YX     
where Y
* can be viewed as an indicator for whether 
the latent dependent variable Y – the probability of 
offshoring – is positive 
*
*
{ 0}
1 if  0 i.e.  0
1
0                        otherwise
Y
YX
Y


    
 

with  X’  denoting  the  vector  of  binary  explanatory 
variables and β being the parameter reflecting the 
marginal effect of a discrete change in the probabil-
ity to offshore for the explanatory variables. Ε is the 
error term, which is assumed to be of zero mean and 
with a standard deviation of σ
2. 
The results are presented in Table 2.9 which shows 
the results from the analysis of factors determining 
outshoring  decisions  between  2006  and  2009.  The 
first three columns include dummy variables control-
ling for firms' home countries. The right three colums 
contains  results  from  controlling  for  the  degree  of 
product market regulation in home countries. 
The results confirm a positive relationship between 
firm  size  and  offshoring,  holding  all  other  factors 
constant. If two firms are the same in all variables 
employed in the regression except for size, the larger 
firm  will,  on  average,  have  a  higher  propensity  to 
offshore. A similar positive relationship is also found 
for revenue per employee and offshoring. 
The relationship between innovation and offshoring 
is not clear cut. Offshoring firms, on the one hand, 
spend slightly less on R&D than non-offshoring firms; 
on the other hand, they introduce new products on-
to  the  market  significantly  more  often.  This  result 
points to the fact that offshoring is not only a passive 
reaction to rising wage costs, but has to be seen in 
the wider context of the international expansion of 
firms. Offshoring firms are also characterised by the 
development  and  production  of  a  standard  pro-
gramme of less complex products.  
The results clearly show that there is a strong rela-
tionship between the firm’s sector affiliation and the 
probability  that  it  will  offshore  production  abroad. 
Firms that belong to the machinery and equipment, 
electrical  and  optical  equipment,  and  transport 
equipment sectors show a higher propensity to off-
shore  than  those  in  the  sector  of  chemicals  and 
chemical products.  
otherwise 
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Moreover, the results confirm that not only do sec-
tor and firm size explain the propensity to offshore 
to a larger degree than firms’ characteristics, but so 
does the firm’s home country. Being a Dutch or a 
Swiss firm has a significant positive effect on offshor-
ing,  compared  to  being  a  German  firm.  Austrian, 
Danish,  Finnish,  Spanish  and  Slovenian/Croatian 
firms do not differ significantly from German firms in 
their propensity to offshore. 
The  regression  also  tests  the  assumption  that  the 
degree of product market regulation in a country is 
related to offshoring, i.e. that firms relocate produc-
tion  because  of  too  much  regulation.  The  analysis 
does not support this assumption. 
Table 2.9 – Probit regression on the probability of being an offshoring firm, 2006–2009 
   2006     2009 
 Propensity to offshore production  Coefficient  Sig.  Std.err.     Coefficient  Sig.  Std.err. 
General                      
Size (log function of number of employees)  0.101  ***  0.007     0.094  ***  0.007 
log revenue per employee  0.041  ***  0.015     0.05  ***  0.016 
Export share (% of turnover)  0.001  ***  0     0.001  ***  0 
Intermediate supplier*  -0.037  *  0.019     -0.035  *  0.02 
Innovation                      
Share of R&D expenditure (% of turnover)  -0.004  **  0.002     -0.005  ***  0.002 
Product innovator (new to firm innovation)*  0.053  **  0.021     0.05  **  0.022 
Share of product innovations (% of turnover)  -0.001  **  0.001     -0.001  *  0.001 
Product complexity (a)                      
Simple products*  0.035     0.037     0.04     0.038 
Complex products*  -0.046  **  0.02     -0.044  **  0.02 
Batch size (b)                      
Single unit production*  -0.02     0.022     -0.032     0.022 
Large batch*  0.068  **  0.029     0.04     0.029 
Product development (c)                      
According to customers’ specification*  -0.007     0.02     -0.009     0.02 
Standard programme*  0.064  **  0.031     0.064  **  0.031 
No product development*  -0.069     0.039     -0.088  ***  0.038 
Sector (d)                      
Machinery and equipment*  0.169  ***  0.037     0.161  ***  0.037 
Electrical and optical equipment*  0.224  ***  0.039     0.216  ***  0.039 
Transport equipment*  0.178  ***  0.055     0.154  ***  0.056 
Country (e)                      
AT*  0.031     0.037             
CH*  0.064  ***  0.025             
NL*  0.142  ***  0.046             
DK*  0.088     0.072             
HR & SI*  -0.057     0.038             
FI*  0.033     0.074             
ES*  -0.033     0.046             
Product market regulation              -0.071     0.046 
Sample size  2,476           2,359       
Pseudo R
2  0.1502           0.1416       
 
Note: (*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Reference groups: (a) medium complexity, (b) medium batch, (c) basic 
programme with alternative, (d) chemicals and chemical products, (e) Germany. Difference in means of the independent variables signifi-
cantly diverge from zero, probability values of 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***). 
Source: European Manufacturing Survey 2006, 2009. Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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2.5.  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The  study  provides  an  overview  of  the  tendencies 
observed  in  the  internationalisation  of  production 
since 1995 and over the period of the recent crisis. 
As outlined above, there is no single approach that 
allows  the  many  facets  of  this  phenomenon  to  be 
captured at the various levels of aggregation: from 
single-firm  decisions  to  overall  industry-level  pat-
terns and macroeconomic consequences. Therefore, 
various approaches have been used here to analyse 
this internationalisation process, in order to highlight 
some  of  the  main  aspects.  Based  on  the  recently 
compiled world input-output tables from the WIOD 
project, ongoing trends in the vertical specialisation 
patterns for the EU countries and other major econ-
omies have been documented. Generally, one finds 
that, for the EU, the integration process since 1995 
has intensified the internationalisation of production 
within Europe considerably — and the  EU-12 coun-
tries play a particular role in this respect. But the rise 
of China as a major partner is also well documented 
in this exercise. An important finding is that during 
the recent crisis there was a tendency towards less 
integration,  which  manifested  itself  in  the  resur-
gence of domestic rather than foreign sourcing. The 
only foreign country that has continued to increase 
its share in the EU sourcing structures has been Chi-
na.  Although  this  phenomenon  of  ‘backshoring’ 
might be caused by those industries that have been 
most affected by the crisis, it might also be indicative 
of a rupture in the trend towards more offshoring 
and ‘farshoring’. Albeit to varying degrees, the trends 
seem to be similar for all four sectors that have been 
studied in more detail. 
The economic and financial crisis that broke out in 
2008  was  accompanied  by  a  great  fall  in  foreign 
trade volumes. The extent of the trade collapse was 
greater than the decline in output. Thus international 
trade can be regarded as one of the great ‘victims’ of 
the world crisis. At the same time, it was also one of 
the channels through which the crisis was transmit-
ted  between  countries.  It  seems  that  production 
chains in the first phase of the crisis had an amplify-
ing effect in terms of the decrease in international 
trade, which is referred to as the ‘bullwhip effect’. 
On the other hand, there is a certain stabilising effect 
created by value chains, at least in the slightly longer 
run. This may be caused by the reversal of the bull-
whip effect, as well as by the fact that companies 
inside  the  value  chain  helped  each  other,  e.g.  by 
providing trade finance. With regard to the changing 
role  of  the  internationalisation  of  production  as  a 
result of the crisis, it is obvious that the internation-
alisation of production is here to stay. 
The  focus  on  industry-level  data  brought  about  by 
using  trade  statistics,  or  trade  statistics  combined 
with detailed input-output tables, might hide aspects 
of this internationalisation process that can only be 
seen at the level of firms. The last section investigat-
ed offshoring — the relocation of production activi-
ties to locations abroad — by European firms. The 
analyses show that the share of offshoring firms de-
creased across most countries, sectors and firm sizes 
between the periods 2004-06 and 2007-09. This may 
indicate that firms focus on utilising their activities at 
home in times of (upcoming) economic crisis.  
The main target regions for offshoring by European 
firms  are  the  EU-12,  China,  the  EU-15  and  other 
Asian  locations  excluding  China.  Despite  a  general 
decrease in the share of offshoring firms, farshoring 
to  Asia  and  China,  in  particular,  has  increased.  By 
contrast, nearshoring to the EU-12 has become less 
attractive, though it is still the most important target 
region. An explanation for this shift may be an in-
crease in labour costs in the EU-12 countries, cou-
pled with their geographical proximity, which allows 
firms to serve these markets from their home coun-
tries. 
The dominant motive for production offshoring is the 
desire to reduce labour costs, followed (at some con-
siderable  distance)  by  proximity  to  customers  and 
market expansion. Expected  labour cost reductions 
explain offshoring to the EU-12, Asia and China, in 
particular. However, in contrast to the EU-12, where 
the offshoring decision is dominated solely by poten-
tial labour cost savings, customer and market expan-
sion motives are also significantly related to offshor-
ing activities involving Asia and China. 
Characteristics of firms that have offshored produc-
tion  activities  include  larger  firm  size  and  greater 
revenue  per  employee,  a  standard  programme  of 
less  complex  products,  and  a  higher  probability  of 
introducing new products to the market. Producers 
of  electrical  and  optical  equipment  have  a  higher 
propensity to offshore production than do firms in 
the other three sectors considered. Previous experi-
ence of production offshoring goes a long  way to-
wards  determining  production  offshoring  today. 
Product  market  regulation  does  not  seem  to  be  a 
push factor for firms to offshore production activities 
abroad. 
The increasing use of foreign sourcing for the con-
tent of exports in the manufacturing industries illus-
trates  well  how  globalisation  has  impacted  firms’ 
value chains. The increased pace of globalisation has 
improved  firms’  and  industries’  opportunities  to 
source  inputs  and  intermediates  from  locations 
which  have  comparative  advantages  in  producing Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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these inputs and intermediates which is now better 
reflected in different parts of firms’ value chains. The 
higher use of foreign content by industries that are 
more  highly  dependent  on  intermediates  clearly 
shows that this is key for competitiveness. 
The globalisation of value chains gives rise to some 
policy challenges due to the new opportunities and 
challenges  which  the  increased  globalisation  leads 
to. Some of these policy challenges are already famil-
iar to some extent and relate to policies aimed at 
reaping the benefits of openness for trade and FDI. 
The growing importance of intermediate goods for 
exports and competitiveness of firms illustrates that 
the costs of national borders have grown as trade 
costs are more important for intra-firm and vertical 
trade within global value chains (GVCs) compared to 
traditional trade where intermediates and inputs are 
produced  domestically.  Raising  barriers  to  interna-
tional  trade  and  direct  investments  can  therefore 
disrupt GVCs for domestic firms that source interme-
diates from abroad. As pointed out in the Communi-
cation  ‘Trade,  Growth  and  World  Affairs’  and  the 
associated Staff Working Document ‘Trade as a driv-
er of prosperity’, openness to trade facilitates local 
companies’ integration in GVCs  which makes them 
more productive. And more than two thirds of EU 
imports  consist  of  intermediate  products  which 
boost EU industry productivity.
41 
Multinational  enterprises  have  been  driving  the 
emergence of GVCs through intra-firm trade and FDI 
flows. In order to reap the  benefits of globalisation 
and GVCs on a broader scale, participation in GVCs, 
particularly of SMEs, needs to increase. In many ca s-
es, SMEs lack the expertise and capacity to engage in 
                                                           
41   European Commission (2010) "Trade as a driver of pros-
perity". Commission staff working document accompany-
ing the Commission’s Communication on “Trade, Growth 
and World affairs”. 
 
international trade directly; more opportunities for 
creating  or  strengthening  linkages  between  local 
firms  and  firms  that  are  already  engaged  in  GVCs 
would be beneficial. 
The emergence of GVCs and increased participation 
of countries also give rise to challenges. As is well 
established, most of the value is created in the upper 
and lower part of the value chains where activities  
such as  R&D, branding, design, management, mar-
keting and sales services are located. While emerging 
countries formulate policies on how to move up the 
value  chain,  policies  to  keep  the  comparative  ad-
vantage in high value-added activities are more rele-
vant for the EU. Intangible assets are crucial in this 
respect. Investments in intangibles are essential for 
innovation and important for capturing larger shares 
of value in the value chains. Investments in intangi-
bles  enable  firms  to  create  superior  capabilities 
which help them acquire unique skills or suppliers of 
unique  factors  indispensable  to  the  whole  value 
chain. Firms that possess such unique, idiosyncratic, 
specific factors in the GVC capture the largest shares 
of  value-added.  Innovation  is  the  most  important 
source for capturing value-added and developing or 
keeping  competitive  advantages.  The  oft-cited  ex-
amples of the Nokia 95 model and the iPhone illus-
trate  that  the  locational  advantages  of  the  home 
countries for activities in the upper part of the value 
chains  relate  to  their  attractiveness  for  innovation 
and the development of intangible assets. Innovation 
policies are therefore obvious candidates. But con-
sideration should also be given to policies that help 
localise factors that are essential for activities which 
capture large shares of value-added. Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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ANNEX 1. THE WORLD INPUT-OUTPUT DATABASE (WIOD) 
 
BOX 2.1 – THE WORLD INPUT-OUTPUT DATABASE (WIOD)
42 
 
The  data  used  are  taken  from  the  World  Input-Output  Database  (WIOD),  which  became  available  in  April  2012  (see 
www.wiod.org) and was compiled within the EU Framework programme. These data provide international supply and use and 
input-output tables for a set of 41 countries (the EU-27, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, the US and the Rest of World) over the period 1995–2009. It was compiled on the basis of national 
accounts, national supply and use tables and detailed trade data on goods and services, combining information for 59 products 
and 35 industries. Corresponding data at the industry level allow the splitting up of value-added into capital and labour income. 
For detailed information see Timmer et al. (2012). 
 
This  results  in  a  world  input-output  database  for  41  (including  the  Rest  of  World)  countries  and  35  industries,  i.e.  the 
intermediates demand block is of the dimension 1 435x1 435, plus additional rows on value-added and columns on final demand 
categories. The outline of such a world input-output table is presented below. Each country listed vertically sources intermediates 
from its own industries and from other countries’ industries. Together with value-added from this country, the level of gross 
output is obtained. Furthermore, each country also demands products from its own economy and the other economies for final 
use, such as consumption and gross fixed capital formation. The horizontal view shows what each country’s industries provide to 
industries in its own country and the other countries, and as final demand for domestic and foreign consumers. Gross output 
produced in one country equals the value of demand for each country’s industries.  
 
Outline of world input-output table (industry by industry) 
 
 
                                                           
42   The WIOD project was funded by the FP7 SSH research programme.  Chapter 2 – The EU Industry in the Global Value Chain 
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ANNEX 2. THE EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING SURVEY 
The European Manufacturing Survey (EMS) investigates technological and non-technological innovation in Eu-
ropean industry. It focuses on fields such as technical modernisation of value-adding processes, the introduc-
tion of innovative organisational concepts, including international offshoring and outsourcing of production 
and R&D activities, and new business models for complementing the product portfolio with innovative ser-
vices. The questions on these indicators have been agreed upon in the EMS consortium and are surveyed in all 
the participating countries. Additionally, some countries ask questions on specific topics. The underlying idea 
of the question design is to have a common core of questions asked consistently over several survey rounds; to 
modify other common questions in a survey round in order to correspond to actual trends, problems and top-
ics; and to provide space for some country- or project-specific topics. 
In most countries, EMS is carried out as a paper-based survey at company level. In order to prepare for multi-
national analyses, the national data undergo a joint harmonisation procedure. 
The latest survey – EMS 2009 – was carried out in 13 countries. Information on the utilisation of innovative 
organisation and technology concepts in the generation of products and services, as well as performance indi-
cators such as productivity, flexibility and quality was collected for more than 3,500 companies from the man-
ufacturing sector in these countries. 
The dataset employed in this report was compiled using those country surveys that included questions on the 
companies’ production relocation behaviour, conducted in nine European countries. It includes the Austrian, 
Croatian, German, Dutch, Slovenian, Spanish and Swiss datasets collected in 2009 and 2006. The Danish and 
Finnish datasets are only available for the 2009 round, as the respective partners joined the EMS network after 
2006. While most partners sent out their questionnaires by mail, the Finnish and Danish data were collected 
using an online questionnaire. Those asked to fill in the questionnaires were the production managers or CEOs 
of the manufacturing firms contacted. 
This report focuses on actual trends and developments in production relocation activities of European manu-
facturing companies in the following industrial sectors: chemicals/chemical products (NACE 24), machinery 
and equipment (NACE 29), electrical and optical equipment (NACE 30–33) and transport equipment (NACE 34–
35). 
Table A.2.1 – Sample of surveyed firms, by firm size, country and sector, 2006 and 2009 
   2006  2009 
Firm size  N  %  N  % 
Up to 49  435  29.96  476  33.36 
50 to 249  669  46.07  663  46.46 
250 and more  348  23.97  288  20.18 
Sector  N  %  N  % 
Chemicals/chemical products 
(a)  170  11.71  180  12.61 
Machinery & equipment 
(b)  617  42.49  628  44.01 
Electrical & optical equipment 
(c)  537  36.98  507  35.53 
Transport equipment 
(d)  128  8.82  112  7.85 
Country  N  %  N  % 
Germany  847  58.33  635  44.5 
Austria  89  6.13  102  7.15 
Switzerland  299  20.59  303  21.23 
Netherlands  89  6.13  116  8.13 
Denmark        143  10.02 
Croatia  40  2.75  24  1.68 
Finland        42  2.94 
Spain  56  3.86  32  2.24 
Slovenia  32  2.2  30  2.1 
Total  1452     1427    
Note: (a) NACE 24, (b) NACE 29, (c) NACE 30–33, (d) NACE 34–35. 
Source: European Manufacturing Survey 2006, 2009. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
ENERGY CONTENT IN EXPORTS AND ECO-INNOVATION 
 
The  prices  of  energy  commodities,  particularly  oil, 
have risen sharply in the last decade (see Figure 3.1). 
Some of the causes are structural, such as globalisa-
tion  and  the  increasing  demand  from  developing 
countries, limited fossil-fuel resources and an overall 
increase in exploration costs, and these tend to lead 
to permanent energy-price increases. Cyclical factors 
such as the considerable rigidity of energy demand in 
the short term; the failure to fully anticipate its fast 
growth, as shown by preceding low levels of explora-
tion investment and spare capacity; or concerns re-
lated  to  geopolitical  events  were  often  the  major 
causes  behind  some  of  the  recurrent  energy  price 
hikes and volatility observed. In addition there has 
been  a  significant  increase  in  financial  investment 
flows  into  energy  commodity  derivative  markets. 
While the debate on the relative importance of the 
multiple  factors  influencing  energy  prices  is  still 
open, it is clear that energy commodity markets have 
become more closely linked to financial markets. 
Figure 3.1 – Crude oil spot prices (USD/barrel) 
 
Source: IMF. 
Rising energy price and volatility levels have a series 
of potential effects on businesses, production costs, 
economic activity or external accounts and competi-
tiveness. These effects will be larger for countries or 
sectors that are less energy-efficient, more special-
ised  in  energy-intensive  products  or  more  energy-
dependent  (e.g.  countries  more  heavily  dependent 
on imported fossil fuels). 
This chapter studies the energy content in exports 
and energy-efficiency trends over the past 15 years 
in the context of key economic developments such 
as  the  globalisation  of  industrial  activities,  invest-
ments  in  energy-efficient  technologies  and  eco-
innovation. Their impact on competitiveness is ana-
lysed at country, sector and firm level. Section 3.1 
analyses the developments and the improvements in 
overall energy productivity and investments in more 
energy-efficient technologies at an international lev-
el.  Section  3.2  analyses  the  interplay  between  the 
trends in the energy content in exports and globali-
sation,  their  impact  on  competitiveness  and  the 
prominent role played by industry and services. This 
is  a  novel  integrated  analysis  (mapping)  of  energy 
use per sector at domestic and global levels based on 
the  World  Input  Output  Database  (WIOD)  made 
available recently. Section 3.3 analyses the evidence 
for  the  adoption  and  development  of  eco-
innovations by EU firms and how this translates into 
performance and competitiveness, focusing on ener-
gy-efficiency process technologies and products. Sec-
tion 3.4 draws conclusions. 
3.1.  ENERGY  EFFICIENCY  FROM  AN  ECONOMIC  PERSPEC-
TIVE 
This section provides a short analysis of the global 
trends in energy efficiency in the last 15 years using 
the World Input Output Database (WIOD). A cross-
country  comparison  of  energy-efficiency  perfor-
mance  makes  it  possible  to  identify  and  introduce 
such related key economic developments as the in-
ternationalisation  of  production  chains  or  invest-
ments in energy-efficient technologies, underpinning 
the more detailed analyses (at country, sector and 
firm level) that follow in the other sections.  
The WIOD accounts for approximately 85 percent of 
the world’s production. The world input-output data 
is reported for 41 countries (the EU-27 countries, 13 
other  major  world  economies  and  the  rest  of  the 
world) and 35 sectors (NACE rev. 1) over the period 
1995-2009 (see Box 2.2 in Chapter 2 of this report). 
Most importantly for this chapter, the economic data 
is linked to environmental accounts and energy use. 
The WIOD database considers the use-side of energy 
and  reports  ‘gross  energy  use’  covering  the  trans-
formation of primary energy into other forms of en-
ergy like electricity and heat, as well as the final use 
of energy. Energy is reported in terajoules of crude-
oil inputs. As a general rule, throughout this chapter 
the other economic variables used to compute ener-
gy-efficiency  indicators  and  ratios  are  first  trans-
formed into constant prices.  Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Figure 3.2 shows the patterns of energy consumption 
and economic output (per capita) for the European 
Union and its most important competitors (as well as 
separately for a selection of Member States: Bulgar-
ia, Ireland and the Netherlands). Countries’ per capi-
ta GDP are plotted against the amount of energy per 
capita that was used to produce per capita GDP (PPP 
adjusted GDP was considered to be closer to the real 
level  of  economic  activity  and  output).  The  figure 
also  shows  energy-efficiency  improvements  over 
time.  Country-level  observations  for  1995  are  indi-
cated by light colours. The more recent an observa-
tion is, the darker it is plotted. 
Figure 3.2 – GDP and Energy Use per Capita (1995 – 
2009) 
 
Note:  Bulgaria  (BG),  Ireland  (IE),  United  States  (US),  Japan  (JP), 
China (CN), (South) Korea (KR), Taiwan (TW), Canada (CA), Austral-
ia (AU), Turkey (TR), Brazil (BR), India (IN), Mexico (MX), Indonesia 
(ID), and Russia (RU).  
Source: WIOD. 
A measure of energy productivity (a crude measure 
of energy efficiency) is indicated by the slope of grey 
dotted lines. The steeper the line the higher the en-
ergy productivity, meaning that less energy per capi-
ta is used to produce a unit of GDP per capita. In 
2009, energy productivity was highest in Ireland and 
lowest  in  Russia  (comparing  the  two  grey  dotted 
lines at their 2009 values, using one gigajoule of en-
ergy one person in Ireland is able to produce goods 
and services with a value of USD 215, 4 times more 
than in Russia — USD 49  — using the same amount 
of energy). It has to be noted that using purchasing 
power parities rates (instead of exchange rates) in-
creases the value of GDP — and therefore measured 
energy productivity  — in countries with a low cost of 
living.  Overall  PPP  adjustment  narrows  the  gap  in 
measured  energy  productivity  between  countries 
and regions, but leaves the trends unchanged. 
Energy  efficiency  improved  overall  in  the  period 
1995-2009  in  advanced  economies  (the  decline  in 
measured energy productivity in  2008 and 2009 in 
some countries can to a large extent be explained by 
cyclical low capacity utilisation associated  with the 
economic crisis). The European Union and Japan re-
inforced their lead in terms of energy productivity. 
EU-12  countries  as  a  whole  significantly  narrowed 
their  gap  in  energy  efficiency  vis-à-vis  the  EU-15 
(Bulgaria is one of the EU Member States with the 
lowest  energy-productivity  levels).  Conversely,  in 
countries like China, India, Taiwan and Korea energy-
efficiency  improvements  from  1995  until  2009  are 
much less perceptible. 
Energy is used in practically all production processes 
and the importance of energy efficiency as a compet-
itiveness factor is growing over time with globalisa-
tion.  The  globalisation  of  industrial  activities  tends 
overall to exert pressure to improve energy efficien-
cy and speed-up the convergence of energy produc-
tivity in industry across countries. As result, signifi-
cant  economic  changes  and  differentiated  impacts 
on  the  competitiveness  of  different  countries  and 
sectors are to be expected. Section 2 analyses the 
changes in the energy content in exports in the con-
text of the increasing global trade in intermediates 
and the internationalisation of production networks.  
Rising energy prices and volatility levels were major 
underlying drivers for the changes observed in ener-
gy  use  and  the  overall  improvement  in  energy 
productivity.  Permanent  increases  in  energy  prices 
and  volatility  levels  lead  to  significant  economic 
changes, in particular in terms of energy-saving ef-
forts  and  investments  in  energy-efficient  technolo-
gies. The search for energy savings includes choosing 
products and services with less energy content and 
more  energy-efficient  production  technologies.  A 
prominent example is the development and use of 
more energy-efficient consumer durables and capital 
goods.  Typically,  they  are  the  result  of  investment 
decisions comparing higher initial capital costs with 
expected  future  savings  in  energy  operating  costs. 
This example also provides a straightforward illustra-
tion of the well-known limitations to the ability of  
obtaining  energy-efficiency  improvements  in  the 
short run (due, for example, to the long lifetimes of  
the  capital  equipment)  versus  a  higher  degree  of 
responsiveness in the medium and long run
43. 
The WIOD data is now linked to country -level data 
from the Penn World Tables 7.0.
44 Figure 3.3 plots 
                                                           
43   See e.g. Berndt and Wood (1975, 1979), Griffin and Gregory 
(1976), Pindyck (1979), Rosenberg (1994), Atkeson and Kehoe 
(1999) or Gillingham et al. (2009). 
44   The Penn World Table data offer additional information on 
gross  domestic  product  (GDP,  in  2005  US  dollars  and Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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energy  use  against  the  countries’  physical  capital 
stock (both energy use and the physical capital stock 
are scaled by the GDP). The y-axis reports the coun-
tries’ energy intensity, meaning the quantity of ener-
gy (in gigajoules) needed to produce 1 US dollar (at 
2005 prices) of GDP. The x-axis indicates capital in-
tensity, i.e. the dollar value of the capital stock of a 
country that was needed to produce 1 US dollar of 
GDP. Only a selection of countries is presented for 
the sake of illustration (Australia, India, and Brazil are 
no longer included in the figure due to visual over-
lap). Again, country-level observations for 1995 are 
indicated by light colours. The more recent an obser-
vation is, the darker it is plotted. 
Figure 3.3 – Capital Stock and Energy Use per GDP 
(1995 – 2009) 
 
Source: WIOD, Penn World Tables 7.0. 
China has reduced both energy use and capital use to 
produce one dollar of GDP over time. In other coun-
tries (including also the European Union), a shift to-
wards  less  energy  intensive  and  more  capital-
intensive  production  tends  to  be  observed.  This 
overall trend of the substitution of energy by capital 
reflects the choice at aggregate level for more ener-
gy-efficient technologies embodied in capital goods 
following  the  overall  increase  in  the  international 
price of energy observed in the period up to 2008 
(see Figure 3.1). 
The aggregate analysis just made applies similarly at 
the  sectoral,  firm  or  household  levels.  Permanent 
                                                                                        
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted) as well as the share 
of GDP that is saved. The capital stock is constructed using the 
perpetual  inventory  method  (see  Caselli  2005).  A  country’s 
capital stock in period t is K(t) = (1 – δ)·K(t-1) + I(t), where I(t) 
is investment (savings) and δ is the depreciation rate that is 
assumed to equal 10 percent for each country and year. The 
starting  value  of  the  capital  stock  is  constructed  as  K(0)  = 
I(0)·(1  +  g)/(g  +  δ),  where  g  is  the  average  growth  rate  of 
investment  in  the  first  5  years.  A  cross  check  with  the 
Extended Penn World Tables, where capital data is reported, 
although only until 2003, indicates a correlation between the 
calculated and the real capital stock of 99.71 per cent.  
increases in energy prices are one of the factors ex-
erting strong pressure for the adoption of more en-
ergy-efficient technologies, the replacement of older 
capital equipment and the attraction of new entrants 
(Linn, 2008), as well as inducing the development of 
energy-efficiency eco-innovations over the  medium 
and  long  term.  Popp  (2002)  identified  increasing 
prices  of  energy  in  the  oil  crisis  as  the  significant 
driver  of  energy-saving  inventions  (energy-related 
patent  applications  appear  to  respond  with  a  lag). 
Newell  et  al.  (1999)  provide  evidence  of  price-
induced eco-innovation in new air conditioners. Jaffe 
and  Stavins  (1995)  find  noticeable  impacts  on  the 
adoption of energy-efficient technology for buildings. 
Energy efficiency and eco-innovation can be promot-
ed through a broad range of public policies and in-
struments  such  as  regulations  and  standards,  eco-
design,  eco-labels,  energy  taxes  and  subsidies.  Evi-
dence  on  energy  efficiency  and  eco-innovations 
adoption and its impact on the competitiveness of 
EU firms are analysed in section 3.4 (using firm-level 
data from the European Community Innovation Sur-
vey). 
3.2.  ENERGY CONTENT IN EXPORTS AND GLOBALISATION 
Increasing global competition and integration of pro-
duction chains (involving more and more economic 
activities and tasks and covering new countries and 
geographical  areas)  are  developments  with  far-
reaching social, political and economic consequenc-
es.  Global  competition  and  off-shoring  have  an 
enormous potential and offer new opportunities in 
terms of the efficient exploitation of existing tech-
nologies and resources. The development and adop-
tion of eco-innovations tend also to be fostered by 
global  competition
45.  As  a  r esult,  greater  energy -
efficiency improvements can be expected within and 
across  firms,  sectors  and  countries,  helping  to 
achieve  environmental  and  climate  change  goals 
world-wide. 
However, the quest for economic efficiency does not 
necessarily translate into energy efficiency and relat-
ed environmental efficiency. Market failures (in  en-
ergy or other markets) or regulatory failures may 
stand  in  the  way  and  impair  the  simultaneous 
achievement  of  eco -efficiency,  in  particular  on  a 
world-wide  basis.  For  example,  various  stages  of 
production may be offshored to less energy-efficient 
countries or firms as a result of distorting taxes or 
subsidies on energy products. Existing plants in pollu-
                                                           
45   Brunnermeier  and  Cohen  (2003)  find  that  international 
competition  is  an  important  determinant  of  environmental 
innovations, see also Section 5 and ECR 2010, Chapter 3. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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tion-intensive industries can be relocated to regions 
with less stringent or unenforced regulations. Some 
evidence for this is presented by Henderson (1996) 
(see  also  List,  Millimet,  Fredriksson  and  McHone 
(2003); a survey of this strand of the literature is of-
fered by Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004)). 
A  fully-fledged  analysis  of  these  complex  issues  is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. This section merely 
investigates  the  relationship  between  the  interna-
tionalisation of production and changes in the energy 
content in exports, focusing on the EU, US and Japan. 
The main interest is in analysing (mapping) the ener-
gy use for exports in terms of its sources: domestic 
intermediates versus foreign intermediates (focusing 
on the energy content of exports — via embodied 
energy in intermediate imports). The role and differ-
ent  impacts  on  manufacturing  and  service  exports 
are  also  analysed.  The  contribution  of  improved 
technical  efficiency  in  the  manufacturing  sector  to 
overall energy efficiency and competitiveness is also 
briefly  analysed  using  a  standard  decomposition 
method.  
3.2.1. Energy content in total exports 
Input-output tables and in particular the WIOD data-
base (which, as mentioned, contains detailed infor-
mation on international and inter-industry transac-
tions, for N=35 industries and C=41 economies – in-
cluding the rest of the world – from 1995 to 2009) 
make it possible to trace the source and the energy 
content of goods and services produced in vertically-
integrated  industries  and  cross-border  production 
networks. This provides an integrated global frame-
work  for  the  analysis  of  energy  use  that  does  not 
suffer  from  the  limitations  of  standard  sectoral  or 
purely domestic input output data which do not take 
the  interlinkages  between  sectors/countries  into 
account. 
Suppose there was interest to trace the energy in-
puts (per sector and country) and  to calculate the 
energy content of a German car exported to China. 
The energy (e.g. electricity) used directly in the car-
manufacturer’s plant would be one element. To that 
must be added the series of (indirect) energy con-
sumptions  embodied  in  the  car  components  pur-
chased by the manufacturer (e.g. the electricity used 
in the mining industry in Australia or in the produc-
tion of the intermediates purchased from the elec-
tronics industry in Germany or other countries). The 
inverse  Leontief  matrix  (from  the  input-output  ta-
bles) can be used to calculate the total energy inputs 
(direct and indirect, in all rounds of production of the 
car and car components). 
With data on energy use by industry, the Leontief 
inverse matrix can be pre-multiplied by the energy 
coefficients vector (i.e. energy used per unit of out-
put)  and  post-multiplied  by  the  vector  of  exports. 
This then allows a separation of the energy directly 
and indirectly used by a partner country to produce 
another  country’s  exports  and  its  domestic  energy 
use. The calculation of energy-input coefficients (i.e. 
energy use per unit of gross output) was performed 
using deflated gross output series. Gross output was 
deflated to constant 1995 prices, using industry-level 
price indices for each country.  
The energy embodied in country r exports (measured 
in terajoule, TJ) is given by 
x A I e
1 ) ( '
   
where e denotes the NCx1 vector of energy use per 
unit  of  gross  output  (measured  in  constant  prices, 
the  prime  denotes  transposition), 
1 ) (
  A I  is  the 
inverse Leontief matrix and  x  the NCx1 vector with 
country  r  exports  (see  Box  2.1  in Chapter  2  of  this 
report). 
The left-hand panel in figure 3.4 shows an index of 
the  energy  embodied  in  exports  for  EU -15,  EU-12, 
Japan and the US, over the period 1995 -2009. Total 
energy  inputs  in  exports  increased  globally  in  the 
four  economies  in  the  pre -crisis  period  (between 
roughly 130% in the US and 180% in the EU-15 up to 
2007). In 2008-2009 the energy embodied in exports 
declined significantly and globally as a r esult of the 
economic crisis and the collapse in worldwide trade. 
The impact of the crisis and the sudden reversal  of 
the long term upward trends in global trade can be 
seen in the right-hand panel in Figure 3.4 (presenting 
the underlying trade trends in terms of the index for 
total  exports,  for  each  of  the  four  economies  over 
the whole period 1995-2009). 
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Figure 3.4 – Indexes (1995=100): total energy embodied in exports (left panel) and total exports (right panel), 
1995–2009  
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
 
The  growth  of  total  exports  was  higher  in  the  EU 
overall (in particular the EU-12) than in Japan and in 
the US over the period analysed. The significant in-
crease in total exports in the EU-12 economies as a 
whole is to a large extent due to their relatively high 
and increasing degree of vertical specialisation (e.g. 
in their role as providers of intermediates namely to 
EU-15, as documented in section 2.3.2 of the second 
chapter in this report, see e.g. Figure 2.1). This fact is 
corroborated  by  the  much  less  than  proportional 
growth rate in the energy embodied in exports (ob-
served in the left-hand panel of Figure 3.4) for the 
EU-12.  
A slight opposite trend occurs in Japan, for which the 
increase in energy inputs was slightly higher than the 
growth in the underlying total exports. In part, this 
may  be  due  to  the  specialisation  of  the  Japanese 
economy and eventually to its relatively high degree 
of vertical specialisation and its integration links with 
the  Chinese  economy  (see,  for  example,  Table  3.1 
below or Figure 2.2. in Chapter 2 of this report). For 
the other two advanced economies (the EU-15 and 
the US), the underlying growth in total exports has 
been  accompanied  by  a  (broadly)  a  more  propor-
tional variation in the energy embodied. 
This can be observed in Figure 3.5, presenting the 
energy  embodied  per  unit  of  total  exports  for  the 
four  economies  over  the  same  period.  In  the  left-
hand panel, the marked decline in the total energy 
inputs per unit of exports in the EU-12 (and only to a 
much smaller extent in the EU-15) contrasts with the 
increase in the energy content in Japanese exports 
and the relative stagnation  observed in the US for 
the whole period. The EU-15 and Japan lead in terms 
of  the  lowest  energy  content  in  exports  but  the 
catching-up achieved by the EU-12 over the period is 
noticeable.  
The right-hand panel in Figure 3.5 depicts the energy 
embodied per unit of exports that is sourced domes-
tically in each of the four economies (i.e. the sum of 
the energy incorporated by each of the 35 domestic 
sectors in all the various  implicit rounds, stages of 
production and embedded economic activities in the 
achievement of the total exports of goods, services, 
raw materials and intermediates).
46  
The energy embodied per unit of exports that is 
sourced domestically is dominant in all four econ o-
mies (particularly in the US, given the similarity in 
size of the respective columns (bars) in the two pan-
els in Figure 3.5). Over time, the domestic e nergy 
embodied in exports and the overall energy content 
tend to move in parallel to a large extent but some 
differences can be noticed. 
                                                           
46   The energy embodied in exports that is sourced domestically is 
given by  
x A I e
r 1 ) ( )' (
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where 
r e  is  the  vector  of  domestic  energy  use  per  unit  of 
gross  output  (i.e.  all  elements  in  the  NCx1  vector  e  are  r e-
placed by zero, except for the c ountry r, - N=35 sector-, ele-
ments, see Box 2.1 in Chapter 2 of this report). Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Figure 3.5 – Energy embodied (TJ) per unit of exports (USD million), 1995–2009 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
For the EU-15 and EU-12, for instance, the observed 
drop in the domestic component of the energy con-
tent in exports is more pronounced than the decline 
in  the  total  energy  embodied,  reflecting  the  rising 
importance of foreign sources in the energy embod-
ied in exports. As a result, the EU-15 caught up Japan 
in 2007 (and outperformed it in 2009) in terms of the 
lowest domestic energy content in exports. 
One of the effects of the increasing cross-border in-
tegration of production networks can be seen in the 
rising importance of foreign economies as a source 
of the energy inputs embodied in exports. Figure 3.6 
presents the share of foreign energy inputs embod-
ied  in  exports
47.  The  energy  content  in  exports 
sourced from foreign countries rose continuously in 
all four economies up to 2007, but at a slower pace 
in Japan and the US. In the US, the domestic compo-
nent is more important, representing more than 80% 
of the overall energy content in exports, partly re-
flecting the USA’s lower dependence in terms of im-
ported  fossil  fuels  compared  to  the  other  three 
economies  overall  (in  2009  the  domestic  energy 
                                                           
47  The difference between total and domestic energy embodied in 
exports  corresponds  to  energy  sourced  from  other  countries 
(e.g. energy embodied in intermediate imports) and therefore 
the share of foreign energy embodied in exports is calculated 
as  
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shares were 72%, 66% and 67% in the EU-12, EU-15 
and Japan, respectively). 
This  is  unlike  the  pattern  observed  in  Figure  2.1 
(Chapter 2 of this report) in which the EU-12 had a 
higher level of import content in exports relative to 
the EU-15, Japan and the US (the reasons are dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, namely the openness of the EU-
12 — being a group of small and medium-sized coun-
tries —  and their vertical-integration links in particu-
lar with the EU-15). This contrasts with broadly iden-
tical levels of foreign-energy content in exports for 
the EU-15 and EU-12 (and Japan in the later years) 
observed in Figure 3.6. Another distinctive feature is 
apparent in Table 3.1. It concerns the greater weight 
overall  of  energy-rich  economies  (such  as  some 
countries  in  BRII  and  ROW)  in  terms  of  foreign-
energy content relative to import content in exports 
(see also subsection 3.2.4 and Figure 3.16 below). 
Table  3.1  presents  a  detailed  breakdown  of  the 
sourcing structure of embodied energy inputs in ex-
ports  (the  domestic  component  is  highlighted  in 
grey). The changes over time and the geographical 
patterns  follow  expectations  for  each  of  the  four 
economies. In the EU-12, the considerable reduction 
(by almost 20 percentage points in the period 1995-
2007) in the domestic share of energy embodied in 
exports  is  mirrored  in  the  large  increases  in  the 
weight of traditional trade and energy supplier part-
ners (like the EU-15, BRII — Brazil, Russia, India and 
Indonesia — and the Rest Of the World — ROW) and 
China (and smaller increases in the shares of other Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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trade partners). In the period 1995-2007, all EU-12 
trade partners in Table 3.1 steadily increased their 
shares of the energy embodied in EU-12 exports (ex-
cept Mexico and the US in 2005). 
 
Figure 3.6 – Share of foreign energy embodied in exports, (percentage 1995–2009) 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
Table 3.1 – Geographic (source) structure of energy embodied in exports (1995–2009, share in percentage, 
domestic source highlighted in grey) 
   EU-12  EU-15 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009  1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
BRII  5.0  6.6  6.8  8.4  6.4  3.7  4.0  6.0  7.4  6.8 
Canada  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.7 
China  0.3  1.1  2.9  4.7  6.1  1,6  2.2  3.4  4.8  6.5 
EU-12  86,2  78.0  74.4  67.7  71.7  2.4  2.2  2.5  2.7  2.8 
EU-15  4.5  6.9  7.8  8.8  7.1  79.4  75.0  72.4  66.5  65.8 
Japan  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6 
S. Korea  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.3  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.8 
Mexico  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
USA  0.5  1.3  1.0  1.3  1.1  2.3  3.1  2.6  2.9  2.9 
ROW  3.2  5.3  5.8  7.3  6.0  9.0  11.3  11.0  13.3  12.8 
   Japan  USA 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009  1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
BRII  4.4  4.7  5.2  6.1  4.7  1.4  1.8  2.4  2.4  2.1 
Canada  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.4  2.3  2.6  2.7  2.5  2.1 
China  3.1  4.0  7.6  7.9  8.5  1.6  1.9  3.4  3.7  4.7 
EU-12  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2 
EU-15  2.1  2.0  2.1  1.8  1.3  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.0  1.6 
Japan  71.9  69.5  64.7  62.1  66.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.4 
S. Korea  2.4  3.2  2.8  2.4  1.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.6 
Mexico  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.2 
USA  2.9  3.3  2.6  2.5  1.6  86.0  83.9  81.5  81.2  81.5 
ROW  11.9  12.2  14.1  16.3  14.9  5.1  5.6  5.5  5.7  5.6 
Source: WIOD.Note: BRII denotes Brazil, Russia, India and Indonesia. ROW-Rest of the world. 
 
 
The  domestic  proportion  of  the  energy  content  in 
EU-15  exports  decreased  steadily  over  the  whole 
period (from 4/5 in 1995 to 2/3 in 2009) reflecting 
the  increasing  weights  of  the  BRII  economies,  the 
ROW  and  China.  In  2009,  China’s  share  of  energy 
embodied in EU-15 exports was already more than 
twice the — relatively stable —  share accounted for 
by traditional trade partners like the EU-12 or the US. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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The  other  trade  partners  listed  in  the  table  have 
smaller shares that increased slightly overall or tend-
ed to remain relatively stable.   
The  increased  importance  of  China  as  a  source  of 
energy  content  in  exports  globally  is  particularly 
striking  in  the  case  of  Japan  (accounting  for  more 
than  8%  of  the  energy  content  in  total  exports  in 
2009). The increase in China’s share, and to a smaller 
extent that of the ROW and the BRII economies, al-
most compensates for the reduction in the domestic 
share in the energy content in Japanese exports in 
the period 1995-2007. The shares of other important 
Japanese trading partners like South Korea and the 
US remained fairly stable or decreased only slightly 
in the period 1995-2007. 
The US maintained a relatively higher domestic share 
of the energy content in exports and relatively lower 
shares  for  typical  energy-sourcing  countries  within 
the BRII and the ROW, partly reflecting the US’s low-
er  dependence  in  terms  of  imported  fossil  fuels 
compared  to  overall  the  EU-15,  EU-12  and  Japan. 
China has comparatively a smaller share of the ener-
gy embodied in US exports and Canada has a more 
prominent weight in the US (relative to the EU-15, 
EU-12 and Japan). 
The recent crisis together with its impact on global 
trade, in particular for industries  with more devel-
oped cross-border production networks, led to a halt 
and in some cases a reversal of the previous trends. 
Overall, the domestic content of energy embodied in 
exports started rising at the expenses of the foreign 
content for the majority of trade partners. The ex-
ception  is  China,  which  continued  to  increase  its 
share  for  the  four  economies  analysed,  squeezing 
the shares of other foreign economies. In fact, China 
is the single economy whose share increased more 
over  the  whole  period  for  all  the  four  economies 
analysed  (China’s  share  increased  by  5  percentage 
points or more for Japan, the EU-12 and EU-15 and 
by 3 percentage points in the US in the period 1995-
2009). 
These developments are to a great extent the result 
of  the  globalisation  of  production  and  underlying 
vertical-specialisation  trends  observed  in  terms  of 
the import content of exports in the second chapter 
of this report (see, for example, Table 2.2). The anal
ysis  suggests  that,  along  with  increasing  globalisa-
tion, the EU economies (as a whole) have been able 
to export more and at the same have reduced the 
energy embodied in their exports, in particular the 
part  that  is  sourced  domestically.  Overall,  the  EU 
economies have been leading (relative to Japan and 
the US) in the reduction of the energy content per 
unit of exports and in the global trends towards the 
increasing  weight  of  foreign-energy  inputs  in  the 
total energy embodied in exports. Services and man-
ufacturing exports have played a central role in this 
process. This is the subject of the analysis in the next 
subsection. 
3.2.2. Energy content in manufacturing and service 
exports 
Manufacturing  transforms  primary  energy  inputs 
into  final  energy  products  and  uses  energy  in  the 
transformation  of  materials  into  products;  many 
manufacturing  sectors  are  at  the  forefront  of  the 
internationalisation of production networks. 
Figure 3.7 highlights the importance of manufactur-
ing in terms of exports and how this is translated into 
the energy embodied in exports for the four econo-
mies  being  analysed.  The  right-hand  panel  shows 
that manufacturing exports accounted in the years 
2007-2009 for around 80% of total exports in Japan, 
70 % in the European economies and 60 % in the US. 
The share of manufacturing in total exports has been 
falling in all economies, except for the EU-12 (reflect-
ing the vigorous increase in manufacturing exports; 
to a great extent, this is the result of the increasing 
vertical  integration  of  the  EU-12  documented  in 
Chapter 2 of this report). A number of manufacturing 
industries  (e.g.  producing  durable  goods)  were  se-
verely hit during the most recent crisis and the share 
of  manufacturing  in  total  exports  dropped  in  all 
economies in 2007-2009 except for Japan, for which 
the exports of services declined more than manufac-
turing exports during the crisis, see Figure 3.8 below. 
Manufacturing  activities  involve  transforming  a 
range of material inputs into products, so manufac-
turing exports generally tend to have a higher energy 
content than total exports. The share of energy em-
bodied in manufacturing relative to total exports (in 
the  left-hand  panel  in  Figure  3.7)  is  higher  overall 
than the weight of  manufacturing in total exports. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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This is true for all four economies, except for the EU-
12 in 2009 and Japan in the years 1995, 2005, cases 
in which the shares in the left-hand and right-hand 
panels in Figure 3.7 are roughly identical.  
Moreover,  the  energy  embodied  in  manufacturing 
exports as a share of the energy embodied in total 
exports remained broadly stable (or even increased 
slightly in some sub-periods and for the whole period 
1995-2009)  while  at  the  same  time  the  share  of 
manufacturing  exports  fell  overall.  The  exception 
was the EU-12, for which manufacturing as a whole 
outperformed the overall reduction of energy con-
tent in total exports. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 – Energy embodied in manufacturing exports relative to total energy embodied in total exports 
(left panel) and share of manufacturing exports in total exports (right panel), 1995–2009 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the growing importance of ser-
vice exports and their overall lower energy content 
relative  to  manufacturing  exports.  The  right-hand 
panel shows that the share of services in total ex-
ports has been growing for all economies in the last 
15 years, except in the EU-12 (for which manufactur-
ing remained the dominant driver of export growth). 
Altogether,  manufacturing  and  services  accounted 
for more than the 95 % of total exports for all four 
economies  (the  highest  share  is  reached  in  Japan, 
99 % of total exports, see Table 3.4). 
The growth of service exports was particular strong 
in the European economies (+320 % in the EU-12 and 
+250 % in the EU-15 in the period 1995-2007). In the 
EU-15,  the  growth  of  manufacturing  exports  was 
much lower (around +150 % in the period 1995-2007) 
and as a result the share of services in total exports 
rose from 20 % in 1995 to close to 30 %. In 2007, the 
share  of  services  accounted  for  more  than  1/3  of 
total exports in the US and for around 20 % in the EU-
12 and Japan. Japan has a much lower share than the 
US and the EU-15 in services such as financial inter-
mediation  and  Renting  and  Machinery  and  Equip-
ment and other business services (including ICT and 
R&D-related  services).  During  the  recent  crisis,  ex-
ports dropped considerably in a number of service 
sectors (including more cyclical-related sectors such 
as water transport and wholesale trade and commis-
sion  trade,  NACE  codes  61  and  51,  respectively), 
leading to the observed fall in the share of services in 
total exports in Japan. 
 Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
 
84 
 
Figure 3.8 – Energy embodied in service exports relative to total energy embodied in total exports (left pan-
el) and share of service exports in total exports (right panel), 1995–2009 
 
 
Source: WIOD. Note: Service includes the sectors NACE rev. 1 codes 50 to P. 
 
Not  surprisingly,  Figure  3.8  shows  that  service  ex-
ports as a whole tend to have a relatively lower en-
ergy content (the share of energy embodied in ser-
vice exports relative to total exports (left-hand pan-
el) is lower overall than the weight of services in total 
exports  (right-hand  panel)).  Moreover,  energy  em-
bodied in service exports relative to total  exports 
decreased (or remained broadly stable in the case of 
EU-12 and  US)  while the  share of   service  exports 
increased overall (except in the crisis period 2007-
2009 in the case of Japan and for the EU-12, where 
growth  in  manufacturing  exports  dominated  the 
whole period).    
Table 3.2 presents energy embodied per unit of ex-
ports (panel A) and the share of the energy inputs 
that is sourced from foreign countries (panel B) for 
manufacturing,  services  and  total  exports  (in  the 
latter case, a convenient recast of the data in Figures 
3.4 and 3.6 above).  
Panel B shows a steady rise in the share of foreign-
energy  inputs  in  the  total  energy  embodied  in  ex-
ports (both manufacturing and services up to 2007). 
Partly reflecting a higher degree of cross-border pro-
duction linkages (see Chapter 2 of this report, Figure 
2.2),  manufacturing  has  a  higher  share  of  foreign 
energy  content  relative  to  services  (except  for  the 
EU-12 in 1995). However, the gap between the share 
of foreign energy in manufacturing and services nar-
rowed, in particular in the EU-15. The input-output 
linkages between services and manufacturing explain 
why  the  differences  between  the  two  sectors  are 
much  smaller  in  terms  of  foreign-energy  content 
than in import content. Services source many of their 
more  energy-intensive  inputs  from  manufacturing, 
some  of  which  are  in  turn  directly  and  indirectly 
sourced from foreign countries.  
Japan leads over the period 1995-2007 in terms of 
the highest content of foreign energy inputs in ex-
ports. The US has overall a larger share of domestic-
energy inputs in exports, particularly in services. 
Figure  3.9  plots  the  changes  (in  the  period  1995-
2007) against the level of the energy content in ex-
ports  in  2007  (highlighting  the  main  trends  in  the 
data presented in  panel A of Table 3.2). Manufactur-
ing is depicted by the larger bubbles. The EU-15 and 
Japan lead in terms of having the lowest energy con-
tent in services and manufacturing exports but the 
energy content in manufacturing exports increased 
in the period 1995-2007, particularly in Japan. The 
EU-15  kept  the  energy  content  in  total  exports 
broadly  constant  in  the  period  up  to  2007  mainly 
thanks to a reduction in the energy embodied in ser-
vice exports (together with their greater and increas-
ing weight in total exports relative to Japan, see also 
Figure 3.8).  Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Following its integration in cross-border production 
networks and strengthening of its vertical specialisa-
tion, the EU-12 achieved a noticeable reduction and 
catching-up in the energy content of manufacturing 
exports. The EU-12 reached the same energy content 
in manufacturing exports as the US in 2007. The re-
duction in the energy content in service exports was 
comparatively much smaller. 
The  energy  content  in  the  US  increased  both  for 
manufacturing  and  service  exports  in  the  period 
1995-2007 (in a broadly similar trend to Japan’s). The 
higher energy content in US exports vis-à-vis the EU-
15 and Japan is less pronounced in services.  Com-
bined with a larger share of service exports in the US, 
this mitigates the gap in energy embodied per unit of 
US total exports. 
 
Table 3.2 – Energy embodied (TJ) per unit of exports (USD million) (left panel) and share of foreign energy 
embodied in exports (right panel) 1995–2009 
   (A) Energy inputs per unit of exports     (B) Share of foreign energy inputs 
   1995  2000  2005  2007  2009     1995  2000  2005  2007  2009 
   Manufacturing (NACE D) 
EU-12  63.6  38.0  34.8  30.0  27.3     14%  23%  29%  36%  33% 
EU-15  17.6  18.2  20.8  20.5  17.8     23%  27%  29%  34%  35% 
Japan  11.1  12.1  16.7  19.5  20.1     29%  31%  36%  38%  34% 
USA  25.9  23.8  29.0  31.8  28.6     16%  19%  21%  20%  20% 
   Services (NACE 50 to P) 
EU-12  31.4  26.7  29.1  22.0  20.8     16%  22%  19%  26%  22% 
EU-15  14.3  12.7  12.6  8.8  8.1     13%  19%  22%  32%  33% 
Japan  10.9  12.1  13.1  12.1  10.8     26%  30%  34%  35%  30% 
USA  14.4  15.8  17.9  16.0  11.0     8%  9%  12%  14%  15% 
   Total exports (NACE A to P) 
EU-12  55.5  36.6  34.8  29.6  27.6     14%  22%  26%  32%  28% 
EU-15  17.0  16.9  18.8  17.4  14.9     21%  25%  28%  33%  34% 
Japan  11.0  12.1  15.9  17.8  18.8     28%  30%  35%  38%  33% 
USA  22.2  21.3  25.2  26.1  21.8     14%  16%  19%  19%  19% 
Source: WIOD. 
 
Figure 3.9 – Energy content in exports (for manufac-
turing,  services  and  total  exports):  change  1995-
2007 versus level in 2007 
 
 
 
Source: WIOD. Note: Manufacturing is depicted by the larger bub-
bles. The size of the bubbles reflects the weight of manufacturing 
and services in total exports in 2007. The points enclosed in the 
small black circles of uniform size represent total exports.  
 
Figure 3.10 presents the breakdown of energy inputs 
per unit of  exports by domestic and foreign coun-
tries’ sources. The amount of foreign-energy inputs 
per unit of exports increased overall in all four econ-
omies  for  both  manufacturing  and  services  in  the 
period 1995-2007. In the period 1995-2007, (as al-
ready observed in Figure  3.5 above), the domestic 
energy content in total exports decreased in the Eu-
ropean economies and increased in Japan and to a 
lesser extent in the US. For the EU-12, this is due to a 
significant drop in the energy incorporated domesti-
cally in manufacturing exports and to a much lesser 
extent in service exports. In contrast, in the EU-15 
this is mainly the result of the considerable drop in 
the domestic- energy content of service exports. As 
from 2007, the EU-15 also clearly leads in terms of 
the lowest domestic-energy inputs per unit of service 
exports.  Regarding  manufacturing  exports,  the  EU-
15’s  domestic-energy  content  remained  constant 
and the increase in total energy embodied was due 
to the increase in foreign-energy inputs. For Japan 
and the US, the increase in the domestic energy con-
tent in total exports was primarily due to the rise in 
the (corresponding domestic) energy inputs in manu-
facturing. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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During  the  crisis  period  2007-2009,  following  the 
slump in global trade, the previous upward trend in 
the  share  of  foreign  energy  inputs  in  total  energy 
embodied in manufacturing and service exports end-
ed or in some cases temporarily reversed. Panel B in 
Table  3.2  above  showed  that  in  the  period  2007-
2009 the share of foreign-energy inputs in total en-
ergy embodied in exports stabilised in the EU-15 and 
USA and decreased in Japan and the EU-12. This may 
be  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  manufacturing  ex-
ports, which were more severely hit overall during 
the crisis, account for a larger share of total exports 
in Japan and in the EU-12. 
 
Figure 3.10 – Energy (TJ, domestic and foreign) content in (manufacturing, services and total) exports (Million 
USD, 1995, 2007) 
 
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show for the period 1995-2007 
an overall increase in the energy content in manufac-
turing (except in the EU-12) and to a lower extent in 
service  exports  (except  for  the  EU-12  and  EU-15). 
These figures also suggest that this could in part be 
related to the increasing globalisation of production 
and the increasing weight of foreign-energy inputs. 
Panel B in Table 3.2 points in the same direction by 
showing a steady rise in the share of foreign-energy 
inputs in the total energy embodied in exports (both 
in manufacturing and services up to 2007). Subsec-
tion 3.2.3 below presents a short exploratory analy-
sis of the country and sectoral trends in the energy 
content in exports in relation to globalisation of pro-
duction and trade. 
Figure  3.11  further  illustrates  the  geographic  pat-
terns implicit in the changes in the structure of the 
energy inputs embodied in exports over the period 
1995-2007.  The figure presents the changes in the 
shares of energy inputs embodied in manufacturing, 
services and total exports for each of the four econ-
omies (e.g. the  share of domestic-energy inputs  in 
total energy embodied in the EU-15 exports of ser-
vices  decreased  by  19%  in  the  period  1995-2007, 
while the share of energy inputs that EU-15 export-
ers  sourced  directly  and  indirectly  from  the  BRII 
countries increased by 5% in the same period). 
Figure 3.11 shows a large shift overall from domestic 
to foreign energy inputs embodied in exports in the 
period  1995-2007.  Interestingly,  the  figure  also  re-
veals for this period a higher (or at least comparable 
in  the  case  of  Japan)  shift  towards  foreign-energy 
inputs  in  service  exports  relative  to  manufacturing 
exports. The exception is the EU-12, whose share of 
domestic-energy  inputs  in  manufacturing  exports 
declined (significantly by 22 %) by more than twice 
the contraction observed in the share of domestic-
energy inputs in service exports. A major and almost Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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equivalent drop (19%) was observed in the share of 
domestic-energy inputs in EU-15 exports of services. 
This, together with the relative weights of the manu-
facturing and services in total exports in the EU-12 
and  EU-15,  explains  why  the  European  economies 
had the largest falls in the share of domestic-energy 
inputs  in  total  exports.  The  US  had  a  much  lower 
reduction in the share of domestic-energy inputs in 
exports (around 4% in manufacturing and 6% in ser-
vices). 
The reciprocal increase in the share of foreign-energy 
inputs  embodied  in  exports  was  not  distributed 
equally across all trade partners. However, almost all 
of them increased their shares of total energy inputs 
embodied  in  the  exports  in  the  period  1995-2007. 
The very few exceptions concern Japan. There were 
marginal decreases in the shares of S. Korea and EU-
15 energy inputs in  Japanese service  exports or in 
the share of US, Canadian and EU-15 energy inputs in 
Japanese manufacturing exports. This means that in 
the case of Japan domestic energy inputs, but also 
(to a minor extent) those from some foreign coun-
tries,  were  shifted  to  other  economies  (e.g.  China 
and the RoW). 
 
Figure 3.11 – Changes in the share of energy inputs embodied in exports in the period 1995–2007 (in p.p.) 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
Figure 3.12 below summarises the main changes in 
the structure of (shares per trade partner in) foreign-
energy inputs embodied in exports. A joint reading of 
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 shows that in the period 1995-
2007 a significant part of the energy inputs embod-
ied in exports were diverted from domestic to for-
eign countries, in particular to China. 
Figure 3.12 shows that this is particularly noticeable 
in  manufacturing,  where  off-shoring  trends  in  the 
period 1995-2007 led to virtually a doubling of the 
share (8 times higher in the case of EU-12) of Chinese 
energy inputs in the foreign-energy inputs in manu-
facturing exports. The increase in the weight of China 
as source of foreign-energy inputs led to an overall 
contraction  in  the  shares  of  other  trade  partners. 
Overall, the shares of the RoW or the BRII contracted 
as well as the share of energy inputs embodied in 
bilateral  manufacturing  trade  between  the  EU-12, 
EU-15, Japan and the US. 
Compared to manufacturing, the rise in the weight of 
China as source of foreign-energy inputs embodied in 
service exports was less pronounced, except for Ja-
pan. For Japan in the period 1995-2007, the share of 
Chinese energy inputs in the foreign-energy inputs in 
Japanese  service  exports  also  more  than  doubled, 
while the corresponding shares of S. Korea and EU-
15  were  roughly  halved.  In the  EU-15,  despite  the 
significant decline in the relative weight of domestic-
energy  inputs  in  service  exports  (remember  Figure 
3.11), the relative increase in Chinese energy inputs 
was less pronounced and the US and the EU-12 kept 
their shares broadly stable. Similarly, in the US in the Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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period 1995-2007, the shares of Canadian and EU-15 
energy inputs in US service exports remained fairly 
stable while the increase in the corresponding share 
of China was much smaller compared to manufactur-
ing. 
Regarding the recent crisis period, Figure 3.12 shows 
that China continued to increase its share of foreign-
energy inputs in exports both for manufacturing and 
services, now at the expense of the other trade part-
ners in general. Over the whole period (1995-2009), 
it more than doubled its share of the foreign-energy 
inputs embodied in both manufacturing and service 
exports of the EU-15, Japan and the US (the corre-
sponding increase was much higher in the case of the 
EU-12). 
Figure 3.12 – Shares (per trade partner) in foreign-energy inputs embodied in exports, 1995, 2007, 2009 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
The  changes  in  the  sourcing  structure  of  foreign-
energy inputs embodied in exports reflect many fac-
tors such as differences in energy-efficiency trends 
across  countries  and  sectors,  together  with  global 
trade and vertical  specialisation developments. For 
instance, Figure 3.12 shows a relatively high share of 
the EU-15 in the foreign-energy inputs embodied in 
EU-12 exports (for manufacturing, services and total 
exports). This is to a great extent a reflection of the 
strong  links  and  importance  of  the  EU-15  (e.g.  as 
providers of intermediate inputs) in the import con-
tent  of  EU-12  exports  (documented  in  Chapter  2). 
Subsection 3.2.4 below analyses in more detail the 
relations between imports and foreign-energy con-
tent  in  exports  and  some  of  their  implications  for 
competitiveness across countries and sectors. 
3.2.3. Globalisation and the energy content in ex-
ports worldwide  
This  section  explores  to  what  extent  globalisation 
and increasing vertical specialisation have been fol-
lowed  by  changes  (and  eventually  some  conver-
gence) in the energy content in exports at the world 
level. World exports are proxied by the whole WIOD 
exports.  The  different  developments  and  contribu-
tions of manufacturing and service exports are also 
briefly analysed, focusing on the long term changes 
in the period 1995-2007. 
Figure 3.13 plots the changes (in the period 1995-
2007) against the level of the energy content in total 
exports in 2007. The size of the bubbles reflects the 
proportion that the energy embodied in each of the 
ten economies’ total exports makes up of the total 
energy  embodied  in  (the  whole  ten  economies’) 
WIOD  total  exports.  The  world  is  proxied  by  total 
WIOD and is represented by the largest circle (with 
vertical and horizontal lines crossing at its centre). 
The figure shows an increase (of 8 %, see Table 3.3) 
in the energy use per unit of worldwide exports in 
the period 1995-2007. This was a period of sustained 
growth in global trade and intensified vertical spe-
cialisation and appears to have led to significant re-
ductions and some convergence in the energy con-
tent  in  exports  for  economies  such  as  the  EU-12, 
China and the RoW. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Figure 3.13 – Energy content in total exports: change 1995-2007 versus level in 2007 
 
Source: WIOD. Note: The size of the bubbles reflects the weight that the energy embodied in the each economy's total exports has in the 
total energy embodied in all WIOD total exports in 2007. Total WIOD is represented by the largest circle. 
China achieved partial convergence by reducing the 
energy content in its exports by ¼ in the period 1995-
2007 (see also Table 3.3 below). However, this re-
duction was much smaller than the increase (it al-
most tripled) in China’s share in total WIOD exports 
in the same period. This explains to a large extent 
the observed increase in energy inputs per unit of 
worldwide exports in the period 1995-2007.
48 It has 
to be noted that domestic-energy inputs account for 
a relatively high share (85  % in 2007) of the e nergy 
content in Chinese exports. Even if the share of fo r-
eign-energy inputs embodied in Chinese total e x-
ports has almost doubled (it increased fro m 8 % to 
                                                           
48   Energy inputs per unit of total WIOD exports can be recorded 
as  the  sum  of  energy  inputs  per  unit  of  exports  of  each 
economy  weighted  by  the  respective  shares  in  total  WIOD 
exports.  A  simple  analysis  consists  in  decomposing  the 
changes in the weighted sum to obtain the changes in each of 
the elements of the weighted sum (as a result of the changes 
in the two variables for each country: energy inputs per unit 
of  exports  and  shares  in  total  WIOD  exports).  A  more 
elaborate analysis would for instance be to use an index or 
structural  decomposition  analysis  (see,  for  example, 
subsection 3.3.6; this approach is not followed here). 
15 %) in the period 1995-2007, this is still a relatively 
low  value.  In  fact,  this  is  the  second-lowest  value 
after the BRII economies and less than half of the 
weight of foreign-energy inputs in exports in the ma-
jority  of  the  other  economies  (except  for  the  US, 
Canada  and  the  RoW,  that  are  less  dependent  on 
energy imports, see the last three columns in Table 
3.3). 
The increasing contribution and role of energy em-
bodied in Chinese exports can also be seen by com-
paring  the  shares  in  total  WIOD  energy  embodied 
with the shares in total exports in Table 3.3. Despite 
some improvement, in 2007 China still had the se-
cond-highest  ratio  (after  the  BRII  economies)  be-
tween the share of energy embodied and the share 
in total WIOD exports (e.g. in 2007 China and the US 
already  had  comparable  shares  of  total  WIOD  ex-
ports – 11 % and 13 % respectively – while the share 
in terms of energy embodied is considerably higher 
in China  – 17 %, as against 10 % in the US). 
 Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
 
90 
 
BRII economies as a whole also contributed (but to a 
lower extent than China) to the observed increase in 
energy inputs per unit of total WIOD exports in the 
period  1995-2007.  This  is  due  to  the  marginal  in-
crease in the BRII economies’ share of total WIOD 
exports,  combined  with  their  overall  high  (un-
changed) level of energy content in exports. The high 
level of energy content in exports may in part reflect 
the relatively abundant energy resources in some of 
the BRII economies. 
The  convergence  (and  significant  reduction)  in  the 
energy  content  in  exports  of  the  RoW  economies 
was  roughly  proportional  to  the  increase  in  their 
share of total WIOD exports which led to a neutral 
(slight reduction) effect on the energy inputs per unit 
of worldwide exports. 
The EU-12 in particular (but also the EU-15) outper-
formed overall in the reduction on energy content in 
exports.  The EU-12 achieved full convergence  with 
the total WIOD level in the period 1995-2007. The 
increase in the energy inputs per unit of exports in 
South Korea and Japan may partly reflect the particu-
lar and intense vertical-specialisation links of these 
two economies with China. 
Figure 3.14 plots the changes (in the period 1995-
2007)  against  the  level  of  the  energy  content  in 
manufacturing exports in 2007. The two panels are 
equal except for the size of the bubbles. In panel A 
(on the left), the size of the bubbles reflects for each 
economy the weight that the energy embodied in its 
manufacturing exports has in the energy embodied 
in total WIOD manufacturing exports. On the right in 
panel B, the size of the circles reflects the share of 
manufacturing exports in total WIOD manufacturing 
exports in 2007. Total WIOD is represented by the 
largest circle in both panels. 
Manufacturing exports are dominant overall in total 
exports (see Table 3.4 below) and appear to explain 
to  a  large  extent  the  observed  increase  in  energy 
embodied  in  exports  at  world  level  in  the  period 
1995-2007. Figure 3.12 shows (see also Table 3.3) an 
increase of 10 % in the energy use per unit of world-
wide manufacturing exports, which is slightly higher 
than  the  (8 %)  rise  in  energy  use  per  unit  of  total 
exports depicted in Figure 3.11 and Table 3.3 above.  
The rise in energy content in total WIOD manufactur-
ing  exports  appears  to  be  primarily  driven  by  the 
increasing  vertical-specialisation  links  with  China. 
The  energy  content  in  Chinese  manufacturing  ex-
ports declined by ¼ in the period 1995-2007 while its 
share in total WIOD manufacturing exports tripled in 
the same period (see Table 3.3). To a lesser extent, 
the BRII economies as a whole and S. Korea also con-
tributed to the rise in the energy use per unit of total 
WIOD  manufacturing  exports.  This  can  be  seen  by 
the position and size of bubbles in Figure 3.14. For 
China, BRII and S. Korea, the bubbles in panel B (re-
flecting export shares) are smaller relative to panel A 
(in which they reflect the shares in energy embodied 
in exports).  
The EU-12 more than halved their energy inputs per 
unit of manufacturing exports (starting from roughly 
the same level as China in 1995). The ROW econo-
mies also reduced significantly (by 30 %) the energy 
content  in  exports  and  moved  closer  to  the  total 
WIOD average in the period 1995-2007. 
Figure 3.15 presents similar plots of the changes (in 
the period 1995-2007) against the level of the energy 
content in service exports in 2007. Unlike manufac-
turing,  the  energy  inputs  embodied  in  service  ex-
ports declined by 9 % in the period 1995-2007. The 
energy content in service exports is converging in the 
majority of countries, except for the BRII economies, 
as  with  manufacturing.  Despite  a  significant  im-
provement,  in  China  the  energy  content  in  service 
exports in 2007 was similar to the level in the BRII 
economies. 
Services and manufacturing have different weights in 
the various economies. Moreover, for some econo-
mies exports from other sectors such as agriculture, 
forestry  or  mining  are  also  significant  (e.g.  in  the 
RoW,  BRII  economies  and  Canada,  exports  other 
than manufacturing and services accounted for be-
tween 1/5 and 1/3 of the total exports in 2007, see 
Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.3 – Energy embodied (TJ) per unit of exports (USD million) and share of trade, energy and foreign energy embodied in manufacturing, service and total exports: 
1995, 1997, 2009 
   Energy (TJ) per unit of exports (Million USD)  Share in total WIOD exports   Share in total WIOD energy embodied  Share of foreign energy inputs 
   1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009 
MANUFACTURING (NACE D) 
BRII  74.9  82.4  77.3  5%  6%  5%  11%  13%  12%  7%  7%  7% 
Canada  32.8  37.6  34.8  6%  4%  3%  6%  4%  3%  22%  26%  24% 
China  68.1  51.2  46.1  5%  15%  21%  10%  21%  28%  8%  15%  17% 
EU-12  63.6  30.0  27.3  3%  5%  5%  5%  4%  4%  14%  36%  33% 
EU-15  17.6  20.5  17.8  27%  24%  23%  14%  14%  12%  23%  34%  35% 
Japan  11.1  19.5  20.1  14%  8%  7%  5%  4%  4%  29%  38%  34% 
S. Korea  33.4  48.8  50.0  4%  5%  5%  4%  6%  7%  30%  31%  32% 
Mexico  26.4  30.5  32.8  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  29%  36%  32% 
USA  25.9  31.8  28.6  17%  12%  11%  14%  10%  9%  16%  20%  20% 
RoW  53.8  37.6  37.3  18%  20%  17%  30%  21%  19%  12%  33%  31% 
WIOD  32.6  35.8  34.6  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  -  -  - 
SERVICES (NACE 50 to P) 
BRII  37.8  37.9  37.4  6%  9%  8%  13%  19%  16%  6%  6%  6% 
Canada  20.6  16.5  15.7  3%  2%  2%  3%  2%  2%  19%  21%  19% 
China  55.9  39.2  36.9  2%  7%  14%  7%  16%  30%  8%  15%  16% 
EU-12  31.4  22.0  20.8  3%  4%  4%  5%  5%  5%  14%  32%  28% 
EU-15  14.3  8.8  8.1  26%  29%  29%  19%  15%  13%  21%  33%  34% 
Japan  10.9  12.1  10.8  10%  6%  4%  6%  4%  2%  28%  38%  33% 
S. Korea  38.5  26.6  30.3  3%  3%  2%  7%  4%  4%  27%  31%  32% 
Mexico  16.2  17.1  17.1  2%  2%  1%  2%  2%  1%  25%  31%  28% 
USA  14.4  16.0  11.0  30%  21%  21%  22%  19%  13%  14%  19%  19% 
RoW  22.8  14.8  15.7  14%  17%  15%  17%  15%  13%  11%  22%  20% 
WIOD  19.2  17.5  17.6  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  -  -  - 
TOTAL EXPORTS (NACE A to P) 
BRII  62.2  64.7  61.0  6%  7%  7%  12%  14%  13%  6%  6%  6% 
Canada  32.0  34.1  31.4  5%  4%  3%  6%  4%  3%  19%  21%  19% 
China  66.6  49.7  44.5  4%  11%  17%  9%  17%  24%  8%  15%  16% 
EU-12  55.5  29.6  27.6  3%  4%  4%  5%  4%  4%  14%  32%  28% 
EU-15  17.0  17.4  14.9  25%  23%  22%  14%  12%  10%  21%  33%  34% 
Japan  11.0  17.8  18.8  12%  6%  6%  4%  4%  3%  28%  38%  33% 
S. Korea  34.2  45.3  46.9  4%  4%  4%  4%  5%  5%  27%  31%  32% 
Mexico  23.6  27.1  29.5  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  25%  31%  28% 
USA  22.2  26.1  21.8  19%  13%  13%  14%  10%  9%  14%  19%  19% 
RoW  45.0  35.9  36.5  21%  25%  22%  31%  27%  26%  11%  22%  20% 
WIOD  30.3  32.7  31.7  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  -  -  - 
Source: WIOD. 
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Figure 3.14 – Energy content in manufacturing exports: change 1995-2007 versus level in 2007 
 
Note: In panel A (on the left) the size of the bubbles reflects the weight that energy embodied in the manufacturing exports of each econ-
omy has in the total energy embodied in the whole WIOD manufacturing exports in 2007. On the right in panel B the size of the bubbles 
reflects the share of manufacturing exports in total WIOD manufacturing exports in 2007. Total WIOD is represented by the largest circle. 
Source: WIOD.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 – Energy content in service exports: change 1995-2007 versus level in 2007 
 
Source: WIOD. Note: On the left panel (A) the size of the bubbles reflects the weight that energy embodied in the service exports (NACE 50 
to P) of each economy has in the total energy embodied in the whole WIOD service exports in 2007. On the right panel the size of the bub-
bles reflects the share of service exports in total WIOD service exports in 2007. Total WIOD is represented by the largest circle. 
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Table 3.4 – Shares of manufacturing, services and other exports in total exports, 1995, 1997, 2009 
   MANUFACTURING (NACE D)  SERVICES (NACE 50 to P)  OTHER (NACE A to C, E,F) 
   1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009 
BRII  0,58  0,51  0,5  0,23  0,26  0,26  0,19  0,23  0,24 
Canada  0,75  0,65  0,59  0,12  0,14  0,17  0,13  0,22  0,25 
China  0,81  0,84  0,79  0,12  0,14  0,19  0,07  0,02  0,02 
EU-12  0,66  0,75  0,71  0,24  0,2  0,23  0,1  0,05  0,06 
EU-15  0,75  0,7  0,67  0,21  0,28  0,3  0,04  0,03  0,03 
Japan  0,83  0,79  0,85  0,17  0,21  0,14  0  0  0,01 
S. Korea  0,81  0,84  0,84  0,18  0,16  0,16  0,01  0  0 
Mexico  0,68  0,69  0,72  0,21  0,15  0,14  0,12  0,16  0,14 
USA  0,63  0,6  0,58  0,32  0,36  0,38  0,05  0,04  0,04 
RoW  0,6  0,52  0,5  0,14  0,15  0,15  0,25  0,32  0,35 
WIOD  0,7  0,66  0,64  0,21  0,22  0,23  0,1  0,12  0,12 
Source:WIOD. 
 
 
3.2.4.  Foreign-energy  inputs  vs  import  content  in 
exports 
Figure 3.16 presents the shares (per trade partner) of 
foreign-energy inputs and import content in exports 
(the latter studied in Chapter 2 of this report) side-
by-side. As expected, the figure depicts a significant 
overall  similarity  between  the  two  structures  but 
also some important differences. Firstly, energy-rich 
economies (such as some countries in BRII and ROW) 
have a higher weight in terms of foreign-energy in-
puts relative to import contents in total exports. This 
general pattern is also found for manufacturing and 
service exports. The direction of the changes (in the 
period  1995-2007)  in  the  shares  of  foreign  energy 
sourced from these (BRII and ROW) countries tend to 
follow the direction of the changes in import content 
in exports. However, the relationship is not one-to-
one: the ratio between the shares in foreign energy 
and import content in exports is rising overall for the 
BRII and declining for the RoW (see Table 3.5 below), 
perhaps  reflecting  many  factors  such  as  energy-
efficiency trends, preferential trade and energy sup-
ply relations between different countries, etc. 
 
Figure 3.16 – Shares (per trade partner) in foreign energy inputs vs import content in EU-12, EU-15, Japan, 
US, China, BRII and RoW total exports, 1995, 2007 
 
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
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Secondly, advanced economies (in particular the EU-
15,  Japan  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  US)  tend  to 
have higher  shares of import content relative to for-
eign-energy  content  in  exports.  Both  shares  de-
creased overall for the EU-15, Japan and the US in 
the period 1995-2007. Thirdly, and unlike these ad-
vanced  economies,  China  significantly  increased  its 
overall share of both foreign-energy inputs and im-
port content in exports over the same period. How-
ever, China’s share of foreign-energy inputs is higher 
(or broadly as great in some cases in 2007) than the 
share of import content in exports. Fourthly, regard-
ing China’s exports, the increase in energy use was 
reflected in a significant increase in the energy con-
tent share of the BRII in the period 1995-2007, most-
ly  at  the  expense  of  the  RoW  economies.  These 
movements do not have an immediate parallel in the 
import-content structure of Chinese exports. In fact, 
partly reflecting the increased use of non-energy raw 
material  inputs,  the  import-content  share  of  the 
RoW economies increased over this period, mostly at 
the expense of Japan and to a much lesser extent of 
the other economies (in 2007, the EU-15 as a whole 
had the second-largest import-content share in Chi-
nese exports, after the ROW). The figures for manu-
facturing and service exports show similar patterns 
and were omitted. 
Table 3.5 presents the ratio between the shares in 
foreign-energy inputs and import content in manu-
facturing, service and total  exports (panels  A, B,  C 
respectively)  for  all  ten  economies.  The  ratio  pro-
vides a measure of relative energy intensity in total 
foreign inputs. It can similarly be seen as the share of 
energy  in  total  (energy  and  non-energy)  inputs 
sourced from a given trade partner relative to the 
corresponding average share for all trade partners of 
a  given  country.  Therefore  it  indicates  (in  relative 
terms, per trade partner) how energy intensive the 
import contents are in the exports of a given coun-
try.  A  value  lower  than  one  indicates  that  a  given 
trade  partner  has  a  lower  than  average  weight  of 
energy inputs relative to all foreign inputs embodied 
in the exports of a given country. In order to facili-
tate reading, values lower or equal to one (and high-
er than ½) are highlighted in yellow. Values lower or 
equal to ½ are highlighted in green. 
The import content of exports is growing with the 
globalisation of production and vertical specialisation 
and  this  ratio  provides  a  summary  of  the  relative 
energy intensities and vulnerabilities to increases in 
the relative price of energy. The table allow us the 
analysis  of  relative  performances  across  countries 
and sectors as a consequence, for instance, of spe-
cialisation or energy-efficiency trends. For instance, 
the  two  columns  for  China  indicate  (for  the  years 
1995  and  2007)  the  ratio  between  foreign-energy 
inputs and import contents in Chinese (manufactur-
ing, service and total) exports. In 2007, the Japanese 
share  of  total  foreign-energy  inputs  embodied  in 
Chinese exports was only half of the Japanese share 
in the import content of Chinese exports. For the EU-
15, the corresponding figure was even smaller. Inci-
dentally, in this particular case the ratios for Chinese 
total exports and manufacturing exports are identical 
(in terms of the figures presented, rounded to one 
decimal place). For Chinese service exports in 2007, 
the lead of the EU-15 in terms of the lowest relative 
weight of energy inputs is even more pronounced.   
The diagonal is empty because only foreign-energy 
inputs and import content in exports are being com-
pared. The last two columns (labelled WIOD) present 
the  ratio  between  the  shares  in  foreign-energy  in-
puts and import content in total WIOD exports (for 
manufacturing, service and total exports). Standard 
deviations are presented in the last three rows for 
manufacturing, service and total exports. 
The EU-15 and Japan have the lowest relative weight 
of energy inputs in the total foreign inputs incorpo-
rated in exports (globally and overall across countries 
and sectors, manufacturing and services). Among the 
economies with a high overall dependency on energy 
imports, the EU-15 as a whole and Japan are there-
fore  those  economies  that  in  principle  will  suffer 
lower external competitiveness losses as a result of 
an increase in the relative price of energy. One dis-
tinction is that the EU-15 slightly reduced overall the 
relative weight of energy inputs in total inputs across 
countries and sectors in the period 1995-2007 (one 
exception  was  the  increase  from  1.4  to  1.7  in  the 
relative weight of EU-15 energy inputs embodied in 
US service exports). 
By contrast, for Japan the relative weight of energy 
inputs in the total inputs it embodies in exports in-
creased overall in the same period. The EU-15 and 
Japan  are  among  the  countries  having  the  lowest 
dispersion in the relative weights of energy inputs, 
reflecting  a  relatively  diversified  sourcing  among 
their trade partners of the energy inputs embodied 
in their exports. 
In  the  US,  the  relative  weight  of  energy  inputs  is 
higher (twice the relative weight in the EU-15 and 
Japan in 2007 in WIOD exports) and, as with Japan, 
also increased overall in the period. Despite this in-
crease,  the  relative  weight  of  US  energy  inputs  is 
overall below (or in some cases close to) the average. 
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ergy inputs embodied in US exports decreased, par-
ticularly in manufacturing exports. 
The EU-12 as a whole achieved the greatest reduc-
tion in the relative weight of energy inputs embodied 
in exports (halving or more than halving the ratio for 
all WIOD service, manufacturing and total exports) in 
the period 1995-2007. In 2007, the relative weight of 
EU-12  energy  inputs  embodied  in  exports  was  al-
ready  below  the  average  for  total  WIOD  and  for 
many  of  the  single-country  exports.  The  standard 
deviation  of  the  relative  weights  of  foreign  inputs 
embodied in EU-12 exports increased, in particular 
for  manufacturing,  as  result  of  the  increase  in  the 
relative  weight  of  the  energy  inputs  sourced  from 
the BRII in the period 1995-2007.  
China and the RoW economies have also significantly 
reduced  the  relative  weight  of  their  energy  inputs 
embodied  in  the  exports  of  the  other  countries. 
However,  unlike  the  EU-12  the  relative  weight  of 
Chinese  and  RoW  energy  inputs  in  general  remain 
above the average of relative weight of foreign ener-
gy  inputs  embodied  in  the  exports  of  most  of  the 
countries in 2007. Exceptions include the considera-
ble convergence of China towards the average of the 
relative weights in energy inputs embodied in EU-15 
and Japanese manufacturing and total exports. 
Some of the BRII countries are energy-rich and this 
may in part explain why energy has a relatively high 
weight in the BRII inputs embodied in exports of the 
other economies. The relative weight of BRII energy 
inputs in manufacturing and service exports has in-
creased in the period 1995-2007. 
Table 3.5 (panel C) indicates a constant or reduced 
variability of the relative weight of energy in the total 
foreign inputs embodied in the total exports of coun-
tries and total WIOD exports in the period 1995-2007 
(the exception is the EU-12). This appears to be re-
sult of the convergence that occurred across coun-
tries in terms of the weight of energy inputs embod-
ied in manufacturing exports (as indicated by overall 
lower  – except for the EU-12 – standard deviations 
in 2007 in panel A of Table 3.5). 
3.2.5 Domestic-energy inputs vs domestic inputs in 
exports 
Figure 3.17 presents the country shares in total (the 
across-countries sum of) domestic energy inputs in 
exports side-by-side with the shares in total (the sum 
of) domestic inputs in exports (the latter studied in 
Chapter 2 of this report). 
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 depict broadly similar patterns. 
The BRII economies as a whole have relatively high 
energy intensities in total domestic inputs embodied 
in exports. By contrast, in the EU-15, Japan and (to a 
lesser extent) the US, the share in domestic content 
in  exports  is  higher  than  the  share  in  domestic-
energy inputs in exports. However, both shares are 
decreasing over time, in particular in the US and Ja-
pan  (including  during  the  crisis  period  2007-2009). 
They are giving way to the larger shares of China in 
both domestic-energy inputs and domestic content 
in exports (as in the case described above of the for-
eign-energy inputs and import content in  exports), 
reflecting the Chinese exports boom in the period. 
Table 3.6 presents the ratio between the shares in 
domestic  energy  inputs  and  domestic  content  (in 
manufacturing, service and total) exports. Similarly, 
the ratio provides a measure of energy intensity rela-
tive to total domestic  inputs embodied in  exports. 
Again, a value lower than one indicates that a given 
country has a lower than average weight of energy 
inputs  relative  to  all  domestic  inputs  embodied  in 
exports (which for economies that are dependent on 
energy  imports  may  represent  relatively  lower  po-
tential  competitiveness  losses  arising  from  an  in-
crease  in  the  relative  price  of  energy). Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Table 3.5 – Ratio between the shares in foreign energy inputs and import content in manufacturing, service and total exports in 1995 and 2007 
   BRII  Canada  China  EU-12  EU-15  Japan  Korea  Mexico  USA  RoW  WIOD 
   1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007  1995  2007 
A) Manufacturing exports 
BRII        3.4  2.7  2.3  2.9  2.4  3.0  1.7  2.0  2.2  2.3  2.5  2.7  3.6  2.7  2.7  2.5  3.1  2.6  2.5  2.6 
Canada  1.2  1.3        1.3  1.4  1.4  1.6  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  1.3  1.1  1.7  1.1  1.3  1.1  2.0  1.4  1.3  1.2 
China  1.4  1.3  2.8  1.5        1.9  1.5  1.4  1.0  1.6  1.0  1.5  1.2  2.7  1.4  2.1  1.2  2.5  1.2  2.0  1.2 
EU-12  1.8  1.0  2.8  1.2  2.5  1.0        1.5  0.7  1.8  0.7  2.0  0.7  3.2  1.0  2.3  1.0  3.1  1.1  2.2  0.9 
EU-15  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5        0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.4 
Japan  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.3        0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4 
Korea  0.7  1.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.3  0.6  0.9  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.9        0,8  0.8  0.6  1.0  1.1  1.3  0.8  1.1 
Mexico  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.7  1.1  0.8  1.2  1.1  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  1.0  0.7        0.8  0.8  1.2  0.8  0.8  0.8 
USA  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.0  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.9  0.9        0.9  0.8  0.7  0.8 
RoW  1.9  1.4  2.2  1.6  1.7  1.2  2.0  1.5  1.2  1.1  1.3  1.2  1.8  1.3  2.0  1.1  1.5  1.2        1.8  1.3 
St dev  0.6  0.4  1.2  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  1.2  0.7  0.9  0.6  1.0  0.7  0.8  0.6 
B) Service exports 
BRII        2.7  2.1  1.9  2.4  2.5  2.8  1.7  2.1  1.7  2.4  1.9  2.7  2.5  2.0  2.7  2.2  3.2  3.2  2.2  2.5 
Canada  0.8  1.1        0.9  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.9  0.9  1.2  1.3  0.8  1.5  1.6  2.1  1  1.3  1.5 
China  1.0  1.2  2.0  1.1        1.6  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.1  0.8  1.3  2.1  0.9  1.6  0.8  2.6  1.3  1.5  1.1 
EU-12  1.3  0.8  1.6  1.0  1.7  0.8        1.4  0.7  1.0  0.6  0.8  0.6  2.1  0.7  1.2  0.7  2.9  1.0  1.6  0.8 
EU-15  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.6        0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.7  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.5  0.5  0.4 
Japan  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3        0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.4  0,5  0.3  0.4 
Korea  0.7  1.5  1.1  1.0  1.7  1.9  0.4  0.8  0.7  0.7  1.4  0.9        0.7  0.9  0.8  1.7  1.4  1.8  1.3  1.4 
Mexico  0.7  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.7  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1        0.9  1.2  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.2 
USA  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.9  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.9  1.1  1.2        1.0  1.0  0.7  0.8 
RoW  2.2  1.5  1.6  1.2  1.8  1.3  2.0  1.3  1.4  1.1  1.3  1.1  1.7  1.4  1.7  1.0  1.5  1.0        1.9  1.2 
St dev  0.6  0.4  0.8  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.4  0.7  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.6 
C) Total exports 
BRII        3.4  2.7  2.3  2.8  2.4  3.4  1.7  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.4  2.7  3.5  2.6  2.7  2.4  3.1  2.6  2.5  2.5 
Canada  1.1  1.2        1.3  1.4  1.3  1.5  1.0  1.1  1.0  0.9  1.2  1.1  1.6  1.1  1.3  1.2  2.0  1.4  1.3  1.2 
China  1.3  1.3  2.8  1.4        1.8  1.4  1.4  1.0  1.5  1.0  1.4  1.2  2.6  1.3  2  1.1  2.5  1.2  1.9  1.2 
EU-12  1.7  0.9  2.7  1.2  2.4  1.0        1.5  0.7  0.7  0.7  1.9  0.7  3.0  1.0  2.1  0.9  3.0  1.1  2.2  0.9 
EU-15  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5        0.4  0,3  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.5  0.4 
Japan  0,3  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.3        0.3  0,4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4 
Korea  0.7  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.1  1.3  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.7  1.0  0.9        0.8  0.8  0.6  1.1  1.1  1.3  0.9  1.1 
Mexico  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.7  1.0  0.8  1.2  1.1  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  1.0  0.7        0.8  0.9  1.2  0.8  0.8  0.8 
USA  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.0  0.5  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.0        0.9  0.8  0.7  0.8 
RoW  1.9  1.4  2.2  1.6  1.7  1.2  2.0  1.5  1.3  1.1  1.3  1.2  1.8  1.3  2.0  1.1  1.5  1.2        1.8  1.3 
St dev  0.6  0.4  1.1  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  1.1  0.6  0.8  0.6  1.0  0.7  0.8  0.6 
Note: values lower or equal to one and higher than ½ are highlighted in yellow. Values lower or equal to ½ are highlighted in blue. 
Source: WIOD. 
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Figure 3.17 – Shares in domestic energy inputs vs. domestic content in (manufacturing, service and total) 
exports, 1995, 2007 and 2009 
 
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
Table 3.6 – Ratio between the shares in domestic energy inputs and domestic content in manufacturing, ser-
vice and total exports in 1995, 2007 and 2009 
 
   Manufacturing  Services  Total exports 
   1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009  1995  2007  2009 
BRII  2.6  2.9  2.8  2.2  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.5  2.4 
Canada  1.2  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.3  1.2 
China  1.9  1.2  1.1  2.5  2.0  1.9  1.9  1.2  1.1 
EU-12  2.2  0.9  0.8  1.5  1.2  1.2  1.9  0.9  0.9 
EU-15  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.4 
Japan  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.4 
Korea  0.8  1.2  1.3  2.0  1.3  1.5  0.9  1.2  1.2 
Mexico  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.3  1.3  0.8  0.9  1.1 
USA  0.8  1.0  1.0  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.9  0.8 
RoW  1.9  1.1  1.2  1.2  0.8  0.9  1.7  1.3  1.3 
St dev  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6 
 
Note: values lower or equal to one and higher than ½ are highlighted in yellow. Values lower or equal to ½ are highlighted in green. 
Source: WIOD.  
 
The EU-15 and Japan also have the lowest relative 
energy intensity in terms of domestic inputs embod-
ied in (total, manufacturing and service) exports. The 
energy intensity ratio decreased by almost ½ for the 
EU-15 in the period 1995-2007, eliminating the gap 
with  manufacturing  and  broadly  converging  to  the 
Japanese  energy-intensity  levels  (that  increased 
slightly over the period). The US also has a higher 
energy intensity when it comes to domestic inputs in 
exports (that, as in Japan, increased slightly in the 
period 1995-2007), but that still remains below the 
average overall (for manufacturing, service and total 
exports). For these economies, the energy intensity 
levels in the domestic and foreign content in exports 
(the latter presented in Table 3.5) are broadly simi-
lar. 
The EU-12  significantly reduced energy intensity in 
domestic  inputs  in  manufacturing  exports  but 
achieved only a much smaller reduction in relation to 
service exports. The weight of energy inputs in do-
mestic inputs embodied in service exports remained 
above one over the whole period and the gap vis-à-
vis the EU-15 was not reduced. This may be one of 
the factors undermining the competitiveness of ser-Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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vice exports in the EU-12 and may partly explain its 
lower growth when compared to manufacturing ex-
ports in the period (see Figure 3.9 and Table 3.3 for 
the  evolution  of  the  EU-12  market  shares  in  each 
sector relative to total WIOD exports). The contrast is 
evident not only with the substantial reduction in the 
weight of energy inputs in the domestic content in 
manufacturing  exports,  but  also  with  the  roughly 
similarly  reduction  observed  in  Table  3.5  above  in 
terms of the relative weight of the EU-12 energy in-
puts  embodied  in  both  manufacturing  and  service 
exports of the other economies.  
Similarly, China has considerably reduced the energy 
intensity of the domestic content in manufacturing 
exports  but  to  a  much  lesser  extent  in  service  ex-
ports. This contrasts with the RoW, where the weight 
of energy in the domestic content in exports declined 
both in manufacturing and services.  
The standard deviations at the bottom of Table 3.6 
point to some convergence in the energy intensity of 
domestic inputs embodied in manufacturing but not 
in service exports. This may be partly explained by an 
overall greater competition, larger weight of tradable 
goods  and  more  developed  vertical  specialisation 
within manufacturing. Table 3.5 indicated some con-
vergence  in  the  energy  intensity  of  foreign  energy 
inputs in the import content of both manufacturing 
and service exports. This is a further indication of the 
importance of internationalisation and the develop-
ment  of  cross-border  production  networks  for  the 
reduction and convergence of energy-intensity levels 
across  countries.  The  next  subsection,  focusing  on 
manufacturing, analyses whether part of the reduc-
tion of the energy intensity of the inputs embodied 
in exports is due to improvements in energy efficien-
cy.
Table 3.7 Energy intensity in TJ per Unit of Output (O) and Value Added (VA) (EU-27 in 1995 prices and US 
Dollars)  
NACE Rev. 
1.1  Description 
Energy Intensity  Change  
1995  2007  2009  1995-2009 
O  VA  O  VA  O  VA  O  VA 
TOTAL  ALL SECTORS  5.94  31.63  4.48  22.90  4.37  23.98  -26%  -24% 
D  MANUFACTURING (Total)  10.28  11.85  6.96  9.60  7.12  9.19  -31%  -22% 
15t16  Food , Beverages and Tobacco  1.97  7.84  1.48  6.15  1.47  6.33  -25%  -19% 
17t18  Textiles and Textile  2.13  6.31  1.49  4.66  1.35  4.19  -36%  -34% 
19  Leather, Leather and Footwear  1.24  4.31  0.81  3.06  0.77  2.79  -38%  -35% 
20 
Wood  and  Products  of  Wood  and 
Cork  2.79  8.21  2.84  9.41  3.42  11.31  23%  38% 
21t22  Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing  3.69  9.73  3.64  10.43  3.64  10.37  -1%  7% 
23 
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nucle-
ar Fuel  195.71  1231.89  128.76  1199.02  95.33  967.93  -51%  -21% 
24  Chemicals and Chemical  13.60  39.97  9.29  28.25  8.95  27.11  -34%  -32% 
25  Rubber and Plastics  1.62  4.40  1.47  4.36  1.41  4.23  -13%  -4% 
26  Other Non-Metallic Mineral  9.45  23.20  7.63  20.22  7.85  20.61  -17%  -11% 
27t28  Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal  7.83  22.46  5.24  16.38  4.70  15.11  -40%  -33% 
29  Machinery, Nec  0.95  2.54  0.57  1.73  0.61  1.82  -36%  -28% 
30t33  Electrical and Optical Equipment  0.68  1.92  0.33  0.87  0.31  0.84  -54%  -56% 
34t35  Transport Equipment  0.77  2.83  0.43  1.90  0.47  2.13  -38%  -25% 
36t37  Manufacturing Nec; Recycling  1.11  3.09  1.02  3.31  1.22  3.83  10%  24% 
Source: WIOD. 
3.2.6 Measuring energy efficiency in the manufac-
turing sector 
There has been a substantial improvement in indus-
trial competitiveness due to investment in more en-
ergy-efficient  technology  and  innovative  products 
and  processes.  This  subsection  analyses  how  to 
measure energy-efficiency changes that are genuine-
ly the result of technology improvements in EU man-
ufacturing and to what extent they have contributed 
to improved competitiveness. 
Energy efficiency is analysed by breaking down the 
changes in energy use to a number of causal factors, 
focusing  on  manufacturing  in  the  European  Union 
and on its major competitors. 
Table 3.7 presents energy intensity in the EU-27 in 
the years 1995, 2007 and 2009. Manufacturing activ-
ities  involve  transforming  different  material  inputs 
into products and tend to use relatively more energy 
in terms of gross output volumes but not in relation 
to value added. Manufacturing sectors contributed Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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significantly  to  the  overall  improvement  in  energy 
productivity  in  the  period  1995-2009.  The  im-
provment  was  particularly  noticeable  in  energy  in-
tensive sectors such as Coke, Refined Petroleum and 
Nuclear Fuel, Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal or 
Chemicals,  but  also  in  some  less  energy-intensive 
sectors.  The  few  exceptions,  such  as  Wood  and 
Products of Wood and Cork, seem to be more a re-
sult of a cyclical increase in measured energy intensi-
ty that may be due to the crisis and to low capacity 
utilisation. 
The analysis of the changes in energy use and the 
improvements  in  energy  efficiency  are  carried  out 
through  a  standard  index  decomposition  method 
(the  Log-Mean  Divisia  Index,  see  Annex  1).  The 
change in total energy use in manufacturing sectors 
is decomposed into three factors: i) scale; ii) compo-
sition and, most importantly, iii) ‘technical effect’. 
Figure 3.18 – Index Decomposition Analysis of Total 
Energy Use in Manufacturing Sectors Using the Log 
Mean Divisia Index: EU-27, EU-15 and EU-12  
 
 
 
Source:WIOD. 
The scale factor accounts for the change in energy 
use  that  is  due  to  a  change  in  economic  activity 
(overall level of production
49). The composition fac-
tor  isolates  the  effect  of  sub -sectoral/structural 
changes within manufacturing. Finally, the technical 
effect shows how energy use would have changed if 
the total level of production (scale) and the industry 
structure  (composition)  had  remained  unchanged 
over time. 
Figure 3.18 presents the results of the decompos i-
tion for the  EU, EU-15 and EU-12. The grey lines in 
the figure show the development of total energy use 
in manufacturing in the EU-27, EU-15, and EU-12. In 
general, the EU -15 aggregate accounts for a very 
high share of the EU -27’s overall economic activity 
and energy use in manufacturing sectors (that is the 
reason  why  the  lines  corresponding  to  these  two 
aggregates appear superimposed). The yellow lines 
(for the scale effect, controlling for a fixed technolo-
gy and sector composition) indicate a significant in-
crease in total energy use up to 2008 (in particular in 
the  EU-12,  almost  a  200 %  increase  from  1995  to 
2008). However, this effect was more than compen-
sated  for  by  the  improvement  in  energy  efficiency 
(accounted for by the green lines). The better per-
formance of EU-12 (vis-à-vis the EU-15) indicates a 
genuine improvement in energy efficiency in manu-
facturing and an important contribution to the over-
all performance and catching-up (from their low ini-
tial efficiency levels as observed above in Figure 3.2). 
Finally, the blue lines indicate negligible composition 
effects for the EU-15. For the EU-12, the composition  
                                                           
49   The level of production is measured by the gross output of the 
various manufacturing sectors. 
effect indicates a shift towards less energy-intensive 
manufacturing subsectors.  
Figure 3.19 shows that the manufacturing sector in 
the US has improved its energy efficiency and con-
tributed to the overall improvement in energy-use in 
that country. However, the technical effect is much 
smaller than the one observed in the European Un-
ion. The scale effect is positive but also smaller com-
pared to the EU (largely a result of the higher growth 
in  manufacturing  output  in  the  EU  in  the  period 
1995-2007,  as  afterwards  the  drop  in  activity  was 
roughly similar in both areas). 
 
Figure 3.19 - Index Decomposition Analysis of Total 
Energy Use in Manufacturing Sectors Using the Log 
Mean Divisia Index: United States 
 
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
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Japan, one of world leaders in energy efficiency in 
manufacturing  (see  European  Competitiveness  Re-
port  2011,  Chapter  5),  has  not  achieved  an  im-
provement of the kind seen in the EU and the US in 
this period (in fact, the technical effect even displays 
a slight upward trend in the period from 1998-2009, 
see Figure 3.20). The scale effect is relatively flat and 
the slight reduction in total energy use observed in 
the later period in the figure is due to a shift towards 
less energy-intensive manufacturing sectors. 
Figure 3.20 - Index Decomposition Analysis of Total 
Energy Use in Manufacturing Sectors Using the Log 
Mean Divisia Index: Japan 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
Figure 3.21 shows that for China the increase in eco-
nomic activity in the manufacturing sector was the 
dominant  factor  (it  would  have  accounted  for  an 
overwhelming 600 % increase in energy use had oth-
er factors remained unchanged in the period 1995-
2009). At the same time, there was a significant im-
provement  in  energy  efficiency  and  a  progressive 
shift  towards  less  intensive  manufacturing  sectors. 
As a result, total energy use of the Chinese manufac-
turing  sector  more  than  doubled  from  1995  until 
2009. 
Figure 3.21 - Index Decomposition Analysis of Total 
Energy Use in Manufacturing Sectors Using the Log 
Mean Divisia Index: China 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
So far, the analysis suggests that EU manufacturing 
sectors had a relatively good performance overall in 
improving energy efficiency and contributed to the 
leading position and eco-performance of the Euro-
pean  Union  as  a  whole.  Figure  3.22  reports  the 
changes in total energy use and the three decompo-
sition factors per Member State in the period 1995-
2009. 
Overall total energy use in the manufacturing sectors 
decreased  from  1995  until  2009  in  most  of  the 
Member States (there are only a few exceptions, e.g. 
Lithuania). Those countries with a high scale effect 
(Ireland and a subset of the EU-12 countries) are at 
the same time those countries that overall achieved 
the greatest improvement in energy efficiency (tech-
nical  effect).  However,  all  Member  States  (except 
five,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Den-
mark) have improved energy efficiency in manufac-
turing.  There  was  a  shift  towards  less  energy-
intensive sectors in the EU-12 countries with only a 
few exceptions (in particular Bulgaria). The composi-
tion effect is heterogeneous across EU-15 countries 
(e.g. there is no discernible shift towards less energy-
intensive  sectors as observed in Figure 3.20 above 
for Japan). 
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Figure 3.22 - Decomposition Analysis of Total Energy Use in Manufacturing Sectors 
 
 
 
Source: WIOD. 
 
3.3.  ECO-INNOVATION ADOPTION AND THE COMPETITIVE-
NESS OF EU FIRMS 
This section analyses the evidence for the adoption 
and  development  of  eco-innovations  by  EU  firms, 
focusing  on  energy-efficient  process  technologies 
and products. It is of particular interest to study how 
the adoption of energy efficiency translates into the 
performance and competitiveness of European firms. 
This section is organised as follows: i) it starts by pre-
senting some background and a short literature re-
view;  ii)  the  second  part  studies  the  reasons  why 
firms introduce energy-efficient technologies; iii) the 
third part analyses whether firms that introduce new 
products on the market that allow their customers to 
save energy have a higher success rate in terms of 
commercialisation  of  their  product  innovations, 
compared  to  conventional  product  innovators.  The 
section ends with a brief analysis of the competitive 
position of EU firms in the growing cross-border in-
vestments in clean, more energy-efficient and other 
technologies  related  to  the  development  of  envi-
ronmental  goods  and  services.  This  assessment 
paves the way for the in-depth analysis that follows Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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in Chapter 4 on general FDI flows and their impact on 
competitiveness. 
3.3.1. Background and literature review 
Eco-innovation is any form of innovation resulting in 
or aiming at significant and demonstrable progress 
towards  the  goal  of  sustainable  development, 
through reducing impacts on the environment, en-
hancing  resilience  to  environmental  pressures,  or 
achieving  a  more  efficient  and  responsible  use  of 
natural resources (European Commission (2011)). It 
can be understood as the ﬁrst introduction of a pol-
lution-abatement  technology  or  resource-saving 
technology (energy or material inputs) by a ﬁrm. It is 
required that the respective technology only to be 
novel to the  introducing ﬁrm and, of course, does 
not distinguish between technology invented by the 
ﬁrm  itself  and  the  adoption  of  well-known  abate-
ment technology that had already been invented by 
others (see Rennings (2000) for a more detailed dis-
cussion).  
The choice to invent or to adopt a new process tech-
nology is determined by several factors (such as in-
put  prices  or  regulations),  but  eco-innovation  has 
also associated a positive environmental externality. 
While for conventional technical change the innova-
tor  is  rewarded  with  private  benefits,  the  eco-
innovator in general also creates social benefits and 
has to bear the costs of introducing technical change 
alone.  For  energy-efficiency  technology,  there  are 
usually both private returns (e.g. lower energy and 
maintenance costs, etc.) and social benefits (such as 
reductions in CO2 emissions).  
This  chapter  restricted  the  scope  of  the  empirical 
analysis to energy-saving technologies and the words 
‘eco-innovation’, ‘invention’, ‘innovation’ and ‘adop-
tion’ - of an existing technology that is new to the 
firm - have been used interchangeably. 
The Community Innovation Survey 2008 (CIS 2008) 
reports  information  for  more  than  76500  firms 
across  18  EU  Member  States  on  whether  they 
adopted energy-saving technologies (amongst other 
eco-innovations)  between  2006  and  2008
50.  The 
countries included are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hung a-
ry, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, The Nether-
                                                           
50   The CIS 2008 reports information about eco-innovation for 22 
Members States. However, microdata is not available for four 
of  them  (Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Austria  and  Poland).  CIS 
reports the firms’ responses to the question “During the three 
years 2006 to 2008, did your enterprise introduce a product 
(good  or  service),  process,  organisational  or  marketing 
innovation with any of the following environmental benefits: 
[…]’. 
lands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden.  
A  first  look  at  both  the  CIS  micro-data  and  WIOD 
sectoral data (see Figure 3.23) reveals that manufac-
turing – as a whole and in particular energy-intensive 
sectors – achieved a relatively greater reduction in 
their energy intensity and that this corresponds to 
higher eco-innovation activities observed in the firm-
level data for the same sectors. The left-hand side of 
Figure 3.23 presents the change in energy intensity 
from 1995 until 2009, based on WIOD. The share of 
firms in the CIS micro-data that introduced energy-
saving process technologies between 2006 and 2008 
is presented in the right-hand-side (RHS) figure. 
The  arguments  and  brief  discussion  in  section  3.1 
had already suggested — at a macroeconomic level 
— that increases in the price of energy were one of 
the major drivers for energy saving eco-innovations. 
An interesting follow-up would be to study whether 
firms  that  use  energy  rather  intensively  are  more 
affected by increasing energy prices and have a high-
er  level  of  induced  energy-saving  eco-innovation 
activities (bearing in mind that existing capital goods 
can limit the opportunity space for the adoption of 
energy-efficiency  technology,  etc.).  Unfortunately, 
the CIS data offers no information on either energy 
prices or on how much energy is consumed by firms. 
There exist a large number of studies indicating that, 
apart  from  prices,  regulation  is  another  important 
driver for the adoption of eco-innovation in general. 
The  price-induced  innovation  argument  can  be 
‘translated’ to environmental regulation that induces 
technical  change.
51  Early  empirical  evidence  that 
regulation triggers eco-innovations is given by La n-
jouw and Mody (1996). They associate international 
patenting behaviour regarding environmentally r e-
lated technologies with pollution-abatement spend-
ing in different countries. Jaffe  and Palmer (1997) 
take the R&D process into account as well as the 
outcomes  of  inventive  pr ocesses  (measured  with 
patent applications) and do not find a statistically 
significant  effect  of  pollution -control  expenditures 
on  patenting  activities.  In  contrast   to  this  study, 
Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find a link between 
pollution-abatement spending and successful patent 
applications related to environmental technologies. 
Popp et al. (2010) contains a detailed and compr e-
hensive survey of this literature. 
                                                           
51   It can be argued that what environmental regulation does is 
to drive a wedge between the market price of polluting inputs 
and  their  shadow  price  (so  that  they  become  ‘loosely 
speaking’  relatively  more  expensive).  In  this  sense, 
environmental regulation would have the same consequences 
as  a  price  increase  for  the  polluting  input  factors  (such  as 
fossil  energy  sources),  making  the  concept  of  induced 
technical change applicable to green innovations. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Figure 3.23 - Change in Energy Intensity 1995 - 2009 by Sectors in 18 EU Member States (LHS) and Energy-
efficiency Innovation Activities of Firms by Sectors in 18 EU Member States (RHS) 
 
 
Source: WIOD, CIS 2008 
 
In contrast to the literature on the drivers of eco-
innovation adoption, a much less clear-cut prediction 
is  provided  regarding  eco-innovation’s  impact  on 
competitiveness. The large body of research on the 
competitiveness impact of eco-innovation adoption 
in general is mostly focused on the role played by 
regulation (e.g. the very early literature begins in the 
1980s after the United States and other highly indus-
trialised countries had started to regulate local water 
and  air  pollutants;  for  instance,  sulphur  dioxide 
(SO2)).  
Christiansen  and  Haveman  (1981)  associate  an  8–
12 %  slowdown  in  U.S.  productivity  between  1965 
and  1979  with  environmental  regulations.  Other 
studies,  like  Gollop  and  Roberts  (1983)  or  Green-
stone (2002), also find that regulation has negative 
effects on economic performance. Jaffe et al. (1995), 
in  a  comprehensive  survey,  conclude  that  overall 
there  was  relatively  little  evidence  to  support  the 
hypothesis that environmental regulations have had 
a  large  adverse  effect  on  competitiveness.  Several 
sectoral studies on how firms’ productivity is affect-
ed by environmental regulation appear to reach simi-
lar mixed and inconclusive results: Berman and Bui 
(2001) find that for U.S. oil refineries, regulation is 
associated with a ‘substantial’ investment in pollu-
tion-abatement  capital  and  productivity  growth  in 
the more stringently regulated regions; conversely, 
Gray and Shadbegian (2003) find the opposite is the 
case  for  pulp  and  paper  plants,  again  in  the  U.S.; 
however, Boyd and McClelland (1999), based on a 
new  (regression-free)  methodology,  find  some  evi-
dence  for  productivity-decreasing  effects  of  abate-
ment technology in the paper industry; Aiken et al. 
(2009)  does  not  find  negative  effects  of  pollution 
abatement on the productivity of several sectors in 
the U.S., Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands. In a 
more  recent  contribution,  Rexhäuser  and  Rammer 
(2011)  use  German  CIS  data  —  distinguishing  be-
tween  regulation  and  non-regulation-induced  eco-Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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innovations (these further broken down into pollu-
tion-preventing ones and those that reduce energy 
and material use) — finding productivity-enhancing 
effects at firm level but only for energy and material-
saving technology adoption.  
3.3.2. Adoption of energy-saving technologies 
The choice to introduce energy-efficiency technology 
is expected to be driven by environmental regulation 
and increasing prices for energy in the first place. For 
regulation, the CIS data offers firms’ responses to the 
question whether energy-saving process technology 
was introduced to meet regulatory requirements or 
whether  it  was  introduced  because  regulation  was 
expected to come into force in the future. For energy 
prices, however, the CIS data unfortunately offers no 
information. 
Examples  of  other  potential  determinants  of  eco-
innovations reported in the CIS data are whether the 
innovation was introduced in response to demand by 
customers,  due  to  voluntary  environmental  agree-
ments by the firm or due to public subsidies for envi-
ronmental technology. There are also such indicator 
variables  as  whether  the  firm  has  introduced  any 
other process innovation or new products, exports to 
European countries or to world markets (which can 
be  seen  as  a  proxy  for  exposure  to  international 
competition). 
Given the discrete nature of a firm’s decision wheth-
er or not to introduce environmental process tech-
nology,  a  discrete  choice  (probit)  model  estimates 
the probability of introducing energy-saving process 
technology, controlling for firm-specific characteris-
tics (such as firm size and sector affiliation) and, of 
course, the determinants for having introduced eco-
innovations the firms reported (see Annex 2).  
In line with previous research, the analysis supports 
the view that environmental regulation is a key driv-
er of eco-innovations (the adoption of energy-saving 
process  innovations  in  this  case).  For  more  than 
46 000  firms  across  16  European  countries
52,  the 
model estimates that those firms that reported they 
had introduced eco-innovations due to environmen-
tal regulation have (on average) an 11.70 percentage 
points  higher  probability  of  adoptin g  energy -
efficiency technology than those firms that did not 
introduce such innovations due to regulation (see 
Annex 2). The mere expectation of further regulation 
increases by 9.56 percentage points the probability 
of adopting energy-saving technology. However, the 
results differ across countries. The effect of regul a-
tion is found to be greater in Romania (25.9 percent-
                                                           
52   Sweden and Finland were omitted due to missing data. 
age  points),  Slovakia  (24.8  percentage  points),  and 
Bulgaria (24 percentage points). In contrast, the ef-
fect is very low but still significant in Italy (4.7 per-
centage points).  
Other  important  determinants  are  voluntary  envi-
ronmental agreements by firms and the adoption of 
other process innovation. Firms that reported volun-
tary  environmental  agreements  as  the  reason  for 
eco-innovation  adoption  have  (on  average)  a  17.0 
percentage  points  higher  probability  of  adopting 
energy-saving innovation compared to firms where 
this  was  not  the  case.  The  effect  of  having  intro-
duced  another  process  innovation  boosts  by  13.2 
percentage  points  the  probability  of  adopting  an 
energy-saving  innovation;  a  possible  interpretation 
for this is that energy-saving process technology is to 
some  degree  adopted  together  with  conventional 
process technology. The effect that introducing new 
products has on the probability of adopting energy-
saving  innovation is also positive but  smaller (+5.3 
percentage points). 
Firms  exporting  to  other  European  countries  or  to 
world markets have higher probabilities of adopting 
energy-saving innovations but in no case is this sta-
tistically  significant.  Interestingly,  the  two  export 
dummy  variables  were  statistically  significant  in  a 
different model specification, not controlling for the 
introduction of new products and other process in-
novations.  This  result  suggests  there  might  be  an 
indirect link between the internationalisation of EU 
firms and the adoption of energy-efficiency innova-
tion  —  meaning  that  (exporting)  internationalised 
firms tend to  be more innovative (introducing new 
products or adopting conventional process technolo-
gy), this being  associated with the adoption of ener-
gy-saving innovations. Anticipating the results in the 
next section, an example would be a firm that intro-
duces a new product embodying energy-saving fea-
tures. 
3.3.3  Market  success  of  energy-efficiency  product 
innovators 
The existing literature largely focuses on the adop-
tion  of  energy-efficiency-improving  technologies 
(especially if regulation-induced) and the impacts on 
measured productivity at firm, sector or aggregate 
level. Unfortunately, the CIS data does not make it 
easy  to  study  the  impact  of  eco-innovation  on 
productivity measures such as total factor productivi-
ty. With CIS it is possible only to study the impact on 
rather rough productivity measures, such as turnover 
or  turnover  per  worker.  Moreover,  the  non-
availability of important factors such as capital use or 
energy  further  complicates  matters.  The  non-Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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availability of capital data is problematic since capital 
is  expected  to  be  correlated  with  the  adoption  of 
energy-efficiency technology. Firms that have a high-
er capital endowment also need more energy inputs 
to  operate  capital  goods  and  therefore  (if  energy 
prices are high) may find a need to replace capital 
goods by more energy-efficient ones. In summary, in 
a standard regression the effect of energy-efficiency-
technology adoption could therefore be biased.  
Rennings  and  Rexhäuser  (2012)  made  several  at-
tempts to circumvent these problems (e.g. by proxy-
ing capital by lagged firm turnover). The regressions 
performed seem to suggest that energy-saving pro-
cess innovation adoption has only minor, if any, ef-
fects on the growth rates of turnover or turnover per 
worker.  
This section takes another approach to studying the 
impact of energy-efficiency innovation activities on 
the performance and competitiveness of EU firms. A 
major — and largely neglected — aspect of competi-
tiveness  and  eco-innovations  is  whether  ‘green’ 
product  innovations  lead  to  a  better  competitive 
position of the innovators. In what follows, the com-
petitiveness  of  product  innovators  will  be  studied 
using firms’ innovation success which is measured, as 
is commonly done, by the share of new products in 
firms’ total sales.  
Innovation  success  is  measured  as  the  sum  of  the 
turnover share of market novelties in total sales plus 
the share of new products introduced into the mar-
ket that are new only to the firm (reported in per-
centage points in CIS). The CIS data also offers infor-
mation on whether the product innovations of firms 
allow their customers to save energy. For instance, 
the  data  shows  (as  expected)  that  manufacturing 
firms lead in the introduction of product innovations 
that allow their customers to save energy but that 
other firms also have important energy-saving inno-
vation activities. Around 15 000 firms (more than 9 
250 in manufacturing) across 17 EU countries
53 re-
ported having introduced newly developed products 
on the market between 2006 and 2008. New pro d-
ucts account for around 28 % of the firm’s total sales 
on average (both for the whole 15 000 and for manu-
facturing firms only). However, 41 % of the manufac-
turing firms reported energy-saving product innova-
tions, against 38 % in the whole sample of product 
innovators (see Annex 3).  
The central question addressed here is then the ex-
tent  to  which  the  introduction  of  energy-efficient 
                                                           
53   Sweden is not included due to missing data. 
products  by  firms  is  valued  by  the  market  and 
whether  this  translates  into  greater  firm  success 
compared to conventional product innovators.  
One of the major determinants of innovation success 
is to what extent a firm is engaged in innovative ac-
tivities. A firm that invests more in R&D will in princi-
ple  have  a  higher  share  of  new  products  in  total 
sales. Moreover, firms that are continuously engaged 
in R&D activities may also be more innovative as well 
as those that cooperate with other firms, customers 
or  research  institutes.  Firms  owned  by  domestic 
groups  or  belonging  to  foreign  multinationals  may 
also  have  access  to  external  knowledge.  The  eco-
nomic literature also offers evidence of the effect of 
other  variables.  For  instance,  innovative  outputs 
tends to increase with firm size, but that this rela-
tionship follows a less than proportionate rate (see 
for  instance  Scherer  (1965)  or  Acs  and  Audretsch 
(1988)). These are the main variables serving as con-
trols in the regression analysis (see Annex 3). 
In surveys, firms often report rather ‘round’ numbers 
if they are asked to state a percentage number, for 
instance because they simply do not know the exact 
number. This was also observed in the CIS data on 
innovation  success.  The  dependent  variable  in  the 
regression was therefore transformed into a categor-
ical  variable  recording  innovation  success  in  10 
equally distributed intervals. A sensitivity check has 
shown that this rearrangement has only a very small 
impact on the results. The analysis reported here is 
restricted to European firms in the CIS that stated 
they  had  introduced  newly developed  products  on 
the  market  (as  a  large  number  of  non-innovator 
firms report missing values for several control varia-
bles).  
The regression analysis provides  evidence that inno-
vators that introduce new products into the market, 
allowing their customers to save energy, are more 
successful innovators. Compared to firms which in-
troduce only conventional product innovations into 
the market, eco-product innovators have on average 
a 2 percentage points higher share of product inno-
vations  in  total  turnover.  At  aggregate  level,  the 
mean share of turnover that is earned by selling new 
products would rise from approximately 28 to 30 per 
cent. This may seem to be a small percentage at first 
glance but individually the effect can be higher (see 
Figure 3.24) and mostly importantly may represent a 
significant competitive advantage. Eco-product inno-
vators in manufacturing sectors enjoy a 2.6 percent-
age point increase in innovation success compared to 
conventional product innovators. For manufacturing 
firms, this effect is illustrated graphically below. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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The figure predicts the likelihood of a certain level of 
innovation  success  being  recorded  and  compares 
firms that introduced energy saving product innova-
tions with those that did not, controlling for any oth-
er differences in innovation success. The interpreta-
tion of these density plots is as follows: For ‘green’ 
product innovators, the likelihood of levels of inno-
vation success from zero up to, say, 25 per cent  
Figure 3.24 – Innovation Success in Manufacturing 
Sectors 
 
Source: CIS 2008.  
being recorded is smaller compared to conventional 
innovators. Conversely, the likelihood of eco-product 
innovators  being  recorded  at  levels  above  25  per 
cent, but most importantly between 25 and 40 per 
cent,  is  higher  for  ‘green’  innovators  compared  to 
non-green innovators. 
Overall,  there  seems  to  be  evidence  that  product 
innovators  introducing  energy-saving  products  on 
the market enjoy higher sales generated by product 
innovation compared to conventional product inno-
vators. This, of course, may also reflect an important 
competitive advantage. 
3.3.4. The internationalisation and competitive po-
sition of EU firms in  ‘green FDI’ 
Energy  efficiency  and  related  environmental  goals 
are global challenges presenting many business op-
portunities for EU firms. This subsection uses the fDi 
markets database to analyse the internationalisation 
and competitive position of EU firms and some EU 
leading industries in the area of environmental goods 
and  services.  The  analysis  focuses  on  cross-border 
greenfield  investments  in  an  environmental-
technologies cluster related to the provision of envi-
ronmental  goods  and  services  (Golub  et  al.  2011). 
The assignment of greenfield FDI to the environmen-
tal cluster is done at the project level. For example, 
particular FDI projects within the machinery industry 
are included if they relate to environmental goods 
(e.g. if the project consists of new production facility 
for  water-treatment  systems).  Another  example  is 
the  electronics  industry  where  projects  related  to 
solar modules from part of the environmental tech-
nology cluster. This classification entails a very large 
overlap with Eurostat’s definition of Environmental 
Goods  and  Services  Industries.  In  particular,  it  in-
cludes  both  the  main  environmental-protection  in-
dustries, i.e. waste and wastewater treatment, and 
the  resource-management  industries,  i.e.  alterna-
tive-energy generation (Eurostat, 2009). In addition, 
the definition also includes several investments re-
lated  to  what  Eurostat  calls  ‘connected’  products 
such as wind turbines. 
Table 3.8 presents the amounts (in million USD) of 
green  FDI  projects  undertaken  by  EU  MNEs  across 
four main sectors of environmental technology in the 
period 2007-2011 and compares them with the activ-
ities of major competitors (MNEs from the US, China 
and Japan). Renewable energy is  clearly the domi-
nant industry in terms of the amount of green FDI 
(374 000  million  USD  worldwide  over  the  period 
2007-2011, accounting for 4/5 of all green FDI pro-
jects).  In  terms  of  the  common  industry  classifica-
tion, the renewable-energy industry would be part of 
the electricity, gas and water supply sector – NACE E 
according to NACE Rev1.). Other important industries 
for green investment projects are also found within 
manufacturing,  namely  the  electronic-components 
industry (48 000 million USD worldwide, a share of 
10 % of the total green FDI), the engines and turbines 
industry  (with  a  4 %  share  of  the  total  worldwide 
green  FDI).  Industrial  machinery  accounts  for  a 
smaller share (around 1 %) of the worldwide green 
FDI  but  includes  a  considerable  number  of  cross-
border FDI projects (around 250 projects worldwide 
in the period 2007-2011 — not reported in Table 3.8, 
comparable to the number of green FDI projects in 
the engine and turbine industry over the same peri-
od). 
The prominence of these industries stems from the 
fact  that  companies  in  these  sectors  build  the 
equipment  needed  for  alternative  forms  of  power 
generation  (FDI  projects  include  plants  producing 
wind engines and turbines or the electronic compo-
nents  of  solar  panels).  The  remaining  green  FDI  is 
attributed to several sectors (e.g. Metals, Chemicals, 
Business  Service),  each  with  much  low-
er individual shares.Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Table 3.8 - Position of EU companies in green cross-border investment projects relative to the US, Japan and 
China (2007-2011, million USD) 
      EU total  intra-EU  extra-EU  US  Japan  China  RoW  WORLD 
Alternative/Renewable  inv.  236820  116053  120767  47873  20145  11001  58211  374049 
Energy  share  (63.3)  31.0  (32.3)  (12.8)  (5.4)  (2.9)  (15.6)  79% 
Electronic  inv.  22811  6191  16620  9824  2896  2449  9962  47943 
Components  share  (47.6)  (12.9)  (34.7)  (20.5)  (6.)  (5.1)  (20.8)  10% 
Engines & Turbines  inv.  12719  1931  10788  1109  932  3580  1868  20208 
   share  (62.9)  (9.6)  (53.4)  (5.5)  (4.6)  (17.7)  (9.2)  4% 
Industrial Machinery,   inv.  2448  392  2056  911  1101  28  420  4908 
Equipment & Tools  share  (49.9)  8.0  (41.9)  (18.6)  (22.4)  (.6)  (8.6)  1% 
Others  inv.  14251  5229  9022  2720  2796  653  5942  26362 
   share  (54.1)  (19.8)  (34.2)  (10.3)  (10.6)  (2.5)  (22.5)  6% 
Overall Total  inv.  289048  129796  159252  62438  27870  17711  76402  473469 
   share  (61.0)  (27.4)  (33.6)  (13.2)  (5.9)  (3.7)  (16.1)    
Note: EU is EU-27. Industry classification of fDi markets database.  
Source: fDi markets database. 
Overall, leading EU manufacturing and services firms 
in green industries are highly internationalised and 
seem to be well positioned in global competition. For 
the environmental-technologies cluster as a whole, 
EU companies accounted for almost 2/3 of green FDI 
by MNEs worldwide in the period 2007-2011 (when 
Intra-EU  FDI  is  also  included).  Around  55 %  of  the 
EU’s green FDI correspond to extra-EU investments, 
160 000 million USD in the period 2007-2011. This is 
almost 3 times the amount of outward green FDI by 
US MNEs over the same period. 
Among the green industries shown in Table 3.8, EU 
companies  are  best  positioned  in  Alterna-
tive/Renewable Energy and in the engines and tur-
bines industry (with a share of close to 2/3 of the 
green FDI worldwide in both sectors). EU companies 
lead international investment activities in these in-
dustries  and  wind-turbine  manufacturing  firms  in 
countries such as Denmark, Germany and Spain play 
a  leading  role.  The  emergence  of  Chinese  wind-
turbine  manufacturers  (with  about  18 %  of  FDI 
worldwide) is reflected by the fact that four of the 
ten leading companies (in terms of installed capacity) 
are from China and some of them have already in-
ternationalised  their  operations  via  cross-border 
projects. 
In the other two main sectors for green FDI, EU com-
panies have a somewhat lower share, but EU MNEs 
are still global frontrunners. For instance, within the 
broader electronics industry EU companies managed 
to occupy a niche and develop a competitive edge in 
photovoltaic components, at least when judged by 
their international investment activity. At the same 
time,  it  should  be  stressed  that  according  to  sales 
figures European (as well as US) companies are fac-
ing  intense  competition  from  Chinese  solar-panel 
producers. China enacted its renewable energies law 
in 2006, aimed at reducing energy dependence and 
CO2 emissions but also at developing domestic pro-
duction capacities and internationally active firms.  
EU outward green FDI is preponderant in all sectors 
except  for  Alternative/Renewable  Energy,  in  which 
Extra-EU and Intra-EU investments are roughly equal, 
showing the importance of the European single mar-
ket  for  this  sector.  Outside  the  EU,  the  main  host 
country for cross-border investments by EU firms in 
environmental  technologies  is  the  United  States 
which accounts for a quarter of total projects (the 
prominent role of the US as destination is also found 
in general for FDI by EU multinationals, see Chapter 4 
of  this  report).  In  second  and  third  position  come 
two other large markets, namely India (6.3 % of pro-
jects) and China (4.6 % of projects).   
Table 3.9 presents worldwide green FDI in the period 
2003-2011 per major host economy (in percentage). 
The EU attracted more than a third of all green in-
vestments globally over the period 2003-2011. This 
makes  the  EU  the  major  host  economy  for  green 
cross-border  investments,  ahead  of  the  US  (12 %), 
China and India. However, the EU as a whole appears 
to have lost some of its attractiveness for green FDI 
in the last 4 years (the share of green FDI located in 
the EU declined to below 40 %, compared to the ex-
ceptionally high pre-crisis level of 55 % in 2007). Simi-
lar trends are observed in overall FDI, the subject of 
a thorough analysis in Chapter 4. 
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Table 3.9 - Major host economies for green cross-border investments, 2003-2011, shares of global green FDI 
(in percentage) 
Destination 
Country  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
average 2003-
2011 
EU-27   21.7  34.4  36.8  44.1  54.5  44.1  37.0  37.9  39.0  40.8 
UK  2.3  11.5  4.7  4.3  7.1  5.8  8.7  7.2  8.6  7.0 
Germany  1.6  2.5  5.2  3.5  3.9  5.3  4.8  6.3  6.9  5.1 
Spain  0.8  4.1  6.1  4.6  7.3  5.7  3.9  4.3  2.5  4.5 
France  3.1  0.0  4.2  7.3  7.1  9.0  3.0  1.4  2.2  4.5 
Italy  1.6  0.0  1.9  0.8  4.1  3.3  4.6  4.3  3.0  3.3 
United States  4.7  4.1  2.4  5.7  8.8  12.4  16.3  16.8  15.1  12.2 
China  6.2  11.5  4.2  5.7  8.2  8.2  7.6  8.5  5.3  7.3 
India  3.1  3.3  2.8  7.6  2.1  4.5  4.0  4.0  6.1  4.5 
Canada  1.6  3.3  3.8  2.2  0.4  1.7  2.4  5.7  4.8  3.1 
Brazil  15.5  0.0  1.9  2.7  1.7  1.6  0.7  3.3  4.0  2.7 
Other Countries  47.3  43.4  48.1  32.2  24.2  27.5  31.9  23.9  25.7  29.5 
Overall Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: fDi markets database. 
 
 
Figure 3.25 shows the trends in cross-border invest-
ments  in green technologies in the EU market (in-
cluding  both  intra-EU  and  extra-EU  projects),  over 
time covering the period from 2003 to 2011. In this 
period, about two thirds of the green FDI correspond 
to intra-EU investments (a pattern found for EU in-
ward FDI in general, see Chapter 4 of this report). 
This pattern is also  observed across the main four 
industries  for  green  FDI  projects  (presented  in  the 
right-hand panel of the figure), except for the elec-
tronic components industry, for which the extra-EU 
investments are predominant. 
 
Figure 3.25 - Green cross-border investment undertaken in the EU-27 (left panel) and green cross-border in-
vestment in the EU market in leading green technologies industries (right panel), 2003-2011  
 
Source: fDi markets database. 
 
The significant decline in green FDI in the EU in 2009 
and 2010 (Figure 3.25, left panel) was mainly due to 
a sharp drop in investment and projects in the re-
newable-energies industry (Figure 3.25, right panel, 
right axis). The renewable-energies industry was also 
driving the recovery observed in green FDI in the EU 
in 2011. The number of jobs created by new cross-
border projects in environmental-technology indus-
tries closely follows the trend in investments, though 
the  number  of  jobs  created  remained  below  the 
2007 level in 2011. 
Despite the recent overall reduction in environmen-
tal-technology investment activities in the EU mar-
ket,  there  is  overall  a  clear  increase  in  the  im-
portance  of  green  technologies  in  the  main  indus-
tries  analysed.  Figure  3.26  (left  panel)  shows  that 
renewable energy FDI has been outperforming cross-
border FDI in projects related to oil, coal and natural 
gas in the EU. The share of renewable energy pro-
jects in total energy projects (renewable and conven-
tional) surpassed 70 % in 2011. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Figure 3.26 - Greening of cross-border investment in the EU-27, selected industries, 2003-2011 
 
Source: fDi markets database. 
 
Within the other major green-technology industries, 
the  share  of  environmental-technology  projects  in 
total  EU  cross-border  investment  projects  also  in-
creased substantially, with the exception of the in-
dustrial-machinery industry. In the engines and tur-
bines  industry,  the  share  of  environmental-
technology projects more than tripled from 25 % in 
2003 to more than 75 % in 2010 (Figure 3.25, right 
panel). The trend is similarly positive in the electron-
ic-components industry. 
3.4.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter studied energy content in exports and 
energy-efficiency trends over the last 15 years. Their 
impact on competitiveness was analysed at country, 
sector and firm level in the context of key economic 
developments such as the globalisation of industrial 
activities  and  investments  and  improvements  in 
technology and eco-innovation. 
The  developments  in  energy  efficiency  were  first 
studied  at  an  international  level.  Overall  energy-
efficiency improvements were observed in almost all 
countries over the period 1995-2009. In Europe, the 
EU-12 economies improved significantly their initial 
low levels of energy efficiency and the European Un-
ion as a whole reinforced its lead in terms of overall 
energy efficiency. The analysis highlighted the role of 
the substitution of energy for capital —in the sense 
of a more energy-efficient technology embodied in 
capital goods — that was observed over time in al-
most all countries. 
Increasing global competition and cross-border inte-
gration of production chains are developments with 
far-reaching  social,  political  and  economic  conse-
quences. The overall increase in the relative price of 
energy is one of its many side effects, often seen as 
partly  due  to  the  increasing  energy  demand  from 
developing countries. The rise in the price of energy 
and volatility levels have significant and highly differ-
entiated  impacts  on  the  competitiveness  of  coun-
tries, sectors, firms or households. 
The analysis in section 3.2 showed that for EU coun-
tries (as a whole) globalisation appears to also repre-
sent additional channels for minimising the negative 
competitiveness effects of the energy-price increas-
es. Overall, EU countries have been able to export 
more and at the same reduce significantly the energy 
embodied in their exports, in particular the propor-
tion of energy that is sourced domestically. 
The analysis covered EU-12, EU-15, US and Japan and 
showed that energy use per unit of exports declined 
in  European  (particularly  in  EU-12)  countries  over 
time in the period 1995-2009. This contrasts with the 
increase in the energy embodied in one unit of ex-
ports observed in Japan, and to a smaller extent in 
the US, over the same period. 
As expected, the share of energy content in exports 
sourced from foreign countries (i.e. energy embod-
ied in intermediate imports) has been rising every-
where. The WIOD database shows that EU countries 
have been leading in this — globalisation induced — 
upward  trend  and  already  have  a  higher  share  of 
foreign-sourced  energy  embodied  in  exports  com-
pared with Japan, a country that also has a high ex-Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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ternal dependency on fossil fuels. The importance of 
emerging  economies  such  as  Brazil,  Russia  and  in 
particular China as sources of the energy embodied 
in the exports of the advanced economies analysed 
has been growing over time. 
As a result, the domestic-energy content in total ex-
ports decreased in the European economies. For the 
EU-12, this is due mainly to a significant drop in the 
energy  incorporated  domestically  in  manufacturing 
exports. In the EU-15, the most important contribu-
tion came from the drop in the domestic-energy con-
tent in service exports. 
Along with globalisation of production and increasing 
vertical specialisation, the European economies have 
overall reduced in relative terms their vulnerability 
to  potential  external-competitiveness  losses  as  a 
result of an increase in the relative price of energy. 
The relative weight of energy in their inputs into the 
foreign content of the generality of their trade part-
ners’ exports decreased overall in the period 1995-
2009.  The  EU-15  as  a  whole,  together  with  Japan, 
have the lowest relative weight of energy inputs in 
the total foreign inputs incorporated in exports glob-
ally. The EU-12 as a whole achieved the greatest re-
duction in the relative weight of energy inputs in the 
foreign content of its trade partners in WIOD. 
Manufacturing is at  the crossroads of globalisation 
and  energy  efficiency.  Manufacturing  transforms 
primary  energy  inputs  into  final  energy  products, 
uses energy in the transformation of materials into 
products, and many of its sectors and firms are at the 
forefront  of  the  internationalisation  of  production 
chains and lead in eco-innovation activities and in-
vestments. 
An  index-decomposition  analysis  has  shown  that 
manufacturing  in  the  European  Union  moderately 
increased gross output while at the same time main-
taining energy use fairly constant due to continuous 
technical  improvement  in  the  period  1995-2009. 
Structural changes were negligible in this period for 
the EU as a whole. 
Japan, like the EU a world leader in energy efficiency 
in manufacturing, did not improve technical efficien-
cy  in  this  period  (the  observed  slight  reduction  in 
energy use is due to a shift to less energy-intensive 
manufacturing sectors, as output has remained fairly 
constant over the period analysed). US manufactur-
ing  increased  output  and  improved  technical  effi-
ciency, but in both cases less than in the EU. 
Manufacturing  output  increased  and  technical  effi-
ciency improved in the very large majority of the EU-
27 Member States but there are significant variations 
in performance. The highest increases in manufactur-
ing output were observed in the EU-12 countries and 
Ireland, and these were also the countries that tend-
ed to achieve the greatest improvements in technical 
efficiency. With only a few exceptions, there was a 
shift towards less energy-intensive sectors in the EU-
12 Member States. 
Section 3.3 analysed data (from the Community In-
novation Survey) showing that EU firms that intro-
duce new products with energy-saving features tend 
to be more successful innovators, particularly in the 
case  of  manufacturing  firms.  Controlling  for  other 
determinants  of  innovation  success  in  the  market, 
these  eco-innovators  sell  more  new  products  (in 
terms  of  the  firm’s  total  sales)  than  conventional 
innovators, which may represent an important com-
petitive advantage. 
The analysis has also shown that, overall, EU firms 
are leading in the growing phenomenon of interna-
tionalisation and in cross-border ‘eco-investment’ in 
clean  and  more  energy-efficient  technologies  and 
products and services, exploiting many business op-
portunities offered by the global environmental and 
societal goals and challenges ahead. For instance, EU 
firms accounted for almost 2/3 of the FDI by MNEs 
worldwide in the important area of renewable ener-
gy  in  the  period  2007-2011.  They  are  also  global 
frontrunners  in  many  other  eco-technologies  (such 
as Engines & Turbines) associated with the provision 
of environmental goods and services. However, in-
ternational competition is increasing, including from 
MNEs of emerging economies. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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ANNEX 1: INDEX DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
 
This annex describes the (Log Mean Divisia index) decomposition method used in Section 3.4 to study energy-
efficiency performance in the various countries over time. The decomposition of an economic index — e.g. en-
ergy intensity or energy use — into sub-indices helps in understanding the different economic factors behind 
the changes in the index. Three sub-indices were considered: i) economic growth, ii) structural change, and iii) 
technical change. 
 
Consider the following variables for a given country and i=1,…N sectors in years t=0,..,T 
 
Variable  Description 
   
Yt  Output in volume of the country in year t 
Yt,i  Output of sector i in year t 
Et  Total energy use of a country in year t (Et=   
i
t i t i t Y I S , , ) 
Et,i  Energy use of sector i in year t 
It =Et / Yt  Energy intensity of the country in year t  
It,i =Et,i / Yt,i  Energy intensity of sector i in year t  
St,i =Yt,i / Yt  Share of sector i in the country’s output 
   
 
The impact of economic growth on the index is called the ‘scale effect’. It describes how the index would have 
changed if the other two factors had remained fixed (i.e. no structural and technical change had taken place). 
The composition and technical effects are defined in a similar way. In a simple Laspeyres index decomposition 
(see e.g. Ang and Zhang, 2000), the scale effect can be obtained by holding fixed the sectoral energy intensities 
and weights (St,i and It,i at the base year, 1995 in this case) in the calculation of the index; the ‘composition ef-
fect’ holds Yt and It,i fixed in order to isolate the impact of the change in St,i ; and the ‘technical effect’ holds Yt 
and St,i fixed: 
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The problem with this simple index decomposition is t hat it leaves a residual that is difficult to interpret. This 
problem does not appear in the Log Mean Divisia index (developed by Sato, 1976). This decomposition is simi-
lar to the Laspeyres method except for the use of a (logarithmic mean) weighting function on the energy used. 
Let  i t,  = Et,i / Et be the share of a country’s total energy that is used by sector i. The logarithmic mean of  i t,   
is calculated as: 
 
 
i t i
i t i
i i t L
, , 0
, , 0
, 0 , ln ln
,
 
 
 


  
 Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
 
115 
 
Note that when  i i t , 0 ,     the logarithmic mean is equal to  i t,   (including when  i i t , 0 ,    =0).  
The Log Mean Divisia index decomposition for energy use is computed as follows (see Ang and Liu, 2001 for a 
detailed discussion of the properties of this decomposition): 
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ANNEX 2: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENCY TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
 
Table A.1: Description of the variables used 
 
Variable   Description 
EN_INNO=1,0  1 if firm introduced energy saving process innovations, zero otherwise 
RD_INT  R&D expenditures in thousands of Euro per employee 
PC_INNO=1,0  1 if a firm has introduced a process innovation; zero otherwise 
PD_INNO=1,0  1 if a firm has introduced new products; zero otherwise 
ln_SIZE  natural logarithm of the number of employees 
REG=1,0  1 if firm introduced an environmental innovation in response to existing environmental regulations or 
taxes on pollution; zero otherwise 
REG _EXP=1,0  1 if firm introduced an environmental innovation in response expected further regulation; zero other-
wise 
SUBS=1,0  1 if firm introduced an environmental innovation in response to governmental grants or subsidies; 
zero otherwise 
DEMAND=1,0  1 if firm introduced an environmental innovation in response to market demand; zero otherwise 
VOLUNT=1,0  1 if firm introduced an environmental innovation in response to voluntary environmental agreements; 
zero otherwise 
ENV_MANAG = 1  1 if firm has introduced environmental management practices; zero otherwise  
GROUP_DOM=1,0  1 if firm is affiliated in an domestic enterprise group; zero otherwise 
GROUP_FOR=1,0  1 if firm is affiliated in an foreign enterprise group; zero otherwise 
EXPORT_NATIONAL  1 if firm sells into national market; zero otherwise 
EXPORT_ EUROPE  1 if firm exports into the European market; zero otherwise 
 
EXPORT_WORLD  1 if firm exports into the world market; zero otherwise 
Source: CIS 2008. 
 
Table A.2 reports the marginal effects (at means) for the probit model estimation  
 
) ( ) 0 * _ Pr( ) | 1 _ Pr(  x x       INNO EN INNO EN , 
 
where the vector x includes all right hind side variable and Φ denotes the (cumulative) standard normal distri-
bution. The marginal effects at means describe by how much the probability of observing EN_INNO = 1 changes 
if the variable of interest changes by one unit observed at the mean of this variable. For a binary dummy varia-
ble, a change from zero to one is considered. Sweden and Finland were omitted due to missing data.  
 
Model (1) includes the standard determinants of eco-innovations while model (2) studies the robustness of 
these variables when conventional process-technology adoption is introduced as well as product innovation. Chapter 3 – Energy Content in Exports and Eco-Innovation 
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Table A.2: Estimation Results for Energy-efficiency Technology Adoption 
 
           
Dependent  Variable  (1)    (2) 
EN_INNO  Marginal Effect  Std. Error    Marginal Effect  Std. Error 
                 
           
RD_INT  -0.0005  (0.0006)    -0.0005  (0.0005) 
PC_INNO        0.1315***  (0.0062) 
PD_INNO        0.0525***  (0.0052) 
ln_SIZE  0.0313***  (0.0020)    0.0265***  (0.0019) 
REG  0.1290***  (0.0077)    0.1176***  (0.0074) 
REG_EXP  0.1029***  (0.0081)    0.0956***  (0.0080) 
SUBS  0.0856***  (0.0097)    0.0804***  (0.0096) 
DEMAND  0.1138***  (0.0078)    0.1006***  (0.0076) 
VOLUNT  0.1811***  (0.0082)    0.1699***  (0.0078) 
ENV_MANAG  0.0253***  (0.0030)    0.0240***  (0.0029) 
GROUP_DOM  0.0103*  (0.0056)    0.0103*  (0.0057) 
GROUP_FOR  0.0108  (0.0068)    0.0138**  (0.0069) 
EXPORT_NATIONAL  -0.0019  (0.0068)    -0.0119*  (0.0068) 
EXPORT_EUROPE  0.0235***  (0.0076)    0.0083  (0.0075) 
EXPORT_WORLD  0.0356***  (0.0074)     0.0108  (0.0073) 
           
Observations  46160      46160   
Observed Probability  0.2798      0.2798   
Predicted Probability  0.2282      0.2231   
Pseudo-R²  0.2237        0.2422    
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses, ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. The 
models include 20 sector dummies and 15 country dummies. 
Source: CIS 2008. 
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ANNEX 3: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENCY TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
 
Table A.3: Description of the variables used 
 
Variable   Description 
IS  sum of the turnover share of market novelties in total sales and the share of new products intro-
duced into the market that are new only to the firm 
IS_INTERVAL  IS in 10 equal intervals 
ESPI=1,0  1 if firm introduced product innovations into the market which allow the customers to save energy; 
   zero otherwise 
GROUP_DOM=1,0  1 if firm is affiliated to a domestic enterprise group; zero otherwise 
GROUP_FOR=1,0  1 if firm is affiliated to a foreign enterprise group; zero otherwise 
CONT_RD = 1,0  1 if firm performs R&D continuously; zero otherwise 
EXT_RD=1,0  1 if firm acquires R&D services from external partners; zero otherwise 
RD_INT  R&D expenditures in thousands of Euro per employee 
COOP=1,0  1 if firm is engaged in R&D cooperation with another external partner; zero otherwise 
PC_INNO=1,0  1 if a firm has introduced a process innovation; zero otherwise 
 
Source: CIS 2008. 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for all variables used in the later regression appear in the following table 
 
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics for Innovation Success Analysis 
 
   Variable  Unit  Observations  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Sample of all Firms             
   IS  % of PD_INNO in turnover  14877  28.582.086  27.896.667 
   IS_INTERVAL  In 10 equal intervals  14877  31.453.922  26.701.385 
   ESPI  0/1  14877  0.38099079  0.48564664 
   GROUP_DOM  0/1  14877  0.30389191  0.459952 
   GROUP_FOREIGN  0/1  14877  0.26698931  0.4424016 
   CONT_RD  0/1  14877  0.63783021  0.4806437 
   EXT_RD  0/1  14877  0.42300195  0.4940523 
   RD_INT  Euro per employee  14877  66.796.596  34.722.871 
   EMPLOYEES  Count  14877  48.430.295  32.325.027 
   COOP  0/1  14877  0.53720508  0.49863062 
   PC_INNO  0/1  14877  0.58983666  0.4918797 
                 
Sample of Manufacturing Firms          
   IS  % of PD_INNO in turnover  9259  27.458.473  26.344.554 
   IS_INTERVAL  In 10 equal intervals  9259  30.336.969  25.249.134 
   ESPI  0/1  9259  0.41311157  0.49241912 
   GROUP_DOM  0/1  9259  0.2891241  0.45338014 
   GROUP_FOREIGN  0/1  9259  0.28610001  0.45196112 
   CONT_RD  0/1  9259  0.67566692  0.46815041 
   EXT_RD  0/1  9259  0.43762825  0.4961213 
   RD_INT  Euro per employee  9259  56.161.638  33.443.144 
   EMPLOYEES  Count  9259  42.939.356  2615.15 
   COOP  0/1  9259  0.52727076  0.49928271 
   PC_INNO  0/1  9259  0.63818987  0.48055021 
Source: CIS 2008. 
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Table A.5 reports the estimation results of the model:  
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The vectors s and c include sector- and country dummies, respectively. Sweden is now included. 
 
 
Table A.5: Estimation Results: Innovation Success of European Firms 
Dep. Variable  OLS     Interval Regression 
Innovation  All     Product Innovators Only 
Success  Firms Across all Sectors     Manuf. Only 
   -1     -2     -3  -4     -5 
ESPI  3.0797***     2.4069***     2.0818***  2.0333***     2.5276*** 
   -0.4283     -0.4671     -0.4479  -0.4416     -0.5283 
GROUP_DOM  -0.9404*     -1.6176***     -1.5504***  -1.7128***     -2.1523*** 
   -0.5254     -0.5734     -0.5499  -0.547     -0.6877 
GROUP_FOR  -0.4156     -0.3844     -0.3878  -0.4777     -1.0518 
   -0.582     -0.6332     -0.6072  -0.5961     -0.736 
CONT_RD  4.7795***     3.8565***     3.5568***  3.2505***     2.1004*** 
   -0.4484     -0.4943     -0.474  -0.4739     -0.6058 
EXT_RD  2.4537***     2.1714***     2.1037***  2.1441***     2.0954*** 
   -0.436     -0.4757     -0.4562  -0.4504     -0.5488 
RD_INT  0.0393***     0.0441***     0.0446***  0.0500***     0.0288*** 
   -0.0059     -0.0063     -0.0061  -0.0064     -0.008 
ln_EMPLOYEES  -2.1662***     -2.3761***     -2.1502***  -1.9474***     -1.3668*** 
   -0.1571     -0.17     -0.163  -0.1563     -0.2112 
COOP  1.7278***     0.6406     0.6758  0.5427     -0.0475 
   -0.438     -0.4782     -0.4586  -0.456     -0.5552 
Constant  44.2960***     45.4269***     42.5886***  41.3524***     36.4683*** 
   -1.9737     -2.0335     -1.9499  -1.9485     -2.2417 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses, ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1 %,   5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. The 
models include 20 sector dummies and 16 country dummies. 
Source: CIS 2008. 
 
 
Model specification (1) uses the innovation success variable (IS) as reported in the questionnaire. Model (2) is 
similar to model (1) but considers only product innovators (estimated by OLS). Model (3) uses the rearranged 
dependent variable (coded in ten intervals, OLS). Model (4) corrects for heteroscedasticity (factors that are 
expected to have some impact on the (logged) variance (ln_Sigma) are reported). Finally, model specification 
(5) further restricts the sample to product innovators in manufacturing sectors. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
FDI FLOWS AND EU INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
The European Union is a major player in global for-
eign direct investment (FDI), in terms of both inward 
and outward FDI. This reflects not only the potential 
of the single market, but also the ability of EU com-
panies in different industries to successfully compete 
in  markets  outside  the  EU.  The  crisis  has,  as  ex-
pected, caused a disruption in FDI: the EUʼs share of 
world (inward) FDI flows have declined substantially, 
from 45% in 2001 to 23% in 2010. Outward invest-
ment flows have also dropped significantly and have 
been accompanied by a shift of FDI outflows to non-
EU emerging markets, less affected by the European 
crisis. 
The recent fall in inward FDI flows raises the follow-
ing questions: what are the main factors influencing 
the decision to invest in an EU country, and how can 
we boost Europeʼs attractiveness to investors? De-
spite the conjectural decrease in inward FDI, the EU 
is generally considered an attractive location for for-
eign  investment,  with  low  FDI  regulation,  a  highly 
educated workforce, and high productivity levels, to 
mention but a few of the factors that may make EU 
countries attractive to foreign investors. The attrac-
tiveness of the EU is well reflected in the high inward 
FDI stock in several industries. An empirical analysis 
will provide some evidence on the most important 
determinants.  
FDI is generally expected to have positive direct and 
indirect  effects  on  the  recipient  economy.  On  the 
one  hand,  foreign  enterprises  directly  increase  the 
capital stock and create employment; on the other, 
they may bring new technologies, skills and human 
capital  that  can  spill  over  to  domestic  firms  and 
workers.  The  empirical  literature  for  EU  countries 
finds strong support for positive direct impacts, while 
the evidence on spillover effects is less clear-cut. A 
better  understanding  of  the  indirect  impact  of  in-
ward FDI is important because it opens the door to 
public interventions. Hence, governments often pro-
vide substantial financial support to attract FDI. The 
impacts that FDI has on host economies and firms 
depend on a wide range of factors, e.g. the type of 
investment,  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the  host 
country,  and  the  size  and  other  characteristics  of 
firms. It is therefore crucial to gain a clearer picture 
of how the benefits of FDI for local firms can be max-
imised and any potential adverse effects minimised.  
Likewise, outward FDI is seen as an important engine 
of  economic  growth.  Multinational  enterprises  are 
larger, and more productive, pay higher wages and 
have better knowledge, technologies and managerial 
skills. They might also gain competitive advantages 
by expanding into new markets, through the learning 
effects  of  internationalisation,  by  reducing  produc-
tion costs and by gaining access to natural resources, 
advanced technologies or know-how. While the posi-
tive effects of outward FDI are generally assumed to 
predominate, there are concerns about its possible 
drawbacks,  particularly  the  adverse  effects  on  the 
domestic labour market. The theoretical predictions 
on home-market effects are far from clear-cut and 
depend on the type of and motive for outward for-
eign  direct  investments  and  the  very  specific  rela-
tionships between the parent company and its for-
eign affiliates. The analysis of the effects of inward 
FDI is completed by a discussion on the home coun-
try impacts of outward FDI.  
In order to better understand the determinants and 
impacts  of  inward  and  outward  FDI  in  Europe  this 
chapter
54 provides the following analysis:  
  an overall picture of the main trends and pat-
terns of EU inward and outward FDI flows at 
the aggregate, sector and firm level; 
  the factors that influence FDI flows, both loca-
tional  factors  driving  FDI  inflows  to  the  EU 
Member States and the firm specific factors 
that in turn account for the internationalisa-
tion of firms; 
  the direct and indirect effects of inward EU 
FDI on domestic firms and the host country in 
general; 
                                                           
54   This chapter is based on the background report, Falk et al. 
(2012) ʻFDI flows and impacts on the competitiveness of the 
EU industryʼ.  Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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  the main findings of the literature on the ef-
fects of outward FDI on the home country of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs); 
Finally, a policy section discusses a number of debat-
ed  issues  based  on  the  analysis  carried  out  in 
this study. 
Box 4.1 – Definitions 
  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving a long‑term relationship and reflecting a lasting inter-
est and control by an entity resident in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident 
in another economy  (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate) (OECD, 1996). FDI has three components: 
equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loan. 
  Forms of FDI 
(1) Greenfield investment: establishment of an entirely new firm in a foreign country, including new operational facilities;  
(2) Mergers and acquisitions (M&A): a complete or partial purchase of an existing firm in a foreign country. 
  Motives for FDI  
Market-seeking FDI involves investing in a host country market in order to be closer to customers and to serve that market 
directly rather than through exporting ('horizontal' FDI). Market-seeking investors will rate the attractiveness of a host 
country mostly with respect to its market size and growth/demand potential, and whether it provides access to both re-
gional and global markets. For non-tradable services (e.g. hotel and catering industry or retail trade), FDI may be the only 
way to internationalise as there would be no alternatives for accessing foreign markets.  
Resource-seeking FDI is driven by the need to gain access to natural resources such as oil, gas, minerals or raw materials. 
Locations qualify as being more attractive the more they provide access to affordable resources, particularly if the domestic 
supply of such inputs has come under pressure by becoming more expensive. Scarce supply of and growing needs for natu-
ral resources explain the EU's growing interest in resource-rich development countries and the proliferation amount of 
respective strategies (for instance the Central Asia Strategy and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy launched in 2007).
55  
Strategic asset-seeking FDI aims to gain access to advanced technologies, skills and other highly developed productive ca-
pabilities. The aim of this type of investment is to increase the acquiring firm's global portfolio of strategic resources and to 
block competitors from obtaining access. Either way, strategic asset-seeking investors value locations depending on the 
quality of the scientific, technological and educational infrastructure they provide and on the availability of a rich pool of 
highly skilled labour.  
Efficiency-seeking FDI takes place when companies try to exploit economies of specialisation and scope across the value 
chain (product specialisation) and along the value chain (process specialisation). The company will slice its production chain 
by allocating different parts (or tasks) to countries that allow low-cost production (vertical fragmentation), particularly 
where the cost of labour is taken into account. The scope for efficiency-seeking FDI and vertical fragmentation originates 
from advances in information and communication technology (ICT), trade liberalisation and cost-effective transportation, 
which enable firms to take advantage of international factor cost differentials. Another key determinant is the competitive-
ness of local industrial infrastructure and its ability to provide strong subcontracting and business partners.  
                                                           
55  http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10113.en07.pdf, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf 
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4.1.  TRENDS AND STRUCTURE OF EU-27 INWARD FDI 
4.1.1.  Inward FDI trends: Sharp crisis related con-
traction and greater role of extra-EU inflows  
The EU is by far the largest destination for global FDI. 
This is primarily the result of the size of the EU mar-
ket but it also has to do with its openness to FDI and 
the deep economic integration among EU Member 
States. Over the past decade, however, the share of 
global  FDI  destined  for  the  EU,  including  intra-EU 
investments, has declined substantially, from 45% in 
2001 to 23% in 2010, in favour of emerging econo-
mies.  
Figure 4.1 – EU-27 FDI inflows, 2001-2010, EUR bn 
 
 
 
Note: EU  is  EU-25  for  2001-2003  and  EU-27  for  2004-2010.  EU 
flows calculated as the sum of EU Member States. Intra-EU flows 
to Luxembourg are adjusted downwards by 90% in order to ex-
clude activities of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). Extra-EU flows 
exclude offshore centres (Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Gibraltar, 
Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Nether-
lands Antilles). 
 Source: Eurostat, wiiw calculation 
FDI inflows to the EU were  hit significantly by the 
global recession of 2008/2009. FDI flows to the EU 
dwindled in 2008 to half of their 2007 peak value and 
continued to decline slightly in 2009 and 2010 (Fig-
ure 4.1). Intra-EU flows continued to decline in 2009, 
while FDI inflows from non-EU countries recovered 
somewhat in 2009. In 2010 total FDI flows to the EU 
amounted to EUR 230 bn of which about 60% origi-
nated from EU Member States. Although EU FDI in-
flows seem to have recovered somewhat in 2011, it 
seems  most  unlikely  that  in  the  coming  years  FDI 
levels  will  return  to  that  of  the  2007  boom  year 
when  investment  activities  were  fuelled  by  exces-
sively high stock prices and overly optimistic business 
sentiments  in  some  sectors.  The  current  situation 
may be better described as a return to ʻnormalʼ lev-
els than a state of depression.  
Until recently a  standing  feature of EU inward FDI 
was that intra-EU flows were much larger than flows 
from  non-EU  countries.  The  downturn  in  FDI  after 
the boom years of 2005-2007 affected both extra-EU 
and intra-EU inflows but the contraction was strong-
er in the case of the latter. As a consequence the 
share of extra-EU FDI in total EU inward flows, which 
until  2006  was  less  than  a  third,  continued  to  in-
crease after 2008. In 2010 the share of FDI inflows 
stemming from non-EU investors stood at 40%. This 
is clearly linked to the depth of the recession in the 
EU  and  the  relatively  good  performance  of  most 
emerging economies. 
The severe drop in intra-EU FDI flows seems to be 
linked to a reduced capability of European firms to 
invest abroad. This appears to be the driving force 
behind falling FDI activities of European banks whose 
international  expansion  plans  have  been  halted  by 
the economic crisis. Outside the financial sector, the 
low intra-EU flows in the period 2008-2011 may pri-
marily reflect the trouble EU firms are undergoing in 
this period. Indeed, FDI from outside the EU is not 
that  affected  by  the  contraction.  Furthermore,  the 
declining share of intra-EU FDI may also reﬂect the 
natural adjustment towards long-run conditions after 
the exceptional increase in intra EU-FDI flows caused 
by  EU  enlargement  in  2004  and  2007  and  strong 
economic growth during that period. 
4.1.2.  FDI inflows from non-EU countries: continued 
dominance of US investors but new sources emerg-
ing  
Given the increased volume of extra-EU inflows it is 
interesting to have a look at the main investor coun-
tries and potential new sources of FDI. A first obser-
vation is that FDI inflows to the EU from the rest of 
the world are extremely concentrated.56 The US and 
the  EFTA  countries,  principally  Switzerland, are  the 
largest investors,  accounting  for  more  than  half  of 
the total inward FDI stock in 2010. The leading posi-
tion of US multinationals in EU inward FDI was large-
ly unaffected by the crisis: in the period 2008-2010 
                                                           
56   FDI  in  R&D  has  been  found  even  more  concentrated 
(European Commission, 2012). Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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the  US  accounted  for  about  45%  of  total  extra-EU 
inflows.  At  the  same  time  the  share  of  the  EFTA 
countries  declined  significantly  over  2001-2010.  A 
declining trend is also observable for Japan. Investors 
from  these  countries  are  expected  to  continue  to 
determine the aggregate trend in inward FDI from 
non-EU  countries.  This  is  in  accordance  with  their 
economic weight and their high degree of integration 
with the EU. 
In contrast to developed regions, the share of devel-
oping regions and transition economies as a whole 
increased  substantially  (Figure 4.2).  In  value  terms 
Western  Asia  is  the  most  important  new  investor 
region  for  the  EU,  with  average  annual  inflows 
amounting to EUR 19 bn in the period 2008-2010
57. 
Just to compare, the annual average inflows from 
developed economies were over EUR 70  bn in the 
same period.  However, the increasing role of  the 
emerging markets in inward EU FDI is not only a cr i-
sis-induced phenomenon but a longer-term trend as 
evidenced by the development of emerging marketsʼ 
shares in overall extra-EU inward stocks since 2001. 
The  magnitude  of  FDI  inflows  (and  also  stocks  be-
cause  of  the  shorter  'FDI  history')  from  emerging 
regions and countries, including China and India
58, is 
likely to grow, but is still rather small. China ʼs FDI 
flows to the EU increased substantially in 2010, to 
EUR 4.5 bn
59 (of which EUR 2.4 bn was destined for 
                                                           
57   A particularity of the FDI from Western Asia, however, is that 
much of it constitutes investments by Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(SWFs) which must be assumed to have little impact on the 
EUʼs  real  economy  in  general  and  to  EU  competiveness  in 
particular because SWFs do not normally become involved in 
the management of the firms in which they take a stake. The 
appetite of SWFs for FDI engagements in  the EU seems to 
have  lasted  only  until  2009  (UNCTAD,  2011).  As  a 
consequence,  EU  inflows  from  Western  Asia  dropped  to  a 
mere EUR 400 m in 2010. 
58   For example, EU inflows from South America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa  amounted  to  approximately  EUR 1.7 bn  annually  in 
2008-2010 while inflows from South Asia (mainly India) and 
the ASEAN countries amounted to EUR 1 bn and EUR 1.3 bn 
respectively.  For  China  Eurostat  reports  inflows  of  only 
EUR 80 m for 2008-2010.  
59   According to the Ministry of Commerce of Ch ina. However, 
Eurostat reports only EUR 100 m for 2010. The difference is 
partly  explained  by  the  fact  that  for  instance,  for 
confidentialility  reasons  Sweden  did  not  report  data  on 
inflows from China.   
Luxembourg).
60 As a comparison,  FDI inflows from 
the US amounted to more than EUR 30 bn in 2010. 
Furthermore, FDI stocks in 2010 stemming from the 
US represented 40.5% of the total extra -EU inward 
FDI, while Chinaʼs stock of FDI to the EU amounted 
to only 1.2%.  
Figure 4.2  –  Share  of  emerging  regions  and  coun-
tries in extra-EU inward stocks, 2001-2010, shares in 
% 
 
 
 
Note: EU is EU-25 for 2001-2003 and EU-27 for 2004-2010. Shares 
calculated on the basis of the inward stocks of the EU-27 aggre-
gate.  
Source: Eurostat, wiiw calculations. 
 
The growing number of greenfield investment pro-
jects suggests the prominent role of China and India 
as  a  new  source  of  FDI.
61  Both  countries  figure 
among the main new greenfield investors in the EU. 
China and India established 137 and 93 projects, r e-
spectively, followed by Russia , with  44  projects in 
2010. The chances are high that in the near future 
Chinese firms will also become increasingly active in 
Europe through FDI and no longer serve the EU mar-
ket only via exports.
62  However, despite the more 
intensive investment activity of emerging multin a-
tionals, the general trend in inward FDI to the EU  is 
expected to be driven by traditional investors. 
                                                           
60   The strong increase in Chinese FDI flows to the EU in 2010 is 
mainly but not entirely due to the purchase of  the Swedish 
car company Volvo by Chinaʼs car manufacturer Geely. 
61   Crossborder Greenfield investment data stem from the ʻfDi 
Intelligenceʼ, service provided by The Financial Times Ltd (also 
called fDi database) See http://www.fdimarkets.com. 
62   This is a natural path  in which FDI follows previous  export 
activities. See Conconi, Sapir and Zanardi (2010). In the case 
of China or India, however, to the extent that trade is based 
on their specialisation in low-tech, low-wage sectors, the step 
from exports to FDI may be less straightforward. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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4.1.3.  Industry  structure  of  EU  inward  FDI  from 
non-EU  countries:  high  foreign  presence  in  manu-
facturing industries  
Regarding  the  structure  of  inward  EU  FDI  stocks 
manufacturing industries and services took 47% and 
43% shares, respectively, in 2008 - when excluding 
the  financial  sector  and  other  business  activities.
63 
This is in line with the structure of EU trade, which is 
dominated by manufacturing, with services typically 
accounting for only 20% of trade.  
Among  the  manufacturing  industries  the  largest 
shares of investment stemming from non -EU coun-
tries  are  to  be  f ound  in  the  chemical  industry 
(EUR 98 bn  and  14%)  and  the  food  industry 
(EUR 53 bn and 8%). In contrast, the automotive (and 
transportation equipment) industries account only 
for slightly more than 3% of the EU ʼs inward stocks 
owned by the rest of the world, which is a compara-
tively low share given the industry's high degree of 
internationalisation and its  great importance in EU 
trade relations. Turning to the services industries but 
leaving aside the important financial sector and the 
activities  of  holding  companies,  trade  and  repairs 
(20%), real estate (6%) and computer services (4%) 
emerge as the industries with the largest EU inward 
stocks owned by non-EU investors.  
In an attempt to gain an idea of the foreign presence 
in EU markets, inward stocks can be compared with 
the value added generated by the respective indus-
try in the year 2008. For the EU economy as a whole, 
the ratio of inward FDI to value added amounts to 
10.9. 
64 This means that non -EU MNEs account for 
approximately 11% of the EUʼs value added. 
The industry-specific ratio of inward FDI stocks of MNEs 
from non-EU countries to value added in the EU econ-
omy suggests that the foreign presence is above the 
average  in  manufacturing  industries.  In  the  area  of 
R&D, FDI occur primarily in the manufacturing sector 
and  in  particular  in  high-tech  and  medium-high-tech 
                                                           
63   The overwhelmingly large FDI stocks of the financial sector 
(EUR  1357  bn)  include  the  activities  of  Special  Purpose 
Entities.  ʻOther  business  activitiesʼ(EUR  430  bn)  include 
business  and  management  consultancy  activities,  i.e.  FDI 
undertaken  by  holding  companies.  When  including  other 
business activities  in total  inward FDI the share of  services 
increases significantly (64%) and that of manufacturing falls 
below 30%.  
64   This calculation again excludes the financial sector. 
manufacturing  sectors  (European  Commission,  2012).  
It is especially true for capital-intensive branches such 
as  the  chemical  industry  and  the  petroleum  refining 
industry (Figure 4.3). Probably due to the large number 
of M&As the European mining  industry also faces a 
competitive  pressure.  In  contrast,  the  FDI  to  value 
added  ratio  is  below  the  economy-wide  average  for 
most services industries (the hotel, transport, storage 
and communication industries). This is somewhat un-
expected given the fact that in several services indus-
tries, such as the hotel industry, FDI is the only way to 
enter a foreign market because market access via ex-
ports is not possible. At the same time it also indicates 
the importance of the domestic EU enterprises in these 
sectors.  
4.2.  DETERMINANTS  OF  FDI  -  LOCATIONAL  ATTRACTIVE-
NESS AND FIRM SPECIFIC FACTORS 
Global investment flows have increasingly tended to 
shift  towards  high-growth  emerging  markets.  The 
recession  and  the  eurozone  crisis  have  adversely 
affected FDI flows in Europe. Nevertheless, the EU in 
general has maintained its fundamentals (e.g. good 
institutions,  openness,  highly  skilled  workforce), 
which can be considered as key determinants of in-
ward FDI. In terms of investment perception, West-
ern Europe ranks as the second most attractive re-
gion and Central-Eastern Europe as the third  most 
attractive destination worldwide for FDI.
65 The het-
erogeneity of Member States in terms of factors d e-
termining FDI inflows reveals dif ferences between 
EU  countries:  several  countries  have  remained 
among  the  most  popular  i nvestment  destinations 
(e.g. Germany or Poland) while others have not a t-
tracted substantial amounts of FDI for many years 
already (e.g. Italy). The literature has invest igated 
extensively what makes a country attractive for fo r-
eign real investors. Below a summary and new e m-
pirical evidence are provided.  
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Figure 4.3 – Ratio of EU inward stocks owned by the rest of the world to value added, by industry, 2008  
 
 
Note: EU  stocks  are  stocks  of  the  EU-27  aggregate.  FDI  stocks  and  value  added  excluding  financial  intermediation (6895). 
Source: Eurostat, wiiw-calculations. The horizontal axis intersects the vertical axis at the EU average of 10.9 so that the bars of industries 
with a lower than average ratio are pointing downwards.  
4.2.1.  Locational attractiveness 
FDI activity depends on a wide range of factors and 
conditions, including location-specific (host country) 
determinants and home country characteristics. The 
next  section  tries  to  address  some  of  these  ques-
tions. According to UNCTAD (1998) the host country 
determinants  of  FDI  can  be  classified  into  three 
groups:  policy  framework  for  FDI,  economic  deter-
minants  and  business  facilitation  (see  Table  4.1). 
Several  of  the  determinants  listed  below  have  re-
ceived quite a lot attention in the literature in the 
last ten years.
66 However, little is known  about the 
sign and magnitude of the FDI determinants differ 
according to (i) the country of origin of the investors 
(e.g. EU versus non-EU investors), (ii) the target in-
dustry (e.g. high- vs low-tech), (iii) the type of FDI 
activity (e.g. production, services, research and d e-
                                                           
66   The backround study (Falk et al., 2012)  provides a summary 
of the  literature on the FDI determinants. 
velopment), (iv) the mode of entry (greenfield FDI or 
cross-border M&As), (v) the type of FDI (vertical and 
horizontal) (vi) the geographical destination (capital 
region or elsewhere).  
The available empirical findings based on EU coun-
tries  make  it  difficult  to  draw  general  conclusions 
about  the  source  of  heterogeneity  in  the  determi-
nants of FDI for EU countries. This section therefore 
also provides some results based on an FDI gravity 
model estimation using FDI stocks and greenfield FDI 
flows from 26 OECD/BRIC countries to the EU-27 in 
the  period  2000-2010.  (Table  A.1  in  the  Appendix 
shows the results of the gravity equation estimated 
in the background study, Falk et al, 2012.) The basic 
gravity model is augmented by the inclusion of cor-
porate taxes and labour costs of the host and home 
country, the impact of EU membership in 2004 and 
2007 and the introduction of the euro in some EU 
countries during the period 2007-2010. A number of 
policy factors (e.g. FDI regulation, costs of starting a Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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business and labour market flexibility indicators) and 
indicators of factor endowments (e.g. skills, R&D and 
broadband penetration) are also included.
67  
4.2.1.1. Policy framework for FDI 
The institutional settings, such as the rules regulating 
entry and operations, and the legal and administra-
tive system, are very important factors in determin-
ing every type of investment decision. For instance, 
FDI barriers (such as legal, legislative and regulatory 
frameworks,  the  strength  of  investor  protection, 
foreign ownership restrictions and red tape) are like-
ly to discourage inward FDI since they lead to higher 
investment costs. FDI restrictions have declined con-
siderably in the EU and they are currently among the 
lowest  in  the  world,
68  providing a favourable bus i-
ness environment for foreign companies.  Similarly, 
the administrative burden on enterprises and pro d-
uct-market regulations in the ho st country impose 
additional costs on businesses and create barriers to 
entry for FDI (Azémar and Desbordes, 2010). In the 
EU-27 countries there is a  significant and negative 
relationship between the foreign employment share 
in the manufacturing sector and the costs of starting 
a business. A significant and positive correlation b e-
tween the ratio of FDI inflows and the strength of 
investor protection has been found for the EU cou n-
tries. Labour market flexibility is also considered to 
have positive impacts on  FDI inflows. For instance, 
based on a sample of 19 EU countries  Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005) found that a more flexible labour 
market in the host country leads to higher FDI inflow 
(see also Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007 based on OECD 
data; Dewit, Görg and Montagna, 2009).  
Most of the policy and non-policy factors are exclud-
ed from the final specification for the gravity model  
on the EU-27, because they are not signif icant at 
conventional  significance  levels  (see  e xplanatory 
variables in Table A. 2. in the Appendix). In particular, 
                                                           
67   The  main  contribution  of  this  analysis  is  to  investigate  the 
determinants of both total FDI stocks and greenfield FDI flows 
using panel data methods that make it possible to control for 
fixed host and home country and common time effects. In ad-
dition, the presence of zero values of FDI flows is taken into 
account by using a variant of the Poisson regression model.  
 
68   Most  EU  countries  have  a  low  (under  0.1)  FDI 
Restrictiveness Index (OECD).    
labour  market  flexibility,  indicators  of  intellectual 
property  rights  protection  and  investor  protection 
are  not  significant  when  source-  and  host  country 
fixed effects and common time effects are taken into 
account. The cost of doing business and the FDI regu-
latory index have the expected negative sign but are 
statistically insignificant. One reason for the insignifi-
cance of these variables is that the annual time varia-
tion is very small.  
Trade policies, trade agreements and regional inte-
gration have significant effects on FDI flows. Regional 
preferential trade agreements (RTAs) not only stimu-
late trade in goods and services due to the removal 
of trade barriers but may also have an impact on FDI 
flows  for  the  participating  countries  and  on  third 
countries. The empirical literature strongly suggests 
that European economic integration (e.g. EU mem-
bership, creation of the European single  market in 
1992) has been accompanied by a rising level of for-
eign direct investment within the EU, and increased 
FDI flows from third countries (Pain, 1997; Clegg and 
Green, 1999; Lafourcade and Paluzie, 2011). The in-
troduction  of  the  euro  is  also  expected  to  have  a 
positive impact on FDI flows because of lower trans-
action costs and elimination of exchange rate uncer-
tainty. The gravity model estimation (Table A.1 in the 
Appendix) finds that the introduction of the euro and 
EU membership (2004, 2007) leads to higher FDI ac-
tivity  among  the  euro  area  and  EU  members.  The 
effect is more pronounced in the case of countries 
that joined the EU in 2007, with an increase in FDI 
inflow of more than 100% between 2007 and 2010. 
Previous empirical studies also found large positive 
effects of the euro on FDI inflows (Coeurdacier, De 
Santis  and  Aviat,  2009;  Petroulas,  2007;  De  Sousa 
and Lochard, 2011 and Brouwer et al., 2008).  
The  signature  and  ratification  of  double  taxation 
agreements  (DTAs)  have  reduced  barriers  to  FDI. 
DTAs deal with the allocation of the taxable capital 
flows, dividends, interest and royalties generated by 
multinational  firm  activity  (Hallward-Driemeier, 
2003). DTAs are expected to have a positive impact 
on  FDI  flows.  Since  most  EU  countries  had  double 
taxation treaties with other EU and/or OECD coun-
tries at the end of 2010, the expected effects of DTAs 
are not likely to be significant for the last decade.  Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table 4.1. – Host country determinants of FDI 
I. Policy framework for FDI 
Economic, political and social stability 
Rules regarding entry and operations 
Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates 
General  legal  and  administrative  system  that  shape  the  structure  and  functioning  of  markets  (e.g.  competition  &  M&A  policies, 
corporate and labour taxation, product & labour market regulations, IPRs) 
International agreements on FDI 
Privatization policies 
Trade policies (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) and the coherence of FDI and trade policies 
II. Economic determinants (by FDI motive) 
II. 1 Market seeking 
Market size and per capita income 
Market growth (potential) 
Access to regional and global markets 
Country-specific consumer preferences 
Structure of markets (e.g. market concentration, entry barriers, pricing) 
II. 2 Resource seeking 
Availability of natural resources (e.g. oil and gas, minerals, raw materials, agricultural land) 
Physical infrastructure (ports, roads, power, telecommunication) 
II.3 Strategic asset seeking 
Skilled labour and quality of educational infrastructure (e.g. schools, colleges, universities) 
Quality of technological and R&D infrastructure (e.g. research institutions, universities, ICT) 
Innovation clusters 
II.4 Efficiency seeking 
Cost and productivity of local labour supply  
Cost of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
Cost of transport and communication to/from and within host economy 
Financing cost 
Industrial infrastructure (e.g., subcontracting and business services, supplier industries, industry clusters) 
III. Business facilitation 
Investment promotion 
Investment incentives (tax and financial) 
Costs related to corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency 
Social amenities (e.g. quality of life) 
Infrastructure and support services  
Cluster and network promotion 
Social capital 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (1998). 
4.2.1.2.  Economic determinants 
The  second  group  of  FDI  determinants  comprises 
economic factors which can be further classified ac-
cording to the motives for FDI. Surveys among for-
eign investors typically find that factors such as the 
size and growth of the local market, the presence of 
suppliers and business partners and access to inter-
national/regional  markets  are  the  most  important 
determinants  for  a  location's  attractiveness 
(UNCTAD, 2011). In the case of the EU-15 countries, 
market  size  and  a  stable  investment  environment 
play the most prominent role. For EU-12 countries, 
growth of the market is the most important factor, 
followed by cheap labour, the availability of skilled 
labour, a stable investment environment and the size 
of the market (see Table 4.2).
69 Results of the gravity 
model also confirm this: a 1% increase in the level of 
GDP in the EU-27 countries in the previous year leads 
to an increase in the inward FDI stock in the current 
year by 1% on average.  
Among the economic determinants both cost  -and 
non-cost based factors have been intensively di s-
cussed in the literature. C ost-based factors such as 
the unit labour costs and effective average corporate 
                                                           
69   Similar results are found when focusing on R&D only. In that 
case however, the labour cost proved to be a less important 
determinant. (European Commission, 2012). Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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tax rate in the host country are expected to have a 
negative impact on bilateral FDI stocks.  
Differentials in labour costs (unit labour costs, labour 
taxation) between the home and host countries play 
an important role, particularly for vertical or efficien-
cy-seeking  FDI.  Results  of  the  gravity  model  show 
that a 1 percentage point increase in the unit labour 
costs of the host country leads to a decrease in the 
FDI stock by 1%. Unit labour costs increased over the 
sample period on average but the change is highly 
uneven  across  EU  countries.  While  the  literature 
based  on  data  for  the  EU-10  countries  shows  that 
unit labour costs have a negative impact on FDI in-
flows into the host country, for the EU-15 countries a 
number of studies found that labour costs are not a 
significant determinant (Wolff, 2007, for EU-25 and 
EU-15  countries;  de  Sousa  and  Lochard,  2011,  for 
EMU countries Bellak and Leibrecht, 2011, for 10 EU 
countries and the US).  This is in contrast with what 
has been found for the EU-15 in the current analysis: 
in some EU-15 countries rising unit labour costs are 
considered as a major factor in the slow growth of 
inward FDI. One explanation of the higher impact of 
unit labour costs is the difference in the time period: 
the  sample  used  for  the  current  analysis  ends  in 
2010. The increase in unit labour costs particularly 
accelerated between 2007 and 2010 in most of the 
EU-15. The increase in unit labour costs is associated 
with a 3% lower growth rate of the bilateral FDI in-
ward  stock  as  compared  to  EU-15  countries  with 
stable  unit  labour  costs.  Furthermore,  the  analysis 
shows  that  high  productivity  growth  together  with 
moderate  wage  growth  plays  an  important  role  in 
attracting FDI flows in the EU-15 countries.  
Regarding indirect labour costs, such as labour taxa-
tion, Egger and Radulescu (2011) found that average 
effective taxes on individual earnings have a signifi-
cantly negative effect on FDI. Other authors (Head 
and Mayer, 2004) find negative effects of the social 
security contributions and/or labour taxation on FDI 
inflows in the EU. With respect to other indirect tax-
es,  Buettner  and  Wamser  (2009)  find  that  indirect 
taxes do not play a role for foreign location choice.  
 
 
Table 4.2 - Locational attractiveness: the view of business  
 
   World  EU-15  EU-12 
Size of local market  21  20  12 
Growth of local market  20  12  19 
Stable investment environment  10  19  12 
Access to regional markets  10  11  7 
Cheap labour  9  n.a  12 
Availability of skilled labour  9  11  12 
Access to natural resources  6  4  8 
Access to capital market (finance)  2  6  2 
Incentives, government effectiveness  5  11  6 
Follow the leader  4  3  3 
Total  100  100  100 
 
Note: The table provides the main location factors for attracting FDI for the period 2007-2009 in %. 
Source: UNTCADʼs World Investment Prospect Survey (2009).  
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Previous  empirical  studies  largely  agree  that  FDI 
flows are sensitive to changes in corporate tax rates 
in the host and also the home countries. In general, 
higher  home  country  tax  rates  lead  to  higher  FDI 
outflows,  whereas  a  higher  host  country  tax  rate 
leads to lower FDI inflows (De Mooij and Ederveen, 
2003). On the other hand, some recent studies based 
on data for the EU-15 countries did not find that cor-
porate taxes had a significant impact on FDI activity 
(e.g. Hansson and Olofsdotter, 2012, for the EU-15 
countries; Egger, 2001, for the EU-15 countries; Bé-
nassy-Quéré, Gobalraja and Trannoy, 2007, for 18 EU 
countries; and Wolff, 2007, for the EU-15 and EU-25 
countries).  Similarly,  using  FDI  data  for  28  OECD 
countries  for  the  period  estimates,  Hajkova  et  al. 
(2006) found that the effects of taxation on FDI are 
quantitatively small and are much less relevant than 
other factors such as labour costs, the regulation of 
FDI and product markets and openness. In contrast, 
studies that explicitly focus on the EU-12 countries 
find that corporate taxes have a negative effect on 
FDI activity (Bellak et al., 2007).  
The  results  of  the  gravity  model  on  the  effects  of 
taxes on FDI stocks are difficult to compare with pre-
vious studies due to the difference between country 
coverage and time period, etc. Corporate tax rates 
decreased in both the EU-15 and the EU-12 by 8 and 
9  percentage  points,  respectively,  over  the  sample 
period. According to the estimations a 1 percentage 
point increase in the effective average tax rate re-
duces the bilateral FDI stock by 1.6%. Furthermore, 
the  coefficient  on  statutory  corporate  taxes  in  the 
home  country  are  not  significantly  different  from 
zero,  indicating  that  the  outward  FDI  stock  is  not 
higher  in  high-tax  countries  than  in  low-tax  coun-
tries.  In  addition,  the  factors  of  FDI  are  different 
when the sample is split into EU-15 and EU-12 host 
countries.  The  results  show  that  corporate  taxes 
matter only in the EU-12 countries and not in the 
remaining EU-15 countries. Taking exclusively green-
field  investments  into  account,  it  has  been  found 
that greenfield FDI is much more sensitive to chang-
es in taxes than total FDI in both the EU-15 and the 
EU-12 (See Table A.3. in the Appendix). The insignifi-
cance of corporate taxes for total FDI might be relat-
ed to the composition of FDI stocks and flows, since 
in the EU-15 the bulk of FDI activity is due to M&As 
whereas  in  the  EU-12  greenfield  investments  ac-
count for the most of the FDI flows.  
Among  the  non-cost  determinants  a  skilled  labour 
force in the host country has long been recognised as 
being important to FDI inflows. For the sample of EU-
12 host countries tertiary education has a significant 
impact.  Hence,  investing  in  education  and  training 
helps to attract FDI and to increase the benefits from 
FDI. For the EU-15 countries, no significant relation-
ship  has  been  found.  The  European  Commission 
(2005)  also  found  that  a  high  qualification  of  the 
workforce in the EU-10 is a more important location 
factor for multinationals as compared to the EU-15 
countries. Furthermore, when focusing only on R&D 
internationalisation human capital, as proxied by the 
share  of  tertiary  graduates  in  technology  related 
fields is important only for the group of EU-12 coun-
tries  (European  Commission,  2012).  A  possible  ex-
planation is that the EU-15 countries already have a 
high proportion of workers with tertiary education, 
while in the case of the EU-12 a significant increase 
in the number of graduates can be observed during 
the sample period. The insignificance of the educa-
tion variables might also be related to the fact that 
length of education quantity is a poor measure of the 
skills of the  workforce in the EU-15. Based on the 
sample  of  OECD  countries,  Nicoletti  et  al.  (2003) 
found that the average number of years of education 
in the host country is significantly positively correlat-
ed with FDI inflows. Studies investigating the location 
choice of multinational companies within a European 
country also found a positive relationship between 
the level of formal qualification of workers and FDI. 
However, it is important to be aware that in Europe-
an  countries  differences  in  skill  quantitative 
measures of skill levels (e.g. average years of school-
ing) are  much less pronounced than differences in 
education quality (e.g. PISA scores).  
Infrastructure  covers  a  range  of  aspects  such  as 
transport infrastructure, ICT infrastructure and elec-
tricity generation capacity. In particular, the accessi-
bility of highways, railways, airports and seaports is 
an important aspect for location choice, for all types 
of FDI. Studies based on regional data for individual 
EU countries confirm this (see Cieślik, 2005a; Cieślik, 
2005b for Poland; Barrios, Görg and Strobl, 2011 for 
Ireland). Based on FDI inflows for eight EU countries Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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in Central and Eastern Europe, Bellak, Leibrecht and 
Damijan (2009) found that information and commu-
nication  infrastructure  is  more  important  than 
transport  infrastructure  and  electricity  generation 
capacity. Using a broader sample of inward FDI activ-
ity in EU countries and the US, Bellak and Leibrecht 
(2011) confirm that ICT endowment is a significant 
and important location factor.  
Agglomeration economies are one of the most im-
portant  factors  affecting  firm  location  decisions  of 
multinational enterprises. FDI tends to cluster in cer-
tain locations that are characterised by a large share 
of  foreign  enterprises.  One  explanation  for  this  is 
that foreign subsidiaries tend to co-locate with for-
eign suppliers and foreign customers. Another rea-
son is that foreign firms may interact with each other 
rather than with domestic firms if the quality or the 
productivity  of  local  suppliers  is  low  (Pusterla  and 
Resmini, 2007). Another reason for clustering of for-
eign firms is to take advantage of a common pool of 
skilled workers and knowledge inputs and ideas. Pre-
vious studies based on the location choice of foreign 
firms moving into EU countries found strong agglom-
eration effects (e.g. Crozet et al., 2004; Disdier and 
Mayer, 2004; Pusterla and Resmini, 2007; Basile et 
al, 2008; Hilber and Voicu, 2010; Procher, 2011).  
4.2.1.3.  Business facilitation 
The third group of FDI determinants consists of busi-
ness facilitation measures, including investment in-
centives and promotion, measures directed at reduc-
ing costs linked to corruption and administrative in-
efficiency, and social amenities (e.g. quality of life).
70 
Proactive measures aimed at facilitating the business 
that foreign investors undertake in a host country 
include investment incentives and investment pr o-
motion. Investment promotion mainly reduce s  the 
transaction costs of foreign i nvestors, who are not 
familiar with the business environment of some loca-
tions, while incentives  more directly increase the 
rate of return on some investment projects. Invest-
ment incentives fall into two broad classes : financial 
incentives and  tax  incentives (Thomas, 2000). The 
most common forms of financial incentives  include 
subsidies and government loans at subsidised rates. 
                                                           
70  This overview is based on various issues of UNCTADʼs World 
Investment Report. 
Tax  incentives  may  take  the  form  of  general 
measures to reduce the corporate tax burden (e.g. 
through lowering the rates of corporate income tax 
or  providing  tax  holidays).  Alternatively,  countries 
may  offer  investment  allowances,  accelerated  de-
preciation or tax credits, all of which would promote 
capital formation (OECD, 2003).  
State aid rules prohibit aids to undertakings that dis-
tort competition and affect trade between member 
States unless they meet one of the exceptions. These 
exceptions  principally  deal  with  equity  issues  and 
market failures  (e.g. the  development of disadvan-
taged regions, the promotion of SMEs, R&D, training, 
employment  and  protection  of  the  environment). 
While the EU-12 countries predominantly focus on 
tax reliefs or allowances, the EU-15 countries priori-
tise innovation policies to stimulate investment from 
abroad.  
According to business surveys among foreign inves-
tors, financial incentives and grants are not regarded 
as primary location factors for multinational enter-
prises (UNCTAD, 2011). However, in a number of EU 
countries, local authorities often use regional policy 
grants to attract FDI.
71 More recently, Basile et al. 
(2008)  found  a  positive  relationship  between  FDI  
inflows and the overall amount of Structural Funds.  
Within the EU, investment promotion activities have 
proliferated both, in terms of numbers and in terms 
of scope (Harding and Javorcik, 2011; Fili ppov and 
Costa, 2007). In the EU countries, investment promo-
tion agencies offer a variety of services, such as prac-
tical information and guid ance on  setting up the 
business and assistance in obtaining financial support 
(grants) from public resources .
72 Furthermore, gen-
erally investment promotion agencies may con cen-
trate activities on a few priority sectors or target 
activities. The priority sectors most often listed are 
ICT (computer, software and   IT services),  pharma-
ceuticals, medical devices, biotechnology, aerospace, 
automotive, energy and environmental technologies. 
The existence and activities of investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs) are expected to have a positive and 
                                                           
71  According to Wren and Jones (2011) countries such as the UK 
and  France  spend  half  of  their  regional  grant  budgets  on 
attracting FDI flows. 
72  Information  is  based  on  the  website s  of  the  investment 
promotion agencies of the EU-27 countries.  Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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significant effect on attracting FDI flows. Harding and 
Javorcik (2011) show that the effect is only signifi-
cant for developing countries, including the EU-10. 
For high-income countries no significant relationship 
has been found. This may indicate that investment 
promotion does not work in high income countries 
where  information  asymmetries  are  relatively  low 
and bureaucratic procedures are less complex.  
4.2.2.  Firm-level determinants of FDI 
Using firm-level data enables important observations 
to be made that cannot be  drawn  from aggregate 
statistics. In this section new evidence is provided on 
the  specific  characteristics  of  firms  and  firm-level 
determinants of FDI decisions is provided. The theo-
retical and the empirical literature on multinational 
enterprises  (MNEs)  actively  investing  abroad  sug-
gests that MNEs score better than non-MNEs on a 
number of performance indicators. The performance 
gaps between MNEs and other firms are born out of 
the existence of firm-specific assets such as specific 
know-how, technology, unique products or intangi-
bles  (trademarks,  reputation  for  quality).  In  turn, 
only  the  most  productive  firms  can  pay  the  entry 
costs associated with exporting and FDI and will find 
it  profitable  to  engage  in  foreign  production.  This 
idea  goes  back  to  Dunning  (1977)  and  Markusen 
(2002) and was most recently formalised by Helpman 
et  al.  (2004),  who  link  productivity  differences  to 
exporting and FDI and suggest a productivity ranking 
with the most productive firms setting up production 
facilities abroad. At the same time firms with an in-
termediate  level  of  productivity  choose  to  export 
and  the  least  productive  firms  neither  export  nor 
invest abroad.
73 The econometric model used here
74 
integrates and tests separately two parts of the FDI 
decision: the decision whether or not to invest in a 
foreign location (the logit part of the model), and 
then the decision on the number of affiliates to  be 
set up (the count data component of the model). 
                                                           
73  The sample is limited to the EU-15 countries due to severe 
data  limitations  and  the  very  low  coverage  of  MNEs  with 
respect to a number of EU-12 countries. 
74  To test the significance of the results the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
stochastic dominance test is applied along with the more 
formal econometric tests based on the zero-inflated negative 
binominal (ZINB) count data model. 
The evidence on multinational activity in the EU-15 is 
largely consistent with the set of predictions drawn 
from  the  theoretical  MNE  literature  and  from  the 
earlier empirical findings for individual countries and 
the euro area. The analysis reveals that EU-15 multi-
national  firms  are  larger,  employ  more  capital  per 
worker, pay higher wages and are more productive 
than  domestic  firms  and  these  firm  characteristics 
are significant determinants of the FDI decision. This 
is  confirmed  by  the  non-parametric  Kolmogorov-
Smirnov stochastic dominance test (not shown) and 
by the econometric results based on the count data 
model.
75 
The  analysis  also  corroborates  theoretical  results 
establishing the fact that foreign direct inv estment 
activities are driven by firm-specific advantages and 
superior performance in the pre -investment period 
and that firms self-select into FDI. Comparing purely 
domestic firms with investing firms at the begi nning 
of the investment period, the ev idence reveals that 
they are larger and more pr oductive, have a  larger 
share  of  intangible  assets,  and  are  more  cap ital-
intensive. Firms that start foreign activities are ex -
ante different from purely domestic firms. Fo reign 
MNEs  (multinationals  with  foreign  he adquarters) 
dominate domestic MNEs in all size and performance 
indicators except for the share of inta ngible assets. 
This could signal the fact that in the case of multin a-
tional networks, firms still tend to undertake most of 
their R&D and related activities in the home country 
of the headquarters (Dunning and Lundan, 2009). 
Results from the count data model (see Table A.4. in 
the Appendix) show that the size and the capital in-
tensity of  firms have the  strongest  effects,   while 
productivity and the share of intangible assets play a 
statistically significant, but quantitatively more li m-
ited role in determining the FDI status of EU-15 firms. 
The relatively small impact of labour produ ctivity 
might be due to (a)  the lack of a more detailed di s-
tinction among different types of non-MNEs such as 
between  domestic  exporters  and  domestic  non -
exporters and (b) inadequate discrimination between 
the various types of MNEs. Both reasons might co n-
found the relationship. Domestic exporters are more 
productive than non-exporters; MNEs with only one 
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subsidiary might be more equal to domestic export-
ers than MNEs with a higher number of subsidiaries. 
The analysis also finds significant heterogeneity with-
in  the  group  of  MNEs.  Multinational  firms  holding 
more  than  one  foreign  subsidiary  outperform  all 
MNEs  with  a  single  subsidiary  in  terms  of  size, 
productivity, capital intensity and the share of intan-
gible  assets.  Multinationals  holding  subsidiaries  in 
more than one market score better on performance  
indicators than multinationals serving only one for-
eign market. 
Furthermore,  entry  costs  vary  across  locations  of 
foreign  subsidiaries.  First,  the  analysis  reveals  a 
strong  relationship  between  firm  size  and  location 
choice.  Larger  firms  invest  in  more  distant  high-
income  and  emerging  countries  overseas.  It  also 
finds the highest performance premium in terms of 
productivity and capital intensity for EU-15 multina-
tional firms setting up affiliates in emerging regions 
in Asia and in CEEC. Furthermore, a significant, but 
lower impact of capital intensity on the decisions to 
invest in Eastern Europe has been found. This might 
indicate that relative to other host regions, a greater 
share of MNEs invest in Eastern European markets 
for vertical (ʻcost-seekingʼ) motives. 
The  evidence  reported  in  this  section  also  reveals 
that  while  MNEs  are  clearly  larger  than  domestic 
firms, the median size of foreign direct investors is 
found to be about 60 employees. It is larger in manu-
facturing (131 employees) than in the services sec-
tors (35 employees). For first-time foreign direct in-
vestors in 2011 (ʻswitching firmsʼ), the median firm 
size is about 100 employees in manufacturing and 30 
employees in non-manufacturing. Thus, many medi-
um-sized manufacturing firms and small service firms 
engage in FDI. Multi-country FDI strategies and FDI in 
more  distant  emerging  markets,  however,  involve 
mostly larger manufacturing firms with a median size 
between 200 employees and 300 employees. 
4.3.  HOST COUNTRY EFFECTS OF INWARD FDI IN THE EU-
27 
What are the channels through which FDI stimulates 
economic  growth  and  productivity?  What  are  the 
main  factors  that  influence  the  magnitude  of  this 
effect? Does FDI contribute to growth? The question 
should  rather  address  whether  and  when  foreign-
owned companies contribute to more desirable pat-
terns of resource allocation or industrial restructur-
ing. Policy making sees FDI as positive for long-term 
development; however, the impacts of FDI depend 
on many factors that can be varied in order to max-
imise the benefits of foreign investments. 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  provide  a  conceptual 
framework  offering  a  better  understanding  of  the 
main factors and channels through which FDI affects 
productivity and economic growth. Most important-
ly,  FDI  can  provide  financing  for  the  acquisition  of 
new plants and equipment, and can be an important 
catalyst of economic restructuring. It can also direct-
ly transfer technology to foreign affiliates, as well as 
indirectly diffuse or ʻspill overʼ into local economies. 
While FDI is capable of producing all these effects, 
this does not mean that it necessarily does so. What-
ever the direct and indirect impact FDI has on a given 
host economy, the effects produced will be condi-
tional  upon  many  factors  (Table 4.3).  For  instance, 
the nature of FDI and the reasons why MNEs carry 
out  investments  in  foreign  economies  can  be  very 
different (distinguishing between efforts focused on 
markets, resources, efficiency, and strategic assets). 
Furthermore, the scale of the effects of FDI also de-
pends on the industries targeted by foreign compa-
nies  e.g.  setting  up  a  retail  store  vs  establishing  a 
business  in  high-tech  manufacturing.  Similarly,  the 
mode of entry of MNEs (greenfield; takeover, merger 
and  acquisition;  minority  shares  in  domestic  firms) 
may  exert  different  impacts  on  host  economies. 
Greenfield FDI is linked to setting up a completely 
new business establishment in a foreign country, and 
therefore the impacts on employment, human capi-
tal, productivity and growth might be larger than in 
the case of a takeover, where these impacts are gen-
erally less pronounced. The  impact of  FDI also de-
pends on the development level of the host country, 
including  the  absorptive  capacity  of  local  firms,  as 
well as other factors such as the size of the market, 
institutional settings or the level of competition.  
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Table 4.3 - Main determinants of the magnitude of FDI impact on local firms 
 
Local firm/economy characteristics   Foreign inestor (MNE) characteristics 
Other environmental character-
istics 
Absorptive capacity  Country of origin of the investor 
Distance between local firm and 
foreign subsidiary 
Technological gap  Entry mode (i.e. M&A versus greenfield) 
Exporting markets  Degree of foreign ownership (e.g. wholly owned, 
JVs) 
Intangible assets/R&D 
Industry affiliation (i.e. primary sector, manufactur-
ing, services) 
Human capital  High-tech, medium and low-tech industries) 
Size of the local firms  Innovation and training activities 
Level of competition in the local markets  Investment motives 
Government assistance, incentives for FDI 
Technology-based ownership 
Technology sourcing 
Source: Crespo and Fontoura (2007) and Kravtsova (2008).  
4.3.1.  Direct effects of inward FDI  
A distinction can be drawn between direct and indi-
rect effects of FDI. If foreign-controlled firms achieve 
higher  labour  productivity  and  capital  productivity 
and create more jobs than  domestic firms, then the 
direct effects are positive. This is because MNEs pro-
vide a bundle of characteristics in the host countries 
that are not necessarily available  locally: technolo-
gies,  brands,  management  procedures,  market  ac-
cess, and so on.  
In a more systematic taxonomy, FDI has the potential 
to directly provide: 
  Financial resources, FDI inflows are more stable, 
long-termist, and easier to service than commer-
cial debt and portfolio investment. 
  Technology,  MNEs  can  introduce  modern  tech-
nologies,  some  of  which  are  only  available 
through FDI, some through technology licences. 
These  corporations  can  stimulate  the  technical 
efficiency of local firms by providing assistance, 
acting as role models, and intensifying competi-
tion.  
  Market access, MNEs can provide access to ex-
port  markets  for  goods  and  some  services  that 
are already provided in the host country. 
  Skills  and  management  techniques,  MNEs  have 
worldwide  access  to  individuals  with  advanced 
skills and knowledge, which they can transfer to 
their foreign affiliates.  
  Good  practices  (regarding  the  environment,  for 
example),  MNEs  are  leading  the  way  in  clean 
technologies  and  modern  environmental  man-
agement  systems.  Some  of  these  can  also  spill 
over to host country firms (see the next section 
on indirect effects) and other MNEs. 
4.3.1.1. GROWTH EFFECTS OF FDI   
One possible approach to measure the direct impact 
of FDI in the EU countries is to estimate Barro-type 
growth  regressions  based  on  cross-section  data 
where GDP per capita growth is a function of initial 
GDP per capita, average years of education and the 
domestic investment ratio. OLS estimates of Barro-
type growth regressions 
76 show that FDI stocks and 
flows have a direct impact on growth of GDP per 
capita with relatively large marginal returns given the 
factor share of FDI in GDP (see Table  A.5. in the Ap-
pendix). Overall, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
ratio of FDI inflows to GDP  increases the growth rate 
by 1.5 percentage points in the EU-12 countries and 
1.2 percentage points in the EU -15 countries. The 
magnitude of the effects indicates that for the EU-12 
countries the increase in FDI inflows between the 
second half of the  1990s and the second half of the 
2000s by 2 percentage points accounted for 30% of 
the increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita 
(from 1.4% to 5.1% based on unweighted avera g-
es)
77.  
                                                           
76  The data consist of a sample of 29 EU and EFTA countries plus 
Turkey for the period 1985-2010 where data are measured as 
five-year averages. 
77  Unreported  results  show  that  the  growth  effect  of  FDI 
increases with the relative level of GDP per capita to the 
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4.3.1.2. EMPLOYMENT SHARE OF FOREIGN AFFILIATES IN THE EU 
COUNTRIES 
The direct importance of inward investment can be 
measured  by  the  share  of  employment  of  foreign 
affiliates  in  the  host  market  based  on  the  inward 
FATS statistics (i.e. foreign controlled enterprise sta-
tistics).
78 Foreign-controlled companies play a major 
role in the EU Member S tates in terms of emplo y-
ment, value added and turnover.  
Based on NACE rev. 2 for the year 2008  the employ-
ment share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing was 
21% (EU-15: 19% and EU-12: 30%).
79 Other industries 
where  the employment share  of foreign-controlled 
enterprises is significant are the followings: info r-
mation  and  communication  (EU -27:  18%;    E U-15: 
16% and EU-12: 32%), admi nistrative and support 
service activities (EU-27: 15%; EU-15: 14% and EU -
12: 22%)  and financial and insurance activities (EU-
27: 13%; EU-15: 9% and EU -12: 68%). The role of 
foreign multinationals in employment in the EU is 
smallest in construction (3%) and real estate activ i-
ties (4%). Within manufacturing a very large variation 
can be observed in the employment share of foreign 
affiliates.  This is much higher than the average in 
pharmaceuticals,  chemicals,  transport  equipment  
and electrical and optical equipment .  At the same 
time, textiles and wood are considered as the least 
FDI-intensive sectors. Almost all industries in the EU-
12 proved to be more reliant on FDI than in the EU -
15.   
The employment share of foreign -controlled enter-
prises in the manufacturing sector increased in a l-
most all Member States between 1997 and 2007.
80 In 
terms  of  employment  multinationals   play  an  i m-
portant role in the EU-12 (most importantly in Hun-
gary,  the  Czech Republic and Sl ovakia), employing 
42-50% of the tot al workforce in 2007. Other FDI -
intensive countries reach similar levels of emplo y-
ment share (e.g. Ireland and Belgium). Over a rough-
ly ten-year period the increasing role of multination-
als can be also observed in the Scandinavian and UK 
                                                           
78   Note  that  inward  FATS  statistics  and  balance  of  payments 
based  FDI  flows  are  not  directly  comparable  since  FATS  is 
based on the 50.1 % rule (share of the voting rights) while FDI 
is based on 10% voting power. The number of countries for 
which data are avaialbe is limited to 20-22, depending on the 
sectors. 
 
80   Except Ireland, Spain and Portugal.  
manufacturing sectors. At the same time in southern 
countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, the share 
of total workers employed by foreign manufacturing 
multinationals did not change much and remained at 
a relatively low level.  
It is interesting to compare the change in the share 
of foreign affiliate employment in services to that in 
manufacturing. In the case of non-financial services 
and business services, all EU countries for which data 
are available  show an increase in the employment 
share of foreign affiliates, with larger increases than 
in  manufacturing.  A  high  (21-23%)  and  increasing 
employment share of foreign enterprises can be ob-
served for instance in Denmark, Sweden and Estonia. 
However,  manufacturing  is  still  much  more  global-
ised than services with the exception of information 
and communication services.   
4.3.1.3. VALUE ADDED SHARE OF FOREIGN MNES 
Regarding  the  manufacturing  sector  foreign  firms’ 
share of value added was larger than their share of 
employment: 28% in the EU-15 countries and 42% in 
the  EU-12  countries.  The  economic  importance  of 
foreign-controlled  enterprises  varies  significantly 
across industries. In the EU-15 foreign affiliates have 
the highest share of value added in pharmaceuticals 
(53 %) followed by paper, chemicals, other transport 
equipment,  computer,  electronic  and  optical  prod-
ucts,  basic  metals  and  motor  vehicles  (see  Figure 
4.4). These industries feature either high capital in-
tensity (e.g. paper and metals) or a high level of in-
novation  and  R&D  activities  (e.g.  pharmaceuticals, 
computer, electronic and optical products).
81 Within 
services,  information  and  communication  services 
have the highest share of foreign -controlled enter-
prises (29%), exceeding the degree of internationali-
sation of total man ufacturing. One reason for the 
high degree of internationalisation in terms of FDI in 
this sector is the rise of ICT. For the EU -12 there is a 
similar ranking of industries with respect to foreign 
presence. 
                                                           
81   In  these  high-tech  and  medium  high-tech 
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4.3.1.4. PRODUCTIVITY OF FOREIGN CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES 
Foreign-controlled  firms  exhibit  a  productivity  ad-
vantage  over  domestically  owned  firms  and  this 
holds true for almost all industries. The ratio of la-
bour productivity between foreign - controlled and 
nationally controlled enterprises is highest in infor-
mation and communication services, and wholesale 
and retail trade (see Table 4.4).  
However, productivity differences between foreign-
owned firms and domestic firms should be interpret-
ed with some caution. The productivity gap between 
foreign and local firms may also be due to foreign 
investors’ cherry-picking of the best firms. 
Recent firm-level studies show that the productivity 
gap  partly  disappears  when  foreign  affiliates  and 
domestically  owned  multinationals  are  compared 
(Griffith, Redding and Simpson, 2002, 2004; Criscuolo 
and Martin, 2009). This suggests that multinationali-
ty rather than foreign ownership per se is the main 
explanation for the higher productivity level of for-
eign owned firms as compared to domestic firms. 
Empirical evidence on the direct effects of FDI can be 
obtained by calculating the contribution of foreign-
controlled  enterprises  to  total  labour  productivity 
growth.  Table 4.5  provides  evidence  on  the  direct 
contribution of foreign-controlled enterprises to real 
labour productivity growth for the EU manufacturing 
sector  using  the  growth  accounting  framework  in-
troduced by Criscuolo (2005). The results show that 
foreign affiliates contribute more than proportionally 
to productivity growth when compared it with the 
employment share of foreign affiliates. In the EU-15 
countries foreign-controlled enterprises in the manu-
facturing  sector  account  for  54%  of  total  labour 
productivity growth. The corresponding contribution 
for the EU-12 countries is 62%. This is a large effect 
given  that  employment  share  of  foreign-controlled 
enterprises is 20% in the EU-15 and 29% in the EU-
12.  When  the  direct  contribution  of  foreign-
controlled enterprises is decomposed into the within 
effect and the between or compositional effect (i.e. 
contribution  by  the  increase  in  the  employment 
share of foreign affiliates in the host economy), it can 
be seen that the between effects account for 45% in 
the manufacturing sector in EU-15 countries and 55% 
in EU-12 countries.  
Figure 4.4 – Share of value added of foreign affiliates in the EU based on NACE rev. 2 
 
Note: Number of EU countries for which data are available range between 16 and 21, except for pharmaceuticals with 10 countries. 
Source: WIFO calculations using Eurostat Foreign-controlled enterprises data (Eurobase). Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table 4.4 - Labour productivity of foreign-controlled and nationally controlled firms (ʻ000 EUR) 
Value added per person employed in 2008 
   EU-12 countries  EU-15 countries 
   Foreign  Domestic  all  ratio  # ind  Foreign  Domestic  all  ratio  # of ind 
Manufacturing  29  17  21  171  -10  89  53  60  168  -11 
Water supply sewerage, waste   30  23  24  128  -6  75  82  81  91  -8 
Construction  35  19  20  182  -11  71  55  55  131  -11 
Wholesale & retail trade; repairs  32  19  21  167  -8  84  37  43  228  -10 
Transportation & storage  29  22  23  132  -7  61  56  57  109  -10 
Accommodation & food service   16  13  13  122  -8  32  39  38  82  -8 
Information & communication  73  36  48  200  -9  209  97  115  216  -11 
Professional, scientific & tech. act.  39  30  31  132  -7  83  58  60  143  -10 
Administrative & support service act.  24  16  18  143  -8  53  37  39  145  -10 
Note: The ratio is defined as value added per person employed. Number of countries for which data is available in parenthesis. 
Source: WIFO calculations using Eurostat Foreign-controlled enterprises data (Eurobase).  
Table 4.5 - Contribution of foreign-controlled enterprises to labour productivity growth in manufacturing 
 
   Average 
annual 
productivity 
growth 
Contribution in percentage points 
Foreign %  Between 
effect 
  
Domestic  Foreign  Within  Between 
EU-15  4  1.8  2.2  1.2  1  54  45 
EU-12  10.1  3.7  6.5  2.9  3.6  62  55 
Note: The EU-15 countries include Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. The EU-12 countries include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The time 
spans are 1999-2007 for the EU-15 countries and 2003-2007 for the EU-12 countries. 
Source: WIFO calculations using Eurostat Foreign-controlled enterprises data, National accounts database (Eurobase) and the EUKLEMS 
database. 
4.3.2.  Indirect  effects  of  FDI  on  productivity  and 
performance 
The unintended indirect impact of FDI on host coun-
tries has been already studied from many points of 
view, including economic growth and development, 
employment and technology transfer.  
The  assumption  underlying  recent  policy  initiatives 
to attract FDI is that FDI inflows upgrade the techno-
logical capabilities, skills and competitiveness of local 
firms in the host countries. How does FDI contribute 
to this when MNEs try to protect their knowledge? 
What is the empirical evidence that FDI upgrades the 
capabilities and competitiveness of host countries? 
It has been suggested that spillovers from MNEs to 
local firms (or other MNEs) represent an important  
 
 
channel  for  the  dissemination  of  technology  and 
knowledge.  Unintended  knowledge  and  technology 
transfers from MNEs to local economies are usually 
referred to as the indirect effect of FDI. Figure 4.5 
highlights the main channels through which a multi-
national  corporation  can  engage  in  activities  that 
affect a host country. Inward FDI is only one of the 
possible  business  strategies  undertaken  by  MNEs: 
licensing,  trade  and  non-equity  forms  of  inter-firm 
cooperation  (e.g.  joint  ventures)  are  also  available 
options.  The  impact  can  be  direct  (on  the  foreign 
subsidiary)  or  indirect  (on  domestic  firms).  In  the 
latter case, the indirect effect is divided horizontally 
(intra-industry effect) and vertically (inter-industry). 
Finally, the vertical effect can be divided into forward 
linkages  (downstream  domestic  customers)  and 
backward linkages (upstream domestic suppliers).  Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
 
136 
 
Figure 4.5 - Channels for technology transfer 
 
Source: Jindra (2005). 
At  least  four  ways  can  be  identified  in  which 
knowledge may spill over from foreign affiliates to 
other firms in a given host economy.
82 
1. Imitation and demonstration effects 
These  can  be  implemented  by  reverse  engi-
neering – efforts in which a firm takes a foreign 
product apart, analyses it and learns about the 
technologies. Domestic companies do not need 
FDI for this; imports can be sufficient for the 
purpose. However, it is easier to imitate and 
copy – also in terms of managerial and organi-
sational innovations  – if MNEs are located in 
the country.  
2. Foreign linkage effects 
The foreign linkage effect is a related demon-
stration  effect:  through  imitation  (or  some-
times  through  collaboration),  domestic  firms 
can  learn  how  to  export  and  reach  foreign 
markets.  
 
                                                           
82   Kokko (1992) and Blomström and Kokko (1998). 
3. Movement of labour and skills acquisition (i.e. 
mobility) 
When an MNE transfers practices or technolo-
gy to affiliates, it has to train its employees in 
the host country in question. This new mana-
gerial and technical knowledge can spill over to 
host country firms when employees with these 
new skills move to other firms or set up their 
own businesses. A number of empirical studies 
suggest  that  the  movement  of  workers  be-
tween firms is the most important mechanism 
for technology and knowledge spillovers83.  
4. Competition – Market interactions 
It is argued that the entry of an MNE (with bet-
ter technology and managerial practices) into a 
host country will force that country’s firms to 
use existing technology and resources more ef-
ficiently  and/or  upgrade  to  more  efficient 
technologies.  However,  competitive  pressure 
                                                           
83  See Barry, Görg and Strobl, 2004, for Ireland; Pesola, 2011, for 
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can force domestic firms to exit (crowding-out 
or business-stealing effects) (Dunning, 1993). 
Do  these  spillovers  take  place  in  all  countries  and 
industries?  According  to  the  ʻabsorptive  capacityʼ 
literature  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1989  and  1990)
84 
and the recent ʻdistance to the frontierʼ literature
85 
the wider a given development gap is, the less lik ely 
it is that the host country  or host country firms will 
have the human capital, physical infrastruc ture and 
distribution networks – therefore more generally the 
absorptive capacity – to attract advanced FDI.  
Absorptive capacity can be defined as the ability to 
recognise  the  value  of  new  external  information, 
assimilate  it,  and  apply  it  to  commercial  ends  –  a 
factor  critical  to  firmsʼ  innovative  capabilities.  This 
definition has also become a key concept in the FDI 
literature, which has extended the notion of absorp-
tive  capacity  by  relating  it  to  a  firm's  prior 
knowledge:  the  more  a  local  firm  already  knows 
when an MNE enters the market, the more likely it is 
to  be  able  to  learn  from  and  imitate  the  MNEʼs 
knowledge (positive FDI spillovers). In the context of 
a given local enterprise, it is the enterpriseʼs absorp-
tive capacity that enables it to appropriate some of 
this knowledge.
86  
4.3.2.1.  New  empirical  evidence  on  the  indirect  ef-
fects of FDI on productivity in the EU-27 
The results shown in  section 4.3.1 have addressed 
the direct impacts of foreign affiliates on productivity 
                                                           
84  See also Alfaro et al. (2004): Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001); 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998). 
85  Sabirianova,  Svejnar,  and  Terrell  (2009);  Rodriguez -Clare 
(1996); Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). 
86    The background study summarises the results of more than 
70 studies investigating the effects of FDI published after 
2000. The absorptive capacity hypothesis is confirmed in 12 
out of 20 studies, with the relative productivity level b e-
tween domestic and foreign firms the most widely used 
measure of absorptive capacity. 
 
growth.  However,  they  do  not  allow  us  to  infer 
whether foreign firms raise overall growth. The aim 
of  this  section  is  to  investigate  whether  domestic 
firms benefit from the presence of foreign MNEs in 
both the same and customer industries. Knowledge 
about the magnitude of FDI spillovers is important 
because it can help policy makers to maximise the 
benefits of FDI for local enterprises and minimises its 
adverse effects. 
In order to gain a first idea of the relationship be-
tween foreign presence and the performance of the 
domestic sector a simple scatter plot using aggregate 
country-level data is provided. The results show that 
in EU countries where foreign-controlled enterprises 
in  the  manufacturing  sector  initially  have  a  large 
share of employment (starting in 1999 for most EU-
15  countries  and  2003  for  EU-12  countries)  the 
growth  in  the  labour  productivity  of  domestically 
controlled firms in the manufacturing sector is signif-
icantly  higher  over  the  period  1999-2007  (alterna-
tively 2003-2007 for the EU-12 countries; Figure 4.6, 
left-hand  panel).  However,  employment  growth  in 
manufacturing  is  not  significantly  correlated  with 
foreign presence (Figure 4.6, right-hand panel). 
When disaggregated data at the one/two-digit level 
for the manufacturing sector are used a significant 
correlation  between  foreign  presence  and  labour 
productivity growth can be observed. This holds true 
for  both  the  EU-15  and  EU-12  countries  for  which 
data are available (see Figure 4.7).  
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Figure 4.6 - Productivity and employment dynamics in the domestic sector and initial employment share of 
foreign-controlled enterprises in manufacturing (EU-27) 
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Source: WIFO calculations using Eurostat, Foreign-controlled enterprises data, National accounts database (Eurobase) and the EUKLEMS 
database. 
Figure 4.7 - Employment growth and initial employment share of foreign-controlled enterprises in manufac-
turing at the one-digit level in EU-15 and EU-12 countries 
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Source: WIFO calculations using Eurostat Foreign-controlled enterprises data, National accounts database (Eurobase) and the EUKLEMS 
database. 
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The inward FATS database has been combined with 
national accounts data,
87 which makes it possible to 
estimate the impact of foreign presence within the 
same industry and in customer industries on the per-
formance of domestically owned firms. For the man-
ufacturing sector in the EU -15 and EU-12, OLS esti-
mates at the industry level show that the impact of 
foreign presence in the same and in customer (bu y-
ing) industries in the initial year has a positive impact 
on the average annual growth rate of real labour 
productivity of the domestic sector. In summary, the 
presence of both horizontal and vertical backward 
spillovers from FDI can be observed. 
The next step is to investigate the impact of the 
presence  of  foreign  affiliates  on  the  productivity 
growth of domestic companies. Since the activity of 
foreign firms is unlikely to affect all firms equally, it is 
interesting to examine, whether firms cha racterized 
by low productivity growth rates benefit from the 
presence of MNEs. The interaction term between the 
backward  production  linkage  variable  and  the 
productivity gap between the domestic and foreign 
sector is significant ,  indicating that the FDI effect 
through backward linkages increases with the labour 
productivity level of the domestic firms to that of 
foreign firms. For the EU-15 countries in the manu-
facturing sector, the magnitude of the FDI effect is 
twice as large as in the industries characterised by a 
small relative labour productivity gap as compared to 
those with a large relative productivity gap (coeff i-
cient of 1.17 for a relative productivity level of  1.9 
(=90%) as compared to 1.9 for a productivity of 1.5 
(=50%; see Table A.6 in the Appendix). 
In addition, the results based on firm level data for 
seven EU-12 countries (including manufacturing and 
service firms) show strong evidence of produ ctivity 
spillovers from backward linkages. However, the FDI 
effect is highly uneven across  the different types of 
firms,  with  insignificant  effects  for  laggards  (e.g. 
shrinking firms) and newly founded firms. Companies 
with lower than average labour productivity growth 
are unlikely to benefit from the presence of MNEs, 
while  spillover  effects of FDI on highly productive 
                                                           
87   Background study, Falk et al. 2012. 
firms in the customer industries proved to be signifi-
cant.  In  particular,  the  spillover  effects  through 
backward linkages are higher for fast-growing firms 
when  compared  with  the  total  sample.  A  negative 
relationship  has  been  found  between  productivity 
growth  of  domestically  owned  firms  and  the  pres-
ence of foreign firms in the same industry, indicating 
negative horizontal spillovers probably due to a mar-
ket stealing  effect (see Table A.7 in the Appendix). 
However,  the  above  results  should  be  interpreted 
with caution, because limited data may lead to an 
aggregation  bias.  To  overcome  the  limitations,  the 
Community  Innovation  Survey  (CIS)  is  used  in  the 
next  section  to  investigate  the  impact  of  foreign 
MNEs on local firms. 
4.3.2.2.  New  empirical  evidence  on  the  indirect  ef-
fects of FDI on employment growth and technological 
innovations in the EU-10 
The findings of the empirical analysis in this subchap-
ter  so  far  have  strongly  supported  the  view  that 
backward spillovers are  more important than hori-
zontal spillovers with regard to productivity growth. 
However, an open question remains as to what ex-
tent the magnitude of FDI spillovers depends on local 
firm characteristics and absorptive capacity. The en-
try of multinational enterprises may not only have an 
impact on productivity and employment growth but 
may also induce local firms to introduce new prod-
ucts  and/or  services  or  new  production  processes. 
This part of the analysis investigates the impact of 
FDI on the employment performance and innovation 
activities of domestically owned companies based on 
CIS 2006 data for eight EU-10 countries is investigat-
ed.
88 Particular  attention is paid to the role of spillo-
vers from downstream multinational enterprises on 
upstream local suppliers (backward linkages).  
Special emphasis is put on the question of  the ab-
sorptive capacity of local firms and firm characteri s-
tics (e.g. firm size). The analysis is based on a large 
firm sample, namely the  CIS  2006 for  eight  EU-10 
countries with about 36000 observations. This analy-
                                                           
88   This section is based on yet unpublished results from the EU 
funded project INNO Grips ENTR-09-11-LOT2. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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sis focuses on the EU-10 countries.
89 The reason  is 
that the productivity differences b etween domesti-
cally and foreign-owned firms are much more pr o-
nounced in the EU -10 countries than in the EU -15 
countries.  
The major contribution of this analysis is that  it in-
vestigates the relationship between the employment 
performance of local firms and FDI  along with the 
impact of FDI on the innovativeness of local comp a-
nies.  Few studies have investigated the impact of 
foreign presence on technological innovation in do-
mestically-owned firms
90. Using data for 27 countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (i ncluding the EU-10 
countries),  Gorodnichenko  et  al.  (2010)  find  that 
domestic  firmsʼ  innovation  activities  increase 
through backward linkages by supplying multination-
al enterprises. 
OLS estimates (see Table A.8 in the Appendix) based 
on eight EU-10 countries show that foreign presence 
has  a  positive  impact  on  employment  growth  of 
firms located in local supply industries. In particular, 
local firms with backward linkages in industries with 
a large initial foreign employment share have a sig-
nificantly higher average employment growth rate in 
the next two years. In other words, local firms with a 
larger  supply of  inputs to industries where foreign 
firms are present tend to create more jobs than in-
dustries with no such linkages. The magnitude of the 
spillover effect through backward linkages increases 
with the absorptive capacity of local firms measured 
as the initial productivity level of domestic firms to 
that of foreign firms. However, the additional effect 
of  the  increased  absorptive  capacity  is  relatively 
modest.  
Furthermore, foreign competition leads to a higher 
probability that local firms will introduce new prod-
uct innovations where foreign competition is meas-
ured  as  a  subjective  qualitative  indicator  as  per-
ceived by local firms. A new empirical finding is that 
the magnitude of  the impact of FDI through back-
ward linkages increases for innovative local firms (i.e. 
                                                           
89  The eight EU-10 countries considered are: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic. 
90  Exceptions are Vahter (2011) for Estonia or Bertschek (1995) 
and Blind and Jungmittag (2004) for German firm level data. 
firms that introduce new products and/or new ser-
vices) in the manufacturing sector.  Overall, the re-
sults  show  strong  evidence  in  support  of  vertical 
spillovers  through  backward  linkages  from  foreign 
buyers  to  local  suppliers.  Local  firm  characteristics 
also influence the strength of FDI spillovers. Spillo-
vers  through  backward  linkages  to  local  firms  are 
present for local firms in the manufacturing sector 
and generally for firms with 25 or more employees 
but do not exist for small firms with less than 25 em-
ployees and for domestically owned firms in the ser-
vice sector. Moreover and somewhat unexpectedly, 
the  results  show  that  spillovers  through  backward 
linkages  to  local  firms  are  much  larger  for  non-
exporting firms than for exporting firms. There is also 
evidence that firms in the same industry benefit from 
industry-level FDI that increases with absorptive ca-
pacity.  However,  the  magnitude  of  the  effects  is 
much smaller than that of spillovers through back-
ward linkages. 
The relationship between foreign presence and the 
innovation performance of local firms is also investi-
gated (Table A.9 in the Appendix). The results show a 
positive  association  between  innovation  perfor-
mance  of  domestically  owned  firms  and  foreign 
presence in customer industries. This suggests that 
local firms in industries that supply a larger share of 
their output to industries with a larger share of mul-
tinational  enterprises  are  more  likely  to  introduce 
product innovations or new market products. How-
ever,  the  positive  effect  only  occurs  when  the 
productivity gap is not too wide and increases with 
the relative labour productivity level between local 
and foreign-owned firms. Furthermore, the positive 
impact of FDI can be observed in all kinds of innova-
tion activities (i.e. new market products, product and 
process innovations
91) but it is the largest for product 
innovations. Hence, FDI favours technology adoption 
(i.e. goods and se rvices that are new to the firm) 
rather than radical innovations (i.e. market nove l-
ties).  
                                                           
91   Process  innovation  refers  to  new  or  significantly  improved 
production  process,  distribution  method  or  supporting 
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Overall, the results suggest that foreign firms act as 
catalysts for domestic suppliers to introduce techno-
logical innovations in the case of EU-10 countries. In 
addition,  foreign  firms  do  not  crowd  out  domestic 
innovation in the same industry and there are posi-
tive  effects  with  increased  absorptive  capacity.  An 
important result is that not only do domestic suppli-
ers benefit in their innovation performance from the 
presence of multinational enterprises, but technolog-
ical  innovations  of  local  firms  and  that  of  foreign 
firms  are  also  significantly  positively  correlated.  In 
other words, the introduction of technological inno-
vations by domestic and foreign firms goes hand in 
hand (holding everything else constant and account-
ing for industry effects). 
92 
4.3.2.3.  Evidence  for  technology  transfer  through 
backward linkages and the use of technology licences 
The aim of this section is to analyse the characteris-
tics of local firms that supply goods and services to 
multinational enterprises. It also examines to what 
extent  foreign  affiliates  contribute  to  technology 
transfers in the form of technology licences. 
There are a number of reasons why multinationals 
prefer local procurement rather than suppliers from 
abroad.  Geographical  proximity  can  lower  produc-
tion costs and makes face-to- face contacts easier, 
and close relationships with local suppliers make it 
easier to tailor products and services to local market 
conditions. However, in some industries local sourc-
ing is less frequent because multinational companies 
prefer  to  work  with  their  established  suppliers 
(UNCTAD, 2001, 2003).  The  factor  determining the 
supply status of supplies MNEs is estimated using a 
probit model. Information on the level of use of local 
suppliers by foreign firms also makes it possible to 
estimate an ordered probit model.
93  
                                                           
92    This important result has also been found when analysing 
specifically  R&D  investmtnes  of  firms  abroad  (European 
Commission, 2012). R&D intensities of domestic and foreign 
firms  are  positively  correlated.  Furthermore,  no  evidence 
has been found that inward R&D crowds out R&D activites 
of  domestic  firms.  On  the  contrary  both  are  found 
complementary.  Reciprocically,  there  is  no  evidence  that 
R&D  activities  performed  abroad  are  a  substitutions  for 
similar domestic actitivites. 
93   The data used here are based on the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005 and 2009 
provided by the World Bank. The data contains information 
for the years 2004 with about 3500 observations for the 
In  the  EU-10  in  2004,  17%  of  local  firms  supplied 
goods or services to foreign affiliates located in the 
same  country  (not  including  the  parent  company) 
(see Table 4.6). This share is higher than the average 
in the case of transport services (24%), mining (23%), 
manufacturing  firms  (19%),  and  business  services 
(19%). Most of the local firms have a low share of 
goods and services supplied to MNEs. Furthermore, 
the supplier status and the share of sales increase 
with firm size. Overall, the incidence of supplier link-
ages between local and multinational firms is quite 
significant given the practice of multinational enter-
prises of purchasing from established suppliers. 
Unreported results show that firms with new prod-
ucts are more likely to become a supplier to multina-
tional  enterprises  in  the  same  country.  Innovative 
firms have a 7 percentage points higher probability 
of being a supplier than non-innovative firms. Local 
firms in construction, wholesale and retail trade, and 
hotels  and  restaurants  have  a  lower  likelihood  of 
being a supplier to multinational enterprises. As ex-
pected,  firm  size  has  a  positive  impact  on  being  a 
supplier  to  MNEs,  with  the  probability  decreasing 
slightly  with  increased  firm  size.  Furthermore,  the 
skill structure is of great importance in being a sup-
plier to foreign affiliates: firms with a larger share of 
workers with some or completed university educa-
tion have a significantly higher probability of being a 
supplier to MNEs.  
The next step is to investigate the extent of technol-
ogy transfers from foreign-owned firms to local firms 
in the form of technology licences. In particular, it is 
examined to what extent foreign affiliates contribute 
to  technology  transfer  and  help  to  upgrade  local 
suppliers in the host economy with respect to inno-
vation performance and innovation input. The focus 
is on  externalised technology transfer, i.e. linkages 
and transfers outside direct transfers such as licenc-
es,  franchises  or  subcontracting  (Ivarsson  and  Al-
vstam,  2005).  These  types  of  technology  transfers 
have the potential to contribute to technology up-
grading (UNCTAD, 1999). 
 
                                                                                        
business  enterprise  sector.  Information  on  technology 
licences  obtained  from  foreign-owned  firms  in  the 
manufacturing sector is taken from the BEEPS 2009 survey. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table 4.6 – Share of domestic sales to multinational enterprises and their foreign affiliates by local firms in 
2004 by industries, EU-10 
Share of domestic sales to multinational enterprises in host country of local firms 
   0  Jan-24  25-49  50-74  75-100  total  1-100 
By industry                      
Mining  77  9  5  9  0  100  23 
Construction  86  7  4  1  1  100  14 
Manufacturing  81  9  4  3  3  100  19 
Transport  76  11  7  4  2  100  24 
Trade  87  9  2  1  1  100  13 
Real estate, renting, business serv.  81  11  2  3  2  100  19 
Hotel and restaurants  87  8  4  0  0  100  13 
Other services  90  7  1  1  1  100  10 
Total  83  9  3  2  2  100  17 
Firm size                      
>5  93  4  1  2  1  100  7 
5 - 24.9  85  9  3  2  1  100  15 
25-49.9  78  12  5  3  2  100  22 
>=50  79  11  5  3  2  100  21 
Total  85  8  3  2  1  100  15 
Note: Figures are based on the question ʻWhat percentage of your domestic sales are to multinationals located in your country (not includ-
ing your parent company, if applicable)?ʼ using 3500 firm observations. 
Source: BEEPS 2005. 
Figure 4.8 - Use of technology licensed from a foreign-owned company, excluding office software, manufac-
turing in 2008, in % 
 
Note: Weighted using sample weights. 
Source: BEEPS 2009 based on 1100 observations 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the share of firms that use technol-
ogy licensed from foreign-owned enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector in the EU-10. About 15% of the 
firms  use  licences  from  foreign-owned  firms  with 
large differences across the EU-10 countries.  
As expected, firms that use technology licences are 
more likely to introduce new products and product 
innovations and to undertake R&D. In the manufac
turing sector 63% of local firms having licences with 
foreign MNEs engaged in product innovation in 2008.  
At the same time only 51% of local companies with-
out technology licences proved to be innovative. The 
percentage  of  firms  with  R&D  activities  is  40%  for 
firms with licences and 21% for those with no licenc-
es. This may indicate that the use of licences from 
foreign-owned  companies  leads  to  technological Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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upgrading of local firms but may also indicate that 
innovative firms and R&D-intensive firms are more 
likely to use technology licences. 
4.4.  TRENDS AND STRUCTURES OF EU-27 OUTWARD FDI  
At global level, the EU is the largest direct investor, 
typically accounting for more than half of global FDI 
outflows (intra-EU flows included). In line with the 
global  trend,  the  investment  activity  of  EU  MNEs 
decreased  substantially  and  resulted  in  the  EUʼs 
share of global outflows dropping to a third in the 
years 2009 and 2010.  
Both  extra-EU  and  intra-EU  outflows  contracted  in 
absolute terms after 2007 and did not return to the 
peak levels of 2006 and 2007 until 2010. EU MNEs 
curtailed  FDI  activities    particularly  within  the  EU, 
which  is  reflected  in  a  marked  decline  in  intra-EU 
flows  since  the  peak  in  2007  (Figure 4.9).  Intra-EU 
outflows dropped by almost 40% in 2008 and again 
by 50% in 2009 to around EUR 140 bn and stabilised 
at that level in 2010. 
 
Outward FDI flows to countries outside the EU also 
contracted and were down for the third consecutive 
year in 2010 shrinking to EUR 143 bn, less than half 
of their peak value in 2007. Despite their severe 40% 
decline in 2009 extra-EU flows have gained relative 
importance since the crisis. Between 2008 and 2010 
the share of extra-EU outflows hovered around 50%. 
The number and value of EU greenfield investments 
went down and the average size of projects was typi-
cally smaller in the period 2009-2011.  
The shift in outward FDI from intra-EU to extra-EU 
flows might indicate that EU MNEs have perceived 
the EU as a less attractive location for FDI since 2008, 
inducing several European MNEs to seek investment 
opportunities in fast-growing emerging markets out-
side the EU. Another factor contributing to the shift 
in the destinations of FDI is that until mid-2008 the 
EU-10  countries  provided  excellent  investment  op-
portunities for EU MNEs, but the convergence pro-
cess  was  interrupted  by  the  economic  crises  of 
2008/2009 and these countries stopped being a fo-
cus destination for EU MNEs.  
Figure 4.9 - EU FDI outflows, 2001-2010 (EUR bn) 
 
 
Note: EU is EU-25 for 2001-2003 and EU-27 for 2004-2010. EU flows calculated as the sum of EU Member States. Intra-EU flows to Luxem-
bourg are adjusted downwards by 90% in order to exclude activities of Special Purpose Enterprises (SPEs). Extra-EU flows exclude offshore 
centres  (Guernsey,  Jersey,  Isle  of  Man,  Gibraltar,  Bahamas,  Bermuda,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Cayman  Islands,  Netherlands  Antilles). 
Source: Eurostat, wiiw calculations. 
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4.4.1.  EU outward FDI by destinations: a shift to-
wards emerging markets 
Like the main sources of the EUʼs inward FDI from 
the rest of the world, the main recipients of EU out-
ward FDI are the US and the EFTA countries. These 
two regions accounted for more than half of the to-
tal extra-EU outflows in the period 2008-2010. This 
supports the view that the dominant share of EU FDI 
is market-seeking FDI targeted at high-income econ-
omies. However, as a result of the crisis, investment 
by  EU  MNEs  in  developed  destinations  –  with  the 
exception of Switzerland - declined significantly. This 
is partly linked to the recession in developed coun-
tries and the dominant role of M&As between devel-
oped countries, which are more sensitive to business 
fluctuations than greenfield investments. 
At  the  same  time  emerging  economies,  mainly  in 
Asia and South America have clearly become more 
important  destinations  for  EU  FDI.  This  trend  had 
started  well  in  advance  of  the  economic  crisis  of 
2008/2009 but the European recession intensified it. 
In 2008-2010, 11 out of the 15 largest FDI destina-
tions  were  emerging  and  transition  economies,  in-
cluding Russia, Brazil, Mexico, China, Turkey and In-
dia. Developing regions bordering the EU benefited 
to a lesser extent from EU FDI, with the notable ex-
ception of North Africa (see more about this in Chap-
ter 5). In general, flows to emerging countries were 
much more resilient to the crisis. This is due to the 
fact that these markets have higher growth perfor-
mance and prospects and are thus ideal targets for 
greenfield investments.  
EU MNEs account for a significant share of overall 
FDI stocks in major destination countries. The over-
whelming  majority  of  the  EU  FDI  stock  in  non-EU 
countries  is  owned  by  companies  from  the  EU-15 
(97%)  while  the  EU-12  accounted  for  about  3%  in 
2010.
94 EU multinationals are particularly well pos i-
tioned in the US, Switzerland, Russia and Argentina
95 
                                                           
94   The share of the EU-12 in intra-EU-27 stocks is even lower, at 
around 2% in 2010; it is, however considerably higher within 
the  EU-12  amounting  to  8.7%.  More  details  about  the  FDI 
activities of MNEs from the EU-12 are provided in the next 
section. 
95   In the case of Russia, EU investments may to some extent be 
overstated because a third of the EU's FDI stock in Russia is 
owned by Cyprus (which makes it the largest investor) but 
these  flows  are  understood  to  mainly  constitute  ʻround-
trippingʼʼ  capital.  ʻRound-trippingʼ  FDI  refers  to  Russian 
accounting for 64%, 71%, 83% and 55%, respectively, 
of the total FDI stock in the country. EU companies 
represent a much larger share of inward FDI stocks in 
many  countries  than  US  or  Japanese  competitors, 
indicating  a  good  competitive  position  in  foreign 
markets. For instance, in both India and Argentina, 
the EU's share of the FDI stock is two and three times 
larger than that of the US. Only in China, EU firms 
seem to be on a par with the US in terms of accumu-
lated  FDI  stocks.  China  seems  to  be  a  particularly 
competitive  market  for  foreign  direct  investors  as 
there is strong competition  there also comes from 
South Korea and Singapore. 
 4.4.2. Industry structure of the EU outward FDI: the 
EU  possesses  comparative  advantages  for  FDI  in 
manufacturing industries  
Like FDI in general, EU outward FDI by broad eco-
nomic sectors takes place predominantly in services. 
Services emerge as the main sector accounting for 
72% of the total outward FDI of the EU, while manu-
facturing  represents  20%.  These  figures  are  biased 
towards the services sector due to the massive FDI 
stocks of the financial sector. However, excluding the 
financial sector and the activities of holding compa-
nies (other business services), the services industries 
account for 29 % of total EU outward stocks. Most 
investments in this sector target the trade and repair 
industry  (10 %)  and  the  post  and  telecommunica-
tions industry (7.4 %). Manufacturing industries ac-
count  for  half  of  the  total  (adjusted)  EU  outward 
stocks in non-EU countries amounting to EUR 645 bn. 
The chemical industry (14%) is the leading industry in 
terms of EU outward FDI stocks owned in the rest of 
the world, followed by the metal industry (6%) and 
the food industry (6%). Generally speaking, the mag-
nitude  of  the  EU  outward  stocks  in  the  individual 
industries reflects the strong competitive positions of 
the EU companies in the respective industries. The 
variation  across  destinations  markets  shows  that 
host country factors, including resource endowments  
                                                                                        
investment  channelled  back  via  Cyprus  for  tax  purposes 
(Hunya  and  Stöllinger,  2009).  Moreover,  these  figures  also 
include  FDI  stocks  owned  by  Luxembourg  which  to  a  very 
large extent represents financial intermediation activity. The 
main  results  from  this  analysis  are  not  affected  by  these 
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and the importance of the industry in the host econ-
omy, also play a role in investment decisions of EU 
firms.  For  instance,  the  EU  and  Switzerland  both 
have  large  multinationals  in  the  chemical  industry, 
and a large share (43%) of EU total outward FDI stock 
in the chemical sector is located in Switzerland. An-
other example is the low presence of EU (and other) 
multinationals in the Indian market in the trade and 
repair industry, which is a clear consequence of the 
prohibition of the FDI in multibrand retailing.  
In the analysis of trade flows it has become common 
to investigate the relative position of a country in a 
specific industry by looking at revealed comparative 
advantages (RCAs). Basically, RCAs signal the indus-
tries in which a given country exports relatively more 
than it imports in comparison to the export and im-
port  ratio  in  the  total  economy.  EU  outward  FDI 
stocks by industries are used to apply the concept of 
RCAs to FDI stocks by comparing inward with out-
ward stocks. Calculating RCAs based on inward and 
outward EU FDI stocks suggests that EU MNEs are 
competitive  in  manufacturing  industries,  including 
the EUʼs traditional industry strongholds (i.e. chemi-
cals, machinery, vehicles) see Figure A.1.in the Ap-
pendix. The EUʼs RCAs in both manufacturing indus-
tries and the mining and quarrying sector are based 
on  technological  capacities.  In  manufacturing,  this 
conclusion is derived from the fact that the EU en-
joys  RCAs  mainly  in  relatively  more  technology-
intensive  industries.  In  mining  and  quarrying  EU 
MNEs  seem  to  have  developed  technologies  that 
allow them to exploit natural resources abroad de-
spite the EUʼs relative resource scarcity. In contrast 
in services industries, including knowledge-intensive 
industries such as R&D and computer activities, re-
vealed comparative disadvantages have been found. 
This suggests that EU MNEs in these sectors are less 
competitive than foreign MNEs. 
4.4.3.  The  importance  of  EU  MNEs  in  the  EU-15 
countries 
Looking beyond the major developments in FDI out-
flows at the aggregate and sector level, the analysis 
at the firm level provides additional insights into the 
number of multinational firms and their importance 
for the EU. Due to data limitations the sample is re-
stricted  to  EU-15  firms.
96  The  empirical  literature 
suggests  that foreign MNEs are more productive, 
more capital-intensive, larger and pay higher wages 
than  firms  operati ng  exclusively  in  the  domestic 
market. Furthermore, only a very small fraction of 
EU-15 firms own foreign affiliates, but they account 
for a disproportionately large share of domestic a c-
tivity. The share of MNEs is typically larger  in small 
countries. The share of domestic MNEs is larger than 
that of foreign MNEs in all EU-15 countries except for 
Luxembourg.  
Despite their small share  in total number of firms 
(2.8%), MNEs (domestic and foreign MNEs toget her) 
account for 21.1% of employment, 28.1% of turn o-
ver, 37.2% of total fixed assets and 36% of intangible 
assets in the EU -15. Domestic multinational ente r-
prises – domestic to each individual country in the 
EU-15 – account for the largest share of these activi-
ties, while foreign multinational enterprises account 
for a much smaller proportion (Figure 4.10). 
Multinational  firms  that  own  subsidiaries  in  more 
than one foreign country account for a mere 1% of 
the total number of firms in the sample, but gener-
ate 15% of employment, 20% of turnover and 27% of 
total fixed assets and intangible assets. Roughly the 
same  picture  emerges  for  multinationals  that  own 
more than four foreign subsidiaries. This is an indica-
tion that these MNEs are on average larger firms. 
The  international  activity  of  multinational  firms  is 
quite  concentrated.  The  largest  25%  of  MNEs  ac-
count for almost 30% of the total number of foreign 
subsidiaries,  76%  of  total  turnover  and  intangible 
assets and  generate 90% of employment. However, 
they  represent  only  15%  of  the  total  number  of 
MNEs in the sample.  
Activities of EU-15 MNEs are highly concentrated in 
the  EU.  The  firm-level  data  reveal  that  70%  of  EU 
MNEs choose the EU-15 and 45% choose locations 
within the EU-15 exclusively. The top three destina-
tions in the EU-15 are Germany, the UK and France. 
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 Figure 4.10 - Contribution of EU-15 multinational enterprises to domestic activities 
 
Source: AMADEUS database (2011 release), WIFO calculations. 
 
Regarding  non-EU  countries  most  European  firms 
prefer to operate in the US market. MNEs in the ser-
vice sector tend to invest more outside the EU than 
manufacturing firms. First-time investors prefer clos-
er  locations  in  Western  and  Eastern  Europe.  Fur-
thermore,  almost  half  of  the  new  investors  place 
their initial investment in the EU-15 and 15% in the 
EU-12 and only a very few first-time investors oper-
ate affiliates outside Europe.  
Most MNEs own only a small number of foreign sub-
sidiaries, and are active in a small number of different 
host  countries.  More  than  half  of  MNEs  hold  only 
one subsidiary, and nearly 60% of the MNEs are ac-
tive in only one foreign market. 
In terms of location choice, the analysis reveals weak 
evidence of a sequence of markets, in the sense that 
on  average  MNEs  tend  to  set  up  affiliates  in  less 
popular markets only if they already have a subsidi-
ary in one of the more popular markets.  
4.4.4.  Emerging  outward  FDI  from  the  new  EU 
Member States (EU-12) 
The trends in overall EU outward FDI reflect mostly 
the pattern of EU-15 countries. Linked to their high 
GDP  per  capita  level,  as  expected,  most  of  these 
countries are net capital exporters, with outward FDI 
stocks  exceeding  inward  FDI  stocks.  The  new  EU 
Member States (EU-12) in turn have been clearly the 
focus of inward FDI over the past decade.  Foreign 
MNEs made a  significant  contribution to structural 
change  and  development.  While  EU-12  countries 
were the source of very low levels of outward FDI, 
there  are  several  signs  that  FDI  outflows  and  out-
ward FDI positions are gradually catching up. In line 
with the theoretical notion of the ʻinvestment devel-
opment  pathʼ
97  (Dunning,  1981,  1986),  there  has 
been a growing number of ʻemerging multinationalsʼ 
operating from the EU-12. FDI outflows from these 
countries increased from around EUR 4 bn in 2003 to
                                                           
97   This  assumes  a  systematic  relationship  between  the 
development  level  of  a  country  and  the  net  outward 
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 EUR 7.5 bn  in  2010  and  peaked  at  levels  of  up  to 
EUR 14 bn  in  some  of  the  pre-crisis  years  (Fig-
ure 4.11).  
The total stock of capital invested abroad by EU-12 
countries  reached  EUR 81.8 bn  in  2010,  having  in-
creased nearly sevenfold from its 2003 value. As a 
result, these countries almost tripled their share in 
total EU  outward FDI, from 1.3% in 2003 to about 
1.8 %  in  2010.  Moreover,  the  EU-12  outward  FDI 
stock grew also in relation to the inward FDI stock in 
these countries: from 7.2% in 2003 to over 16% in 
2010  (Figure 4.12).  This  growth  occurred  despite  a 
more than threefold increase in the value of inward 
FDI  stock  in  these  countries:  from  EUR 167 bn  in 
2003 to EUR 507 bn in 2010.
98 
Figure 4.11 - EU-12 FDI outflows, 2003-2010 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Regarding  individual  countries,  Poland,  the  biggest 
economy  in  the  EU-12,  held  a  35.7%  share  of  the 
value of the total  outward FDI stock from the region. 
Hungary  was  the  second  largest  investor  from  the 
EU-12 region (18.0%), followed by the Czech Repub-
lic (13.3%). However, relative to GDP, smaller coun-
tries such as Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary are the 
best  performers  in  terms  of  internationalisation 
through outward FDI. 
While in the pre-accession period FDI outflows from 
the  EU-12  were  strongly  concentrated  in  regions 
outside the EU-27, this changed to a much stronger 
                                                           
98  This  phenomenon  was  initially  described  by  Svetlicic  and 
Jaklic (2006), Boudier-Bensebaa (2008), Gorynia, Nowak and 
Wolniak (2010), Sass, Éltető and Antalóczy (2012), Radło and 
Sass  (2012)  Ferencikova  and  Ferencikova  (2012),  Radło 
(2012) and Zemplinerová (2012). 
focus on intra-EU flows after  accession. In 2010 well 
over  50%  of  the  total  EU-12  stock  of  outward  FDI 
constituted  intra-EU-27  investments  (see  Fig-
ure 4.11). Note that this is a different trend to the 
one that has been found inherently for the EU-15 in 
the analysis of overall EU foreign direct investment 
trends. 
Distinguishing  between  the  types  of  outward  FDI 
projects, the geography of M&A is highly influenced 
by  ʻround-trippingʼ  FDI  deals,  referring  to  invest-
ments that are channelled back to the original invest-
ing  country  by  Special  Purpose  Entities  (holding 
companies)  located  in  financial  centres  or  tax  ha-
vens. This trend is mostly reflected in foreign direct 
investments  in  Cyprus,  the  Netherlands,  the  UK, 
Switzerland  and  Luxembourg.  Another  clean  domi-
nant trend is for M&A deals in proximate, neighbour-
ing  countries  within  the  Central-East  European  re-
gion.  The  largest  EU-15  locations  for  EU-12  M&A 
activities are Germany, Austria and Italy, while Ro-
mania,  Lithuania,  the  Czech  Republic,  Bulgaria  and 
Slovenia are the main destinations within the EU-12. 
Extra-EU M&As are most intensively undertaken in 
neighbouring Croatia, the Ukraine, Serbia and Russia. 
The geography of greenfield FDI is less influenced by 
factors related to financial flows resulting from tax 
optimisation. The main focus is on countries within 
the EU-12 region itself – foremost Romania, the Slo-
vak Republic and Bulgaria – and neighbouring coun-
tries  in  Eastern  Europe  (Russia  and  Ukraine)  along 
with  markets  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  in  South-
Eastern Europe. The most important target countries 
for greenfield investments from the EU-12 are Ger-
many, Italy, the UK and Austria. It is worth noting 
that  some  outward  investment  is  oriented  toward 
emerging regions in Asia.  
The main feature of the sector structure in the EU-12 
is a very strong focus on construction and engineer-
ing and on the coke and refined petroleum products. 
Comparable to the overall EU sector pattern of out-
ward FDI, the investment activity of EU-12 MNEs is 
dominated by the service sector. The total value  of 
manufacturing projects is greater than that of green-
field  projects.  Apart  from  finance  and  insurance 
which leads in M&A projects, the focus of FDI from 
the  EU-12  is  on  transportation  and  wholesale  and 
retail trade. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Figure 4.12 - Inward and outward FDI stock (EU-12, 2003-2010) 
 
 
Source: WERI calculations based on Eurostat. 
Figure 4.13 - Greenfield FDI projects and M&A deals by MNEs from EU-12 (number of deals and value in EUR 
bn) 
 
 
 
Source: WERI calculations based on the fDi markets database. 
 
4.5.  HOME  COUNTRY  EFFECTS  OF  OUTWARD FDI  ON EU 
INDUSTRY 
A  debate  is  ongoing  in  most  developed  countries 
about the possible adverse effects of outward FDI on 
domestic  industries.  In  particular,  the  fear  of  job-
exporting has sparked widespread concerns due to 
the increasing attractiveness of  emerging and fast-
growing and low-wage countries. This is a highly con-
troversial issue in the EU-15 Member States, which 
see themselves as affected by such concerns, espe-
cially since the eastern EU enlargements in 2004 and 
2007 and the intra-EU reallocation. A related issue is 
the increase in the internationalisation of corporate 
R&D and fears that the offshoring of R&D activities 
of multinational enterprises is hollowing out the in-
novation  base  in  the  home  country.  On  the  other 
hand, outward FDI is seen as a means to gain market 
access and secure market shares, to reduce produc-
tion costs and gain access to technologies and know-
how of foreign countries, with positive feedback to 
the growth and the international competitiveness of 
home-based  parent  companies.  Moreover,  as  re-Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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viewed in section 4.2.2 multinational firms are found 
to be more productive, larger and more capital- and 
technology-intensive,  to  pay  higher  wages  and  to 
employ  a  more  highly  skilled  labour  force.  For  all 
these reasons, countries with an increasing share of 
multinational firms should experience an increase in 
aggregate  productivity  and  aggregate  competitive-
ness on international markets. 
The theoretical predictions on the home-market ef-
fects of outward FDI are far from clear-cut and de-
pend on the type of motive for outward foreign di-
rect investments and the very specific relationships 
between the parent company and its foreign affili-
ates. The main questions that are raised in terms of 
direct  effects  typically  treat  FDI  as  an  exogenous 
event and then seek to examine the impact on per-
formance or employment. This is highly dependent 
on the motivation of the firm, home country charac-
teristics and the industry in which FDI takes place.  
The  motivation of the firm to undertake FDI influ-
ences both the scale and scope and also  the level 
and destination of FDI. In turn, these factors will also 
lead to very different impacts at home (Buckley and 
Casson,  2009;  Driffield  et  al.,  2009;  Driffield  and 
Love, 2007). Table 4.7 provides a synopsis of the im-
pacts of the different types of FDI, based on the ex-
isting literature, in terms of the effects on employ-
ment, skill structures, technology transfer, productiv-
ity and profitability. 
Table 4.7 – Home-market effects of outward FDI depend on the motive for going abroad 
Typology  Motivation  Employment  Technology 
transfer 
Productivity  Skills  Profitability 
market seeking 
the desire to exploit 
existing firm-
specific assets in 
new markets 
little reallocation, 
some expansion at 
home, may also 
replace exports 
technology is 
exported 
neutral 
potential in-
crease for skilled 
labour at home 
to coordinate 
new activity 
positive 
resource seeking 
the desire to access 
(natural) resources 
abroad 
positive  neutral  neutral  neutral  positive 
efficiency seeking 
(re)location of 
activity to low-cost 
locations 
negative for low-
skilled workers and 
positive for high-
skilled workers 
neutral 
potentially 
positive on 
average as 
more produc-
tive activities 
are retained at 
home 
home- country 
activities be-
come more skill- 
intensive, as  
demand for low-
skilled workers is 
reduced at 
home 
positive 
technology sourcing 
the desire to access 
new technology 
abroad 
may be positive in 
the long run 
positive  positive 
increased de-
mand for skilled 
workers at home 
positive, but 
only in long 
run 
Source: WIFO illustration. 
 
The background study provides an overview of the 
empirical literature reviewed. While it is possible to 
draw feasible conclusions on the impact of FDI from 
this review with respect to productivity, profitability 
and technology transfers, there remain some areas 
where the home -country effects remain uncertain. 
These  mostly  relate  to  employment  effects,  where 
the literature presents a very heterogeneous picture. 
4.5.1. Employment effects 
The most pressing question in terms of the employ-
ment effects of outward FDI is the extent to which it 
leads  to  a  reduction  in  employment  at  home.  A 
glance  at  the  literature  on  home  country  employ-
ment  effects  in  the  background  study  (Falk  et  al. 
2012) shows that European firms that have engaged 
in  FDI  in  low-cost  locations  are  more  likely  to  de-
crease the demand for low skill worker and increase 
the  demand  for  high  skill  workers  with  an  overall 
ambiguous  effect.  However,  this  represents  only 
about a third of the total FDI by EU firms, with FDI in 
general  producing  more  positive  impacts  on  em-
ployment. Even where outward FDI does lead to a Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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reduction in employment, the ʻemployment substitu-
tionʼ is much less than 100%.  
When it is possible to differentiate between motiva-
tions and locations, it has been typically found that a 
doubling  of  FDI  to  low-cost  locations  reduces  the 
demand for unskilled workers by some 4%, while it 
leads to a similar increase in the demand for skilled 
workers, (Driffield et al., 2009). The findings of Co-
penhagen Economics (2010) suggest that EU outward 
FDI has had no measurable impact on employment 
at the aggregate level. However, bearing in mind the 
very  different  data  sets  and  estimation  techniques 
that  are  used,  and  the  different  measures  of  FDI 
(from employment abroad to capital flows, and even 
assets held abroad), it is impossible to draw strong 
conclusions  about  the  employment  effects  of  out-
ward FDI.  
4.5.2.  Skill structure 
In  recent  years  both  academics  and  policy  makers 
have expressed concern that increasing globalisation, 
in the form of both foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and international trade, is causing dramatic changes 
in labour demand in the developed world. Specifical-
ly, that demand for unskilled workers in the US and 
Western Europe has been declining and will continue 
to decline as unskilled workers face significant com-
petition from the newly industrialised countries and 
other parts of the developing world. 
One of the biggest problems when seeking to exam-
ine the impact of FDI on skill structures in Europe, 
and to arrive at any clear conclusions, is that labour 
market flexibility differs greatly even within the EU-
15 countries, and has changed over time. In general, 
labour market flexibility rewards more skilled work-
ers,  who  not  only  have  higher  earnings  but  more 
secure  employment.  Outward  FDI  enhances  this, 
rewarding more skilled workers while relocating low-
skill activities elsewhere.  
Empirical work on the impact of outward FDI on rela-
tive employment of different skill levels is limited in 
scope. A central aspect of the relevant literature is 
the difficulty of separating the effects of outward FDI 
from  that  of  skill-biased  technological  change.  The 
introduction of new technologies and the decision to 
offshore  production  activities  or  services  often  oc
curs simultaneously, making it difficult to isolate the 
effects. This literature can be summarised by two key 
points. The first is that where the home country has 
a  technological  advantage  and  where  this  is  rein-
forced by lower unit labour costs then outward FDI 
increases  the  demand  for  skilled  labour.  Secondly, 
the higher level of skills an individual has, the better 
placed they are to gain from FDI in either direction. 
4.5.3.  Technology transfer 
Benefits from knowledge flows between MNE parent 
companies and their affiliates abroad are most likely 
in cases where strategic knowledge and technology 
sourcing are the key motive for FDI, especially be-
tween  advanced  economies.  Recent  evidence  sug-
gests that corporations are increasingly moving their 
R&D facilities abroad. This is being done as part of a 
strategic  move  away  from  merely  adapting  ʻcoreʼ 
technology  to  a  foreign  market  towards  a  much 
more central role in product innovation and devel-
opment. Companies which previously exerted rather 
tight control over their R&D sites are now granting 
more autonomy and empowerment to R&D labora-
tories situated abroad. Since the 1990s organisations 
have begun to take a more decentralised approach 
to R&D (Pearce, 1999; Niosi, 1999). In addition, the 
literature suggests that there is a growing willingness 
to  locate  such  facilities  close  to  leading  centres  of 
research and innovation specifically with a view to 
absorbing learning spillovers from geographical prox-
imity to such sites (Serapio and Dalton, 1999; Ito and 
Wakasugi, 2007). 
The existing empirical studies also provide evidence 
on  extensive  ʻreverseʼ  knowledge  flows  from  affili-
ates  to  parents.  This  indicates  that  knowledge-
sourcing is indeed an important determinant of out-
ward  FDI.  However,  these  flows  might  not  always 
spill over to the home economy. On the other hand, 
outward  FDI,  without  any  intra-firm  knowledge 
transfers, creates spillovers of knowledge back to the 
home country. Thus, intra-firm knowledge transfers 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for subsequent 
spillovers to the home economy. However, the fact 
remains  that  spillovers  are  overwhelmingly  more 
likely  to  occur  where  there  exists  parent-affiliate 
knowledge transfer exists.  Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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4.5.4.  Productivity  
In line with the evidence reported on the characteris-
tics of EU-15 MNEs, the bulk of the empirical litera-
ture  on  FDI  and  productivity  finds  that  firms  self-
select into foreign markets, via either exports or FDI. 
This self-selection means that they are already per-
forming  better  than  the  rest  of  the  population  of 
firms.  These  companies  are  more  productive  than 
average, sometimes as much as 25% more produc-
tive than the rest of the firms. However, there is ad-
ditional evidence suggesting that there is a positive 
productivity gain associated with increased outward 
FDI, which in turn depends on the type of investment 
undertaken. 
Typically, the main theoretical rationale for the home 
country to expect benefits from outward FDI is based 
on the likely indirect effects (Driffield et al., 2009). As 
firms locate abroad, they may improve their overall 
performance  and  efficiency  by  relocating  only  low 
value-added  production  abroad  and  keeping  and 
even expanding high value-added activities at home. 
The standard analysis suggests that such FDI flows 
merely reflect the desire to locate in the lowest pos-
sible cost locations. FDI of this type may well gener-
ate  productivity  growth  at  home,  through  what 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) highlight as the ‘batting 
average’ effect of outward FDI that can occur as a 
result of the reallocation of resources that may ac-
company FDI, especially to low-cost locations. 
Positive feedbacks from FDI to productivity at home 
are also associated  with successful technology and 
knowledge  sourcing  and  benefits  from  agglomera-
tion effects in specific sectors (Barba Navaretti and 
Venables,  2004),  or  effects  related  to  the  general 
notion of ʻlearning by exportingʼ due to exposure to 
international  competition,  best  practice  and  the 
technology frontier as well as demonstration effects 
(Clerides et al., 1998). 
4.5.5.  Profitability 
Much  of  the  literature  concerning  the  relationship 
between  outward  FDI  and  profitability  centres  on 
what  has  become  known  as  the  multinationality-
performance  debate.  Overall,  the  literature  finds 
that multinationals are more profitable than others, 
but  with  some  evidence  that  this  is  because  the 
more  successful  firms  become  multinational.  How-
ever, overall multinationality is associated with long-
run  profitability.  One  weakness  in  this  literature  is 
that it typically fails to distinguish between either the 
location of the FDI or its type. For example, Driffield 
and Yong (2012) find that FDI from EU firms to de-
veloping  countries  is  more  profitable  (though  less 
productive) than FDI between EU countries. 
The  importance  of  mergers  and  acquisition  (M&A) 
activity also has to be considered in this regard. Gug-
ler et al. (2003) analyse the effects of M&A activity 
around the world for a 15- year period. They sepa-
rate the effects of domestic and cross-border M&A 
on firms’ profits and market shares and show that 
mergers on average do result in significant increases 
in profits, but reduce the sales of the merging firms. 
Differences between mergers in the manufacturing 
and the service sectors, and between domestic and 
cross-border mergers are also found to be minimal. 
4.6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Impacts and motivation for FDI policies. Investment 
in its various forms is generally acknowledged to be 
the main driver of economic growth,  without ever 
giving rise to much controversy about its desirability. 
In  contrast,  due  to  its  transnational  character,  FDI 
conducted  by  multinational  enterprises  demands 
additional attention. It is important to continue de-
signing  smart  policies  to  encourage  more  and  re-
sponsive FDI, while applying the principle of Policy 
Coherence  for  Development.  On  the  one  hand, 
economies aim to attract inward FDI, counting on its 
direct contribution to the job creation and productiv-
ity  growth  and  anticipating  of  positive  indirect  ef-
fects through knowledge spillovers and user-supplier 
linkages.  This applies in particular to greenfield in-
vestments,  whereas  M&As  are  sometimes  viewed 
with reservations in the host country. On the other 
hand, outward FDI is often considered a sign of eco-
nomic strength, e.g. by securing competitive assets 
or opening markets abroad. Again, the positive atti-
tude  towards  internationalisation  does  not  always 
predominate, for example when there is a fear that 
domestic jobs will be offshored to lower- cost loca-
tions. 
This chapter has reviewed the literature and provid-
ed new empirical evidence on the trends, determi-
nants and impacts of FDI. Overall, the evidence con-Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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firms the general view that FDI inflows into the EU 
have  a  direct  and  significant  effect  on  economic 
growth and productivity growth in the host country. 
And the marginal contribution of foreign investment 
appears to be greater than the growth stimulus of an 
equivalent amount of domestic investment. Green-
field investment especially not only brings new capi-
tal, but often creates  employment both directly in 
the affiliate and indirectly through supplier linkages 
to local firms. 
The review of the home country effects of outward 
FDI  also  shows  the  effects  on    productivity  in  the 
home economy are predominantly positive. The evi-
dence in the literature on the impact on employment 
is  less  clear.  When  employment  substitution  takes 
place,  it  is  mostly  to  the  detriment  of  low-skilled 
workers, but it is difficult to disentagle the impact of 
skill-biased  technical  change  from  that  of  interna-
tionalisation. Researchers therefore agree that there 
is a substantial need for labour market policies which 
facilitate the process of adjustment towards a higher 
proportion of high-skilled employees. 
In short, from a policy perspective the internationali-
sation of firms is a major driver of competitiveness, 
exerting  positive  impacts  on  growth,  technological 
capabilities, labour productivity and wages and also 
the aggregate international performance of an econ-
omy. 
The firmʼs decision to invest abroad. Two findings of 
the  firm-level  analysis  of  internationalisation  are 
especially relevant. First, self-selection of firms into 
FDI seems to prevail over learning effects from inter-
nationalisation. Thus, the causality runs from superi-
or performance to the FDI decision and then (possi-
bly) to some growth effects from learning, while the 
observed performance premia are not the result of 
internationalisation.  Consequently,  inducing  low-
performing to engage in foreign activities does not 
turn  them  into  high-performing  firms.  Second,  ag-
gregate performance (growth, competitiveness) is to 
a large extent driven by reallocation effects between 
well-performing and poorly performing firms. That is, 
aggregate  competitiveness  (productivity)  increases 
because  of  an  increase  in  the  number  of  high-
performing  firms  and  not  so  much  because  of  an 
increase in the productivity growth of these firms. 
Both  the  evidence  of  self-selection  of  high-
performing firms into FDI and the importance of real-
location  effects  for  aggregate  performance  lead  to 
the conclusion that the best policy measures to pro-
mote  outward  FDI  are  not  subsidies  and  targeted 
support,  but  the  promotion  of  a  competitive  busi-
ness environment in general (Greenaway, 2004). This 
would  ensure  an  intra-industry  reallocation  of  re-
sources  from  the  worst-performing  to  the  best-
performing  firms  with  the  effect  of  increasing  the 
MNE  base  of  countries  and  increasing  aggregate 
productivity, growth and wages. The policy question, 
thus, is not so much which firms to support, but what 
policy environment ensures reallocations and leads 
more firms to reach the threshold levels of perfor-
mance indicators to self-select into internationaliza-
tion. 
It  is  also  crucial  to  provide  conditions  which  allow 
small firms and small MNEs to grow. The analysis has 
shown a strong relationship between firm size and 
multinational activity, both in terms of starting for-
eign operations and in terms of the number of affili-
ates. While the findings do not imply that firms need 
to be very large - and a lot of medium-sized firms 
actually undertake both intra-EU and extra-EU FDI - 
the firm size must reach critical levels to cover the 
fixed  and  variable  costs  of  global  operations.  The 
growth of SMEs seems to be especially important in 
efforts to promote multi-country strategies of MNEs 
and FDI into dynamic emerging economies. The firm 
growth literature finds that US firms enjoy more dy-
namic growth than European firms and suggests that 
there are still sizeable barriers to firm growth in Eu-
rope which need to be identified properly (Scarpetta 
et al., 2002; Bartelsman et al., 2004; Bartelsman et 
al., 2005; and Navaretti et al., 2011). 
From a policy perspective it will be important to as-
certain why firms with similar size and performance 
characteristics  to  MNEs  fail  to  self-select  into  FDI. 
Entry  costs  could  vary  across  firms  due  to  infor-
mation asymmetries and uncertainties (Eaton et al., 
2008; Todo, 2011). If the choice to not operate inter-
nationally via FDI is due to firmsʼs different abilities 
to gather information about foreign markets, there is 
room for policy to set up an infrastructure to allevi-
ate these factors of uncertainty. If the failure to em-
bark on FDI activities or to broaden the country base Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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of FDI activities is due to management failures within 
firms,  any  policy  action  in  terms  of  subsidies  ʻwill 
simply be a waste of resourcesʼ (Greenaway, 2004). 
Thus, policy should focus on curing market failures 
(information  and  knowledge  problems,  missing  in-
surance  markets,  etc.),  while  any  targeted  support 
and promotion of particular firms with high interna-
tionalisation potential will always run into problems 
of ex-ante selection. 
Determinants of FDI flows – how to attract FDI. The 
empirical  evidence  shows  that  factor  cost  ad-
vantages, the introduction of the euro and EU mem-
bership are driving forces behind FDI in the EU-27. 
Skills also play a positive role in attracting FDI in sup-
porting the importance of improving education and 
training systems to develop higher levels and better 
quality skills in the workforce. While the effects of 
unit labour costs are larger in the EU-15 than in the 
EU-12, tax effects are larger and only significant in 
the latter group of countries. Only for greenfield FDI 
do corporate taxes have a strong impact in both the 
EU-12 and EU-15 countries. 
Furthermore, changes in employment protection and 
the  cost  of  starting  a  business  cannot  explain  the 
change in FDI activity over time but are significant at 
the cross-sectional level. Moreover, some determi-
nants  (e.g.  ICT  infrastructure,  intellectual  property 
rights and labour market protection) fail to have a 
significant impact on FDI activity when other effects 
are controlled  for. All these determinants are only 
significant at the cross-sectional level. 
Although the empirical analysis in this study indicates 
that in the EU-15 countries, differences in the corpo-
rate tax rate have little impact in attracting FDI to a 
country,  these  differences  have  generated  much 
debate on corporate tax consolidation (see Betten-
dorf  et  al.  2010),  tax  competition  (Genschel  and 
Schwarz, 2011) and transfer pricing (Gresik, 2001). 
Differences in tax rates can have negative impacts on 
productivity growth and in other areas of the Euro-
pean  market.  Transfer  pricing  may  have  negative 
consequences  when  multinational  enterprises  re-
duce  their  overall  tax  burden  by  moving  earnings 
from  subsidiaries  in  high-tax  to  low-tax  countries 
through the prices they set on internal transactions 
(Gresik, 2001). Estimates of the mean semi-elasticity 
of FDI with respect to the tax rate provided in this 
chapter  are  higher  for  the  EU-12  than  the  EU-15, 
suggesting  that  some  profit  shifting  happens  be-
tween  Eastern  and  Western  Europe.  In  the  EU-12 
greenfield FDI accounts for the majority of FDI, which 
is more sensitive to taxes than M&As, which account 
for the bulk of FDI in the EU-15. As a solution all EU 
Member States have in place transfer pricing rules 
following OECD armʼs length principle. According to 
this principle transfer pricing for transactions within 
multinationals is considered armʼs length, if it is with-
in a range of market prices for comparable transac-
tions. However, it may not be easy to identify the 
correct armʼs length price for a transaction, as com-
parable  market  prices  are  not  available  for  some 
transactions and it is difficult to monitor all transac-
tions.
99 
A second solution would be to implement some kind 
of tax harmonisation, either partially through the tax 
base, or fully through both the tax rate and the tax 
base (Bettendorf et al., 2010). Harmonised tax sy s-
tems also provide an attractive solution to the tax 
competition problem. Tax competition encourages a 
steady decline in the corporate tax rate whe n coun-
tries maintain relatively lower tax rates or offer tax 
incentives on a unilateral basis. This trend has the 
potential  to  create  certain  perverse  incentives 
through greater differentials, especially if the corp o-
rate income tax rate is below the ind ividual income 
tax rate (European Commission, 2011). However, the 
idea of tax harmonisation remains very controversial, 
mainly because Me mber States generally want to 
retain sovereignty over their tax systems. 
Furthermore, greenfield FDI is much more sensitiv e 
to changes in host- and home country GDP than total 
FDI. Since distance may be related to transport costs, 
improving transportation infrastructure can help to 
increase greenfield FDI. 
Finally, a sizable share of the slow growth of FDI 
stocks in some EU-15 countries can be attributed to 
rising  unit  labour  costs.  Hence,  Member  States 
should attempt to improve their cost competitiv e-
ness by ensuring that rates of real wage growth do 
not exceed the rate of labour productivity growth. 
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Policies  to  maximise  the  benefits  of  inward  FDI. 
Multinational enterprises can be an important con-
duit of international technology transfer and spillo-
vers. Linkages are relevant and the effects are siza-
ble. Hence, fears that FDI may create an ʻeconomic 
enclaveʼ or ʻcathedrals in the desertʼ are not justi-
fied. The size of spillovers and technology transfers is 
clearly shown to depend on firm-specific characteris-
tics  of  local  enterprises,  especially  their  absorptive 
capacity. 
Both  technology  transfer  and  knowledge  spillovers 
are strongly dependent on how much multinationals 
are embedded in the host country, or the extent to 
which  multinationals  include  local  enterprises  in 
their  global  production  and  innovation  networks. 
Estimates based on CIS data suggest that local sup-
pliers  to  multinational  enterprises  introduce  new 
products  more  often  than  non-collaborators.  This 
indicates that technology transferred to local firms 
may  also  lead  to  spillovers  often  associated  with 
competitive behaviour. An implication of these find-
ings is that neither inward FDI nor spillovers should 
be targeted as policy variables, but instead industrial 
policy should focus on encouraging the formation of 
networks  between  local  enterprises  and  multina-
tional enterprises (see more about this in Chapter 5). 
Targeted incentives to promote the strengthening of 
linkages can be important but the use of such incen-
tives should be compatible with the EU regulations 
on subsidies and countervailing measures. 
Estimates  based  on  firm-level  data  for  the  EU-12 
suggest that labour productivity growth in local firms 
is significantly positively correlated with the extent 
of backward linkages from foreign-owned industries 
to local firms, but not with the presence of foreign-
owned firms in the same industry. Estimates based 
on CIS data for the EU-12 also show that local firms 
with  backward  linkages  from  multinational  enter-
prises  have  a  significantly  higher  average  employ-
ment growth rate (except for small firms). Further-
more,  the  magnitude  of  the  employment  effect 
through  backward  linkages  increases  with  the  ab-
sorptive capacity of local firms. These estimates con-
firm the need to introduce policies that facilitate the 
transfer of technology between local firms and mul-
tinationals and assist firms in building capabilities. 
Investment promotion in practice. There is consider-
able controversy over what kind of investment pro-
motion measures the EU and/or individual Member 
States  should  adopt.  Many  national  and  regional 
investment promotion agencies offer services to re-
duce transaction cost and information asymmetries 
for foreign firms. These can ease the burden of bu-
reaucratic procedures and help to better assess the 
costs and opportunities in a particular business envi-
ronment. Harding and  Javorcik (2011) suggest that 
investment  promotion  does  not  work  in  countries 
where  information  asymmetries  are  relatively  low 
and bureaucratic procedures less complex, but that it 
could work in less developed countries, including the 
EU-12  countries.  The  above  statistical  analysis  re-
veals,  however,  that  information  asymmetries  and 
other regulations did not discourage investors in the 
EU-12. Furthermore, the trend toward consistency of 
external relations and the internal market will likely 
further  reduce  these  barriers  over  the  next  few 
years. In any case, policy can benefit from the mutual 
learning about good practices among the variety of 
approaches and agencies currently operating in the 
different Member States. 
Free  movement  of  capital  is  one  of  the  four  free-
doms of the internal market which means that there 
should not be any barriers to or restrictions on capi-
tal  movements  within  the  European  Union.  While 
this policy is resolutely part of EU law, harmonisation 
of corporate taxation remains highly controversial.  
Expanding  the  common  commercial  policy.  The 
common commercial policy, enshrined in the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957, is central to the European Unionʼs  
external relations. Article 206 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty), 
which entered into force in 2009, requires external 
relations to be harmonised by progressive abolishing 
of  restrictions  on  international  trade  and  FDI,  and 
the lowering customs and other barriers. The Lisbon 
Treaty expands the scope of the common commer-
cial policy by providing the EU with exclusive compe-
tence  to  negotiate  international  agreements  con-
cerning FDI. 
The EU pays particular attention to develop a com-
mon international investment policy: the Communi-
cation ʻTowards a comprehensive European interna-
tional  investment  policyʼ  COM(2010)  343  explores Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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how the EU may develop an international investment 
policy  that  increases  the  EUʼs  competitiveness  and 
thus  contribute  to  smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive 
growth, as set out in the Europe 2020 Strategy.
100 In 
July 2010, the European Commission released a n-
other  communication  on  establishing  transitional 
arrangements for bila teral investment agreements 
between  Member  States  and  third  countries 
(COM(2010)344).  By improving i nvestment protec-
tion and reducing the investor ʼs  risk  of  entering  a 
foreign market these agreements reduce the costs of 
investments.  Furthermore,  from  the  host  country 
perspective clear and enforceable rules add to their 
attractiveness as a destination for FDI. 
On the one hand, the EU should ensure ʻan open, 
properly and fairly regulated business environmentʼ 
for investors throughout Europe. Article 173 of the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union 
specifies a number of objectives to ensure all neces-
sary  conditions  for  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU 
industry. As such FDI can play an important role in 
delivering these objectives, such as ʻspeeding up the 
adjustment  of  industry  to  structural  changes  and 
better exploitation of industrial potential of policies 
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of  innovation,  research  and  technological  develop-
mentʼ. At the same time  Article 173 highlights the 
importance of a favourable business environment, a 
crucial factor for attracting foreign investors. More 
recently,  on  3  July  2012,  the  European  Parliament 
adopted  a  non-legislative  resolution  on  Attractive-
ness  of  investing  in  Europe  (2011/2288(INI).  The 
basic approach of the resolution is that Europe needs 
more  investment  from  both  EU  and  non-EU  inves-
tors. It covers a range of recommendations, such as 
exploiting  the  EUʼs  position,  maximising  cohesion 
policy,  improving  access  to  finance  and  education, 
combating  tax  evasion  in  order  to  provide  better 
framework conditions for attracting FDI.  
On the other hand the Communication COM(2010) 
343  points out that ʻthe EU should ensure that EU 
investors  abroad  enjoy  a  level  playing  fieldʼ.  The 
Communication  on  ʻAn  Integrated  Industrial  Policy 
for the Globalisation Eraʼ
101 among others highlights 
the role of internationalisation of enterprises (espe-
cially that of SMEs) both within and outside the EU 
and  the  enterprises  ability  to  ʻaccess  international 
markets and exploit global value chainsʼ. 
                                                           
101  COM(2010) 614. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Panel data estimates of the determinants of bilateral FDI stocks in the EU-27 countries 
   Fixed effects estimates  HT-estimates  HT-estimates  HT-estimates 
   coef     t 
t clust 
adj. a) 
coef     T  coef     t  coef      T 
 host ln GDP in EUR host country, t-1  0.83 
***  6.67  2.77  1 
***  15.1  1.01 
***  15.19  1.05 
***  13.69 
 parent ln GDP in EUR parent country, t-1  0.85 
***  11.03  5.35  0.81 
***  11.35  0.8 
***  11.08  0.8 
***  11.23 
 host effective average corporate tax rate t-1  -1.8 
***  -4.42  -1.61  -1.56 
***  -4.03    
      -1.52 
***  -3.96 
 host statutory corporate tax rate, t-1    
           
      -0.64 
*  -1.85    
     
 parent statutory corporate tax rate, t-1    
           
      -0.41 
**  -0.94    
     
 host unit labour costs, t-1  -0.83 
***  -2.74  -1.55  -1.02 
***  -3.73  -1.05 
***  -3.8  -0.91 
***  -3.3 
 parent ln tertiary graduates share, t-1  0.56 
***  3.81  2.49  0.59 
***  4.12  0.55 
***  3.79  0.65 
***  4.56 
 parent ln R&D/GDP ratio, t-1  0.5 
***  4.22  1.93  0.49 
***  4.26  0.5 
***  4.31  0.45 
***  3.91 
 ln distance    
         -1.64 
***  -18.93  -1.63 
***  -19  -1.65 
***  -19.4 
 common language    
         0.85 
**  2.51  0.83 
**  2.49  0.78 
**  2.31 
 former colony    
         1.25 
***  3.27  1.27 
***  3.34  1.28 
***  3.39 
 contiguity    
         -0.88 
***  -2.68  -0.9 
***  -2.77  -0.93 
***  -2.88 
 year 2001 (base year 2000)  -0.17 
***  -3.07  -2.96  -0.17 
***  -3.22  -0.15 
***  -2.81  -0.17 
***  -3.19 
 year 2002  -0.11 
**  -2.01  -1.45  -0.13 
**  -2.38  -0.11 
**  -2.08  -0.13 
**  -2.47 
 year 2003  -0.06 
   -0.97  -0.68  -0.07 
   -1.37  -0.06 
   -1.1  -0.08 
   -1.58 
year 2004  0.07 
   1.08  0.75  0.05 
   0.91  0.06 
   1.03  0.05 
   0.97 
year 2005  0.06 
   0.93  0.65  0.04 
   0.69  0.06 
   0.92  0.06 
   1.08 
year 2006  0.08 
   1.15  0.78  0.06 
   0.93  0.09 
   1.31  0.07 
   1.08 
year 2007  0.1 
   1.26  0.67  0.07 
   0.96  0.1 
   1.33  0.07 
   1.08 
year 2008  0 
   0.03  0.02  -0.03 
   -0.41  0 
   0.06  -0.01 
   -0.18 
year 2009  0 
   0.04  0.02  -0.03 
   -0.33  0.01 
   0.16  -0.04 
   -0.43 
year 2010  0.12 
   1.33  0.69  0.1 
   1.21  0.13 
   1.43  0.11 
   1.25 
year 2004*EU-12  0.08 
   0.95  1.14  0.07 
   0.87  0.1 
   1.23    
     
year 2005*EU-12  0.17 
**  2.09  1.97  0.16 
**  2  0.19 
**  2.47    
     
year 2006*EU-12  0.14 
*  1.79  1.69  0.12 
   1.58  0.15 
*  1.94    
     
year 2007*EU-12  0.27 
***  3.5  2.51  0.24 
***  3.35  0.27 
***  3.75    
     
year 2008*EU-12  0.32 
***  4.11  2.68  0.29 
***  3.91  0.31 
***  4.23    
     
year 2009*EU-12  0.25 
***  2.93  1.79  0.2 
***  2.58  0.22 
***  2.77    
     
year 2010*EU-12  0.39 
***  3.96  2.23  0.35 
***  3.77  0.38 
***  4.06    
     
year 2007*(dBG | dRO)    
           
        
      0.65 
***  4.59 
year 2008*(dBG | dRO)    
           
        
      0.63 
***  4.43 
year 2009*(dBG | dRO)    
           
        
      0.47 
**  2.35 
year 2010*(dBG | dRO)    
           
        
      0.75 
***  3.72 
year 2007*newEURO    
           
        
      0.19 
   0.83 
year 2008*newEURO    
           
        
      -0.04 
   -0.23 
year 2009*newEURO    
           
        
      0.19 
   1.38 
year 2010*newEURO    
           
        
      0.31 
*  1.93 
constant  -34.5 
***  -9.26  -3.91  -25.3 
***  -11.2  -25.5 
***  -11.2  -26.1 
***  -10.9 
host country effects (p-value)  0           0        0 
      0       
home country effects (p-value)  0           0        0        0       
R
2 within  0.34           0.68        0.67        0.67       
number of observations  5116           5116        5116        5116       
number of country-pairs  626           626        626        626       
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of bilateral inward FDI stock held by EU country i from country j; a)t-values are based on cluster-
adjusted standard errors accounting for common host country effects. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The within transformation is used to wipe out country-pair fixed effects. In the HT-estimator all time varying 
variables except time dummies and their interaction terms are assumed to be endogenous. The sample includes 26 home countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The host 
countries are the EU-27 countries. 
Source: European Commission, World Bank, OECD, Eurostat Eurobase. 
The empirical specification is based on a standard gravity equation augmented by several host and home coun-
try factors:  
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where i is the home country and j is the host country and Ln is the natural logarithm. The variables are defined 
as follows: 
ijt FDI  is the inward FDI stock (book value of foreign assets) in current million EURO held by a EU country j 
from parent country i in a given year (or alternatively  ijt FDI  plus EUR 1); in addition Greenfield FDI flows from 
country i to country j is used; 
1  it GDPHOME ,  1  ij GDPHOME  are home and host country GDP in current EUR; 
ij DIST  is the distance between capital cities of the investing and host country; 
1  it E CORPTAXHOM ,  1  jt T CORPTAXHOS  are the effective average tax rate for the nonfinancial sector of the 
home and host country respectively; 
1  jt ULCHOME ,  1  jt ULCHOST  are unit labour costs of the home and host country respectively; 
1  it ME TERTIARYHO ,  1  jt ST TERTIARYHO , are the share of labour force aged 15 to 74 with tertiary education 
(levels 5 and 6) of the home and host country respectively;  
jt
it
jt
jt
ijt POP
GDPHOMEpp
POP
GDPHOSTpp
RELGDPCAP    is the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita 
in purchasing power parities between the source and the host country respectively;  
ijt ijt NEWEURO EURO  is a time-varying dummy variable which takes the value of one if the parent country 
belongs to the Euro area,  ijt EURO , and the host country introduced the EURO,  ijt NEWEURO   (Slovenia in 
2007, Cyprus and Malta 2008 and Slovakia starting from 2009) and zero otherwise respectively; 
ijt ijt EUNEW EU   takes the value one if the parent country is a EU member state,  ijt EU  and the host coun-
try is joining the EU,  ijt EUNEW  (2004 for EU-10 countries and 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania) respectively;  
1  ijt X  
 
represents a set of time varying host and parent country factor variables (i.e.,  R&D/GDP  ratio,  FDI 
regulatory restrictiveness index, strength of legal rights index for getting credits, strength of investor protection 
index, cost of starting a business as a percentage of income per capita, employment protection legislation; top 
marginal tax rate, protection of intellectual property, hiring and firing practices, labor force share with wages 
set by centralized collective bargaining, fixed broadband internet subscribers, internet users per 100 people, 
total tax rate of businesses in percent of commercial profits);  
ij Z  represents time invariant control variables (i.e. contiguity, sharing the same language and when they share 
a (former) colonial link); 
t are time dummies (TD);  t   are time effects;  ij   are country-pair specific effects and  ijt   is the error term.  
The gravity equation contains bilateral country-pair fixed effects,  ij   to control for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity includes common time effects,  t  . In addition, a large number of policy factors of the home and 
host country are included. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table A.2.: Means and correlations coefficients between the ratio of the FDI stock to (home and host country) 
GDP and the explanatory variables 
   means  means  correlation with the ratio of inward FDI stock to host country 
GDP     unweighted 
host country factors:  2000  2010  coef.  p-value  # of observations 
 adjusted top statutory tax rate on corporate income  in %  31.9  23.3  -0.01  0.46  6228 
 effective average corporate tax rate in %  27.5  21.8  -0.02  0.12  6228 
 bilateral effective average corporate tax rate (host) in %  31.3  25.2  -0.13  0  3238 
 total tax rate (% of commercial profits)   50.3  45.4  -0.1  0  2909 
 top marginal tax rate in %  55.4  50.3  -0.04  0  5648 
 unit labour costs (ratio)  0.54  0.72  -0.01  0.33  5845 
 hourly wage compensation in EUR  13.8  18.8  0.08  0  6204 
 tertiary graduates share in %  16.5  22  0.08  0  6228 
 R&D/GDP ratio in %  1.2  1.6  0.02  0.07  6083 
 fixed broadband internet subscribers (per 100 people)   0.8  24.2  0.1  0  5947 
 internet users per 100 people  19.6  69.7  0.1  0  6228 
 strength  of  investor  protection  index  (0-10)  (10=highest  investor 
protection) 
5.5  5.6  0.04  0.03  2909 
 protection of intellectual property (0-10) (10=highest protection)  6.6  6.9  0.09  0  5624 
 getting credit - strength of legal rights index (0-10) (10=best)  6.7  7  0.05  0  4032 
 FDI regulatory restrictiveness index (0-1) (0=open; 1=closed)  0.07  0.05  -0.09  0  5516 
 cost of starting a Business (% of income per capita)  11.4  5.6  -0.06  0  4564 
 hiring and firing practices (1-10) (1=least regulated, 10=most regulat-
ed) 
3.6  4.1  0.04  0.01  5604 
 employment protection legislation, (0-6) (0= least and 6 most restric-
tive  
2.13  2.09  -0.07  0  3477 
 labour force share with wages set by centralized collective bargaining 
(1-10) (=1 highly centralized, 10=least centralized, i.e. best) 
5.7  5.7  0  0.79  5604 
 GDP per capita in int. $ US ppp  23025  26711  0.2  0  6228 
 distance in kilometres  3969.3     -0.23  0  0 
 former colony  7     0.2  0  0 
 common language  7.1     0.26  0  0.04 
 contiguity  3.6     0.27  0  0 
        
correlation with the ratio of outward FDI stock to home coun-
try GDP 
home country factors:  2000  2010  correlation  p-value  # of observations 
 adjusted top statutory tax rate on corporate income  in %  34.3  28.2  -0.01  0.28  6237 
 effective average corporate tax rate in %  n.a.  n.a.          
 bilateral effective average corporate tax rate (host) in %  31.3  25.2  -0.01  0.48  3238 
 total tax rate (% of commercial profits)   51.1  46.5  -0.19  0  3081 
 top marginal tax rate in %  52.5  49.1  -0.03  0.02  5511 
 unit labour costs (ratio)  0.59  0.72  -0.11  0  4864 
 hourly wage compensation in EUR  19.2  24.4  0.09  0  6206 
 tertiary graduates share in %  20.6  26.6  -0.01  0.35  6237 
 R&D/GDP ratio in %  1.8  2.4  -0.03  0.01  5974 
 fixed broadband internet subscribers (per 100 people)   1.7  26.2  0.05  0  6137 
 internet users per 100 people  27.6  71.3  0.08  0  6172 
 strength  of  investor  protection  index  (0-10)  (10=highest  investor 
protection) 
5.9  6  0.04  0.05  2907 
 protection of intellectual property (0-10) (10=highest protection)  7.2  7.5  0.06  0  5676 
 getting credit - strength of legal rights index (0-10) (10=best)  6.6  6.9  0  0.79  4268 
 FDI regulatory restrictiveness index (0-1) (0=open; 1=closed)  0.15  0.1  -0.12  0  6237 
 cost of starting a Business (% of income per capita)  9.9  6.5  -0.03  0.07  4809 
 hiring and firing practices (1-10) (1=least regulated, 10=most regulat-
ed) 
3.8  4.5  -0.04  0  5676 
 employment protection legislation, (0-6) (0= least and 6 most restric-
tive  
1.88  1.96  0.07  0  4068 
 labour force share with wages set by centralized collective bargaining 
(1-10) (=1 highly centralized, 10=least centralized, i.e. best) 
5.4  5.7  -0.04  0  5676 
 GDP per capita in int. $ US ppp  27638  31103  0.29  0  6237 
 distance in kilometres                
 former colony                
 common language                
 contiguity                
Note: Data refer to unweighted means for the year 2000 and 2010 or the latest available year. In some cases data refer to 2003 and 2004. 
Source: European Commission, World Bank, OECD, Eurostat Eurobase. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table A.3: Pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) estimates of the determinants of bilateral greenfield 
FDI flows in the EU-27 countries (marginal effects) 
   Host countries: EU-27, home countries: 26 OECD   and BRICs 
   (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
   marg eff     t  marg eff     t  marg eff     t 
host ln GDP in EUR host country, t-1  5.53 
***  3.21  3.36     1.25  5.11 
**  2.03 
parent ln GDP in EUR parent country, t-1  2.96 
***  3.06  3.17 
***  3.17  3.13 
***  3.14 
host effective average corporate tax rate, t-1  -11.98 
***  -2.93  -10.9 
***  -2.58  -12.7 
***  -3.16 
host ln hourly wages costs, t-1  -6.05 
***  -2.76  -6.17 
***  -2.58  -7.18 
***  -2.99 
host ln share of tertiary education, t-1  2.32     1.53                   
parent ln share of tertiary education, t-1  2.68 
*  1.87                   
parent ln R&D/GDP ratio, t-1  3.98 
***  3.44                   
GDP per capita dissimilarity, t-1  3.9 
***  4.66                   
new EMU members 2007, 2008, 2009                    1.76 
**  2.31 
new EU members 2007           2.07 
***  3.92          
ln distance  -2.07 
***  -3.84  -1.84 
***  -3.14  -1.79 
***  -3.01 
Contiguity  -0.66     -0.93  -0.6     -0.79  -0.6     -0.79 
common language  1.23     1.77  1.01     1.44  1.05     1.5 
former colony  1.19     1.26  1.22     1.26  1.22     1.27 
time dummy variables  yes        yes        yes       
host country effects  yes        yes        yes       
home country effects  yes        yes        yes       
R
2   0.44        0.426        0.42       
number of observations  5348        5348        5348       
number of country-pairs  688        688        688       
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of bilateral greenfield FDI flows from country i to country j in current euros. t-values are based on 
cluster-adjusted standard errors accounting for common  host country  effects. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 
5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. The marginal effects can be interpreted as elasticities and semi-elasticities. 
Source: European Commission, World Bank, OECD, Eurostat Eurobase, fDi Intelligence database. 
Table A. 4: ZINB estimates of the number of subsidiaries and market coverage of EU-15 multinational firms 
   Manufacturing  Non-Manufacturing 
  Number of subsidiaries  Market coverage  Number of subsidiaries  Market coverage 
 
Coef. 
  z- 
Coef. 
  z- 
Coef. 
  z- 
Coef. 
  z- 
value  value  value  value 
 
-1  -2  -3  -4 
 
Logit model component explaining zero subsidiaries 
log age in years  -0.39  ***  -5.6  -0.39  ***  -5.2  -0.04 
 
-0.8  0 
 
-0.1 
log number of shareholders  0.31  ***  6.4  0.34  ***  6.5  0.19  ***  5.8  0.21  ***  5.6 
log employment  -1.33  ***  -28.8  -1.37  ***  -28.1  -0.97  ***  -27.7  -1.05  ***  -25.6 
log turnover per employee  -0.28  ***  -4.3  -0.3  ***  -4.2  -0.09  ***  -2.7  -0.09  **  -2.4 
log total fixed assets per employee  -0.8  ***  -12.8  -0.86  ***  -12.9  -0.74  ***  -25  -0.8  ***  -24.1 
log intangible assets 
-0.07  ***  -3.1  -0.07  ***  -2.8  -0.06  ***  -4  -0.03  **  -2 
to fixed assets 
Industry dummy  yes 
   
yes 
   
yes 
   
yes 
    Constant  12.4  ***  27.5  12.86  ***  26.8  9.26  ***  34.8  9.49  ***  31.6 
lnalpha  1.08  ***  32.8  0.88  ***  26.2  1.63  ***  46  1.42  ***  36.5 
alpha  2.93 
   
2.42 
   
5.08 
   
4.15 
   
 
Marginal effects of the count data component of the model 
log age in years  0.022  ***  13.2  0.02  ***  12.1  0.004  ***  7  0.003  ***  5.3 
log number of shareholders  -0.005  ***  -3.6  -0.006  ***  -4.3  0.002  ***  2.9  0 
 
0.1 
log employment  0.071  ***  37.1  0.066  ***  36.7  0.03  ***  43.1  0.027  ***  39.5 
log turnover per employee  -0.003 
 
-1.8  -0.001 
 
-0.5  0.0002 
 
0.4  0.001 
 
1.3 
log total fixed assets per employee  0.062  ***  30.6  0.056  ***  29.3  0.028  ***  43.4  0.024  ***  43.6 
log intangible assets 
0.003  ***  5.8  0.003  ***  5.5  0  ***  3.3  0.001  ***  3.4 
to fixed assets 
Industry dummy  yes 
   
yes 
   
yes 
   
yes 
    number of observations  88,690 
   
88,690 
   
248,783 
   
248,783 
    number of nonzero observations  7,321        7,321        10,481        10,481       
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent-level, respectively. Model specification is not shown. 
Source: AMADEUS database (2011 release), WIFO calculations. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table A.5 - Estimates of the Barro-type growth model (pooled OLS) 
   Total sample  EU-15+NO and CH  EU-12 + TR 
   Impact of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
   coef     t  coef     t  coef     t 
log  GDP  per  capita,  PPP  (const.  2005 
intern. $) lagged one period 
-0.004 
  
-0.77  -0.021 
***  -2.73  -0.01 
  
-0.87 
Investment % GDP   0.203 
***  2.57  0.08 
*  1.93  0.333 
**  2.36 
Average years of schooling   0.001     1.05  0.002 
*  1.77  0     0.04 
Foreign direct investment inflows % GDP   0.104 
***  2.69  0.106 
**  2.34  0.203 
*  1.9 
Constant  0.001     0.02  0.194 
***  2.81  0.035     0.33 
R
2  0.166        0.232        0.227       
number of observations  128        82        46       
number of countries  29        17        12       
   Impact of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP adjusted for double counting 
   coef     t  coef     t  coef     t 
log  GDP  per  capita,  PPP  (const.  2005 
intern. $) lagged one period 
-0.004 
  
-0.77  0.008 
  
0.01  -0.01 
  
-0.87 
investment % GDP adjusted by FDI inflows  0.203 
**  2.57  0.08 
*  1.93  0.333 
**  2.36 
average years of schooling   0.001     1.05  0.002 
*  1.77  0     0.04 
foreign direct investment inflows % GDP   0.307 
***  3.68  0.186 
***  2.65  0.536 
***  3.75 
Constant  0.001     0.02  0.194 
***  2.81  0.035     0.33 
R
2  0.166        0.232        0.226       
number of observations  128        82        46       
number of countries  29        17        12       
   Impact of FDI inward stock GDP ratio 
   coef     t  coef     t  coef     t 
log  GDP  per  capita,  PPP  (const.  2005 
intern. $) lagged one period 
-0.006 
*  -1.47  -0.018 
***  -2.37  -0.026 
*  -1.95 
Investment % GDP   0.215 
**  2.92  0.076     1.82  0.336 
***  3.11 
Average years of schooling   0     0.05  0.001     1.16  -0.002     -1.06 
Foreign direct investment stock % GDP   0.024 
**  3.91  0.013 
***  2.21  0.08 
**  3.43 
Constant  0.031     0.62  0.171 
**  2.44  0.191     1.57 
R
2  0.227        0.225        0.421       
number of observations  129        82        47       
number of countries  29        17        12       
 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. 
***, 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level. t-
values are based on robust standard errors. The sample for EU-12 + Turkey includes the following countries and years: MT and TR all for the 
five year periods 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010; , BG, EE, HU. LV, RO and SK all for the five year periods 
1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010; CZ, PL, LT and SI all for the five-year periods 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010. The 
sample for EU-15 + NO and CH includes following countries and years: AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, EL, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, SE and UK all for 
the five year periods 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010; and LU for the five-year periods 2000-2005 and 2005-
2010. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, Barro-Lee database, UNCTAD. Chapter 4 – FDI Flows and EU Industrial Competitiveness 
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Table A.6 - Productivity effects of foreign presence in the same industry and in customer industries (backward 
production linkages) 
(Manufacturing, EU-15 countries)  Robust regression method 
   (i)  (ii)  (iii)       
   coef     t  coef     t  coef     t 
Initial employment share of foreign affiliates  0.1 
***  4.01  0.11 
***  4.14  0.09 
***  3.56 
Initial employment share of foreign affiliates among customers (FORCUST)  0.11 
***  2.77  0.08 
*  1.77  -0.01     -0.25 
Relative labour productivity domestic/foreign sector   0.01     1.32  0.01     0.95  -0.02     -1.47 
Av. annual labour productivity growth foreign sector           0.28 
***  4.7  0.33 
***  5.8 
Interaction term rel. labour productivity X FORCUST                    0.2 
**  2.28 
Industry and country dummies  yes        yes        yes       
Constant  0  0.01  -0.09  -0.02     -2.08  0.02     1.07 
number of observations  94        94        94       
number of co  11        11        11       
number of industries  11        11        11       
Interaction term (p-valued                    0.025       
Impact of initial foreign employment share among customers with varying levels of the relative labour productivity              
Relative labour productivity domestic/foreign sector:                            
0.5                    0.09       
0.6                    0.11       
0.7                    0.13       
0.8                    0.15       
0.9                    0.17       
1                    0.19       
 
(Manufacturing EU-12 countries)  Robust regression method    
   (i)        (ii)       
   coef     t  coef     t 
Initial employment share of foreign affiliates  0.48 
***  2.85  0.57 
**  3.57 
Initial employment share of foreign affiliates among customers  0.88 
**  2.3  0.04     0.05 
Relative labour productivity domestic/foreign sector   -0.06     -1.18  -0.24     -1.3 
Av. annual labour productivity growth foreign sector                   
Interaction term           1.25     1.14 
Industry and country dummies  yes        yes       
Constant  -0.12     -1.11  -0.04     -0.31 
number of observations  45        45       
number of co  6        6       
number of industries  11        11       
Interaction term (p-value)           0.1       
Impact of initial employment share of foreign affiliates among customers with varying levels of the relative labour productivity level 
Relative labour productivity domestic/foreign sector:           coef.       
0.5           0.66       
0.6           0.79       
0.7           0.91       
0.8           1.04       
0.9           1.16       
1           1.29       
Note: 
***
,
 ** and 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level. Sector and country dummy variables are included but 
not reported. t-values of the OLS estimates are based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. FORCUST measures the backward 
linkage from foreign owned firms to domestically owned firms. This table is based on yet unpublished results from the EU funded project 
INNO Grips ENTR-09-11-LOT2. 
Source: Inward FATS and National Accounts, Eurostat. 
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Table A.7 - Productivity effects of foreign presence in the same and customer industries at the firm level (EU-
12 countries) 
 
  
Total sample  Firms with 25 and more employee 
Firms with 24 and 
less employees 
   coef     t  coef     t  coef     T 
foreign employment share in the same industry, '03  -0.76 
***  -2.82  -0.55 
**  -2.32  -1.01 
***  -3.68 
foreign employment share in the customer industries, '03  0.83 
***  2.85  0.62 
**  2.54  1.13 
***  3.49 
relative productivity level, 2003  -0.13 
***  -4.77  -0.11 
***  -5.37  -0.14 
***  -3.98 
growth rate of fixed assets in const. Prices  0.06 
***  9.81  0.1 
***  7.46  0.03 
***  3.39 
country and industry dummies  yes        yes        yes       
Constant  -0.02 
.  .  0.26 
***  2.5  0.66 
***  4.77 
R
2  0.31        0.25        0.33       
number of observations  32959        18035        14924       
   Newly founded firms (2001 & older)  Mature firms (2000 & younger)          
   coef     t  coef     t          
foreign employment share in the same industry, '03  -0.5 
**  -2.22  -0.88 
*  -1.8          
foreign employment share in the customer industries, '03  0.26     1.41  4.9 
***  4.29          
relative productivity level, 2003  -0.08 
***  -6.33  -0.16 
***  -3.84          
growth rate of fixed assets in const. Prices  0.06 
***  7.74  0.06 
***  6.25          
country and industry dummies  yes        yes                
Constant  0.07     1.29  0.59 
***  5.27          
R
2  0.17        0.38                
number of observations  12854        21303                
   low productivity growth (Q1)   low medium prod. Growth (Q2)          
   coef     t  coef     t          
foreign employment share in the same industry, '03  0.03     1.37  0 
   0.53          
foreign employment share in the customer industries, '03  0.02     0.93  0.01 
   1.59          
relative productivity level, 2003  -0.01 
***  -2.92  0 
   -0.86          
growth rate of fixed assets in const. Prices  -0.02 
***  -5.69  0 
***  4.07          
country and industry dummies  yes        yes                
Constant  -0.13 
***  -12.96  0.06 
***  14.66          
R
2  0.14        .0.03                
number of observations  8227        7963                
   med-high productivity growth (Q3)   very high productivity growth (Q4)          
   coef     t  coef     t          
foreign employment share in the same industry, 2003  -0.03     -1.6  -0.51 
***  -3.07          
foreign employment share in the customer industries,'03  0.06 
***  2.81  0.7 
***  2.76          
relative productivity level, 2003  0     -1.15  -0.22 
***  -2.92          
growth rate of fixed assets in const. Prices  0.01 
***  3.74  0.03 
**  2.15          
country and industry dummies  yes        yes                
Constant  0.17 
***  20.22  0.66 
***  4.63          
R
2  0.05        0.13                
number of observations  8474        8295                
Note: The dependent variable is average annual real labour productivity growth between 2004 and 2007. 
***
,
 ** and 
* denote significance at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level. t-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors with 219 clusters (by industry and coun-
try). Sector and country dummy variables are included but not reported. 
Source: AMADEUS firm-level database 
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Table A.8: OLS estimates of the impact of FDI on average employment growth 2004-2006, 8 EU-10 countries 
   Foreign presence based on inward FATS 
   Horizontal  Backward 
   coeff     t  coeff     t 
foreign presence in the same industry in 2003 (FOR03)  0.08 
***  2.68  0.04     1.62 
foreign presence in customer industries in 2003 (FORCUST03)  0.03     0.9  0.1 
**  2.41 
employment growth of foreign affiliates 2004-2006  0.1 
***  5.72  0.11 
***  5.69 
ln sales per employee of local firms to that of foreign firms, 2004   0.03 
***  7.02  0.03 
***  8.68 
ln sales per employee of local firms to that of foreign firms, 2004 X 
(FOR03) 
0.07 
***  3.62          
ln sales per employee of local firms to that of foreign firms, 2004 X 
(FORCUST03)           0.09 
**  2.4 
ln employment in 2004  -0.46 
***  -21.67  -0.46 
***  -21.71 
ln employment squared in 2004  0.04 
***  16.61  0.04 
***  16.58 
country and industry dummies  yes        yes       
Constant  0.94     7.83  0.95 
***  7.48 
R
2  0.447        0.45       
number of observations  37,893        37,893       
average effect of FOR2004  0.12 
***             
average effect of FORCUST2004           0.15 
***    
   Foreign presence based on CIS 2006    
   coeff     t  coeff     t 
   Horizontal  Backward 
foreign presence in the same industry in 2004 (FOR04)  0.08 
***  2.7  0.05 
**  2.09 
foreign presence in customer industries in 2004 (FORCUST04)  0.04     1.55  0.08 
***  2.7 
employment growth of foreign affiliates 2004-2006  0.11 
**  5.85  0.11 
***  6.02 
ln employment in 2004  -0.46 
**  -21.68  -0.46 
***  -21.71 
ln employment squared in 2004  0.04 
***  16.59  0.04 
***  16.59 
ln sales per employee of local firms to that of foreign firms, 2004   0.03 
***  8.38  0.03 
***  7 
ln sales per employee of local firms to that of foreign firms, 2004 X 
(FOR03) 
0.04 
**  2.37          
ln sales per employee of local firms to that of foreign firms, 2004 X 
(FORCUST03)           0.06 
**  2.4 
country and industry dummies  yes        yes       
Constant  0.93     8.27  0.94 
***  8.28 
R
2  0.446        0.45       
number of observations  378,966        378,966       
average effect of FOR2004  0.09 
***             
average effect of FORCUST2004           0.11 
***    
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level. Standard errors are computed using robust 
standard errors clustered on industry-country pairs. FORCUST03 and FORCUST04 measure the backward linkage from foreign-owned firms 
to domestically owned firms. 
Source: Inward FATS, CIS (2006). 
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Table A.9: Probit estimates of the impact of FDI on technological innovations of local firms 2004-2006, 8 EU-
10 countries (marginal effects) 
   (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
   marg eff     z  marg eff     z  marg eff     z 
   Dependent variable: probability of introduction of new market products of local firms 
introduction  of  new  market  products  of  foreign 
firms 
0.04 
**  3.13  0.04 
***  3.37  0.04 
***  3.11 
foreign  presence  in  the  same  industry  2004 
(FOR04) 
-0.01 
  
-0.8  -0.02 
  
-0.95  0 
  
-0.06 
foreign presence in customers industries in 2004 
(FORCUST04) 
0.04 
  
1.53  0.06 
***  2.56  0.04 
  
1.52 
ln RELPROD04  0.01 
***  4.99  0     0.47  0.01 
**  2.34 
ln RELPROD04 X (FOR04)                     0.02 
*  1.94 
ln RELPROD04 X (FORCUST04)            0.04 
**  2.34          
ln employment  0     -0.07  0     -0.07  0     -0.07 
ln employment squared  0 
**  4.92  0 
***  4.91  0 
***  4.93 
country and industry dummies  yes        yes        yes       
number of observations  37866        37866        37866       
Pseudo R
2  0.12        0.12        0.12       
   Dependent variable: probability of introduction of new product innovations of local firms 
   marg eff        marg eff     z  marg eff     Z 
introduction  of  product  innovations  of  foreign 
firms 
0.05 
*  1.75  0.05 
*  1.9  0.05 
*  1.74 
foreign  presence  in  the  same  industry  2004 
(FOR04) 
-0.03 
  
-1  -0.04 
  
-1.12  0 
  
0.04 
foreign presence in customers industries in 2004 
(FORCUST04) 
0.08 
*  1.73  0.13 
***  2.68  0.08 
*  1.71 
ln RELPROD04  0.02 
***  5.49  0     0.06  0.01 
*  1.83 
ln RELPROD04 X (FOR04)                     0.05 
***  3.47 
ln RELPROD04 X (FORCUST04)            0.08 
***  3.08          
ln employment  -0.01     -1.13  -0.01     -1.16  -0.01     -1.15 
ln employment squared  0.01 
**  7.7  0.01 
***  7.74  0.01 
***  7.75 
number of observations  37866        37866        37866       
Pseudo R
2  0.1        0.1        0.1       
   Dependent variable: probability of introduction of new production processes of local firms 
   marg eff     z  marg eff     z  marg eff     Z 
introduction of new production process of foreign 
firms 
0.05 
**  2.26  0.05 
**  2.37  0.05 
**  2.25 
foreign presence in the same industry 2004 
(FOR04) 
-0.02 
 
-0.91  -0.03 
 
-1.05  0.01 
 
0.24 
foreign presence in customers industries in 2004 
(FORCUST04) 
0.05 
 
1.26  0.11 
**  2.49  0.05 
 
1.24 
ln RELPROD04  0.02 
***  6.61  0 
 
0.23  0.01 
***  2.72 
ln RELPROD04 X (FOR04)  
           
0.05 
***  2.69 
ln RELPROD04 X (FORCUST04)  
     
0.1 
***  4.1 
      ln employment  -0.02 
**  -2.32  -0.02 
**  -2.33  -0.02 
**  -2.32 
ln employment squared  0.01 
***  9.13  0.01 
***  9.07  0.01 
***  9.11 
country and industry dummies  yes 
   
yes 
   
yes 
    number of observations  37866 
   
37866 
   
37866 
    Pseudo R
2  0.09 
   
0.1 
   
0.1 
    Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level. Standard errors are computed using robust 
standard errors clustered on industry country pairs. FORCUST04 measures the backward linkage from foreign owned firms to domestically 
owned firms. 
Source: Inward FATS, CIS (2006). 
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Figure A.1 -  Revealed comparative advantages in EU-27 FDI relations with the rest of the world 
 
 
EU stocks are stocks of the EU-27 Aggregate. Total inward stocks exclude the inward stocks of the finance industry (EU nomenclature: 6895, 
financial intermediation). RCAs in industry i is calculated as  
 
. OFDI are EU outward stocks and IFDI are EU inward stocks. 
Source: Eurostat, wiiw-calculations. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
CLUSTERS AND NETWORKS 
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Academics and policy makers have been interested 
for a long time in linkages between companies that 
go beyond market interactions, but that fall short of 
vertical. Thus, the issue of clusters and networks of 
firms is not recent. What has changed, however, is 
that globalisation and new types of innovation pro-
cesses have over the last few decades reshaped in 
new ways the organisation of value chains. Activities 
that  were  traditionally  provided  within  a  firm  are 
now provided in a different type of institutional set-
ting, somewhere between hierarchy and market. 
In the global economy, there is a growing interest in 
new  organisational  structures,  which  are  flexible 
enough  to  respond  to  market  changes  and  at  the 
same time solid enough to take on cooperative pro-
jects. In this sense, the increasing amount of statisti-
cal  evidence  indicating  a  positive  relationship  be-
tween the presence of clusters and the prosperity of 
regional  economies
102  has brought to the fore the 
positive role that clusters and ne tworks could play. 
Clusters and networks are increasingly seen as cata-
lysts for accelerating indu strial transformation and 
for developing new regional competitive advantages, 
speeding  up  the  creation  of  firms  and  j obs  and 
thereby contributing to growth and prosperity.  
Because of these characteristics, cluste rs and net-
works have been identified as crucial instruments for 
implementing the EU's Europe 2020 strategy. The EU 
2020 flagship initiatives ‘Innovation Union’ and ‘An 
integrated industrial policy for the globalisation era’ 
specifically refer to clusters and networks as critical 
tools. 
Over the last few years, the European Commission 
has supported a range of research and joint learning 
efforts. It has also set up specific advisory bodies that 
have  analysed  in  detail  the  presence  of  clusters 
across Europe and the potential for policy, especially 
policy at EU level, to leverage them and strengthen 
                                                           
102  See, for example, Delgado/Porter/Stern (2011), DG Enterprise 
and Industry (2007), and the overview in Ketels (forthcoming 
2012).  
their growth. Many of these activities, including the 
European Cluster Observatory, the European Cluster 
Alliance, the European Cluster Excellence initiative, 
the TACTICS group and the European Cluster Policy 
Group, have been organised under the Competitive-
ness and Innovation Programme (CIP). These activi-
ties  have  informed  a  number  of  Commission  com-
munications, policy documents, and action agendas 
on clusters. 
While it is relatively easy to detect and assess the 
presence  of  clusters  and  their  economic  impact, 
networks  are  more  elusive.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
theoretical literature on networks is less developed 
than in the case of clusters, leading to many concep-
tual misunderstandings. On the other hand, there is 
a  relative  scarcity  of  empirical  evidence,  since  a 
company  that  decides  to  participate  in  a  network 
may  be  extremely  reluctant  to  disclose  any  infor-
mation  for  fear  of  exposing  its  competitive  ad-
vantage to its rivals.   
This chapter is specifically focused on the presence 
and role of firm networks and their potential as a 
tool  or  platform  for  EU  programmes  to  enhance 
competitiveness. It aims to inform the debate as to 
whether network-oriented policies are a substitute, a 
complement or an instrument in relation to cluster-
based economic policies and to clarify the role of the 
European Commission in this this.  
To this end, the chapter is structured as follows. The 
first section contains operational definitions to dis-
tinguish  clusters  from  networks.  The  next  section 
discusses the presence of networks in the EU, as well 
as the public programmes and tools, which support 
networks. Then, the following section deals with the 
rationale, objectives and design of network-support 
programmes.  Finally,  the  last  section  sums  up  the 
policy implications.   
5.2.  CONCEPTS  OF  CLUSTERS,  CLUSTER  ORGANIZATIONS 
AND NETWORKS 
The term ‘cluster’ has a long tradition in economics. 
At the end of the nineteenth century Alfred Marshall 
had already observed the ‘concentration of special-Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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ised  industries  in  particular  localities’.  For  policy-
makers, too, the phenomenon of industries moving 
into the same geographical area has not gone unno-
ticed. In fact, a number of countries have viewed the 
investment of state aid into specific territories as a 
means of embedding an industry into a targeted re-
gion with a view to fostering growth and develop-
ment. 
Over  the  last  decades,  the  literature  on  firm  net-
works  has  grown  alongside  cluster  studies,  with  a 
similar  emphasis  on  linkages  among  companies. 
However,  the  networks  literature  is  not  so  much 
concerned with the concentration of firms in particu-
lar areas, but rather with the process that leads indi-
vidual firms to establish cooperative links with each 
other, even if they operate in different regions.
103 
Clusters and networks share some common features. 
Conceptually, both are located between the atomi s-
tic structure of an uncoordinated market and the 
organic structure of a vertical hierarchy. Firms within 
networks and clusters are linked by something more 
than the price mechanism of the ma rket. However, 
they are not branches of a larger company, since 
they continue to be independent.    
In spite of these similarities, it is very important to 
draw a line between them, all the  more so since fo-
cusing on clusters or networks has very different 
policy implications. In the case of clusters, the r a-
tionale for state intervention is clearly derived from 
the presence of externalities. Regardless of mana g-
ers´ intentions, externalities create knowledge spillo-
vers, affect the dynamics of rivalry, and e ncourage 
the development of a more specialised labour maket 
and  supplier  base.  Hence,  gover nments  can  help 
cluster organisations internalise some of the exte r-
nalities  in  clusters  by  pr omoting  joint  decision-
                                                           
103  For a review on the literature on clusters and networks, see 
Frank Lerch and Gordon Müller-Seitz (2012). 
making  and  action  and  can  also  organise  funding 
programmes around clusters to compensate for ex-
ternalities. 
On the other hand, the presence of externalities in 
networks that spread across different regions is not 
so obvious. The crucial point is the activity in which 
firms are engaged. If a group of firms is working on 
innovation  projects  or  entering  new  fields  or  new 
markets, companies could be encouraged to join a 
network structure for the purpose of sharing infor-
mation and creating synergies. 
Therefore, conceptual categorisation is required. This 
chapter  employs  the  following  operational  defini-
tions in order to clarify the conceptual relations and 
differences  between  clusters,  cluster  organisations 
and networks. 
Clusters are geographically co-located firms and oth-
er institutions engaged in economic activities in a set 
of related industries, connected through externalities 
and  other  types  of  linkages.  Collaboration  may  or 
may not take place, and could focus either on broad-
er competitiveness upgrading or on specific projects. 
Cluster organisations are organisations focused on a 
specific geographical area, oriented towards a set of 
related  industries  (also  called  a  ‘cluster’  category), 
and they provide a structure for actual collaboration. 
Networks of firms are structures specifically created 
for active collaboration. This collaboration could be 
open-ended  or  focused  on  a  specific  project  task. 
They may or may not be confined to a specific geo-
graphical location and set of industries. Cluster or-
ganisations are a specific type of network that is con-
centrated in a particular geographical area. Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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Figure 5.1: Key characteristics of clusters, cluster organisations, and networks 
 
 
5.3.  PRESENCE AND POLICY OF NETWORKS 
5.3.1. Types of Firm Networks 
While the presence of clusters is quite easy to de-
tect, the presence of networks is more problematic. 
As mentioned in the previous section, networks are 
created on a voluntary basis, because firms expect it 
to be more advantageous to stay in the network than 
to stay outside it. Thus, it is in firms' interests to be 
discreet  about  their  participation  in  a  network  for 
fear  of  revealing  sensitive  information  from  which 
their rivals might benefit. 
Nevertheless, useful information about networks can 
be found in the organizational database of the Euro-
pean  Cluster  Observatory  (ECO),  a  site  developed 
with financial support from the European Commis-
sion. This database covers more than 2000 organiza-
tions
104 in total  with a focus on economic develo p-
ment through collaboration between firms and other 
entities and has been created partly through internet 
                                                           
104  The organisations are clusters that have been identified in 32 
countries.    
search and partly through self-registration by organi-
sations.  
Of all the organisations covered by the ECO database 
the  percentage  of  organisations  that  could  be  de-
fined  as  networks  in  the  terms  specified  above  is 
between 4-6 %. If the analysis is restricted to particu-
lar categories of activities, it turns out that in areas 
such as ‘general technology’, ‘design’ or ‘human re-
sources’,  the  network  share  is  even  higher  and 
reaches  10-12 %  in  life  sciences  (bio-
tech/pharmaceuticals). 
On  the  basis  of  these  findings,  two  criteria  (geo-
graphic scope and industry scope), can be put for-
ward for the purpose of classifying networks. 
Since networks are not constrained to a specific geo-
graphical  area  and  can  involve  firms  operating  in 
regions which are quite far apart, geographic scope 
could be an instrument for classifying and systema-
tising networks. Thus, in terms of their geographical 
extension,  networks  could  be  classified  from  the 
most locally concentrated to the most geographically 
scattered. Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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  The first type of networks takes place at regional 
level. They aim at favouring the exchanges of in-
formation  and  experiences.  An  example  is  the 
Romagna Creative District in Italy (see Annex Box 
5.2)  that  aims  at  creating  synergies  between 
twelve different creative sectors. 
  The second type of networks are those open to 
membership from a broad set of regions within a 
country.  These  networks  tend  to  be  set  up  to 
overcome a lack of critical mass at regional level. 
The  networks  of  the  German  Kompetenznet-
ze.de,105 a federally funded network of clusters 
or networks, are a good example. 
  The third type refers to networks operating in a 
set of similar industries and that organize them-
selves explicitly at the national level. In general, 
they are set up by government to compensate for 
a lack of critical mass at the regional level and 
create a cost-efficient central platform to provide 
services for firms in the same industrial activity. 
Such networks exist, for example, in Ireland (Irish 
Software  Innovation  Network),  the  Netherlands 
(Dutch  Maritime  Network),  and  Slovenia  (Tech-
nology Network ICT). 
  The fourth type of networks extends beyond na-
tional boundaries and connects firms that work in 
a set of related industries, in most cases through 
participation  in  cluster  organisations.  This  hap-
pens  either  across  smaller  countries  or  in  re-
sponse to EU-funded projects driving the emer-
gence of European networks. One such network 
is Scanbalt, which focuses on life sciences in the 
Baltic Sea Region, is such a network (see Annex 
Box 5.1). 
  Finally,  the  last  type  of  network  is  formed  by 
firms  which  pursue  one  specific  issue  and  find 
that it is in their interest to try to operate at EU 
level.  This  is  the  case  of  Social  Firms  Europe 
CEFEC (see Annex, Box 5.4), a network of social 
firms and cooperatives across Europe, whose goal 
is to create paid work for disabled and disadvan-
taged people and help individuals who face dis-
crimination in their bid to overcome their social 
and  economic  exclusion  through  employment. 
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CEFEC is open to all industries that can help peo-
ple  with  disabilities  or  disadvantages  find  em-
ployment. 
In addition to geographic coverage,  industry scope 
could  provide  other  useful  criteria  for  classifying 
networks.     
  The first type of network focuses on new emerg-
ing  patterns  of  relatedness  across  industries. 
Networks in this category are often strongly driv-
en by government action to explore the potential 
of  new  fields.  One  such  effort  is  the  Romagna 
Creative  District  in  Italy  (see  Annex,  Box  5.2) 
whose aim is to connect and share the creative 
resources  of  individuals  and  companies  in  the 
hope of sparking off creativity and boosting the 
economy  of  the  Romagna  region.  The  network 
covers creative sectors such as communications, 
art, design, architecture, theatre, music and pho-
tography. 
  The second type of network covers a broader set 
of  industries,  often  in  wider  traditional  sectors 
such  as  manufacturing.  Those  networks  have  a 
broader industry-scope than one cluster catego-
ry. An example is the Network Industry RuhrOst 
(NIRO), which aims to enhance the competitive-
ness of firms in mechanical engineering and in-
dustrial electronics located in the RuhrOst region 
around  the  cities  of  Dortmund  and  Unna.  This 
type of network is in response to a lack of critical 
mass for firms working within similar industries 
within a region. 
The third type of network aims to enhance the com-
petitiveness  of  the  entire  regional  economy.  The 
Cambridge Network in the UK falls into this category. 
Its purpose is to connect people from business and 
academia in the Cambridge region in order to share 
ideas,  thereby  encouraging  collaboration  and  part-
nership that can contribute to the overall economic 
success of the region. Although some activities are 
often directed towards a cluster-orientation, others 
aim to improve the general business environment. 
5.3.2. Public Policy Support to Networks 
For  several  reasons,  regional  administrations,  na-
tional  governments  and  supra-national  institutions 
have designed programmes aimed at strengthening Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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clusters and networks. Although the scope, ambition 
and achievements of these programmes depend on 
their political, geographical and administrative con-
text,  public  authorities  have  a  common  interest  in 
fostering  cooperative  links  between  firms.  These 
programmes do not target networks or clusters per 
se, but tend rather to focus on activities with a posi-
tive impact on a wider community. Since clusters are 
easier to identify and there is a longer policy tradi-
tion of working through them, in most cases network 
programmes  are  a  part  of  existing  cluster  pro-
grammes. Policy makers who decide to give a special 
boost to networking, do so because regions lack crit-
ical mass or because there is a case for supporting 
collaborative projects, such as joint research or edu-
cation. 
In the previous subsections networks were classified 
according to their geographic or industrial focus and 
these  two  criteria  continue  to  be  relevant  for  the 
purpose of classifying public network programmes. 
5.3.2.1. Geographic focus. 
Programmes for networks that have a different geo-
graphic  focus  have  been  launched  by  some  larger 
regions, national governments, and as part of cross-
national collaboration. 
A  number  of  larger  German  states  have  organised 
region-wide  cluster  efforts  (‘Bayern  Innovative’, 
‘bwcon’, ‘bw-automotive’, ‘Landescluster NRW’). All 
clusters belonging to the same industry are served 
through one network organisation, either driven di-
rectly  by  government  or  through  a  company  that 
drives it on behalf of government. This seems to be 
partly a reflection of limited critical mass in smaller 
regions and partly a matter of political and organisa-
tional  expedience  in  aligning  the  organisation  with 
the way the public sector is organised. 
Countries like France (‘Action Collective’), Germany 
(‘ZIM-NEMO’), and the Netherlands (‘Innovation Per-
formance Contract’) have launched programmes at 
national level that invite groups of companies to ap-
ply for funding to set up a network. All these pro-
grammes are focused on enhancing the performance 
of  groups  of  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs), mostly by encouraging joint innovation activ-
ities but sometimes also joint exporting efforts. Co-
location in one specific region is not a criterion for 
funding. Unlike traditional cluster programmes, the 
motivation for these networks is, at least initially, a 
specific task or objective that can best (or only) be 
achieved  collectively.  Over  time,  however,  these 
programmes  hope  to  encourage  more  stable  pat-
terns of collaboration that are then motivated by a 
broad  common  interest  in  upgrading  the  competi-
tiveness of the firms in the network. 
The Italian programme in support of contract-based 
business networks (‘Contratto di Rete d’Impresa’) is 
similar  to  this  approach  but  is  also  open  to  large 
companies and seems to be less restrictive in terms 
of the type of joint activities that qualify for support. 
It  provides  tax  incentives  for  collaboration,  often 
among small groups of around five companies that 
frame some of their activities within a specific legal 
structure. 
Countries  like  the  UK  (‘Knowledge  Transfer  Net-
works’),  Ireland  (‘Irish  Software  Innovation  Net-
work’), the Netherlands (‘Dutch Maritime Network’) 
and Slovenia (‘Technology Network ICT’) have set up 
national platforms serving specific cluster categories. 
In some ways, these platforms are natural extensions 
of  traditional  industry-  or  sector-oriented  pro-
grammes in research and innovation policy. The plat-
forms,  largely  financed  by  government,  provide 
companies with information on how to access pro-
ject funding from other parts of government. While 
this  funding  might  be  based  on  collaboration,  the 
networks also provide information about more tradi-
tional firm-based programmes. In addition, the net-
works aim to encourage linkages between firms and 
research institutions carrying out a set of similar in-
dustrial activities to increase the effectiveness of the 
research  funding.  The  networks  also  provide  addi-
tional information on industry and technology trends 
to enhance companies' overall sophistication. 
National networks in Denmark (‘Innovation Networks 
Denmark’)  and  Finland  (‘OSKE  Centre  of  Expertise 
Programme’)  have  been  strengthened  thanks  to  a 
base  of  regional  cluster  efforts.  As  these  efforts 
proved to have insufficient critical mass, the national 
government  consolidated  them  under  a  country-
wide umbrella. Where robust regional clusters exist, 
they continue to play an important role. The national 
approach explicitly aims to connect firms which are Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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active within these cluster categories but located in 
other regions within the country.   
The  EU  and  groups  of  EU  neighbouring  countries 
have also set up several programmes to encourage 
the emergence of networks across larger geograph-
ical  areas.  In  almost  all  cases,  these  networks  are 
facilitated  through  regional  cluster  organisations. 
The Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) 
are one such example at EU level. The available fund-
ing combines networking and actual research activi-
ties.  In  the  Baltic  Sea  Region,  the  StarDust  pro-
gramme has been launched as part of the EU Baltic 
Sea  Region  Strategy  to  connect  regional  clusters 
across  the  wider  Region  in  five  cluster  categories. 
Funding  is  available  for  network  management  be-
tween the cluster organisations, while collaborative 
actions, including networking between firms in the 
regional  clusters,  have  to  be  covered  through  the 
existing budgets of the cluster organisations. 
5.3.2.2. Industry focus. 
Support for network organisations that have a  dif-
ferent industry focus from traditional cluster catego-
ries is to a large degree organised through the same 
type of network programmes discussed above. While 
the general toolkit is the same, in these cases gov-
ernment agencies decide to change the scope of the 
network. 
A number of governments have set up specific net-
work programmes in areas considered to be emerg-
ing, where activity boundaries are porous. In the UK, 
the  Creative  Industries  Network,  part  of  the 
Knowledge Transfer Networks, focuses on the broad 
range  of  industries  designated  as  ‘creative’  in  the 
academic  literature  and  increasingly  also  in  policy 
programmes. In Austria, the regional economic de-
velopment  agency  supports  networks  in  nanotech-
nology, nanosciences, and creative industries as part 
of  its  overall  cluster  and  network  programme.  In 
Denmark, Environmental Network South (See Annex, 
Box 5.3) focuses on the collaboration between public 
authorities and companies in the area of the envi-
ronment. 
A number of governments at the local and regional 
level, especially in Germany, support SME networks 
that reach out to local companies in broad sectors 
such as manufacturing. In such cases the main moti-
vation is to create cost-effective tools, to have large 
numbers  of  companies  improve  their  operational 
sophistication  and  to  establish  platforms  for  com-
munication between local government and the local 
business community. 
When the goal is to support the overall competitive-
ness of a region, networks are usually not funded by 
government.  This  task  tends  to  be  undertaken  by 
regional economic development agencies set up by 
regional  authorities,  working  in  dialogue  with  the 
business  community  they  serve.  In  Germany,  eco-
nomic  development  organisations  such  as  Hanno-
verImpuls  and  the  Dortmund-Project  arose  from 
specific projects that aimed to reframe the way local 
government pursued its economic development ef-
forts. 
5.3.3. Public Tools 
Many  programmes  use  financial  incentives  to  en-
courage  collaboration.  Some  pay  only  for  network 
management  activities.  Others  make  funding  for, 
say,  joint  innovation  activities,  conditional  on  the 
presence of a network. Compared to traditional clus-
ter programmes, the funds in network programmes 
tend  to  be  much  smaller.  There  is  more  focus  on 
networking activities, joint activities are often small-
er in scale, and the number of participants also tends 
to be significantly lower than in cluster programmes. 
An interesting new effort currently being tested in 
France  is  ‘Territoires  et  innovation’,  a  programme 
that  supports  regional  networks  ‘in  kind’,  through 
consulting services and by providing access to bank 
credit, the aim being to support the export activities 
of SMEs. There is no direct financial support for the 
SMEs involved. 
One group of programmes provides funding and then 
invites  prospective  networks  to  submit  their  pro-
posals. This approach is used when there is no clear 
information or political target in terms of the type of 
networks  to  support,  and  when  collaboration  be-
tween firms is the prime objective. A different group 
of programmes defines the network scope and then 
sets up an organisation to mobilise, serve, and man-
age the network of firms. This organisation can be 
part of government, or it can be run by another or-
ganisation  on  behalf  of  government.  This  second 
approach is more interventionist, with the focus are-Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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as selected by government. However, in setting up 
an  intermediary  linked  to  both  firms  and  govern-
ment, the available policy tools and programmes of 
government are also more likely to be linked to the 
needs of a set of companies. 
An interesting development is the emergence of na-
tional support mechanisms for all clusters and net-
works within a country. In Denmark, RegX, RegLab, 
and netmatch provide different types of training and 
information  services  to  the  country's  innovation 
networks.  In  Austria,  the  national  cluster  platform 
has  been  created  to  enable  collaboration  between 
the  clusters  and  networks  that  have  developed 
through  the  initiative  of  regional  governments.  In 
Germany,  Kompetenznetze.de  provides  a  national 
platform bringing networks together to collaborate 
and learn about best practices. In the German state 
of North Rhine –Westphalia, a central cluster secre-
tariat supports all the clusters and networks in the 
state. 
In terms of impact, the evidence relating to network 
programmes is limited. Available evidence does sug-
gest  that  companies  participating  in  collaborative 
research  efforts,  i.e.  those  facilitated  by  network 
programmes, record better results on a number of 
key indicators than peers that do not belong to such 
networks.
106  Evaluating  the  effect  of  these  pr o-
grammes raises difficult questions. Particularly diffi-
cult to disentangle is whether the superior perfo r-
mance of network-participating companies is due to 
the programme itself or to un observable individual 
characteristics.  While  evaluations  of  such  pr o-
grammes tend to provide fairly positive assessments, 
there is hardly any hard impact data available. 
5.4.  THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Since economic resources are scarce, public policies 
must be carefully designed to avoid wasting time and 
money. Likewise, it is crucial that design programmes 
are not taken over by special interest groups to the 
detriment of the public good. Hence, every proposal 
relating to a public policy programme must address 
three issues: first, its rationale; second, its objectives; 
and third, its operational design. 
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5.4.1. Justification of network programmes.   
The first question to ask is whether there is a good 
case  for  public  policy.  Public  policy  interventions 
should be based on a clear social welfare argument. 
In  the  case  of  cluster  organisations,  such  an  argu-
ment is founded in the existence of local externalities 
that give rise to the emergence of a cluster and drive 
cluster dynamics. There is a market failure that gov-
ernment intervention can address. 
One way of doing this is to internalise the externality 
by  creating  an  organisational  structure  that  allows 
members  of  the  cluster  to  share  information  and 
coordinate  action.  Government  can  play  a  role  in 
initiating  and  supporting  this  organisational  struc-
ture, i.e. a cluster organisation. Interestingly, if the 
argument for government support is an externality, 
some government engagement is reasonable as long 
as the externality exists. In this case, there is no fun-
damental reason for governments to finance cluster 
organisations only in the start-up phase. Expanding 
the range of activities, however, should be driven by 
private sector contributions. 
Another way of doing this is for government to com-
pensate  for  the  externalities  by  providing  govern-
ment  funds  to  support  the  specific  activities  that 
create them. This can be done by organising public 
policies in areas such as innovation, workforce de-
velopment,  and  investment  attraction  around  clus-
ters.  This  approach  also  has  key  operational  ad-
vantages in comparison with programmes that target 
individual companies or, conversely, the entire econ-
omy. On the one hand, they are more effective be-
cause they reach a larger group of companies than 
firm-level support but are more targeted than econ-
omy-wide  programmes.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
create  less  distortion  than  firm-level  support,  be-
cause they include all industries that are active along 
a value chain and compete for the same specific in-
puts. 
The welfare argument for public support to networks 
is  more  complex.  There  is  no  inherent  externality, 
and thus no generic argument, for funding networks. 
There are, however, two arguments that can support 
public network programmes. First, the externalities 
might occur at the level of the activity that the net-
work is engaged in. If, for example, networks work Chapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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on  collaborative  innovation  projects,  collaborate  in 
projects that explore the potential of emerging new 
fields, or collaborate on export efforts towards a new 
market,  there  could  be  knowledge  spill-overs  that 
justify public support. Second, the network might be 
a more efficient delivery tool for public investments 
in knowledge provision, largely because a large num-
ber of companies can be reached through a common 
platform. In both cases, then, the argument for net-
works rests on what they do, not on the network per 
se. 
One example of a network activity that can provide 
significant  positive  externalities  is  that  of  exports 
towards  a  new  market.  The  statistical  evidence 
shows that entering a new market is a risky endeav-
our and that most such attempts fail.
107 As the in-
formation needed to evaluate the potential of a new 
market is often dispersed, this is where a network 
can help. Once an attempt has been made to enter a 
new market, the revealed evidence of success or 
failure provides valuable information to other co m-
panies considering a similar move. This is why public 
support to cover some of the risk can be justified. 
The same logic might apply to emer ging industries, 
where new combinations of technologies and opera-
tional practices are used to meet (potentially new or 
changing) customer needs. Rather than just subsidis-
ing the search activity, that is the entry into a new 
market, public support for networks can lower the 
search costs and make the search activity more eff i-
cient. 
Network  programmes  that  support  collaboration 
between companies but impose  little conditionality 
on the actual activities within the network are hard 
to justify. They provide public subsidies to a small 
group of companies to conduct activities that mainly 
generate private benefits for them. 
5.4.2. Objectives of network programmes. 
Thus, the second question to be addressed relates to 
which objectives network programmes should have, 
in other words, in which situations are network pro-
grammes useful additions to the public policy toolkit. 
This  discussion  will  focus  on  network  programmes 
                                                           
107   See Hausmann/Rodrik (2002). 
that are separate from the networking activities sup-
ported as part of traditional cluster programmes. 
In  the  light  of  experience  there  are  four  types  of 
network programmes that seem to complement ex-
isting  cluster  programmes  particularly  well.  First, 
networks  with  a  broader  geographic  and  industry 
scope than established regional clusters can play a 
useful role in the early stages of cluster development, 
including  work  with  emerging  industries.  Networks 
can then be an important element in an integrated 
cluster policy that recognises the different needs of 
clusters throughout the cluster life cycle.
108 In exist-
ing cluster categories, new regional clusters might 
not have reached critical mass. Networks can then be 
a flexible tool to help co mpanies collaborate a nd 
explore growth opportun ities. They allow firms to 
tap more easily into co mplementary capabilities of 
companies located elsewhere. In emerging cluster 
categories, networks can be a tool for companies to 
explore opportunities for new markets to emerge by 
recombining technologies and capabilities from tr a-
ditionally  different  cluster  categories.  They  allow 
them to act more easily across cluster boundaries. 
Second, networks can  provide  shared  services  and 
connect individual firms from weaker regional clus-
ters across a larger region or nation. This amounts to 
a more efficient use of public support infrastructure 
in terms of knowledge provision and sharing. Moreo-
ver, it helps to overcome the challenges of limited 
critical  mass  in  individual  regions.  However,  this  is 
always a second-best solution compared to allowing 
companies to agglomerate and regions to specialise 
more  strongly.  Given  the  considerable  barriers  to 
mobility that still exist in Europe, some of them poli-
cy-made but others related to culture and behaviour 
patterns, these national networks can play a useful 
role, even if cluster dynamics will inherently be more 
limited than in the case of a strong regional cluster. 
Third, networks can be a useful tool for organising 
activities  specifically  directed  towards  SMEs.  The 
importance of SMEs is increasing in both exports and 
innovation processes. Nevertheless, their needs for 
public support in these activities are different from 
                                                           
108  This idea fits well into the structure of an integrated cluster 
programme with dedicated tools and services for immature 
clusters, mature clusters, and clusters in transition. See NGP 
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those of large companies that have been the tradi-
tional focus of policy in these areas (and that contin-
ue to play a dominant role in them). Network pro-
grammes can be an efficient tool for reaching out to 
a larger number of  SMEs  without creating unman-
ageable process costs. In some cases these networks 
will be separate from clusters. Here the network is a 
mechanism to improve the general sophistication of 
SMEs in activities that have significant fixed costs or 
create positive externalities. In other cases, the SME 
network will be part of a cluster.
109 Here the network 
can be connected to la rge companies that in turn 
provide connections to global value chains and di s-
tribution channels. 
Fourth, networks can be a useful tool for more co m-
prehensive efforts to enhance  regional competitive-
ness. The focus on these networks might be on clus-
ters, where there is sufficient critical mass. If this is 
not  the  case,  networks  can  focus  on  cross-cutting 
framework  conditions  that  are  relevant  across  a 
broader  range  of  industries  and  clusters.  The  net-
work  is  then  an  efficient  platform  for  information 
exchange  and  dialogue,  providing  a  connection  to 
local and regional authorities to companies that oth-
erwise would not have access. 
5.4.3. Operational design of network programmes. 
The third question concerns the operational design 
of  network  programmes.  Here  the  evidence  is  still 
limited but the analysis suggests a number of issues 
for consideration. 
First, network programmes should set out clear ob-
jectives for the actual activities of the network. Col-
laboration  does  not  happen  automatically,  even  if 
some  funding  is  provided.  Without  clear  targets 
there is a danger that network programmes attract 
what have become known as ‘hunting parties’, i.e. 
small  groups  of  companies,  often  facilitated  by  a 
consultant,  that  tap  into  available  funding  without 
creating  any  meaningful  public  value.  Given  the 
modest budgets required for network programmes, 
there  is  a  danger  of  wasting  money  on  numerous 
small efforts without any clear impact. 
                                                           
109   One example is Hanse-Aerospace, a network of SMEs that is 
part  of  the  larger  Hamburg  Aerospace  Cluster.  See 
http://www.hanse-aerospace.net/home.html.  
Second,  network  programmes  should  be  managed 
on the basis of clear milestones with a transparent 
exit strategy for networks that do not meet expecta-
tions.  For  cluster  organisations  supporting  estab-
lished clusters there is a case for providing predicta-
ble long-term funding for connections to emerge. For 
networks operating in more fluid environments with 
a  much  higher  likelihood  of  failure,  it  is  more  im-
portant to keep reviewing and pruning the portfolio 
of supported networks. It should be easier to obtain 
support but also easier to lose it.   
Third, network programmes should make significant 
use  of  in-kind  services  rather  than  direct  financial 
support. What is missing in networks is the structure 
to collaborate and the knowledge to provide through 
these structures, rather than capital (that in clusters 
is designed to compensate for externalities). Provid-
ing funds to buy these services rather than having 
the  services  provided  directly  by  government  may 
have  a  negative  impact  on  incentives  and  can  in 
some cases be less efficient. In this context the na-
tional support units for networks and clusters are an 
interesting recent innovation. 
Fourth, network programmes designed for emerging 
clusters  should  be  integrated  into  an  overall  pro-
gramme  for  cluster  support.  There  needs  to  be  a 
clear transition to the next stage of the programme, 
reflecting  the  changing  needs  of  clusters  as  they 
evolve  and  providing  incentives  to  be  assertive  in 
pursuing the development from a network to a clus-
ter organisation. 
5.5.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The analysis of existing public policy programmes to 
support  or  leverage  firm  networks  reflects  a  wide 
range of approaches, driven to a large degree by the 
significant differences in size, government structure, 
and  economic  profile  across  European  countries. 
Some network programmes are closely connected to 
clusters and cluster organisations, focusing on clus-
ters that have only regional importance, or connect-
ing regional clusters within a national structure. Oth-
ers  are  less  like  clusters,  especially  those  that  supChapter 5 – Clusters and Networks 
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port networks of SMEs in specific activities such as 
innovation or exports. In particular, they have a dif-
ferent geographic and industry scope. 
Public support for network programmes can be mo-
tivated by the activities that the network organises 
and by the efficiency of the network as a policy de-
livery  channel.  Unlike  clusters,  the  nature  of  the 
network itself is not a reason for intervention. There 
are three types of network  programmes that have 
the  highest  potential  to  add  useful  instruments  to 
the policy toolkit for economic development: 
  support for networks in emerging industries and 
clusters; 
  establishment  of  national  cluster  platforms  to 
provide shared services and connect firms across 
regions; 
  support for networks of SMEs active in areas with 
positive externalities, such as innovation and ex-
porting to new markets. 
Many networks are market driven and hardly require 
any policy intervention. Nonetheless, proper frame-
work conditions are essential if private organisations 
are to have the incentives to invest in networks. Eu-
rope-wide  network  programmes  are  a  useful  com-
plement to cluster-based programmes.  
Moreover,  if  intervention  is  to  take  place,  in-kind 
services should be preferred to direct financial sup-
port. The objectives and operational design of net-
work  programmes  are  to  be  carefully  thought 
through and implemented to reap the expected ben-
efits. If clear milestones are identified early on, the 
network programmes can be monitored. It should be 
possible to discontinue unsuccessful programmes. 
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ANNEXES 
Box 5.1 Case-study on cross-national network based on regional clusters: Scanbalt, Baltic Sea Region 
 
Scanbalt (http://www.scanbalt.org) promotes the development of ScanBalt BioRegion as a globally competitive macro-region and innova-
tion market within health and life sciences. ScanBalt promotes projects, business and research, visibility and branding, policy issues, re-
gional innovation and cluster development. The network is active in the Baltic Sea Region comprising Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the northern part of Germany and the north-western part of Russia. ScanBalt BioRegion also 
collaborates with neighbouring regions of particular interest, e.g. northern Netherlands. It includes the health and life science community 
and related industries. 
Scanbalt has two co-opted founding members (Nordic Innovation Centre, Nordforsk), 26 founding members, 19 institutional members, 
and two affiliated members. Any public or private organisation involved in life sciences can apply for membership (if located in the Scan-
Balt BioRegion) or affiliated membership (if located outside the ScanBalt BioRegion). The cost of membership fees depends on the mem-
bership type (here 2011 prices). Founding members (FOU) pay EUR 5,500 per annum and have five votes in the General Assembly and one 
vote in the Executive Committee (ExCo). Institutional members (INS) pay 1,100 EUR per annum and have one vote in the General Assem-
bly; if elected to ExCo, INS also have one vote there. Affiliated members (AFF) pay 1,100 EUR per annum and have similar voting rights as 
institutional members. Affiliated members may apply for founding membership if they receive a corresponding invitation from ExCo. 
The Scanbalt secretariat is located in Copenhagen with liaison offices in Tartu, Gdansk, Groningen and Copenhagen. There is one person 
working full-time in the secretariat in Copenhagen, who is the only person financed directly by ScanBalt. Other secretariat members work 
in the liaison offices and are regionally financed. The General Assembly (GA) is the network’s highest body; it decides upon the change of 
statutes or membership fees and advises ExCo on the association’s strategy. The Executive Committee (ExCo) decides on all relevant mat-
ters that do not require GA’s approval. ExCo comprises of Founding Members, up to 6 Institutional Members and up to 5 Co-Opted Mem-
bers of strategic interest. Scanbalt’s Chairmanship w is responsible for representing of the organisation and overseeing the management. 
The Chairmanship comprises a Chairman elected by ExCo and up to 4 Vice Chairmen proposed by the Chairman and approved by ExCo. 
The term of Chairmanship is 2 years with the possibility of being re-elected twice. Scanbalt’s annual budget is about DKK 1,500,000 or EUR 
200,000. However, this only covers the budget of the CPH secretariat; there is much more financing for regional liaison offices and actual 
activities. The budget is made up of 50 % fees and 50 % external resources (CPH secretariat only). Over the last decade about EUR 20 M of 
EU funds were used for specific activities in research and education. 
The ScanBalt BioRegion project was piloted and then initiated in full in 2002 by the Nordic Innovation Centre and the Nordic Council of 
Ministers. In 2004 ScanBalt became an independent legal entity, a non-profit membership association (ScanBalt fma). The year 2005 saw 
the establishment of the ScanBalt Academy which started organising ScanBalt Summer Schools in 2008 and became an independent non-
profit association in 2011. In 2006 ScanBalt became a strategic partner of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). In 2009 the option of 
Affiliated Membership was introduced for organisations, institutions and regions outside the ScanBalt BioRegion. In 2009 ScanBalt pub-
lished the Innovation Agenda “Smart Growth: Bridging Academia and SME’s in the Baltic Sea Region” proposing an EU Baltic Sea Region 
strategy flagship project ScanBalt Health Region which was officially approved the same year. In 2012 ScanBalt was responsible for devel-
oping and promoting 'Submariner – Sustainable uses of Baltic Marine resources' to a new flagship in the EU Baltic Sea Region strategy. 
ScanBalt acts as a mediating, coordinating and communicating umbrella and platform for the Baltic and Nordic regions and the regional 
networks. ScanBalt attracts or helps its members attract funding to promote coordinated private-public cross-border project activities. 
These focus mainly on creating regional cross-border infrastructure or to develop private-public cross-border collaboration within specific 
thematic areas. Up to 2012 ScanBalt has attracted or helped to attract approximately EUR 20 M for the members in project funding. Scan-
Balt has been involved in many EU-funded projects, including ScanBalt Competence Region (EU FP 6), Boosting Baltic FP 6 (EU FP 6), Boost 
Biosystems (EU FP 6), Trayss Prime (EU FP 6), ScanBalt IPKN (EU FP 6), ScanBalt Campus (InterregIIIB), Bridge-BSR (EU FP 7 – Coordinator), 
BSHR HealthPort (Interreg IV – Coordinator), Eco4Life (South Baltic Programme), ScanBalt Health Region  (EU BSR Flagship – Coordinator). 
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Box 5.2 Example of a regional network focused on a broad, emerging cluster: The Romagna Creative District, Italy 
The Romagna Creative District (RCD; http://romagnacreativedistrict.com/) aims to connect and share the creative resources of individuals 
and companies to spark off creativity and boost the economy of the region. RCD is active in the Romagna region in Italy. The network 
covers twelve creative sectors as identified by the European Union, including communications, art, design, architecture, theatre, music 
and photography. 
RCD has about 1200 members. Standard membership is free, but RCD is planning to create a sort of premium membership including ac-
cess advantages and special services; the fee will probably be different for companies and individuals. RCD operates as an open platform 
where new members can always come and participate. The board consists of 6 members who at the moment, and until the next renewal, 
are the 6 founders of the RCD Association. The current president and vice-president of the Association also participate. 
The RCD secretariat has two full-time and two part-time employees. The cumulative budget over the last four years has been close to EUR 
450 000, i.e. about EUR 125 000 annually. Roughly 45 % of the necessary funds have been provided by private companies, 35 % by an EU-
funded regional project, 10 % by foundations, and the remainder by the Chamber of Commerce and a local municipality. 
The idea for RCD was developed in 2008 and the first formal event to launch the network took place in May 2009. Barbara Longiardi from 
Matite Giovanotte, a design and communication studio based in Forlì, played a central role in initiating the endeavour. RCD aims to foster 
creative networking and advertise the region’s inherent talent and its local assets. The network organises events to foster networking, 
such as Ortofabbrica. It also organises international missions, such as a mission to China in May 2011 where 3 companies from RCD net-
works represented Italy at the Shenzen Festival of Creative Industries, and a joint presence at international conferences such as the 2011 
London Design Festival. RCD is currently not involved in any EU-funded projects. 
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Box 5.3 An example of a regional network focused on a cross-cutting theme: Environment Network South (Miljønetværk Syd), Denmark 
The Environment Network South (ENS -  http://www.milsyd.dk/) aims to establish and support cooperation between public authorities 
and companies in the environmental field, increase knowledge of the environment, and promote sustainable environmental development 
for the benefit of citizens and businesses in the region. The ENS covers the former Ribe County in Denmark, which includes the municipali-
ties of Fanø, Billund, Varde, Vejen and Esbjerg. It is open to all industries; the focus is on the environmental impact of the network mem-
bers from a variety of industries. 
The ENS has a total of 152 members, 76 of whom are V-members (businesses), 56 I-members (interested parties), 13 F-members (stores 
endorsing the Green Shop concept) and 7 O-members (public authorities). Members pay an annual fee depending on the type of member-
ship. In 2011 Companies (V-members) pay DKK 4 300 per annum if they have less than 50 employees and DKK 6 000 per annum if they 
have 50 or more employees. V-members have the right to vote at the general meeting and they receive support in preparing their envi-
ronmental reviews. Interested parties (I-members) pay DKK 4 300 per annum. They have the right to speak at the general meeting and 
they receive newsletters and invitations to events that are open to network members. Stores (F-members) pay a registration fee of up to 
DKK 3 000, depending on the municipality they are located in, and an annual fee of DKK 500. They may speak at the general meeting, and 
they receive the network’s newsletter and the environmental diploma (the Green Shop concept). Public authorities (O-members) pay DKK 
3 per inhabitant in corresponding municipalities and they have the right to vote at the network’s annual general meeting. 
The ENS secretariat employs three regular staff, one trainee and two student workers. Of the three employees in the secretariat, two are 
working full-time (37 hours/week) and the third is working only part-time (7 hours/week). The general assembly is the network's highest 
authority; it takes place every spring and all members have the right to attend and speak. The Board consists of 10 members: 4 members 
are chosen from among the enterprises undertaking to prepare an environmental statement which at minimum fulfils the network’s re-
quirements (the Chairman also comes from among these 4 representatives), 5 mayors or committee chairmen from the public authorities 
and a representative of the Environmental Centre of Odense. The ENS has an annual budget of about DKK 1.8 million, covered largely by 
membership fees. For special events the ENS seeks project funding. For the moment the ENS does not have any source of funding apart 
from membership fees. However, 2 applications for funding along with partners are currently in progress. Additionally, for the last 4 years 
the network has had a joint programme with other environmental networks in the region. The ENS does not receive any EU funding at 
present, but it has previously participated in 2 projects, one of which ended in 2009 and another in 2011. The network also has several 
applications for further funding currently in progress. 
The ENS was founded in June 1998 by a group of companies in the former Ribe county. Over the last 14 years, the profile of activities has 
remained more or less the same. The Network’s activities aim to have individual members undertake their own environmental manage-
ment tasks and attain tangible goals in the environmental sphere. The network offers practical support to ensure an overview of the com-
pany and provide guidance to the company in its environmental work. The ENS’s environmental diploma is awarded for a two-year period 
and the diploma is renewed when a new environmental statement has been prepared. In addition, the network organises theme days, 
lectures and seminars on environmental topics and gives an annual Environmental Award to a company in the network that has shown 
extraordinary commitment to the environment. The network organises groups where members meet 4-5 times per year to talk about 
specified topics. Over time the ENS has increased its focus on education; it now offers a number of one-day courses on environmental 
topics. For the time being the ENS is not participating in any EU-funded projects but has taken part in one project in the past. 
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Box 5.4 Case-study of a European network with a topical focus: Social Firms Europe CEFEC 
 
Social Firms Europe CEFEC (http://socialfirmseurope.org/) aims to create paid work for disabled and disadvantaged people and help indi-
viduals who face discrimination to overcome their social and economic exclusion through employment. Social Firms Network CEFEC wishes 
to raise  awareness and enhance the profile of social firms and social cooperatives across Europe, to increase and serve the membership 
and to become more financially sustainable and influential as a European Network. CEFEC is active across Europe and organisations from 
outside Europe may also join. Recently the network has taken in an increasing number of members from Eastern Europe (such as Hungary, 
Romania). CEFEC is open to all industries that could help people with disabilities or disadvantages to find employment. 
CEFEC has 43 members and its annual conference attracts around 150-200 participants. There are 3 types of members: full members (EUR 
150 per year for organisations employing less than 20 people and EUR 300 per year for organisations with 20 or more employees); sup-
porting organisation members (EUR 150 per year regardless of size); and individual members (EUR 25 per year). The secretariat has one 
employee, working 20 %.  The network is run by an Executive Committee, responsible for managing the association. It consists of member 
representatives, with a minimum of 3 members and a maximum equal to the number of countries represented in the network. Each 
member has to be from a different country. Currently, the Executive Committee has 15 members, including a treasurer, a secretary and a 
chairperson. A General Assembly brings together all the network’s members and supporters, although only full and individual members 
have the right to vote. The Assembly decides on the following issues: changing the articles, appointing and letting go of members of the 
Executive Committee, dissolving the association and excluding members. CEFEC has an annual budget of approximately EUR 10 000. The 
bulk of the funding (EUR 8 500) comes from membership fees. About EUR 1 000 comes from projects, and around EUR 1 000 from confer-
ence donations. CEFEC has not used EU funding directly and nor is not planning to do so in the near term. However, they have had part-
nerships with other organisations that use EU funding for joint projects. 
CEFEC was founded in 1987 by Mr Patrick Daunt, who was in charge of the EU office of Handicapped Affairs at the time. Initially the net-
work focused on the mentally handicapped, but in 1989 the Social Firms' movement was widened in scope to include all disadvantaged 
people. In 1990 CEFEC became a legal body. In 2007 CEFEC issued the first LINZ-document, the ‘LINZ APPEAL’ which gives recommenda-
tions on Social Firms to the European Union and presents CEFEC’s research in the area. The network collects data and evidence about the 
impact of Social Firms, facilitates networking and sharing of best practice among members, shares the skills and expertise of its members 
and encourages and explores opportunities for further research into the Social Firm model as it operates in various EU countries. Further-
more, where possible the network facilitates inter-trading opportunities between Social Firm businesses, organises annual conferences for 
its members and hands out the European Social Firm of the Year Award. The aims and activities are achieved mainly through annual con-
ferences, but CEFEC’s representatives have also attended other conferences to introduce the Social Firm model. So far CEFEC has not had 
direct participation because the network is very small and not very robust financially, as the majority of its income comes from member-
ship fees. Although they cannot have EU-funded projects directly they partner with other organisations that can. For example, last year 
CEFEC partnered with ENSIE on their Progress Project, (funded by the EU) and hopes to continue the cooperation this year 
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CHAPTER 6. 
COMPETITIVENESS DEVELOPMENTS ALONG THE EXTERNAL 
BORDERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, most countries shar-
ing a border with the EU have gone through change 
on an unprecedented scale. In many ways the Euro-
pean Union has been an important factor behind this 
change:  successive  waves  of  EU  enlargement  have 
extended  its  external  borders  outwards  from  the 
borders  of  the  founding  Member  States,  turning 
former neighbours into current Member States while 
creating new neighbours along its new external bor-
ders. Enlargement has had an impact on the regional 
economy mainly via improved rule-of-law and busi-
ness environment, new trade opportunities, foreign 
direct investment, cross-border purchases, commut-
er and migration flows, and through the acceleration 
of structural change (Smallbone et al. 2007). Moreo-
ver, the EU has acted as a driver of change outside its 
external borders by virtue of its economic and com-
mercial importance for neighbouring states, as well 
as its insistence on respect for democratic principles 
and human rights. 
Table 6.1 illustrates some of the changes over time, 
starting at a time when the EEC consisted of its six 
founding Member States, the combined population 
of which was around 200 million. Those six countries 
were surrounded by 15 countries with a combined 
population of some 170 million and a combined GDP 
of more than half the GDP of the EEC. Since then the 
number of Member States  has more than quadru-
pled,  the  EU  population  has  risen  to  half  a  billion 
citizens,  and  many  of  the  15  countries  that  sur-
rounded the EEC in 1970 have themselves become 
Member States. With the expansion of its external 
borders  at  each  stage  of  enlargement,  the  EU  has 
gradually gained new neighbours and the number of 
countries surrounding the EU has increased from 15 
to more than 20. In parallel with the increasing num-
ber of surrounding countries, their combined popula-
tion  has  more  than  doubled,  from  200 million  in 
1970 to 435 million today. In terms of output, how-
ever, the combined GDP of the countries surround-
ing the EU today is just a fraction of the latter’s GDP. 
This is a reflection not only of the economic success 
of the EU, but mainly the fact that many of the coun-
tries  surrounding  it  today  are  relatively  poor  and 
underdeveloped  (whereas  many  of  the  countries 
surrounding  it  in  1970  were  at  an  economic  level 
comparable to that of the founding Member States). 
Table 6.1. Member States and neighbouring states 1970–2010 
Year  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Number of Member States  6  9  12  15  27 
Number of neighbouring states  15  17  17  24  23 
Member States’ population in relation to population of 
neighbouring states 
20% higher  70% higher  50% higher  15% lower  15% higher 
Member States’ total GDP in relation to total GDP of neigh-
bouring states 
60% higher  150% higher  330% 
higher 
180% 
higher 
340% 
higher 
Source: Own calculations. Percentages are approximations 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the current and future 
economic and competitiveness situation in the coun-
tries  surrounding  the  EU,  with  an  eye  to  future-
oriented implications. The following aspects will be 
specifically addressed: 
  Description of the economic situation and com-
petitiveness around the external borders of the 
EU. 
  Existing agreements with the EU or with Member 
States; economic impact in terms of foreign di-
rect  investment  (FDI)  and  trade  of  the  agree-
ments. 
  Migration  and  remittances  across  the  external 
borders of the EU; economic impact and impact 
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On  the  basis  of  the  analysis,  conclusions  will  be 
drawn  and  policy  implications  formulated  covering 
the challenges and opportunities arising for EU en-
trepreneurs and companies operating, or wishing to 
operate, on the other side of the external border. 
6.1.  THE RIM 
The countries covered in this chapter are (shorthand 
names  in  brackets,  used  in  the  remainder  of  the 
chapter):  Republic  of  Albania  (Albania);  People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria (Algeria); Republic of 
Armenia (Armenia); Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbai-
jan); Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); Arab Republic of 
Egypt (Egypt); Georgia; State of Israel (Israel); Hash-
emite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan); Kosovo under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (Kosovo)
110; Leba-
nese Republic (Lebanon); Libya; Principality of Liech-
tenstein (Liechtenstein); Republic of Moldova (Mol-
dova); Kingdom of Morocco (Morocco); Kingdom of 
Norway  (Norway);  Occupied  Palestinian  Territory 
(Palestine); Russian Federation (Russia); Republic of 
Serbia  (Serbia);  Swiss  Confederation  (Switzerland); 
Syrian Arab Republic (Syria); Republic of Tunisia (Tu-
nisia); and Ukraine.
111 
In this chapter, these countries  are referred to col-
lectively as ‘the Rim’ – a concept borrowed from the 
European Rim Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC) 
but used here in a slightly different meaning. Within 
the Rim, the following four broad groupings of coun-
tries with similar characteristics can be identified: 
  Advanced:  Norway,  Switzerland,  Liechtenstein, 
Israel. 
  Eastern Rim: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Mol-
dova, Russia, Ukraine. 
  Western Balkans: Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Serbia. 
  Southern  Rim:  Algeria,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia. 
The  countries  in  the  Advanced  group  are  affluent, 
highly  developed  and  competitive  democracies. 
Through commercial links as well as agreements and 
programmes  such  as  the  European  Economic  Area 
                                                           
110   Without prejudice to any positions on the status of Kosovo. 
111   Croatia  and  most  candidate  countries  (Iceland,  Turke y, 
Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 
are excluded from the analysis. Belarus, Andorra, Monaco, 
San Marino, and the Vatican State are also not included in 
this chapter. 
(EEA)
112, the Schengen Agreement, and the Fram e-
work  Programme  for  Research  and  Techn ological 
Development, these countries  are linked to the EU 
and  some can be considered Member States in all 
but name and institutions. 
The Eastern Rim countries are all former Soviet r e-
publics and share the corresponding post-communist 
legacy. More than 20 years after gaining indepen d-
ence, most of them are still politically unstable a nd 
suffer from democratic deficits (to varying degrees). 
The majority of them are low -income to medium-
income economies with a strong adverse legacy in 
their  economic  structures.  Despite  their  relatively 
low per capita income level, they are highly indu s-
trialised and have an educated population and a rela-
tively well-qualified labour force. Most Eastern Rim 
countries also have close ties with the EU in terms of 
culture, history and values. Russia (the EU’s strategic 
partner)  does  not  aspire  to EU  membership  but  is 
leading  alternative  integration  processes  in  the  re-
gion which, if based on WTO rules, could be compat-
ible with and complementary to the work of the EU 
in the region, but which also give rise to speculation 
about geopolitical motives. Parts of the Eastern Rim 
are potentially competitive, in particular in selected 
high-technology niche sectors (related to space and 
military technology; metals, chemicals and food in-
dustries; tourism) and many of them are important 
for the supply and transit of energy to the EU. The 
negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Areas (DCFTAs) as part of (also currently negotiated) 
Association Agreements, has either started (Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova) or has been completed but not 
signed  for  political  reasons  (Ukraine).  Russian  is  a 
widely understood language in the Eastern Rim, an 
important  asset  for  entrepreneurship  and  a  factor 
facilitating regional integration. On the other hand, 
several  ‘frozen  conflicts’  (Armenia/Azerbaijan  over 
Nagorno-Karabakh; Georgia over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia,  Moldova/Transnistria)  remain  unresolved 
and represent serious obstacles to deeper economic 
integration in the region. 
The Western Balkans share many of the characteris-
tics  of  the  Eastern  Rim,  but  are  already  candidate 
countries or potential candidates for EU membership 
and  therefore  institutionally  closer  to  the  EU  than 
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the  Eastern  Rim.  The  region  is  fragmented  and 
plagued  by  serious  labour  market  problems  (ex-
tremely  high  unemployment,  migration).  Despite 
persisting  tensions  and  unresolved  conflicts,  the 
shared past has left a lasting positive legacy in the 
form of negligible language barriers (except for Alba-
nia and Kosovo). There is also a lasting commercial 
legacy  in  the  form  of  the  Central  European  Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
The  Southern  Rim  economies  enjoyed  strong  eco-
nomic growth in the 1990s and early 2000s, follow-
ing a series of economic reforms. Impressive though 
the reforms were, they proved unbalanced and un-
sustainable, giving rise to tensions and regional im-
balances  within countries that contributed to their 
current instability. The whole region is now in transi-
tion and has witnessed revolutions and outbreaks of 
violence (in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Palestine and 
Lebanon). Democratic processes, free and fair elec-
tions, and viable civil societies are key to sustainable 
and inclusive growth in the region and are welcomed 
by the EU. In the short term though, doing business 
remains a challenge in the Southern Rim and EU in-
vestment  dropped  sharply  in  2011.  The  start  of 
DCFTA negotiations with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and 
Jordan  was  approved  by  the  Council  in  December 
2011, marking a step forward in relations between 
the EU and those four countries as well as within the 
Agadir Agreement Free Trade Zone; the intraregional 
trade in the Southern Rim is among the smallest in 
the world.
113 Because of their demographic features, 
the majority of countries in the region face serious 
labour market challenges, even if official unemplo y-
ment is lower than in the Western Balkans. 
6.2.  ECONOMIC SITUATION AND COMPETITIVENESS OF THE 
RIM COUNTRIES 
Apart from Switzerland and Norway, the Rim is dom-
inated by three large economies: Russia and Ukraine 
on the Eastern Rim; and Egypt in the South. The eco-
nomic size of the Rim would be much smaller with-
out  these  three  big  countries,  which  together  ac
                                                           
113   The  2004  Agadir  Agreement  between  Morocco,  Tunisia, 
Egypt  and  Jordan  aimed  at  establishing  a  free  trade  area 
(FTA). 
count for more than half of the Rim’s population and 
about half its GDP. In terms of the structure of the 
Rim economies, it is only in some energy-exporting 
countries – Algeria, Azerbaijan and Libya – that in-
dustry  gross  value  added  accounts  for  more  than 
50 % of GDP.
114 Elsewhere, the majority of Rim coun-
tries are service-based economies (the share of ser-
vices is very high in Albania, Armenia, Georgia, BiH, 
Moldova, Morocco and Syria) , in many cases also 
with a relatively large agricultural sector. 
In terms of their share of goods exports in relation to 
GDP, most Rim countries are not very open econ o-
mies and, from that point of view, not very compet i-
tive.  In the Southern Rim  the lack of openness   is 
clearly linked to the political obstacles to trade with 
neighbours in the region (closed fro ntiers between 
Morocco  and  Algeria ,  for  instance).  Several  Rim 
countries specialise in services exports, the share of 
which in relation to GDP is higher than for the EU. 
Services exports from Rim countries are a mix of 
transport, tourism and financial services. Financial 
services are important in Lebanon and Switzerland, 
while tourism plays  a decisive role in a number of 
Southern Rim countries (Egypt, Morocco and Tun i-
sia). Transport services are fairly important in Geo r-
gia and Ukraine (mainly oil and gas pipelines).  
Historically,  more  rapid  GDP  growth  or  industrial 
growth has not necessarily been associated with high 
export openness. In a number of Rim countries,  es-
pecially in the East, relatively rapid GDP or industrial 
growth from 2000 to 2010 occurred without particu-
larly high openness. In contrast to most 2004/2007 
accession states and other emerging economies, any 
economic catching-up in Rim countries has been the 
result not of expo rt-led growth but of expanding 
domestic demand, frequently financed from remi t-
tances or other transfers (Armenia, Georgia  and Ko-
sovo). In the Southern Rim, already existing regional 
imbalances and exclusion have been exacerbated by 
the economic impact of free or special export zones. 
This has contributed to the recent revolutions. 
 
 
                                                           
114   The share of industry in another energy-exporting country, 
Norway, is also fairly high – more than 40% of GDP. By way 
of comparison, on average in the EU industry accounts for 
less than 17% of GDP; and in the 2004/2007 accession states 
it accounts for 23% of GDP. Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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Table 6.2. Rim countries: overview of economic fundamentals, 2010 
Country  Alb  Alg  Arm  Aze  BiH  Egy  Geo  Isr  Jord  Kos  Leb  Liby  Liec  Mol  Mor  Nor  Pale  Rus  Serb  Swit  Syri  Tuni  Ukr  EU 
GDP at exch. rates, EUR bn  8.85  119  7.06  39.2  12.5  165  8.79  164  19.9  4.26  29.6  53.8  3.58  4.46  68.7  312  5.57  1115  29  399  44.7  33.4  104  12k 
GDP at PPP, EUR bn  21.7  194  12.8  69.3  24.9  385  17.1  170  27.2  9.31  45.9  70.1  2.57  8.4  118  214  n/a  1808  62  286  83.1  76.9  249  12k 
GDP at PPP, EU=100  0.18  1.58  0.1  0.57  0.2  3.14  0.14  1.38  0.22  0.08  0.37  0.57  0.02  0.07  0.96  1.74  n/a  15  0.51  2.34  0.68  0.63  2.03  100 
GDP at PPP per cap, EU=100  28  22  16  32  27  20  16  93  18  17  48  44  293  10  15  179  n/a  52  35  146  16  30  22  100 
GDP volume, 1990=100  197  170  146  237  n/a  248  68.8  238  292  n/a  331  149  n/a  57.2  205  168  n/a  107  n/a  131  247  245  65.8  143 
GDP volume, 2000=100  171  145  216  402  143  162  183  136  184  178  166  147  n/a  165  162  116  n/a  159  150  118  155  155  152  116 
Industrial output, 2000=100  234  108  161  326  187  133  130  119  146  120  110  140  n/a  136  137  85  107  149  106  118  120  123  155  103 
Share of industry in GDP %  8.9  54.5  14.8  52.6  17.8  37.5  12.1  27  34.3  20  17.7  78.2  36  13.2  37.3  40.1  24.3  26.7  18.4  26.8  33.7  30  24.4  16.8 
Share of agriculture in GDP  16.8  11.7  17.4  5.4  7.1  14  7.3  3  2.8  12  4.8  1.9  6  11.9  19.9  1.2  21.6  3.5  8  1.2  21  7.8  7.2  1.5 
Share of services in GDP %  74.3  33.7  67.8  42  75.1  48.5  80.6  70  62.9  68  77.6  19.9  58  74.8  52.8  58.7  54.1  69.8  73.6  72  45.3  62.3  68.4  81.7 
Population (million)  3.21  36.1  3.25  9.05  3.84  77.8  4.45  7.43  6.11  2.21  3.91  6.56  0.04  3.56  31.9  4.89  4  143  7.3  7.79  21  10.5  45.9  501 
Population, 1990=100  99.9  144  90  124  n/a  152  81  165  176  n/a  138  150  n/a  92  132  115  n/a  96.6  n/a  116  165  129  88.4  n/a 
Population, 2000=100  105  119  101  113  102  123  100  122  126  n/a  110  123  n/a  98  112  108  n/a  97.5  97.1  108  127  110  93.3  n/a 
Unemployment rate (LFS) %  15  10  7  5.6  27.2  9  16.3  6.7  12.5  45  6.4  n/a  3.2  7.4  9.1  3.6  24  7.5  19.2  4.6  8.4  13  8.1  9.7 
Public debt, % of GDP  61  11.1  39.4  7.4  39.1  78  36.7  74.7  67  6.1  145  2.5  n/a  26.3  26.1  49.7  n/a  8.6  36  20.2  28.5  43.5  39.5  80.2 
Price level, EU=100  41  61  55  57  50  43  51  97  73  46  64  77  n/a  53  58  146  n/a  62  47  139  54  43  42  100 
Average wages, EU=100  8.9  n/a  7.9  11  22.4  n/a  9.3  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  151  7  n/a  210  n/a  18.9  16.6  182  n/a  n/a  7.7  100 
Exports of goods, % of GDP  13.2  32.3  12.2  51.1  29.8  12.2  21.1  25.6  26.6  7.2  13.9  63  n/a  35.7  19.3  32.1  13.1  27.2  25.5  49  20.2  37.1  37.8  30.4 
Imports of goods, % of GDP  36.8  26.8  33.7  13  55.7  21.2  43.2  26.7  51.7  47.6  45.2  37.4  n/a  85.4  35.8  18  65.4  16.9  42  46.6  25.8  47.4  44.2  30.9 
Export of services, % of GDP  19.2  2.1  8.1  4  7.8  11.4  13.7  11.4  19.5  12.2  38.9  0.7  n/a  15.5  13.8  9.6  n/a  3  9.2  15.8  8.9  13.1  12.4  9.7 
Import of services, % of GDP  17.2  8.4  10.7  7.3  3.6  7.4  9.2  8.3  16.1  11.1  33.2  8.6  n/a  17.3  8.2  10.4  n/a  5  9.2  7.5  5.3  7.6  8.8  8.4 
Current account, % of GDP  –12  7.9  –15  29  –5.6  –2.0  –9.6  2.9  –4.9  –15  –11  14  25  –12  –4.3  12  –8.9  4.8  –7.2  16  –3.9  –4.8  –2.1  –0.2 
Exports to EU, % of exports  70.1  52  49.6  47.6  54.5  35.5  18.7  26  4.2  44.7  15.3  75.7  62.4  51.9  59.3  80.9  2.1  52.6  57.3  58.7  35.6  72.1  25.4  65 
Imports fr. EU, % of imports  64.6  52.9  23  25.3  45.9  27.1  28.3  35  20.9  38.3  36.5  48.3  89  43.4  51.8  63.3  8.1  41.6  56  77.5  25  57.3  31.4  61.9 
Share of EU total exports, %  0.05  0.54  0.01  0.06  0.08  0.19  0.03  0.31  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.74  n/a  0.04  0.22  2.04  0  2.23  0.19  2.18  0.09  0.26  0.45 
  Share of EU total imports, %  0.02  0.41  0.01  0.25  0.05  0.39  0.01  0.38  0.07  0  0.12  0.18  n/a  0.02  0.36  1.09  0  3.92  0.1  2.76  0.1  0.29  0.29 
  Doing Business rank (2012)  82  148  55  66  125  110  16  34  95  117  104  n/a  n/a  81  94  6  131  120  92  26  134  46  152  n/a 
Institutional arrangement  S  F  E  E  S  F  E  F  F  –  F  F  eea  E  F  eea  F  P  S  efta  F  F  E  n/a 
FDI stock per capita, EUR  960  364  1000  400  1500  650  1300  8060  2341  n/a  6226  2138  n/a  600  967  27k  n/a  1750  2164  53k  272  2285  954  10k 
PPP: purchasing power parity. LFS: labour force survey. S: stability and association agreement. F: free trade agreement. E: Eastern partnership. P: partnership and cooperation agreement. eea: European economic 
area. efta: European free trade association. k = thousand 
Sources: Eurostat, national statistics, AMECO, IMF, UNCTAD, UN Comtrade, OECD, World Bank, Coface, European Commission and High Representative (2012c). 
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Another common feature is the fairly high external 
imbalance of many Rim countries. Energy exporters 
(Azerbaijan, Russia, Algeria, Libya and Norway) run 
considerable trade and current account surpluses –
close  to  30 %  of  GDP  in  the  case  of  Azerbaijan  – 
whereas the majority of resource-poor Rim countries 
report  high  or  even  very  high  (and  unsustainable) 
external deficits (Armenia, Georgia, Albania, Kosovo, 
Lebanon and Palestine). Countries that fail to build 
up a viable export sector are particularly vulnerable 
to the kind of effects felt during the current econom-
ic crisis and have to adjust their economic policies 
accordingly (Gligorov et al. 2012).
115  
In absolute terms,  the Rim countries are relatively 
minor EU trading partners. Less than 10 % of total EU 
exports and less than 11 % of total EU imports were 
accounted for by  trade with the Rim cou ntries in 
2010. At the same time there is an asymmetry in the 
relative importance of EU-Rim trade. For most Rim 
countries, the EU is by far their most important e x-
port and import partner. This is esp ecially true for 
the  Eastern  Rim   (with  the  possible  exception  of 
Georgia). Distinct geographical trading patterns exist 
at the sub -regional  level as well.   Conversely, the 
competitiveness and trade balances of EU Member 
States such as France, Spain, Italy and Greece are 
significantly affected by their trade with Rim cou n-
tries. 
This trade asymmetry has important consequences 
for the competitiveness of the Rim. Any EU policy or 
measure that affects trade relations with the Rim 
countries, in particular a free trade agreement, has a 
disproportionately large impact on the latter cou n-
tries.  This  also  applies  to  individual  EU  Member 
States if they maintain particularly close trading links 
with certain Rim countries (cases in point i nclude 
Poland and Ukraine, France and  Tunisia, Spain and 
                                                           
115   A more comprehensive discussion of the different ways in 
which the economic crisis affected neighbouring economies 
can be found in European Commission (2010d, 2011 b). 
Morocco, and Romania and Moldova) or are trading 
in a particular sector. 
Similarly, from an EU point of view the assessment of 
the competitiveness of Rim economies depends on 
the political situation, their investment climate and 
other conditions for doing business. Here again, the 
Rim  countries  differ  widely  (cf.  Figure 6.1).  Several 
Rim countries have improved the conditions for do-
ing business in recent years, notably Morocco, Mol-
dova  and  Armenia.  According  to  the  World  Bank  
(2011a),  SMEs  that  benefit  most  from  these  im-
provements are the key engines for job creation. In 
this  context  it  is  useful  to  note  that  SMEs  employ 
25 % of the active work force in the Southern Medi-
terranean (European Parliament 2012).  
Financial intermediation is generally underdeveloped 
in Rim countries, as demonstrated, for instance, by 
the relatively low percentage of firms that operate 
with a bank loan or a credit line. Lending practices 
thus pose a serious obstacle; a fact of particular rele-
vance  to  the  development  of  SMEs  (Alvarez  de  la 
Campa 2011). The practices of the informal economy 
(crime and corruption) are frequently mentioned as 
important obstacles, especially in Eastern Rim coun-
tries.  The  Southern  Rim  has  also  long  been  faced 
with  certain  corrupt  practices,  for  instance  when 
obtaining an import licence, a construction permit, a 
mains electricity connection, or a government con-
tract. It is too early to tell whether this will change in 
the wake of the Arab Spring and subsequent elec-
tions. Whereas only a small proportion of Rim firms 
possess an internationally recognised quality certifi-
cate, a relatively high proportion of firms use inter-
net (slightly more in the East than in the South). By 
contrast, only a small percentage of firms use tech-
nologies licensed from abroad (again, more firms in 
the East than in the South). 
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Figure 6.1. Main obstacles to doing business (2009), shares (%) of firms surveyed 
 
Source: Enterprise Surveys, World Bank. 
 
In addition to overall rankings, the World Bank En-
terprise Surveys provide a number of additional re-
sults  which are  relevant for  assessing the business 
environment  and  competitiveness,  particularly  of 
SMEs. These indicators assess several areas with an 
impact  on  entrepreneurship  and  firm  competitive-
ness  (such  as  regulations  and  taxes,  access  to  fi-
nance,  corruption,  crime,  infrastructure,  various 
characteristics  of  firms  and  labour,  innovation  and 
technology). In each country covered by the survey, 
several hundred firms – usually domestically-owned 
SMEs operating in the non-agricultural, formal, pri-
vate economy – are surveyed. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the eight most important obstacles to doing business 
in the Rim, as identified by respondents (usually the 
owners or managers of SMEs) in the individual Rim 
countries. These eight obstacles account for 60 % to 
70 % of all obstacles surveyed in most Rim countries 
covered  (except  for  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Ukraine  and 
Palestine,  where  other  obstacles  were  more  im-
portant). The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enter-
prise was adopted by ministers in 2004 to address 
some  of  the  obstacles.  Inspired  by  EU  policies  to 
promote  SMEs,  it  includes  guidelines  for  spurring 
entrepreneurship  and  improving  the  business  cli-
mate. Since its adoption, it has been a key document 
for guiding reforms in Mediterranean neighbouring 
countries.  It  has  also  been  used  as  a  platform  for 
exchanging  good  practice  across  the  Euro-
Mediterranean area. 
Labour regulations are not perceived as a major con-
straint  by  the  majority  of  firms,  especially  in  the 
more  market-oriented  and  liberal  Eastern  Rim.  An 
inadequately educated workforce is seen as a con-
straint  by  a  substantial  percentage  of  firms  in  the 
Southern Rim, in particular in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon 
and Syria. In Eastern Rim countries, lack of education 
is perceived to be much less of a constraint: firms in Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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those countries also employ fewer unskilled workers 
and  –  crucially  important  for  competitiveness  –  a 
higher  proportion  of  Eastern  Rim  firms  offer  their 
workers  formal  training  (46 %  of  firms  in  Armenia, 
and about 50 % in BiH, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). 
The  fairly  high  level  of  qualification  of  the  labour 
force also represents one of the key competitive ad-
vantages of Eastern Rim firms, despite a decline in 
the quality of education since the fall of the Soviet 
Union (OECD 2011). 
6.3.  TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE RIM 
Most Rim economies are small and, with the excep-
tion of Russia, Norway, Switzerland and Israel, play a 
limited  role  in  global  trade.  With  the  exception  of 
Russia and Switzerland, none of these countries ac-
count for more than 1 % of world import demand.  
Grouping the Rim countries regionally, the Southern 
Rim and the Western Balkans each account for no 
more  than  1.2 %  to  1.5 %  of  global  exports  (WTO 
2011). Were it not for the exports of Russia, the fig-
ure for the Eastern Rim would be of a similar magni-
tude. 
Notwithstanding considerable liberalisation efforts in 
Eastern Rim and Southern Rim countries, overall Rim 
countries do not have successfully implemented the 
kind of extensive and export-led growth strategy that 
would diversify and upgrade their export base and 
integrate  their  economies  into  global  trade  net-
works. In terms of exports by broad economic sector, 
manufacturing  is  the  least  developed  in  Russia 
(where manufacturing accounts for 18 % of total ex-
ports) and the Southern Rim. Switzerland is at the 
opposite  end,  as  its  export  structure  is  geared  to-
wards  manufactured  goods  (63 % of total exports). 
Algeria, Libya, Azerbaijan and Russia, which depend 
mainly on commodity exports, are caught in a type of 
resource  trap,  where  rents  from  natural  resources 
turn out to be detrimental to export diversification 
and structural upgrading. The share of manufactured 
goods in total exports is also below the global aver-
age in Norway, due to its high share of energy ex-
ports. 
Turning  to  services,  in  many  countries  the  bulk  of 
export  revenues  comes  from  ‘traditional’  service 
sectors such as travel (tourism) and, to a lesser ex-
tent,  logistics  and  transport  services.  A  dispropor-
tionately high share of services in overall exports can 
be observed in Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Lebanon, 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The lack of any signifi-
cant  manufacturing  export  base  makes  tourism 
(travel services) the single most valuable export item 
in resource-scarce, less-developed countries. Most of 
the resource-poor Rim countries – which should be 
more  inclined  to  develop  manufacturing  capacities 
because they cannot rely on rents from natural re-
sources  –  have  not  managed  to  diversify  their  ex-
ports  enough  and  move  into  manufacturing  (see 
Masood 2010; Eurochambres 2011, López-Cálix et al. 
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Figure 6.2. Export structure of Rim countries by broad sector (2010), shares (%) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Commodity exports are calculated as merchandise exports less manufacturing exports. Data for Kosovo, Liechtenstein and Palestine 
are not available. For Syria and Libya, data refer to 2009.  
Source: WTO database; background study. 
 
As a consequence of the lack of an export manufac-
turing base some Rim countries, particularly in the 
South and the East, are forced to compete mainly on 
price  in  areas  with  static  comparative  advantages 
from  natural  resource  endowments.  Hence,  their 
competitiveness  in  international  markets  remains 
based on the abundance of resources and, with the 
possible  exceptions  of  Tunisia  and  Morocco,  these 
countries are still in transition from ‘factor-driven’ to 
‘efficiency-driven’  economies  (Porter  et  al.  2002). 
While in developed economies such as the EU, Nor-
way,  Switzerland,  Liechtenstein  and  Israel,  innova-
tion  and  technological  leadership  in  products  and 
services are key to success in international markets 
(cf. European Commission (2010c) for a discussion of 
Swiss and EU competitiveness in key enabling tech
nologies), such factors are so little developed in most 
Rim countries that they offer no basis for export suc-
cess. Hence the importance attached to the neigh-
bourhood in the EU framework programme for RTD, 
and its support to science, technology and innova-
tion through ENP programmes. 
On aggregate, Rim countries account for some 27 % 
of extra-EU merchandise exports and 29 % of extra-
EU  merchandise  imports.  Of  the  27 %  of  extra-EU 
exports,  more  than  a  third  (11 %)  are  exported  to 
EEA/EFTA  countries,  followed  by  Russia  (6 %)  and 
North  Africa  (5 %).  The  29 %  of  extra-EU  imports 
come  mainly  from  EEA/EFTA  countries  (11 %)  and 
Russia (also 11 %), the latter largely due to energy 
imports.Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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Table 6.3. EU merchandise exports to Rim countries/groups of Rim countries (2010) 
 
   Destination region 
Exporter 
EEA- 
Potential candidate 
countries 
Eastern Partner-
ship countries 
Russia  North Africa 
Mediterra-nean 
Middle East (excl. 
Israel) 
Israel  Extra-EU total 
EFTA 
EU27  value, million  €  148198  -100%  13253  -100%  22936  -100%  86131  -100%  61882  -100%  11236  -100%  14405  -100%  1349610  -100% 
   share of  exports  10.98%     0.98%     1.70%     6.38%     4.59%     0.83%     1.07%     100%    
   export growth  4.03%     8.97%     12.48%     14.25%     6.68%     5.44%     –1.22%     4.74%    
DE, AT, Bene-
lux 
value, million €  70976  -47.90%  3790  -28.60%  8595  -37.50%  38705  -44.90%  15084  -24.40%  3782  -33.70%  6559  -45.50%  596105  -44.20% 
   share of  exports  11.91%     0.64%     1.44%     6.49%     2.53%     0.63%     1.10%     100%    
   export growth  4.61%     9.40%     12.31%     14.34%     7.33%     5.64%     –1.85%     6.25%    
Northern EU  value, million €  20038  -13.50%  158  -1.20%  934  -4.10%  8179  -9.50%  2677  -4.30%  547  -4.90%  636  -4.40%  100352  -7.40% 
   share of  exports  19.97%     0.16%     0.93%     8.15%     2.67%     0.54%     0.63%     100%    
   export growth  3.66%     –0.48%     9.10%     9.45%     5.09%     3.60%     –1.95%     3.34%    
Western EU  value, million €  13918  -9.40%  216  -1.60%  1154  -5.00%  3960  -4.60%  3171  -5.10%  1008  -9.00%  1692  -11.70%  178043  -13.20% 
   share of  exports  7.82%     0.12%     0.65%     2.22%     1.78%     0.57%     0.95%     100%    
   export growth  1.98%     7.79%     11.78%     12.27%     2.40%     4.51%     –5.10%     1.39%    
Southern EU  value, million €  34884  -23.50%  3759  -28.40%  3304  -14.40%  16639  -19.30%  38151  -61.70%  4961  -44.20%  4190  -29.10%  375763  -27.80% 
   share of  exports  9.28%     1%     0.88%     4.43%     10.15%     1.32%     1.11%     100%    
   export growth  2.68%     6.80%     9.65%     12.27%     6.68%     5.00%     –0.31%     3.35%    
Eastern EU  value, million €  8382  -5.70%  5330  -40.20%  8949  -39.00%  18649  -21.70%  2800  -4.50%  938  -8.40%  1328  -9.20%  99347  -7.40% 
   share of  exports  8.44%     5.36%     9.01%     18.77%     2.82%     0.94%     1.34%     100%    
   export growth  18.84%     11.82%     22.68%     26.65%     16.94%     11.75%     17.38%     17.81%    
Source: Eurostat Comext; background study. 
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Table 6.4. EU merchandise imports to Rim countries/groups of Rim countries (2010) 
   Source region 
Importer 
EEA- 
Potential candi-
date countries 
Eastern Partner-
ship countries  Russia  North Africa 
Mediterra-nean 
Middle East (excl. 
Israel) 
Israel  Extra-EU total 
EFTA 
EU27  value, million €  163687  -100%  7152  -100%  22587  -100%  160058  -100  74801  -100%  4213  -100%  11087  -100%  1509090  -100% 
  
share of  im-
ports 
10.85%     0.47%     1.5     10.61     4.96%     0.28%     0.73%     100%    
   import growth  3.99%     13.77%     13.37     9.64     5.22%     0.46%     0.45%     4.28%    
DE, AT, Benelux  value, million €  76196  -46.50%  2038  -28.50%  4411  -19.50%  60028  -37.5  14324  -19.10%  1998  -47.40%  4969  -44.80%  622667  -41.30% 
   share of  im-
ports 
12.24%     0.33%     0.71     9.64     2.30%     0.32%     0.80%     100%    
   import growth  5.73%     14.81%     8.82     11.11     3.06%     0.99%     –0.56%     5%    
Northern EU  value, million €  16467  -10.10%  53  -0.70%  219  -1.00%  15247  -9.5  400  -0.50%  23  -0.50%  232  -2.10%  74488  -4.90% 
  
share of  im-
ports 
22.11%     0.07%     0.29     20.47     0.54%     0.03%     0.31%     100%    
   import growth  2.24%     2.00%     13.56     12.14     9.46%     2.86%     –3.17%     3.86%    
Western EU  value, million €  30688  -18.70%  118  -1.70%  524  -2.30%  5888  -3.7  4327  -5.80%  91  -2.20%  1661  -15.00%  220122  -14.60% 
  
share of  im-
ports  13.94%     0.05%     0.24     2.67     1.97%     0.04%     0.75%     100%    
   import growth  4.96%     12.51%     10.41     6.07     4.79%     –5.66%     –1.38%     0.87%    
Southern EU  value, million €  35056  -21.40%  2586  -36.20%  11016  -48.80%  37630  -23.5  54833  -73.30%  2002  -47.50%  3338  -30.10%  453528  -30.10% 
   share of  im-
ports 
7.73%     0.57%     2.43     8.3     12.09%     0.44%     0.74%     100%    
   import growth  1.13%     9.64%     16.59     8.36     5.86%     0.03%     2.52%     4.18%    
Eastern EU  value, million €  5280  -3.20%  2357  -33.00%  6417  -28.40%  41265  -25.8  916  -1.20%  99  -2.30%  887  -8.00%  138288  -9.20% 
  
share of  im-
ports 
3.82%     1.70%     4.64     29.84     0.66%     0.07%     0.64%     100%    
   import growth  9.08%     22.82%     18.43     14.65     9.95%     11.82%     10.39%     14.39%    
Source: Eurostat Comext; background study. 
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Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show bilateral trade relations be-
tween parts of the EU and individual Rim countries 
or groups of countries and provide a clear illustration 
of  the  heterogeneity  of  EU  Member  States  in  this 
respect. It is clear that the Rim is not necessarily a 
focus area for core EU Member States such as Ger-
many, Austria and the Benelux countries. The same is 
true  for  Northern  EU,  albeit  with  the  qualification 
that it is clearly overrepresented in trade with the 
EEA/EFTA (because of Norway) and strongly under-
represented in trade with Israel. Western EU is un-
derrepresented in exports to all Rim regions, as its 
trade is more concentrated on the USA and Japan. By 
contrast, parts of the Rim are important export des-
tinations  for  Southern  EU  countries  and  also  for 
Eastern EU – Southern EU accounts for 62 % of total 
EU exports to North Africa. Two obvious reasons for 
this  are  their  geographical  proximity  and  colonial 
heritage.  Another  clearly  discernible  pattern  is  the 
export orientation of Eastern EU towards the Eastern 
Rim, a legacy of previous economic relations within 
Central and Eastern Europe. The share of Eastern EU 
exports to total EU exports to the  potential candi-
dates  in  the  Western  Balkans  is  also  high  (40 %), 
again explained by their geographical proximity and 
the  close  trade  relations  that  used  to  exist  within 
Yugoslavia and now prevail in the Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
Primary commodity exports (apart from oil) account 
for a significant share of exports to the EU from a 
number of Rim countries, including Armenia, Georgia 
and  Ukraine  (Table 6.5).  Countries  such  as  Tunisia 
and  Morocco,  Moldova,  Ukraine,  Georgia  and  the 
Mediterranean Middle East tend to export a propor-
tionally higher share of agricultural sector output to 
the  EU.  However,  agricultural  exports  from  these 
countries  to  the  EU  are  sometimes  hampered  by 
non-conformity  with  EU  legislation  on  food  safety 
and  animal  feed  (Eurochambres  2011).  Turning  to 
manufacturing, bilateral trade relations between the 
EU and resource-rich Rim countries mirror the gen-
eral export structure of the latter, characterised by a 
lack of manufactured goods (with the notable excep-
tion of Switzerland and Israel). Rim countries gener-
ally have industrial export capacities in ‘early stages’ 
manufacturing industries with low technology inten-
sity, such as agricultural products and textiles. The 
textile industry, for example, constitutes 45 % of Al-
bania’s total exports to the EU; the share is similar 
for Moldova and somewhat lower, around 34 %, for 
Morocco and Tunisia. The food industry is a strong 
export  sector  in  Serbia  (13 %  of  total  exports)  and 
Lebanon  (11 %);  it  is  also  important 
for Ukraine and Kosovo.
Table 6.5. EU exports to and imports from EaP countries by product category 
   Exports to EaP countries  Imports from EaP countries 
(EUR million)  January-June 2010  January-June 2011  January-June 2010  January-June 2011 
Manufactured goods  10625  13672  3784  5733 
– chemicals  2360  2807  413  776 
– machinery and vehicles  4757  6781  676  842 
– other manufactures  3509  4083  2695  4114 
Primary goods  1983  2543  7662  11732 
– food and drink  1058  1287  285  720 
– raw materials  288  385  1525  2025 
– energy  638  871  5852  8988 
Other  198  274  207  284 
Total  12807  16489  11652  17749 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Countries  wishing  to  build  up  manufacturing  often 
start by developing their export capacities in the tex-
tile, leather and first processing food industries, as 
these sectors depend more on cheap labour than on 
technology. However, increasingly globalised supply 
chains  and  greater  opportunities  for  multinational 
firms  to  relocate  production  processes  to  other 
countries have made it possible for countries to at-
tract the foreign direct investment associated with 
such  offshoring  activities  and  move  straight  into 
more technology-intensive industries. This has hap-
pened,  for  example,  in  some  2004/2007  accession 
states now integrated in the European automotive 
industry network. Outside Europe it has taken place 
in China, Malaysia and Thailand, which have become 
part of the Asian electronics cluster originally formed Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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around Japan and South Korea. However, in the cur-
rent  economic  climate  such  developments  can  be 
observed only on a small scale and in a small group 
of Rim countries such as Serbia and BiH among the 
Western Balkan countries, and Tunisia and Morocco 
in the South. 
While  imports  from  the  Rim  countries  tend  to  be 
concentrated to certain goods, mainly primary com-
modities, EU exports to the Rim are well diversified 
and  reflect  the  overall  export  structure  of  the  EU, 
with  a  focus  on  manufactured  goods  related  to 
transport  equipment,  chemicals  and  machinery,  as 
well as electronics. Taking the revealed comparative 
advantages (RCAs) of the trade of the EU as a proxy 
for  sectoral  competitiveness,  the  EU  has  a  pro-
nounced comparative disadvantage in primary indus-
tries, including agriculture, fishing, mining and quar-
rying (cf. Figure 6.3). By contrast, the EU has a strong 
revealed comparative advantage in high-technology 
and  medium-high-technology  industries  such  as 
chemicals (except pharmaceuticals), machinery and 
automotives. Its revealed comparative disadvantage 
in low-technology industries is mainly due to the fact 
that  several  Rim  countries  (Albania,  BiH,  Moldova, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) have substantial textile 
industries. In the medium-low-technology industries, 
the metals and mineral industries explain the posi-
tive RCAs of Armenia and Ukraine. In the case of Rus-
sia, it is mainly the petroleum-refining industry that 
explains  the  revealed  comparative  disadvantage  of 
the EU. As regards the EEA/EFTA countries as well as 
Israel, the EU is in almost the opposite position – at 
least in its trade with Switzerland, Liechtenstein and 
Israel – since it has positive RCAs in low-technology 
and medium-low-technology industries, but a com-
parative disadvantage in high-technology industries. 
Figure 6.3. Revealed comparative advantages (RCAs) in EU trade with the Rim; industries classified by tech-
nology content (2010) 
 
 
Note: Industry groupings according to OECD technology classification (OECD 2003). 
Source: Eurostat Comext; background study. 
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Box 6.1. Effects of EU trade liberalisation 
Almost all Rim countries have signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with the EU; where such agreements do not exist there tend to be EU 
autonomous trade measures (ATMs) or a generalised system of preferences (GSP) in their place. As a consequence, the average EU tariff 
rate vis-à-vis the Rim was no more than 1.4 % in 2010. By contrast, EU exporters face an average weighted tariff rate of 5 % when exporting 
to the Rim countries, with some rates reaching as high as 19 %. As a core component of the Europe 2020 strategy for growth, EU trade 
policy pursues ‘deep and comprehensive FTAs’ (DCFTAs) as part of future Association Agreements within the framework of the Eastern 
Partnership and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The aim is to bring all its neighbours gradually closer to the single market through 
regulatory convergence. As a result, the average tariff faced by EU exports of industrial products is expected to fall from 5 % to about 1.7 %. 
The combined growth effects of its different FTAs would be to add up to 1.5 % to EU GDP in the long term (European Commission 2010a; 
European Commission 2011 b). 
6.4.  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT EFFECTS 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) – discussed in a pre-
vious chapter of this report – illustrates the intensity 
at firm level of integration between countries. The 
ability to attract inward FDI flows confirms the com-
petitiveness of a host country location for production 
and services. The intensity of outward FDI flows, on 
the  other  hand,  indicates  the  competitiveness  of 
home country multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
capturing  foreign  markets.  Companies  expand 
abroad either to capture new markets (horizontal or 
market-seeking  FDI)  or  in  order  to  optimise  their 
production by allocating stages of production to the 
most efficient location (vertical or efficiency-seeking 
FDI).  Both  types  of  FDI  have  important  growth  ef-
fects at firm level by increasing production, expand-
ing into new markets and reducing production costs. 
FDI also has productivity effects as a result of econ-
omies of scale and lower production costs. In addi-
tion, FDI may provide access to scarce natural, hu-
man  and  R&D  resources  (resource-seeking  FDI). 
Globally, outsourcing activity has declined during the 
current  crisis,  and  in  future  ‘near-shoring’  may  be 
preferred to  ‘far-shoring’ FDI. This  provides an op-
portunity for the Rim countries to benefit from EU 
offshoring. The aims of analysing the size of FDI flows 
between the EU and the Rim countries are to deter-
mine the existing intensity of direct investment links, 
explore the impact of these links on the competitive 
position  of  Member  States,  and  look  for  location 
advantages in the region that could be exploited by 
EU firms in years to come. 
In  recent  years,  the  EU  has  intensified  its  FDI  ex-
changes with countries outside the EU. Inward FDI 
flows from the Rim have fluctuated around their av-
erage  of  EUR 16.9 billion  over  the  last  ten  years 
(24.4 % of total extra-EU inward flows). In 2007, in-
ward FDI from the Rim peaked at EUR 38.4 billion, 
followed however by almost no inward flow in the 
subsequent year. In 2010, firms in Rim countries in-
vested EUR 14.5 billion in the EU. The last three years 
point to lower-than-average inward flows from the 
Rim, indicating a possible loss of competitiveness of 
this region on EU markets. 
In terms of outward FDI flows from the EU, the share 
of the Rim was 42 % (EUR 84.6 billion) in 2009 and 
28 % (EUR 55.2 billion) of total extra-EU FDI in 2010, 
far  above  the  ten-year  average  of  17 %.  The  Rim 
countries have thus benefited from the shift of FDI to 
extra-EU countries (cf. Chapter 4.3). Among the Rim 
countries, Norway and in particular Switzerland nat-
urally account for the bulk of outward FDI from the 
EU to the Rim and of inward FDI to the EU from the 
Rim. Inward FDI flows from the rest of the Rim are on 
a much smaller scale and have been characterised by 
divestment in 2008–2010 (Figure 6.4),  whereas the 
same  countries  have  received  significant  FDI  flows 
from the EU (Figure 6.5). Particularly large outward 
flows from the EU to the region were recorded in the 
run-up to the current economic crisis. This reflects 
the global trend towards a peak in international FDI 
in 2008, followed by much smaller FDI flows subse-
quently, as a result of the crisis. Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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Figure 6.4. Inward FDI flows to the EU from the Rim (excl. EEA/EFTA), EUR million 
 
 
 
Note: EU is EU25 for 2001–2003, EU27 for 2004–2010. EU flows calculated as the sum of flows to Member States. Intra-EU flows to Luxem-
bourg are adjusted downwards by 90 % in order to exclude activities of special purpose enterprises (SPEs). Extra-EU flows exclude offshore 
centres (Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Gibraltar, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles). 
Source: Eurostat; background study. 
A closer look at inward FDI to the EU from non-EFTA 
Rim countries reveals Russia to be the main investor. 
Russian firms accounted for most inward non-EFTA 
FDI in 2006 and 2007 (Figure 6.4) but were also re-
sponsible for the massive capital withdrawals after-
wards. 
Until 2008, Russia was also the prime destination for 
outward non-EFTA FDI, often with more than half of 
total  non-EFTA  flows  (Figure 6.5).  As  a  result,  EU 
companies account for an overwhelming share (83 %) 
of the total FDI stock in Russia. It should however be 
noted that no less than a third of the EU stock of FDI 
in Russia is owned by Cypriot firms, making Cyprus 
the largest investor country in Russia. The large Cyp-
riot stock is mainly the result of flows of Russian cap-
ital being channelled through Cyprus for tax purpos-
es,  so-called  round-tripping  (Hunya  and  Stöllinger 
2009).  Proper  EU  investments  in  the  Russian  real 
economy may therefore be overstated by as much as 
a third. Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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Figure 6.5. Outward FDI flows from the EU to the Rim (excl. EEA/EFTA), EUR million 
 
 
 
Note: EU is EU25 for 2001–2003, EU27 for 2004–2010. EU flows calculated as the sum of flows to Member States. Intra-EU flows to Luxem-
bourg are adjusted downwards by 90 % in order to exclude activities of special purpose enterprises (SPEs). Extra-EU flows exclude offshore 
centres (Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Gibraltar, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles). 
Source: Eurostat; background study. 
Another important destination for EU investments in 
the non-EFTA part of the Rim is the Southern Rim, in 
particular  Egypt  and  Morocco.  Over  the  last  ten 
years,  both  countries  have  received  about 
EUR 1 billion each per year in FDI from the EU, while 
Morocco has increased its share of total EU FDI, from 
6 % in 2000 to about 16 % in 2009 (Zachmann et al. 
2012). Host country statistics reveal that in Algeria, 
Egypt and Libya, most FDI went into the petroleum 
industry, while FDI flows to the manufacturing sector 
were much smaller (between 4 % and 8 % of the to-
tal).  The  EU  is  the  leading  investor  (based  on  an-
nounced  projects  listed  at  www.animaweb.org)  in 
the  Southern  Rim,  followed  by  the  Gulf  countries. 
The  strong  role  of  the  EU  can  be  attributed  to  its 
geographical  proximity  and  historical  ties  with  the 
Southern Rim: France, Italy and Spain have retained 
strong links with North African countries, while Brit-
ish firms are in a strong position in Egypt (Zachmann 
et  al.  2012).  Significant  FDI  liberalisation  measures 
since  the  mid-2000s  have  given  a  boost  to  FDI,  in 
particular  in  2006–2008.  Nonetheless,  the  upswing 
was  followed  by  setbacks,  first  in  the  form  of  the 
global crisis and then, in 2011, the events of the Arab 
Spring. The revolutions interrupted a period of rapid 
economic growth and had a negative impact on both 
trade and FDI. 
Economic reforms to make Southern Rim countries 
more attractive to FDI have included privatisations in 
the telecommunication and banking sectors, in par-
ticular around 2005/2006. In addition, the influx of 
petrodollars  from  the  Gulf  States  has  pushed  up 
prices and activity in the real estate sector. In Egypt 
for example, increasing FDI in the energy and service 
sectors followed a policy change in 2006, when some 
state-owned assets  were privatised and foreign  in-
vestors gained  more access. Similar policy changes 
took place in Tunisia, triggering a rise in FDI in 2006. 
But  even  in  those  two  countries,  several  business 
sectors remain largely off-limits to foreign investors, Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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mainly  media,  air  transportation  and  natural  re-
sources. 
Another way to look at the development of foreign 
investment is to see when and where new greenfield 
projects  have  been  announced.  The  number  of 
greenfield  FDI  projects  undertaken  by  EU-based 
MNCs reached a high in 2008, when it was higher 
than in any of the three years before or since. Whilst 
the impact of the current crisis has so far been lim-
ited,  the  number  of  new  projects  has  declined  in 
each of the past three years. With a fifth of all pro-
jects,  Germany  is  the  Member  State  investing  the 
most  in  the  Rim,  followed  by  France  and  the  UK. 
Over the last eleven years, the main focus of invest-
ments by EU MNCs has been Russia (47 % of all EU 
projects and 51 % of total EU pledged investment). 
Ukraine attracted much less FDI from MNCs in the 
EU: 11 % of the projects and 6 % of the investment 
capital, which is relatively little considering the size 
of  the  economy.  In  the  Western  Balkan  countries, 
especially Serbia, there have been a remarkably high 
number of projects relative to their size. Among the 
Southern  Rim  countries,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  also 
have relatively numerous projects in different indus-
tries,  confirming  that  these  countries  have  a  com-
paratively liberal attitude to FDI. EU Member States 
have been involved in more than 70 % of the green-
field investment projects in Serbia, Tunisia, Morocco 
and BiH. While Germany, Austria and Italy were the 
main  investors  in  the  Western  Balkan  countries, 
France and Spain were important investors in Mo-
rocco, and France by far the most frequent investor 
in Tunisia. Egypt is a special case, as it combines a 
late opening of a large market with an important oil 
sector. The other big oil producers in the European 
neighbourhood – Azerbaijan, Algeria and Libya – at-
tracted a small number of high-capital projects. The 
other Rim countries are either too small or provide a 
less liberal environment to attract FDI from EU MNCs 
on a big scale; most of their new FDI projects tend to 
come from historical and geographical allies. 
Difficult  local  business  conditions  (cf.  Section 6.2 
above) are the main obstacle to FDI. However, re-
forms undertaken since the early 2000s have made it 
easier to do business in several countries and have 
contributed to an upswing in FDI. Morocco, Tunisia 
and Serbia, but also the other Western Balkan coun-
tries, have been successful in this regard and have 
attracted FDI in the manufacturing sector as well as a 
relatively high number of greenfield investment pro-
jects,  often  involving  SMEs.  EU  policies  fostering 
trade and FDI and supporting the liberalisation pro-
cess have been beneficial for both parties, and for 
MNCs  and  SMEs  alike.  Supporting  open  and  fair 
competition and shaping a transparent and predicta-
ble business environment could provide more oppor-
tunities for further FDI and SME development in Rim 
countries. 
Apart  from  the  business  environment,  the  invest-
ment risk of the destination country is also a factor 
to consider and has to be weighed against the ex-
pected return on the investment. According to the 
latest country risk assessment published by Coface, 
only two Rim countries, Norway and Switzerland, are 
in the lowest risk category (A1). Israel is rated third in 
terms of risk, marginally ahead of Morocco and Tuni-
sia. Libya is the Rim country where it is most risky to 
invest. BiH, Moldova, Syria and Ukraine are also rat-
ed as high-risk countries for investment, but slightly 
less risky than Libya (Coface 2012). 
6.5.   SOUTHERN  RIM:  FOSTERING  NORTH-SOUTH  AND 
SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership gained momen-
tum in 1995 with the Barcelona Declaration and the 
established goal of a common area of peace, stability 
and  shared  prosperity  around  the  Mediterranean. 
The  current  goal  is  the  creation  of  a  deep  Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area, aimed at substantial 
trade liberalisation both between the EU and South-
ern  Rim  countries  (North-South)  and  between 
Southern  Rim  countries  (South-South).  Relations 
between  the  EU  and  the  Southern  Mediterranean 
are currently organised mainly through bilateral Eu-
ro-Mediterranean  association  agreements  (apart 
from Syria and Libya).  The Association Agreements 
with  Jordan,  Egypt,  Israel  and  Morocco  have  been 
revised based on the 2005 Rabat Roadmap for Agri-
culture  and  the  Euro-Mediterranean  ministerial 
mandate to proceed with further trade liberalisation 
in the areas of agriculture, processed agriculture and 
fisheries. In these areas, the new trade arrangements 
negotiated in 2008–2011 have led, or will lead, to a 
significant  opening  of  agro-food  markets  on  both 
sides of the Mediterranean. A further leap forward in 
Euro-Mediterranean  cooperation  took  place  on  14 Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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December 2011, when a fresh round of trade negoti-
ations  was  launched  with  Egypt,  Jordan,  Morocco 
and Tunisia with the aim to establish deep and com-
prehensive  free  trade  agreements  (DCFTAs)  which 
will go beyond the mere removal of tariffs and cover 
all  regulatory  issues  relevant  to  trade,  e.g.  invest-
ment protection, intellectual property rights, compe-
tition  and  public  procurement.  Moreover,  in  2012 
Jordan  and  Tunisia  joined  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Bank 
will  be  able  to  invest  up  to  EUR 2.5 billion  a  year 
across the Southern Rim, following the recent deci-
sion to extend its activities to the Southern and East-
ern Mediterranean. At the same time, loans from the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) are guaranteed by 
the EU to all Southern Rim countries except Syria. 
The  EU  will  also  support  capacity  building  and  in-
tends to pay particular attention to measures to en-
hance  regional  economic  integration,  in  particular 
the process launched within the framework of the 
Agadir Agreement (FTA between Egypt, Jordan, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia). Since 1996, the Commission has 
coordinated  the  Euro-Mediterranean  industrial  co-
operation  process,  with  the  aim  to  spur  entrepre-
neurship and improve the business environment in 
the Mediterranean neighbouring countries. This pro-
cess  strengthens  Euro-Mediterranean  economic  in-
tegration and helps companies, in particular SMEs, 
on both sides of the Mediterranean to start, grow, 
export and do business together in a safe, predicta-
ble, transparent environment. The Commission has 
stated  its  intention  to  upgrade  the  existing  Euro-
Mediterranean  Charter  for  Enterprise  (European 
Commission et al. 2008) into a Euro-Mediterranean 
Small Business Act and to extend EU cross-sector and 
sector-specific  networks  and  actions  to  Southern 
Mediterranean  partner  countries  (European  Com-
mission and High Representative 2012a). 
Fostering  regional  (South-South)  economic  integra-
tion  is  one  of  the  key  objectives  of  the  Euro-
Mediterranean  industrial  cooperation  and  trade 
partnership, and an essential element in the move 
towards  establishing  a  fully-fledged  Euro-
Mediterranean  free  trade  area.  However,  regional 
economic integration between Southern Mediterra-
nean  countries  is  still  limited:  intra-regional  trade 
accounts  for  a  small  fraction  of  the  total  trade  of 
Southern Rim countries (6 % of exports, 5 % of im-
ports); many of the borders are either closed or sub-
ject  to  burdensome  procedures,  and  there  is  little 
infrastructure  in  place  for  South-South  logistics.  In 
spite  of  progress  and  reforms  made  (cf.  European 
Commission  et  al.  2008),  SMEs  still  face  extraordi-
nary challenges both in access to finance, starting up 
new businesses and in maintaining or extending ex-
isting businesses. At the same time SMEs are of fun-
damental importance in the Southern Rim region in 
at least two specific areas: job creation and econom-
ic diversification. Appropriate financing of SMEs is a 
precondition for a more dynamic development of the 
region.  To  that  end  the  European  Commission  has 
established a special instrument to foster financing 
of the private sector, including SMEs. Both the EIB 
and the EBRD intend to intensify their activities in 
Southern Rim countries. 
6.6.  EASTERN RIM: HESITANT INTEGRATION 
At present, the main institutional arrangements un-
derlying relations between the EU and Eastern Rim 
countries are bilateral partnership and cooperation 
agreements  (PCAs).  As  regards  the  economy,  PCAs 
aim at fostering trade, ensuring a level playing field 
for  investments  through  the  principle  of  ‘national 
treatment’  (non-discrimination  of  foreign  invest-
ments), and promoting cooperation in a number of 
priority  areas.  Most  PCAs  do  not  envisage  a  free 
trade regime between Eastern Rim countries and the 
EU but offer a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) treat-
ment of exports from Eastern Rim countries to the 
EU. 
Except for Russia, all Eastern Rim countries are also 
party  to  the  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP)  initiative 
launched in May 2009. The EaP aims to ‘create nec-
essary conditions to accelerate political association 
and further economic integration’ of Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with 
the EU. Cooperation within the EaP framework has 
concentrated  on  four  broad  areas:  democracy  and 
governance,  economic  integration,  energy  security, 
and contacts between people (including visa liberali-
sation). Within these four areas, a number of flagship 
initiatives have been launched: on integrated border 
management,  support  for  SMEs,  energy  efficiency, 
civil protection, and the environment. The task now 
is to press ahead with the negotiation of AAs with 
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appropriate, and to enhance the mobility of people 
through  visa  facilitation  and  re-admission  agree-
ments, as well as gradual steps towards visa liberali-
sation. 
The current EU strategy towards EaP countries is to 
negotiate  DCFTAs,  as  part  of  broader  Association 
Agreements. The purpose is to integrate EaP coun-
tries into the EU single market in trade-related areas, 
to the extent justified by their economic profile and 
level  of  development.  In  December  2011,  DCFTA 
negotiations  were  completed  with  Ukraine  and 
opened with two other EaP countries: Georgia and 
Moldova  (European  Commission  and  High  Repre-
sentative 2012a). Armenia followed suit in 2012. As 
regards Azerbaijan, its WTO accession is a precondi-
tion for any future tightening of relations, therefore 
current  negotiations  on  an  Association  Agreement 
merely include an update on the trade part of the 
PCA (European Commission and High Representative 
2012 b). As regards Russia, an agreement on greater 
compatibility in the updated PCA is a precondition 
for further deepening of EU-Russia trade relations on 
a preferential basis. A free trade agreement (rather 
than a DCFTA) is a long-stated common objective but 
has become more difficult to pursue in the short to 
medium term in the light of the customs union be-
tween Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
The  aims  of  the  DCFTAs  are  to  liberalise  trade  in 
goods and services and ensure an approximation of 
legislation to EU standards in areas that have an im-
pact on trade, such as competition policy, public pro-
curement,  customs  and  trade  facilitation,  technical 
barriers  to  trade,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  rules, 
sustainable  development,  and  intellectual  property 
rights. The idea is to create, through the adoption of 
these reforms, a favourable business climate in order 
to accelerate the flow of EU FDI into the country, as 
well as to boost exports to the EU of products that 
do  not  currently  meet  essential  EU  safety  require-
ments (De Gucht 2011). 
DCFTAs are expected to have significant and positive 
effects on EaP economies because of the potential 
benefits of the structural reforms that they require. 
Francois and Manchin (2009) found that a simple FTA 
with the EU would lead to a decline in the GDP of the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  of  between 
1.1 % and 1.4 %, depending on whether or not trade 
in  agricultural  and  food  products  is  liberalised.  In 
contrast, a DCFTA with the EU would boost their GDP 
by  1.2 %.  Maliszewska  et  al.  (2009)  also  expected 
deep integration with the EU to have positive effects 
on the EaP countries, with the greatest benefits for 
Ukraine,  whose  GDP  would  be  5.8 %  higher  in  the 
long term, followed by Armenia (3.1 % higher), Azer-
baijan (1.8 %) and Georgia (1.7 %). These overall gains 
would, however, be accompanied by profound struc-
tural changes and the output of some sectors would 
go down drastically. The Institute for Economic Re-
search and Policy Consulting has found that a DCFTA 
with  the  EU  would  increase  welfare  in  Ukraine  by 
nearly 12 % in the long term – more than twice the 
figure to be expected in the case of a simple FTA with 
the EU (Movchan and Giucci 2011). In a similar vein, 
the  experience  of  Turkey,  whose  entry  into  a  cus-
toms union with the EU in 1995 was accompanied by 
the  approximation  of  various  policies  to  EU  stand-
ards,  also  suggests  strongly  positive  effects  (Togan 
2011). 
Failure  to  conclude  DCFTAs  would  have  negative 
consequences  for  both  sides:  the  EaP  countries 
would find themselves stuck in the current trap of 
low  competitiveness  and  instability,  while  at  the 
same time the competitiveness of EU businesses in 
the  EaP  countries  would  suffer.  For  instance,  the 
unreformed (and in many cases corrupt) system of 
public procurement in EaP countries would continue 
to  disadvantage  foreign  suppliers  (including  those 
from the EU) and hamper the development of SMEs. 
6.7.  LABOUR MARKETS AND MIGRATION 
The impact of increased labour migration from Rim 
countries is of particular interest to EU policymakers. 
The Southern Mediterranean region is recognised as 
a region of emigration, with the total number of first-
generation  emigrants  somewhere  between 
10 million  and  13 million  (World  Bank  2011 b).  In-
creasing differences in economy, demography, poli-
tics and security matters, together with its geograph-
ical proximity, make the EU the main destination for 
migrants from the region. Immigrants from Mediter-
ranean neighbouring countries represent 20 % of the 
30 million immigrants in the EU and 1.2 % of the total 
EU population. Following the Arab Spring, the flow of 
migrants from the region is expected to rise. Moreo-
ver, the region is a transit route for migrants from Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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other, more distant and even less developed regions. 
Consequently, EU migration policy towards this re-
gion can be expected to evolve significantly and gain 
even greater prominence. 
The promotion of the  mobility of EaP citizens  repre-
sents one of the main commitments made by the EU in 
the  Prague  Declaration  of  the  Eastern  Partnership 
Summit (May 2009) as well as in the Joint Communica-
tion on a new response to a changing Neighbourhood 
(European Commission and High Representative 2011) 
and the subsequent Joint package on delivering a new 
European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (European  Commis-
sion and High Representative 2012a). As a contribution 
to a more ambitious partnership with its Eastern neigh-
bours, this commitment builds on the four pillars of the 
global approach to migration of the EU: better organis-
ing legal migration and fostering well-managed mobili-
ty;  preventing  and  combating  irregular  migra-
tion/eradicating trafficking in human beings; maximis-
ing the development impact of migration and mobility; 
and promoting international protection, and enhancing 
the external dimension of asylum. The Western Balkan 
countries, some of which are candidates or potential 
candidates  for  EU  membership  and  most  of  which 
(apart from Kosovo) have recently benefited from visa 
liberalisation, are experiencing a new migration devel-
opment, since their citizens no longer need a visa to 
travel to the EU (except for Kosovo citizens). 
The development of migration management systems 
has been uneven across regions, not least because of 
differences in available resources and in the general 
development of the quality of public institutions. The 
links between migration and employment or educa-
tion policies remain vague in all countries of the re-
gion (European Training Foundation 2011) but these 
links  are  none  the  less  relevant  for  their  competi-
tiveness. In particular, the high level of migration is 
linked  to  economic  hardship  and  unemployment. 
Labour  migration  represents  an  alternative  mecha-
nism to gain employment and is a reaction on the 
part of the population to social and economic crisis and 
internal conflict. 
6.7.1 The Eastern Rim 
The population structure in the Eastern Rim countries is 
very heterogeneous: Armenia and Azerbaijan have very 
young populations, with the age group up to 14 years 
accounting for around 30 %, while this age group repre-
sents only 14 % in Ukraine and Russia. Ageing of the 
population in these economies will pose a serious risk 
to welfare systems. With the exception of Russia, the 
economic activity rates are below the EU average of 
71 %. A salient feature of the labour market in the East-
ern Rim countries is the high activity rate of females, 
which in most cases is comparable to the EU level (and 
distinctly higher than the Southern Rim). 
With the exception of Russia (and to a lesser extent 
Ukraine), agriculture is an important source of income 
in the Eastern Rim countries, although its share has 
been declining everywhere. Agriculture in Moldova, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia can barely be considered to 
be an economic sector (in the sense used in more 
developed economies) as the ‘preponderance of sub-
sistence farming on small scale plots has made this 
activity a buffer for employment lost during restruc-
turing of industrial enterprises and small scale farms’ 
(European Training Foundation 2011). The relevance 
of industry is highest in Ukraine and Russia (cf. Euro-
pean Commission (2009a, 2011a) for discussions of 
Russian industry), whereas the industrial base is very 
small in Georgia and Azerbaijan, accounting for only 
10-13 % of total employment. The share of employ-
ment in the service sector has been rising steadily in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. In the latter two coun-
tries, the service sector accounts for about 60 % of 
total employment. The fragility of the labour markets 
is  highlighted  by  the  high  proportion  of  self-
employment – 64 % in Georgia, 58 % in Azerbaijan, 
39 % in Armenia and around  30 % in Moldova. Un-
employment has been relatively low in most Eastern 
Rim countries. However, given the high proportion of 
self-employment  (subsistence  agriculture)  in  these 
countries,  unemployment  is  probably  much  higher 
than official figures  suggest  (European Commission 
2011 b). 
The latest data available on migrants from the EaP 
region  show  that  the  number  of  migrants  reached 
almost 11 million in 2010 – a figure only slightly be-
low the total stock of migrants from Russia. Among 
the EaP countries, more than 6 million people emi-
grated from Ukraine, more than 1 million each from 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, and less than 1 million each 
from Armenia and Moldova. The preferred destina-
tions for Eastern Rim migrants are Russia and the EaP 
region itself, which hosts more than half of all EaP 
migrants. Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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Migrants from Eastern Rim countries make up 12 % 
of all migrants in the EU (in absolute numbers, the 
EU hosts around 1.4 million migrants from the EaP 
region and 1.1 million from Russia). The EaP country 
with  the  largest  share  of  immigrants  in  the  EU  is 
Moldova.  The  EU  Member  States  with  the  largest 
number of Eastern Rim migrants are Germany, Po-
land, Spain, Greece, Italy, Estonia and Latvia. 
Mobility Partnerships aiming at enhancing and pro-
moting mobility of people have been concluded be-
tween the EU and Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. 
Negotiations with Azerbaijan are ongoing. 
6.7.2 The Southern Rim 
A  prominent  feature  of  the  Mediterranean  neigh-
bouring countries is the high share of young people 
in  their  populations:  almost  a  third  of  them  are 
younger  than  14.  As  a  consequence,  and  notwith-
standing  rapidly  declining  birth  rates,  the  working-
age population in the region will continue growing in 
coming decades. The large influx of new labour mar-
ket entrants, combined with lower rates of workers 
retiring  and  low  job  creation,  has  put  enormous 
pressure on Southern Rim labour markets and will 
continue to do so. Thus, job creation will remain a 
top priority in the coming years if the countries are 
to retain or reduce their current unemployment lev-
els. Estimates made by international organisations of 
the need for additional jobs in the next decade range 
from  25 million  jobs  (MENA-OECD  Investment  Pro-
gramme) to 50-75 million jobs (World Bank 2011c). 
Such high rates of job creation would require annual 
GDP growth rates of 6.5 % or more, which is hardly 
realistic  given  the  structure  and  poor  competitive-
ness of the economies. 
Activity  rates  are  very  low  in  the  region  and  have 
grown only modestly (if at all). This is mainly because 
of low rates among females, ranging from only 14 % 
in Syria to 32 % in Libya (OECD and International De-
velopment Research Centre 2012). Israel is the only 
country in the region where female labour force par-
ticipation (61 %) is comparable to EU levels. Employ-
ment patterns by broad economic sector differ sub-
stantially across the region, but agriculture is still an 
important  employer  almost  everywhere.  Industrial 
employment is highest in Tunisia (35 %) and Syria (32 
%), while Israel, Jordan and Morocco have the lowest 
shares (around 20 % each). A breakdown of service-
sector employment shows that administration (gov-
ernment services) accounts for more than half of the 
sectoral  employment  in  Jordan,  Algeria,  Syria  and 
Egypt, while its share is relatively small in Morocco. 
As regards market services, the major sectoral em-
ployers  are  trade,  tourism  and  communications 
(World Bank 2011c). Together with construction and, 
in some cases, agriculture, these  sectors have also 
been  the  major  drivers  of  employment  creation  in 
recent years. The public sector – including govern-
ment agencies, military and state-owned enterprises 
– is the preferred source of employment for gradu-
ate  (female)  workers  in  the  Mediterranean  neigh-
bouring countries, accounting for up to 35 % of total 
employment. Employment in the public sector offers 
higher wages, employment protection, shorter work-
ing hours and other social benefits. In the past, the 
rise of public sector employment was driven by social 
contract  obligations  guaranteeing  all  graduates  a 
state job; this led to a concentration of highly skilled 
people  in  the  state  sector.  Consequently,  ‘guaran-
teed  employment  without  concern  for  productivity 
led to the prevalent rent-seeking behaviour among 
graduates and created strong disincentives for work 
in  the  productive  sectors’  (European  Commission 
2010 b). Governments have therefore had to termi-
nate the system of guarantees. Despite the reforms, 
however, the public sector wage bill still accounts for 
8–10 % of GDP in most countries (European Commis-
sion 2011 b). 
In 2010, the unemployment rate in the Mediterrane-
an neighbouring countries was around 10 %. Howev-
er, unemployment among people with a university or 
secondary  education  is  considerably  higher  than 
among  people  with  little  or  no  education,  and  in 
some  Southern  Mediterranean  countries  the  time 
between completing university education and finding 
employment can be as long as eight years. This rep-
resents a particular challenge, even though the num-
ber of university graduates remains very low in the 
region. Youth unemployment is considered to be a 
major challenge and is highest in Palestine (39 %) and 
Tunisia (31 %). It is lower (14-18 %) in Israel, Lebanon 
and Morocco and around 20 % in other Southern Rim 
countries. The labour markets of the Southern Rim 
countries have been less affected by the euro area 
crisis than most EU Member States or the Western 
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crisis mainly affected export-oriented firms in certain 
Southern Rim countries (Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tuni-
sia) as well as migrant workers. On top of the enor-
mous pressure of young cohorts entering the labour 
market,  the  revolutions  of  the  Arab  Spring  have 
brought about additional increases in unemployment 
as numerous migrants have returned (e.g. from Lib-
ya)  and  the  private  sector  has  laid  off  temporary 
workers (Galal and Reiffers 2011). 
Southern Rim countries have very dynamic popula-
tions  and  high  migrant  numbers,  with  several  of 
them serving not only as sending and receiving coun-
tries, but also as transit countries. Before the Arab 
Spring, there were over 12 million Southern Rim mi-
grants, more than from any other Rim region, with 
Egypt and Morocco receiving the greatest numbers 
of migrants. The EU is the main destination region, 
hosting more than 40 % of migrants from the South-
ern Rim, particularly from Morocco, Algeria and Tu-
nisia.  Moreover,  almost  a  third  of  migrants  from 
Lebanon and Libya have moved to the EU, while only 
7 % or less of migrants from Egypt, Israel and Jordan 
find their way to the EU. The main destination coun-
tries  for  Moroccan  migrants  are  France,  Italy,  Bel-
gium,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  while  more 
than 80 % of Algerian and Tunisian migrants are in 
France. 
The flow of migrants from the Southern Rim coun-
tries to the EU was on the increase until 2008, when 
it reached 180.000. However, as in the case of East-
ern Rim migrants, the flow from the Southern Rim 
countries  has  declined  significantly  in  the  wake  of 
the  recent  financial  crisis.  The  turmoil  of  the  Arab 
Spring generated a fresh wave of irregular migration, 
particularly  from  Tunisia,  where  attempts  to  reach 
Italy and France increased significantly in late 2010 
and  early  2011.  Fears  over  sizeable  movements  of 
irregular immigrants induced EU governments to sign 
bilateral agreements with potential migration coun-
tries, with a view to halting the irregular crossing of 
coastal borders. Moreover, climate change and envi-
ronmental disasters have generated another flow of 
migrants  from  outside  the  Rim  who  have  been 
forced  to  migrate  because  of  unsustainable  condi-
tions at home. 
Cooperation on migration and mobility related issues 
between the EU and Southern Rim is very intense, in 
particular with Morocco and Tunisia with which the 
EU is negotiating Mobility Partnerships in order to 
enhance  mobility  and  strengthen  cooperation  on 
migration related issues. Cooperation with Egypt and 
Libya will intensify in the future, leading to possible 
Mobility Partnerships, once the internal situation of 
those countries so allows. 
6.7.3 Western Balkans 
Almost the entire Western Balkans region is charac-
terised  by  demographic  contraction,  high  outward 
migration and ageing populations. Only Albania and 
Kosovo have a large share of the population in the 
age group up to 14 years. The entire region also has 
low activity rates, with extremely low levels in Koso-
vo (below 50 %) and in BiH, while in Albania and Ser-
bia the rate is about 60 %. Female participation in 
the labour force is particularly low in specific ethnic 
groups across the region, and in particular in Kosovo 
and BiH. The region has a high share of agricultural 
employment  (Albania,  with  55 %  of  its  total  work-
force employed in agriculture, is an extreme case in 
this respect and is similar to Georgia and Morocco). 
Employment in industry is highest in BiH (31 %) and 
about 25 % in Serbia and Kosovo. The service sector 
is less developed in the  Western Balkan countries, 
accounting  for  about  half  of  total  employment  in 
Serbia and BiH, and only 37 % in Albania. By contrast, 
the service sector represents a very high proportion 
of the labour force in Kosovo. 
Unemployment in the Western Balkans is very high – 
in fact higher than in any other Rim region. Kosovo 
and BiH have the highest rates of unemployment in 
the region. Albania is the only country where unem-
ployment has remained flat in recent years, possibly 
helped by a long tradition of outward migration in 
combination  with  relatively  stable  employment  in 
agriculture.  Unemployment  has  a  disproportionate 
impact on young people. Like in some Eastern Rim 
countries, there is a sizeable and persistent regional 
imbalance  in  unemployment,  which  suggests  that 
there are major barriers to regional labour mobility. 
In many cases young people lack the skills and pro-
fessional  experience  for  employment,  so  their  op-
tions are to emigrate or enter the informal economy 
(Vidovic  2011).  Long-term  unemployment  has  be-
come a persistent and salient feature of the Western 
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in  other  transition  economies.  However,  it  can  be 
assumed that the high reported rates of long-term 
unemployment  are  distorted  and  hide  large  flows 
between the formal and informal sector. 
There is a long history of migration in the Western 
Balkans  as  most  Balkan  countries  share  common 
borders  and  cultural  ties  with  EU  Member  States. 
More recently, wars have created additional migra-
tion by forcing refugees to flee to other countries. 
The total number of migrants from the Western Bal-
kans is around 4.5 million, mainly from BiH and Alba-
nia, each with more than 1.4 million migrants. While 
85 % of all Albanian migrants have migrated to the 
EU, only half of the migrants from BiH have chosen 
the EU as their destination. Visa liberalisation in 2011 
contributed to an intensification of circular migration 
and  to  a  reduction  in  illegal  migration  to  the  EU. 
There have been fewer cases of Albanian migrants 
illegally crossing the EU border or overstaying their 
visas in Member States. However, there has been an 
increase in the number of applications for interna-
tional protection (asylum) submitted in the EU, par-
ticularly from Serbia and Albania. The difficult eco-
nomic situation in Greece has forced many Albanians 
to return home, for good or temporarily and will con-
tinue  to  exert  pressure  on  Western  Balkan  labour 
markets. 
6.7.4 Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
All  three  countries  have  experienced  population 
growth over the past decade. Their labour markets 
are  characterised  by  low  unemployment  and  high 
activity  and  employment  rates,  the  latter  reaching 
over 75 %. In all three countries, unemployment is 
very low compared with the EU – another example of 
the diversity of the Rim. 
6.8.  REMITTANCES 
6.8.1 The Eastern Rim 
Migration and remittances both show an increasing 
trend over the last 20 years, generating significant 
welfare gains either for the home country of the mi-
grants or for the migrants themselves. In 2000, re-
mittances  sent  to  the  EaP  group  of  countries 
amounted to around USD 769 million, while in 2011 
the  estimated  amount  was  16  times  higher,  at 
around  USD 12.3 billion.  Moldova  has  the  highest 
share of remittances to GDP (23 %), and remittances 
are among the main contributors to developments 
on its labour market. 
6.8.2 The Southern Rim 
In  2011,  the  overall  amount  of  remittances  was 
around  USD 33 billion,  three  times  higher  than  in 
2001.  The  main  receiving  countries  were  Lebanon 
and Egypt. In the light of persistent unemployment in 
Europe  and  precarious  employment  prospects  for 
existing migrants, as well as rigid immigration poli-
cies, there is a risk that remittances will decrease in 
future  years  (Mohapatra  et  al.  2011a, b).  In  Libya, 
Tunisia  and  Egypt,  numerous  migrants  returned 
home  or  were  deported  back  to  their  country  of 
origin  during  the  Arab  Spring.  Such  developments 
might also negatively affect the future flow of remit-
tances to the country of origin, holding back growth 
in the region (Ben Mim and Ben Ali 2012). 
6.8.3 Western Balkans 
Remittances  strongly  affect  the  economic  develop-
ment in the Western Balkans, in particular in Kosovo 
and BiH, where the share of remittances to GDP is 
18 % and 13 % (World Bank 2011  b). In 2011, the flow 
of  remittances  to  the  Western  Balkan  countries 
reached nearly USD 10 billion, three times more than 
in 2002. As in other regions, most of the Western 
Balkan countries recorded a decline  in the flow of 
remittances  from  2008  to  2009,  but  from  2010  to 
2011 there was again an increase (+6 %). The difficult 
economic situation in the euro area (particularly in 
Greece, Spain and Italy) raises concerns that there 
will  be  less  demand  for  migrant  workers,  which 
might trigger a massive return migration and depress 
flows  of  remittances  accordingly.  Remittances  to 
Albania may keep falling if migrants continue return-
ing from Italy and Greece. At the same time, the pos-
itive effects in terms of migrants returning to their 
country of origin with new skills, knowledge and cap-
ital, must not be ignored. 
6.9.   LABOUR MIGRATION AND EU COMPETITIVENESS 
One  of  the  policy  objectives  of  the  Europe  2020 
strategy  is  to  reinforce  EU  competitiveness  in  the 
international arena. In view of recent developments 
in  the  EU,  in  particular  its  ageing  population  and 
shrinking  labour  force,  potential  labour  market Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
211 
 
shortages – in terms of numbers as well as skills – 
put the competitiveness of the EU at risk. In this con-
text, labour migration has gained higher attention in 
the policy debate as it could contribute to meeting 
the  objectives  of  sustaining  employment  growth, 
reducing  unemployment,  satisfying  labour  demand 
for highly skilled workers and filling sectoral labour 
market  shortages  with  migrant  workers  (European 
Commission  2009a).  The  3rd  EU  Annual  Report  on 
Immigration and Asylum underlines the positive con-
tributions  that  migration  makes  and  will  need  to 
bring in order for the EU to grow and continue to 
thrive (European Commission 2012 b).  
The economic crisis and increase in unemployment 
in the EU have forced several Member States to in-
troduce  severe  austerity  measures.  At  the  same 
time, despite the sharp rise in unemployment in sev-
eral Member States, labour shortages persist for var-
ious reasons, for instance unattractive working con-
ditions, lower wages offered by employers, and lim-
ited geographical mobility (EMN 2011). Meanwhile, 
qualitative  shortages  are  the  result  of  insufficient 
numbers of workers with appropriate qualifications 
and skills. Moreover, migration within the EU, partic-
ularly  migration  from  and  between  the  2004/2007 
accession states, has generated labour market short-
ages also in several of these Member States. 
In  contrast,  demographic  trends  indicate  that  the 
Southern Rim countries will experience a significant 
increase  in  the  working-age  population,  which  will 
exceed demand on the domestic labour market. It is 
highly  likely  that  a  considerable  number  of  young, 
and particularly well-educated, people will not find a 
place  on  the  domestic  labour  market  and  will  be 
forced  to  migrate.  Several  Member  States  have 
adopted national strategies to mitigate the demand 
for  labour  through  the  migration  of  third-country 
nationals,  and  in  particular  migrant  workers  from 
Rim countries. Available data on third-country work-
ers in the EU suggest that Rim countries account for 
a large share of migrants and that the contribution of 
migrant workers from the Rim countries, especially 
from  the  Western  Balkans,  Russia  and  Ukraine,  is 
very important for a number of Member States. 
6.10.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Countries  belonging  to  the  Rim  are  extremely  di-
verse. Their diversity is multidimensional (geograph-
ical, socio-economic, political, cultural and religious) 
and each individual dimension has important impli-
cations  for  EU  policies  towards  the  region,  for  EU 
institutional relations with individual Rim countries, 
and for Rim countries themselves  – including their 
competitiveness. 
More  specifically,  with  respect  to  the  institutional 
relations between the EU and the Rim, the key ques-
tion is whether the current EU approach – aiming at 
the conclusion of bilateral DCFTAs with the countries 
in the Rim able and willing to do so – is optimal and 
sufficient  (or  even  appropriate)  for  every  country 
and society in such a diverse group. Evidence sug-
gests that for sustainable development, there is no 
alternative to domestic policy reform as outlined in 
the DCFTAs, to boost domestic competitiveness and 
external trade. Apart from policies aimed at bilateral 
trade liberalisation and measures to support the in-
vestment  climate  in  the  countries  concerned,  the 
DCFTAs and the industrial cooperation process  will 
also  contribute  to  promoting  regional  integration 
and intra-regional cooperation, in particular as and 
when  the  pan-EuroMediterranean  rules  of  origin 
allow diagonal  cumulation. If duly implemented by 
the partner countries, these initiatives would be par-
ticularly helpful in the Eastern and Southern parts of 
the Rim, where regional fragmentation is particularly 
detrimental to further growth. 
Regarding the economic development model, except 
for  in  the  Advanced  Rim,  the  economic  growth  of 
Rim countries and their progress in catching up have 
been the result not of increased exports, but in most 
cases – apart from energy exporters and tourist des-
tinations – stem from increasing domestic demand, 
frequently  financed  from  transfers  (aid  and  remit-
tances  to  resource-poor  countries).  The  growth  of 
industry in the majority of Rim countries, and in the 
Southern Rim in particular, has been slower than the 
growth of GDP. Recent experience in the EU shows 
that  any  pre-crisis  neglect  in  building  up  a  viable 
trade  sector  and  sufficiently  competitive  export  caChapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
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pacities tends to aggravate the crisis. Policies leading 
to an expansion of the export sector have to take 
priority, and the use of different policy instruments 
(e.g. labour market, investment promotion, institu-
tional  development,  entrepreneurial  promotion) 
needs to be strengthened (Gligorov et al. 2012). 
Competitiveness  in  the  Rim  needs  to  be  improved 
(again, except for the Advanced Rim). This is reflect-
ed in the low intensity of manufacturing exports and 
insufficient inward FDI flows. The reasons for this are 
manifold  and  related  to  the  political  context,  the 
economic  sluggishness  (and  dependence  on  slow-
growing EU economies) in general, low employment 
skills and also the poor business climate, adversely 
affecting  SMEs  in  particular.  The  Eastern  Rim  has 
been  doing  somewhat  better  in  this  respect  than 
both the Western Balkans and the Southern Rim in a 
number of business-relevant areas (such as access to 
finance,  use  of  foreign  technology,  labour  market 
regulations  and  worker  skills).  Southern  Rim  coun-
tries  are  highly  heterogeneous;  some  have  made 
impressive  progress  while  others  are  held  back  by 
poor  competitiveness  in  industry  and  technology. 
Improving investments in education is key; there is a 
lack of high-quality, technology-based teaching and a 
severe  mismatch  between  the  orientation  of  stu-
dents and the needs of the economy, as well as poor-
ly performing secondary education students. In sev-
eral  countries  there  can  be  up  to  eight  years  be-
tween completion of university education and taking 
up employment (European Commission et al. 2008). 
Though important for the trade surpluses of some EU 
Member States, the Rim countries are relatively mi-
nor trading partners for the EU as a whole and do 
not  pose  any  serious  challenge  to  EU  competitive-
ness. However, the trade asymmetry – the EU being 
the main trading partner of Rim countries  in most 
cases – is challenging, not least for the formulation of 
EU policies, since any bilateral agreement will impact 
more on the Rim than the EU. Trade asymmetry and 
the underexploitation of the trade potential arising 
from geographical proximity should be overcome. In 
particular, the proximity of the huge EU market can 
be thought of as a locational competitive advantage 
of the Rim,  so far largely unexploited. Each of the 
four  Rim  regions  is  a  focal  area  in  terms  of  trade 
flows for at least one part of the EU. The varying re-
gional  specialisation  (and  interests)  of  individual 
Member States represents another challenge for the 
formulation of a uniform and effective EU policy or 
policies towards the Rim. 
Limited diversification of exports (except for the Ad-
vanced Rim) is one of the greatest stumbling blocks 
for competitiveness. In spite of attempts to improve 
the international competitiveness of the Rim coun-
tries – product and labour market reforms, but also 
liberalisation efforts and improvements in the busi-
ness  climate  in  general  –  the  Rim  economies  still 
need to develop the industrial capacity and the nec-
essary structural flexibility to respond successfully to 
external  competitive  pressures.  These  drawbacks 
result in high adjustment costs and low gains from 
liberalisation in terms of an increased emergence of 
new firms and new export products. 
European FDI plays a crucial role in the Rim region. 
FDI  by  European  companies,  including  SMEs,  can 
exploit  locational  benefits,  even  though  the  poor 
business  environment  in  the  Rim  limits  FDI  flows. 
Improved conditions for doing business benefit local 
SMEs and EU investors alike. SMEs have benefited in 
countries  like  Serbia,  Morocco  and  Tunisia,  all  of 
which have managed to attract a number of green-
field FDI projects in different industries. Further poli-
cy reforms should take place in order to open the 
remaining  restricted  sectors  in  the  Rim  countries. 
Open  and  fair  competition,  breaking  local  (often 
state-supported) monopolies, could increase oppor-
tunities for further FDI flows and the development of 
SMEs (European Commission 2011c). 
A major impediment to the competitiveness of the 
Rim is regional fragmentation. Even within the four 
Rim  regions  there  are  many  barriers  to  trade  and 
business  in  general  (the  persisting  frozen  or  open 
conflicts are obviously unhelpful as well). Numerous 
trade barriers exist in both the Eastern and Southern 
parts of the Rim. In the Southern Rim, the limited 
intra-regional integration is viewed as the key obsta-
cle to FDI, trade diversification and growth. In the 
Eastern Rim, attempts at a revival of Russian-led re-
gional integration (the customs union between Rus-
sia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) have had the effect that 
the prospects of a free trade agreement between the 
EU and Russia – a long-stated objective on both sides 
–  should  now  be  seen  in  a  long-term  perspective. 
The  continuing  bilateral  ‘hub-and-spoke’  trade  ar-Chapter 6 – Competitiveness Developments along the External Borders of the European Union 
213 
 
rangements between the EU and the Rim resemble 
the pre-accession arrangements which the EU con-
cluded  with  accession  countries  from  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  during  the  1990s  (Baldwin  1994). 
However,  without  a  strong  anchor  in  the  form  of 
future EU membership, it is important to maintain a 
high level of ambition in EU trade agreements with 
the neighbourhood countries to foster reforms, re-
gional integration and a sustainable development of 
the Rim (Dreyer 2012). 
Demography  and  labour  market  developments  are 
among  the  crucial  areas  affecting  competitiveness, 
yet frequently neglected in this context. The Rim is 
characterised by large informal sectors, labour mar-
ket  segmentation,  high  unemployment  and  large-
scale migration. A number of differences and com-
mon features can be identified: 
  Because  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Albania,  Kosovo 
and  the  Mediterranean  neighbouring  countries 
all  have  a  high  share  of  young  people  in  their 
populations, large cohorts are entering the labour 
market each year. All other countries are faced 
with  ageing  (and  often  shrinking)  populations, 
exerting serious pressure on the welfare systems 
and potentially holding back competitiveness (as 
it is in the EU). 
  Activity rates are below 50 % in all Southern Rim 
countries and Kosovo. In Eastern Rim countries, 
labour  force  participation  is  similar  to  the 
2004/2007 accession states and can even exceed 
the EU average. 
  The employment gap between males and females 
is substantial in some Western Balkan countries 
and  in  the  Mediterranean  neighbouring  coun-
tries. On the other hand, female labour force par-
ticipation  in  the  Eastern  Rim  countries  is  tradi-
tionally high, on a par with that in the EU.  
  With the exception of Russia and Ukraine, East-
ern Rim countries have a high share of persons in 
vulnerable  employment.  Among  Southern  Rim 
countries, Morocco stands out as about half of its 
workforce have vulnerable jobs. There is also an 
important north/east/south divide in the educa-
tional  attainment  and  qualification  structure  of 
employment, with more highly educated workers 
in the north and east than in the south. 
Given the irreversible nature of the ageing workforce 
in the EU, the potential of human resources in the 
Southern Rim represents an opportunity for sustain-
ing employment growth and international economic 
competitiveness in the EU as well as in the Southern 
Rim  in  coming  decades.  The  promotion  of  circular 
migration and various programmes that induce tem-
porary  migration  is  a  challenging  way  of  satisfying 
labour shortages in the EU. It should not be neglect-
ed. 
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 
SECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS 
 
Explanatory notes 
 
Geographical coverage: all indicators refer to EU-27 
 
Production index.
116 The production index is actually an index of final production in volume terms. 
 
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by combining the indexes of production and number  of persons 
employed or number of hours worked .
117 Therefore, this indicator measures final production per person of 
final production per hour worked. 
 
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the production index and the index of wages and salaries and measur es 
labour cost per unit of production. “Wages and salaries” is defined (Eurostat) as “the total remuneration, in 
cash or in kind, payable to all persons counted on the payroll (including homeworkers), in return for work done 
during the accounting period, regardless of whether it is paid on the basis of working time, output or piecework 
and whether it is paid regularly wages and salaries do not include social contributions payable by the employ-
er”.  
 
Relative Trade Balance: it is calculated, for sector “i”, as (Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 exports and 
imports of products of sector “i” to and from the rest of the World. 
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA):  
 
The RCA indicator for product “i” is defined as follows: 
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where: X=value of exports; the reference group (‘W’) is the EU-27 plus 105 other countries (see list below); the 
source used is the UN COMTRADE database. In the calculation of RCA, XEU stands for exports to the rest of the 
world (excluding intra-EU trade) and XW measures exports to the rest of the world by the countries in the refer-
ence group. The latter consists of the EU-27 plus the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argenti-
na, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Armenia, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),  Bosnia Herze-
govina, Brazil, Belize, Bulgaria, Myanmar, Burundi, Belarus, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Sri Lanka, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominica, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, French Pol-
ynesia, Georgia, Gambia, Occ. Palestinian Terr., Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, China, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Israel, Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Rep. of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, China, Ma-
cao SAR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Other Asia, nes, Rep. of Moldova, 
Montenegro, Oman, Nepal, Aruba, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia, India, Singapore, Viet Nam, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Ton-
ga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Egypt, United Rep. of Tanzania, USA, Burkina Faso, Samoa, 
Zambia. 
 
Statistical nomenclatures: the indicators in tables 7.1 to 7.6 are presented at the level of divisions of the statis-
tical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE Rev.2
118), while those in tables 7.7 
                                                           
116   The data are working-day adjusted for production. 
117   The data are working-day adjusted for hours worked. Statistical Annex 
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and 7.9 are presented in terms of divisions of the statistical classification of products by activity (CPA). Table 
7.10 uses extended balance of payments services classification. In terms of data sources: tables 7.1 to 7.6 are 
based  on  Eurostat’s  short-term  indicators  data.  Tables  7.7,  7.8  and  7.9  are  based  on  United  Nations’ 
COMTRADE. Table 7.10 is based on IMF balance of Payments. Royalties and license fees were not included as it 
is not related to a special service activity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
118   Compared to the statistical annexes of the previous publications, the new activity classification is used: NACE REV 2. The corre-
spondance  tables  from  NACE  Rev.  2  –  NACE  Rev.  1.1  and  from  NACE  Rev.  1.1  to  NACE  Rev.  2,  are  available  on  Eurostat: 
  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nace_rev2/introduction 
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Table 7.1 - EU-27 - Industry production  index, annual growth rate (%) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
2006-2011 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING  -2.3  -2.7  0.5  -2.9  -2.2  -6.2  -3.9  -0.2  -3.6  -10.6  -0.5  -8.1  -4.7 
C  MANUFACTURING  5.6  0.1  -0.7  0.4  2.7  1.6  4.8  4.3  -1.8  -14.7  7.4  4.6  -0.4 
C10  Manufacture of food products  1.1  1.2  2.0  0.1  2.0  2.3  1.5  1.9  -0.5  -0.9  2.0  1.4  0.8 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  -1.0  2.5  2.5  1.4  -2.5  1.0  3.9  1.3  -2.3  -2.4  -0.2  5.7  0.4 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  -6.4  -2.0  -0.8  -5.4  -6.4  -4.5  -5.2  3.0  -16.8  -1.4  -5.8  -2.4  -4.9 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  1.9  -3.0  -4.7  -3.4  -4.7  -5.6  -0.8  -1.3  -9.6  -17.7  8.1  -2.9  -5.1 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  -4.4  -3.9  -10.6  -6.1  -4.8  -9.0  2.4  2.4  -3.3  -11.4  0.7  -5.9  -3.6 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  -1.8  -5.2  -7.5  -7.2  -11.6  -9.0  -1.8  -1.6  -7.5  -13.2  3.0  4.3  -3.2 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, ex-
cept furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
6.8  -3.9  0.7  2.2  3.3  0.1  4.3  1.1  -8.6  -13.9  3.4  -0.2  -3.9 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  2.8  -2.0  3.4  1.5  2.7  0.0  3.8  2.7  -3.0  -8.5  6.2  -0.8  -0.8 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  1.8  -2.1  -0.3  -1.3  1.2  2.3  0.4  0.4  -2.1  -7.5  -0.4  -1.8  -2.3 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  5.3  0.2  -2.3  2.1  4.8  -0.8  1.6  -0.3  2.6  -7.9  -0.8  0.4  -1.3 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  4.6  -1.5  1.9  0.0  3.2  1.8  3.5  3.3  -3.2  -11.9  10.3  1.4  -0.3 
C21  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations 
4.9  10.8  9.0  5.2  -0.4  4.8  6.5  1.9  0.9  3.5  5.7  0.8  2.5 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  4.7  -0.5  0.1  1.9  1.7  0.8  4.1  4.5  -4.4  -13.7  7.6  4.2  -0.7 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  3.8  -0.5  -1.8  0.5  1.9  0.6  4.5  2.0  -6.5  -18.7  2.2  3.3  -3.9 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  7.1  -1.0  0.1  0.5  4.8  -0.5  6.3  1.2  -3.2  -26.7  18.6  4.8  -2.2 
C25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
6.6  0.3  -0.6  1.1  2.7  1.5  5.0  6.2  -2.5  -22.1  7.1  6.7  -1.6 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  15.5  -5.9  -9.0  1.2  7.8  4.8  9.4  9.9  2.1  -16.6  8.4  6.7  1.6 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  9.7  0.0  -3.2  -2.4  2.8  1.4  8.5  4.8  -0.3  -20.2  11.6  4.1  -0.6 
C28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  6.0  1.3  -2.0  -0.6  4.1  3.9  8.4  8.4  1.5  -26.4  10.7  11.4  0.0 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  7.7  2.2  1.0  1.9  5.0  1.9  2.9  6.1  -6.0  -24.2  21.5  12.8  0.7 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  2.1  1.7  -3.9  1.3  0.5  2.3  7.6  5.1  4.9  -4.9  1.1  4.7  2.1 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  2.5  -1.8  -4.4  -2.5  0.4  0.6  3.2  3.3  -4.5  -16.3  -0.6  2.5  -3.4 
C32  Other manufacturing  5.5  3.5  2.9  -1.2  1.5  1.2  4.9  2.5  -1.4  -5.8  7.7  3.2  1.1 
C33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  5.9  -0.8  -4.9  -2.5  4.4  1.5  8.1  4.2  4.7  -9.2  2.6  5.6  1.4 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY  3.7  2.2  0.8  3.0  2.2  2.0  0.9  -0.7  -0.1  -4.7  4.2  -4.5  -1.2 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND 
REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
F  CONSTRUCTION  4.0  0.7  0.6  2.0  0.9  2.5  3.3  2.5  -2.8  -7.7  -3.5  1.1  -2.1 
N/A: data not available. 
Source: Eurostat. Statistical Annex 
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Table 7.2 - EU-27 - Number of persons employed, annual growth rate (%) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 
2) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Average 
2006-
2011 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING  -8.2  -3.3  -4.7  -4.5  -4.6  -3.2  -3.9  -3.5  -1.4  -3.8  -4.1  -3.5  -3.3 
C  MANUFACTURING  -0.5  0.0  -2.0  -2.0  -1.9  -1.4  -0.7  0.5  -0.3  -7.1  -3.6  0.6  -2.0 
C10  Manufacture of food products  -0.7  -0.6  -0.9  -0.5  -1.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -1.9  -0.4  0.5  -0.4 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  N/A  -1.8  -1.2  -1.8  -1.4  -1.5  -1.4  -0.1  -1.2  -6.3  -1.8  -1.5  -2.2 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  -4.1  -3.4  -0.5  -5.1  -5.7  -2.4  -0.4  -
10.1 
-9.0  -5.7  -6.6  -3.0  -6.9 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  -3.9  -3.3  -5.1  -7.2  -6.3  -4.5  -5.9  -5.3  -6.4  -
12.8 
-5.8  -2.8  -6.7 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  -5.7  -3.3  -3.7  -4.0  -6.2  -7.7  -5.7  -5.6  -6.5 
-
12.8 
-8.5  -1.6  -7.1 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  -3.3  -1.1  -1.0  -4.4  -6.9  -5.8  -2.7  -3.0  -5.2 
-
12.0  -3.0  4.0  -4.0 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials  -0.8  -1.2  -1.8  -1.3  -1.4  -0.8  -0.8  0.9  -2.2 
-
12.1  -2.9  -0.2  -3.4 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  -1.5  -1.7  -1.0  -2.9  -1.6  -2.6  -2.6  -2.7  -2.0  -5.1  -2.1  -0.7  -2.5 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  -0.9  -0.3  -2.2  -4.0  -1.9  -3.3  -1.6  -0.1  -2.3  -7.0  -4.6  -3.4  -3.5 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  -1.4  -2.2  -3.1  -3.4  -2.1  -3.4  -3.4  1.2  -1.0  -3.0  -2.7  -2.2  -1.6 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  -2.8  -0.9  -1.6  -2.6  -3.3  -2.1  -1.2  -0.5  -2.3  -4.5  -2.2  -0.1  -1.9 
C21  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations  1.3  2.0  2.5  -0.2  -2.5  -0.9  1.9  0.9  -2.2  -3.2  -0.2  -0.4  -1.1 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  2.5  0.9  -0.9  0.2  -0.2  -0.7  -0.8  1.5  0.5  -6.8  -2.5  1.2  -1.3 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -0.5  -0.6  -2.3  -2.7  -2.1  -1.0  -0.6  1.4  -2.0 
-
10.3  -6.3  -1.8  -3.9 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  -4.2  -0.3  -4.0  -3.2  -3.9  -1.1  -1.0  -0.4  -0.4  -8.0  -5.3  1.1  -2.7 
C25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  0.9  0.9  -1.1  -1.2  0.1  -0.3  1.3  3.3  2.6  -8.2  -5.3  1.5  -1.3 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  3.8  1.8  -5.7  -4.5  -3.0  -1.3  -0.8  1.2  -1.8  -8.6  -3.7  1.0  -2.5 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  1.6  0.5  -3.9  -4.1  -1.4  -0.6  1.0  2.4  1.2  -8.1  -2.1  3.2  -0.8 
C28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  -2.0  1.1  -1.5  -2.2  -2.4  -0.9  0.8  2.9  2.1  -5.7  -5.0  2.7  -0.7 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  2.2  1.8  -1.0  -0.4  0.2  -0.8  -0.9  -0.2  0.9  -8.9  -2.7  2.9  -1.7 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  -2.3  -0.3  -1.6  -2.7  -1.7  0.3  0.6  2.8  2.1  -2.5  -4.8  -0.9  -0.7 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  N/A  0.4  -3.3  0.0  -2.5  -2.5  -1.1  0.3  -2.1  -9.1  -8.2  -1.6  -4.2 
C32  Other manufacturing  -4.6  1.0  -1.6  -0.2  -1.0  -1.8  -0.4  0.3  0.0  -3.0  -1.8  -1.2  -1.1 
C33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  -4.7  -0.1  -2.9  -2.5  -1.0  -0.6  0.2  0.3  3.8  -2.0  -2.1  -1.3  -0.3 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY  -3.9  -2.9  -4.3  -4.3  -3.8  -2.5  -1.2  -1.5  -0.8  2.4  0.3  0.7  0.2 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES  0.9  -1.3  -0.5  0.4  -0.8  -1.7  1.4  0.5  -0.5  0.1  0.5  -0.1  0.1 
N/A: data not available. 
Source: Eurostat. Statistical Annex 
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Table 7.3: EU-27 - Number of hours worked, annual growth rate (%) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
2006-2011 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING  N/A  -3.0  -4.9  -5.6  -3.7  -3.2  -4.5  -3.4  -1.2  -4.9  -2.4  -2.5  -2.9 
C  MANUFACTURING  N/A  -1.2  -2.4  -2.7  -1.1  -1.6  -0.1  0.2  -0.6  -9.3  -0.5  1.5  -1.8 
C10  Manufacture of food products  N/A  -1.1  -2.2  -2.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.1  -0.6  0.3  -2.5  0.5  0.5  -0.4 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  N/A  -0.7  -3.5  -0.7  0.4  -2.4  -3.9  -1.3  -1.7  -4.6  -4.3  -0.2  -2.4 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  N/A  2.3  -3.1  -9.7  -5.2  -4.0  -6.1  -3.5  -9.7  -5.4  -4.5  -4.6  -5.6 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  N/A  -4.2  -5.1  -7.1  -5.7  -5.0  -5.5  -2.9  -5.4  -14.9  0.0  -0.3  -4.9 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  N/A  -4.1  -3.1  -3.5  -3.5  -3.8  -3.7  -5.4  -6.3  -14.7  -8.2  0.5  -6.9 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  N/A  -2.2  -3.6  -4.0  -3.8  -4.3  -1.0  -3.7  -5.8  -11.0  0.1  3.7  -3.5 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, ex-
cept furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
N/A  -4.1  -1.9  -2.3  -0.8  -1.8  -0.1  -0.1  -2.6  -12.9  0.6  0.2  -3.1 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  N/A  -1.4  -0.8  -2.8  -1.7  -1.9  -1.0  -1.1  -3.9  -7.2  -0.2  0.3  -2.4 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  N/A  0.0  -3.4  -4.2  -3.0  -2.3  0.1  0.1  -1.7  -5.9  -3.1  -1.7  -2.5 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  N/A  -2.5  -4.4  -1.6  -0.6  -0.6  -3.3  0.1  2.1  -8.3  -3.0  -3.4  -2.6 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  N/A  -2.4  -2.1  -2.7  -2.0  -3.0  -1.0  -1.5  -1.7  -5.4  -1.2  1.2  -1.7 
C21  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations 
N/A  0.3  2.1  0.0  -1.0  -1.5  -0.1  1.0  -0.2  -1.9  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  N/A  -0.2  -1.8  -1.6  -0.3  -1.4  1.8  0.6  -0.4  -9.0  1.0  2.3  -1.2 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  N/A  -2.6  -3.1  -3.1  -1.0  -0.9  -0.3  0.6  -2.5  -12.0  -1.9  -0.3  -3.3 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  N/A  -1.9  -3.3  -4.8  -1.7  -2.4  0.2  -0.4  -0.9  -12.8  1.8  2.6  -2.1 
C25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
N/A  -0.4  -1.4  -2.2  -0.4  -1.1  1.7  2.3  3.0  -11.4  -0.5  2.0  -1.1 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  2.8  0.1  -4.8  -4.5  -2.8  -1.6  -0.5  0.3  -1.0  -12.0  -2.0  -0.4  -3.1 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  N/A  -1.1  -3.0  -3.9  -1.4  -1.9  2.5  1.7  0.8  -12.6  3.1  3.3  -0.9 
C28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  N/A  -0.6  -2.3  -2.4  -1.3  -1.3  1.5  2.5  1.5  -10.6  -0.6  3.8  -0.8 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  N/A  0.7  -1.5  -1.1  0.5  -0.5  -0.4  0.9  -1.4  -14.0  3.9  4.6  -1.4 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  N/A  -1.4  -2.1  -2.1  -2.3  -0.3  1.5  1.0  1.4  -3.5  -4.0  0.1  -1.0 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  N/A  0.3  -4.2  -3.4  -1.0  -3.4  1.0  0.4  -2.9  -11.4  -4.8  -0.5  -3.9 
C32  Other manufacturing  N/A  0.1  -3.0  -2.4  -0.2  -2.6  -0.5  0.8  0.3  -4.9  0.0  2.7  -0.3 
C33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  N/A  -2.2  -3.5  -3.6  -2.7  -0.4  0.9  0.5  1.1  0.3  -2.9  0.2  -0.2 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY  N/A  -1.7  -4.8  -4.5  -2.4  0.2  -1.7  -1.2  -0.1  -0.5  -0.5  1.5  -0.2 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND RE-
MEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
N/A  -2.0  -1.5  -0.8  0.8  -3.0  -0.5  0.4  0.9  -2.3  1.7  0.7  0.3 
F  CONSTRUCTION  1.7  -1.6  -3.0  -1.2  0.0  5.9  3.2  2.8  -1.5  -9.1  -6.7  -0.6  -3.1 
N/A: data not available.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 Statistical Annex 
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Table 7.4: EU-27 - Labour productivity per person employed, annual growth rate (%) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
2006-2011 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING  6.4  0.6  5.5  1.6  2.5  -3.1  0.0  3.4  -2.3  -7.1  3.7  -4.8  -1.5 
C  MANUFACTURING  6.1  0.1  1.3  2.4  4.7  3.0  5.6  3.8  -1.5  -8.2  11.4  3.9  1.7 
C10  Manufacture of food products  1.8  1.8  3.0  0.6  3.2  2.3  1.7  1.9  -0.5  1.0  2.4  0.9  1.1 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  N/A  4.4  3.8  3.3  -1.2  2.6  5.4  1.4  -1.1  4.2  1.7  7.3  2.6 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  -2.4  1.4  -0.3  -0.3  -0.7  -2.2  -4.8  14.5  -8.6  4.6  0.8  0.6  2.1 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  6.1  0.3  0.4  4.1  1.7  -1.2  5.4  4.2  -3.4  -5.7  14.7  -0.1  1.7 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  1.4  -0.6  -7.2  -2.2  1.5  -1.4  8.6  8.5  3.4  1.6  10.0  -4.3  3.7 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  1.6  -4.2  -6.6  -3.0  -5.1  -3.4  1.0  1.5  -2.4  -1.3  6.2  0.3  0.8 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
7.7  -2.8  2.6  3.6  4.7  0.9  5.2  0.2  -6.6  -2.1  6.5  0.0  -0.5 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  4.3  -0.3  4.4  4.5  4.3  2.7  6.5  5.5  -1.0  -3.6  8.5  -0.1  1.8 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  2.7  -1.8  1.9  2.8  3.2  5.8  2.0  0.5  0.2  -0.6  4.4  1.6  1.2 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  6.8  2.5  0.9  5.7  7.1  2.6  5.1  -1.5  3.7  -5.1  1.9  2.6  0.3 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  7.6  -0.6  3.6  2.7  6.8  4.0  4.8  3.9  -1.0  -7.8  12.8  1.5  1.7 
C21  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations 
3.5  8.6  6.3  5.4  2.2  5.8  4.6  1.0  3.2  7.0  6.0  1.2  3.6 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  2.2  -1.4  1.0  1.7  1.9  1.5  5.0  3.0  -4.9  -7.4  10.4  3.0  0.6 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  4.4  0.1  0.5  3.2  4.0  1.6  5.1  0.6  -4.6  -9.3  9.1  5.2  0.0 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  11.8  -0.7  4.3  3.8  9.1  0.6  7.4  1.6  -2.9  -20.3  25.3  3.7  0.4 
C25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
5.6  -0.6  0.5  2.3  2.6  1.8  3.6  2.8  -5.0  -15.2  13.1  5.1  -0.3 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  11.2  -7.5  -3.5  6.0  11.1  6.2  10.3  8.6  4.0  -8.8  12.6  5.6  4.1 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  8.0  -0.5  0.8  1.8  4.2  2.0  7.5  2.3  -1.4  -13.1  14.0  0.9  0.1 
C28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  8.1  0.2  -0.5  1.7  6.7  4.8  7.6  5.3  -0.6  -22.0  16.5  8.5  0.6 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  5.4  0.4  2.0  2.3  4.8  2.8  3.9  6.3  -6.8  -16.8  24.9  9.7  2.5 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  4.5  2.0  -2.4  4.1  2.3  2.0  6.9  2.3  2.8  -2.4  6.2  5.6  2.8 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  N/A  -2.2  -1.1  -2.5  3.0  3.2  4.4  3.0  -2.4  -8.0  8.2  4.2  0.8 
C32  Other manufacturing  10.5  2.5  4.6  -1.0  2.6  3.1  5.3  2.2  -1.4  -2.9  9.7  4.5  2.3 
C33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  11.1  -0.7  -2.1  0.0  5.5  2.1  7.8  3.9  0.9  -7.3  4.8  7.0  1.7 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY  7.9  5.2  5.4  7.7  6.2  4.6  2.2  0.8  0.7  -6.9  3.9  -5.2  -1.4 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND 
REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
F  CONSTRUCTION  4.3  0.5  1.1  1.4  -0.5  0.0  -0.8  -2.3  -1.9  0.0  2.2  4.6  0.5 
N/A: data not available.  
Source: Eurostat. Statistical Annex 
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Table 7.5: EU-27 - Labour productivity per hour worked, annual growth rate (%) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
2006-2011 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING  N/A  0.3  5.7  2.9  1.6  -3.1  0.6  3.3  -2.5  -6.0  1.9  -5.7  -1.9 
C  MANUFACTURING  N/A  1.3  1.7  3.1  3.9  3.2  4.9  4.1  -1.2  -5.9  8.0  3.1  1.5 
C10  Manufacture of food products  N/A  2.4  4.3  2.2  2.2  2.7  1.6  2.5  -0.8  1.7  1.5  0.9  1.1 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  N/A  3.2  6.2  2.1  -2.9  3.5  8.1  2.6  -0.6  2.4  4.3  5.9  2.9 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  N/A  -4.2  2.3  4.8  -1.3  -0.6  0.9  6.7  -7.9  4.2  -1.4  2.3  0.7 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  N/A  1.2  0.5  4.0  1.1  -0.7  4.9  1.6  -4.4  -3.3  8.1  -2.6  -0.2 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  N/A  0.2  -7.8  -2.7  -1.3  -5.4  6.3  8.2  3.2  3.8  9.7  -6.4  3.6 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  N/A  -3.1  -4.0  -3.4  -8.1  -4.9  -0.8  2.2  -1.8  -2.5  2.9  0.6  0.3 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
N/A  0.3  2.6  4.6  4.1  1.9  4.4  1.2  -6.1  -1.1  2.8  -0.4  -0.8 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  N/A  -0.6  4.3  4.5  4.5  2.0  4.8  3.8  0.9  -1.4  6.4  -1.1  1.7 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  N/A  -2.1  3.2  3.0  4.3  4.7  0.3  0.3  -0.4  -1.7  2.8  -0.1  0.2 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  N/A  2.8  2.2  3.8  5.4  -0.2  5.0  -0.4  0.5  0.5  2.3  3.9  1.4 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  N/A  0.9  4.1  2.8  5.3  4.9  4.5  4.8  -1.5  -6.9  11.6  0.2  1.5 
C21 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations 
N/A  10.5  6.7  5.2  0.6  6.4  6.6  0.9  1.1  5.5  6.0  1.0  2.9 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  N/A  -0.3  1.9  3.6  2.0  2.3  2.2  3.9  -4.0  -5.2  6.6  1.9  0.5 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  N/A  2.1  1.3  3.7  3.0  1.5  4.8  1.4  -4.1  -7.6  4.2  3.6  -0.6 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  N/A  0.9  3.5  5.6  6.7  1.9  6.1  1.6  -2.3  -15.9  16.6  2.1  -0.1 
C25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
N/A  0.7  0.8  3.3  3.1  2.6  3.2  3.8  -5.4  -12.1  7.7  4.6  -0.5 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  12.3  -6.0  -4.5  5.9  10.9  6.5  9.9  9.5  3.1  -5.3  10.6  7.1  4.9 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  N/A  1.1  -0.2  1.5  4.2  3.4  5.8  3.0  -1.0  -8.7  8.3  0.7  0.3 
C28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  N/A  1.9  0.3  1.8  5.5  5.3  6.8  5.7  0.0  -17.6  11.4  7.3  0.8 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  N/A  1.5  2.6  3.0  4.5  2.5  3.3  5.1  -4.7  -11.9  17.0  7.8  2.2 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  N/A  3.2  -1.9  3.5  2.9  2.6  6.1  4.1  3.5  -1.5  5.3  4.5  3.2 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  N/A  -2.1  -0.2  0.9  1.4  4.1  2.2  2.8  -1.6  -5.6  4.4  3.0  0.5 
C32  Other manufacturing  N/A  3.4  6.1  1.2  1.7  3.9  5.4  1.7  -1.7  -0.9  7.7  0.5  1.4 
C33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  N/A  1.4  -1.4  1.2  7.3  1.9  7.1  3.7  3.6  -9.5  5.7  5.4  1.6 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY  N/A  4.0  5.9  7.9  4.7  1.8  2.6  0.5  0.0  -4.2  4.8  -5.9  -1.0 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND 
REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
F  CONSTRUCTION  2.3  2.3  3.7  3.2  0.9  -3.2  0.1  -0.3  -1.3  1.5  3.4  1.7  1.0 
N/A: data not available.  
Source: Eurostat. Statistical Annex 
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Table 7.6: EU-27 - Unit labour cost, annual growth rate (%) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
2006-2011 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING  -2.8  7.7  -0.7  6.8  4.2  1.1  8.5  5.4  10.9  11.2  2.1  11.3  8.1 
C  MANUFACTURING  -1.0  2.8  1.6  0.1  -1.4  -0.5  -2.3  -0.3  5.8  9.8  -6.4  -0.8  1.4 
C10  Manufacture of food products  0.3  2.3  0.8  2.8  -0.5  -0.7  0.3  1.4  5.0  1.0  0.2  0.0  1.5 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  N/A  1.0  -1.6  2.5  3.8  -1.3  -3.8  1.1  5.2  1.6  -1.5  -3.3  0.6 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  8.8  4.8  0.8  6.5  8.5  6.2  7.0  -4.1  16.2  2.0  -1.4  -9.0  0.4 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  7.8  1.8  3.1  0.6  0.7  2.8  -2.3  0.7  8.8  6.0  -8.8  2.8  1.7 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  14.4  0.8  9.2  2.4  1.6  4.3  -3.7  -0.5  3.2  2.2  -5.4  6.7  1.1 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  15.0  9.1  7.3  4.2  9.5  5.8  4.6  4.9  10.3  4.9  -0.8  1.9  4.2 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
-5.1  5.3  -0.9  -1.8  -0.6  1.0  -0.4  4.7  11.9  4.3  -4.5  2.1  3.6 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  0.3  4.8  -2.5  -1.7  -1.2  1.0  -3.5  -1.3  3.5  3.5  -5.1  1.9  0.4 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  2.7  5.1  0.4  -1.4  -1.0  -1.8  -0.7  0.9  4.3  1.9  -4.2  -1.6  0.2 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  6.1  1.0  6.2  -5.0  -1.2  4.1  2.5  2.5  4.0  7.9  3.7  -1.2  3.3 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  0.5  3.2  -1.0  1.5  -3.5  -0.9  -3.6  -0.4  4.8  10.6  -9.0  4.5  1.9 
C21  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations 
N/A  -6.2  -2.8  -0.4  1.6  -2.9  -3.3  4.2  0.3  -3.2  -4.4  1.2  -0.4 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  0.2  3.3  1.3  -0.2  0.6  0.3  -2.9  -0.9  7.8  8.2  -4.9  0.2  2.0 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  -2.1  2.0  2.9  0.2  -1.0  0.7  -1.8  2.5  8.9  12.3  -3.2  -3.0  3.3 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  -4.9  -3.1  -1.4  -0.6  -3.4  2.9  -3.0  3.0  6.8  23.0  -14.0  0.1  3.1 
C25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
-4.6  4.0  1.9  -0.4  0.0  0.0  -1.0  0.5  10.3  15.1  -6.8  -2.6  3.0 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  -2.2  12.3  6.2  -5.6  -7.7  -4.7  -8.1  -6.2  0.8  10.9  -9.4  -4.2  -1.9 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  -4.2  2.4  2.2  0.2  -1.1  -1.0  -4.3  0.6  5.2  12.2  -8.7  2.2  2.0 
C28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  -2.8  2.9  2.8  1.5  -1.9  -2.6  -3.7  -1.6  4.3  27.7  -9.1  -3.7  2.8 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  0.1  1.1  0.6  0.5  -2.6  -0.5  0.2  -5.4  9.2  16.2  -15.5  -4.2  -0.6 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  -0.1  2.9  7.8  0.7  -1.2  0.6  -3.4  0.4  1.8  7.6  -0.1  -1.8  1.5 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  N/A  5.5  4.5  -0.6  -1.1  -0.1  -0.2  0.3  7.0  10.3  -3.9  -3.5  1.9 
C32  Other manufacturing  -10.7  1.1  -0.9  2.0  0.6  -1.5  -2.4  3.1  3.9  3.3  -5.3  0.3  1.0 
C33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  -2.3  5.1  5.9  2.4  -2.4  0.8  -4.9  0.0  2.5  12.9  -6.2  -5.1  0.6 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY  -1.4  -0.8  1.9  -1.7  -1.3  0.1  4.3  5.1  4.5  8.8  -1.7  6.6  4.6 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND 
REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
F  CONSTRUCTION  -5.8  3.4  3.0  0.1  1.4  5.9  3.3  6.8  6.4  0.4  -2.5  -0.4  2.1 
N/A: data not available.  
Source: Eurostat. Statistical Annex 
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Table  7.7: EU-27 - Revealed comparative advantage index 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2007  2008  2009  2010 
C10  Manufacture of food products  1.20  1.12  1.10  1.09 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  1.61  1.58  1.62  1.71 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  1.52  1.55  1.61  1.67 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  0.81  0.76  0.69  0.67 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.74 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  0.96  0.90  0.91  0.88 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furni-
ture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
1.15  1.17  1.18 
1.16 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  1.28  1.30  1.35  1.35 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  1.20  1.61  1.79  1.88 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  0.83  0.84  0.77  0.79 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  1.13  1.14  1.16  1.16 
C21 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations  1.47  1.54  1.54  1.65 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  1.18  1.21  1.18  1.19 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  1.22  1.19  1.18  1.15 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  0.92  0.88  0.82  0.86 
C25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment  1.18  1.20  1.16  1.20 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  0.60  0.60  0.57  0.57 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.97 
C28  Manufacture of machineryand equipment n.e.c.  1.14  1.17  1.18  1.16 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  1.22  1.22  1.30  1.28 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  0.85  0.87  1.15  1.21 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  1.27  1.23  1.20  1.13 
C32  Other manufacturing  0.80  0.81  0.75  0.77 
Note:  there was a transition from NACE REV 1 to NACE REV 2, therefore the data are only available from 2007. 
Source: own calculations using Comtrade data. 
 
 
Table 7.8: EU-27 - Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M) 
Code 
(NACE Rev. 2) 
Sector  2007  2008  2009  2010 
C10  Manufacture of food products  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01 
C11  Manufacture of beverages  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.22 
C12  Manufacture of tobacco products  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.05 
C13  Manufacture of textiles  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 
C14  Manufacture of wearing apparel  -0.19  -0.19  -0.21  -0.22 
C15  Manufacture of leather and related products  -0.07  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08 
C16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.03 
C17  Manufacture of paper and paper products  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
C18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.08 
C19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  -0.03  -0.01  -0.05  -0.05 
C20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.04 
C21 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical prepara-
tions  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.10 
C22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
C23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.08 
C24  Manufacture of basic metals  -0.06  -0.03  0.01  -0.01 
C25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10 
C26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12 
C27  Manufacture of electrical equipment  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.07 
C28  Manufacture of machineryand equipment n.e.c.  0.16  0.17  0.20  0.19 
C29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.11 
C30  Manufacture of other transport equipment  0.13  0.11  0.11  0.10 
C31  Manufacture of furniture  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.02 
C32  Other manufacturing  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.02 
Note:  there was a transition from NACE REV 1 to NACE REV 2, therefore the data are only available from 2007. 
Source: own calculations using Comtrade dataStatistical Annex 
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Table 7.9.1: Revealed comparative advantage index in manufacturing industries in 2010 - EU countries, Japan and Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
  
Food  Beva-
rages 
Tobacco  Textiles  Clothing  Leather & 
footwear 
Wood & 
wood 
products 
Paper  Printing  Refined 
petroleum 
Chemicals  Pharmaceuticals 
Rubber 
& 
plastics 
Non-
metallic 
mineral 
products 
Basic 
metals 
Metal 
products 
Computers, 
electronic & 
optical 
Electrical 
equipment 
Machinery  Motor 
vehicles 
Other 
transport 
Furniture  Other manufac-
turing 
   C10  C11  C12  C13  C14  C15  C16  C17  C18  C19  C20  C21  C22  C23  C24  C25  C26  C27  C28  C29  C30  C31  C32 
Austria  0.92  2.25  0.38  0.70  0.53  0.70  4.47  2.19  1.55  0.25  0.50  1.46  1.35  1.40  1.29  2.15  0.40  1.35  1.40  1.29  0.79  1.22  0.80 
Belgium  1.33  0.97  1.10  0.84  0.71  0.96  0.83  0.99  7.72  1.13  2.24  3.48  1.04  1.09  1.10  0.69  0.21  0.43  0.67  1.04  0.20  0.54  1.33 
Bulgaria  1.53  0.87  5.38  1.15  3.23  1.29  1.66  0.75  0.22  2.14  0.54  0.86  0.92  2.23  2.76  0.76  0.27  1.10  0.78  0.35  0.33  1.37  0.36 
Cyprus  2.22  1.23  40.71  0.13  0.46  0.64  0.16  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.69  6.25  0.37  0.20  0.60  0.94  0.85  0.40  0.45  0.22  0.80  1.02  1.78 
Czech Rep.  0.46  0.64  1.65  0.87  0.34  0.38  1.41  0.97  1.18  0.25  0.54  0.31  1.71  1.71  0.65  2.09  1.00  1.60  1.14  2.04  0.38  1.51  0.85 
Denmark  3.30  1.36  1.68  0.69  1.73  0.79  1.13  0.69  0.86  0.71  0.65  1.54  1.14  1.01  0.33  1.51  0.52  0.98  1.63  0.31  0.51  2.57  0.89 
Estonia  1.29  2.28  0.28  1.32  1.08  0.67  8.96  0.82  0.40  2.60  0.61  0.13  1.42  1.49  0.52  1.93  0.63  1.45  0.64  0.72  0.57  2.97  0.64 
Finland  0.35  0.45  0.02  0.26  0.17  0.24  5.11  9.43  0.75  1.57  0.87  0.52  0.84  0.74  1.82  0.90  0.51  1.30  1.43  0.25  1.07  0.24  0.49 
France  1.16  4.40  0.63  0.56  0.71  1.06  0.62  1.01  1.67  0.53  1.31  1.77  1.11  0.99  0.75  0.94  0.44  0.87  0.86  1.15  4.13  0.52  0.77 
Germany  0.76  0.67  1.85  0.52  0.49  0.36  0.83  1.23  2.60  0.23  1.03  1.37  1.31  1.01  0.79  1.31  0.56  1.20  1.57  1.85  1.30  0.80  0.61 
Greece  2.89  1.80  6.52  1.57  2.07  0.75  0.60  0.77  1.92  2.13  0.94  1.84  1.25  2.16  1.99  0.97  0.24  0.75  0.38  0.09  0.87  0.37  0.44 
Hungary  0.83  0.41  0.10  0.34  0.27  0.47  0.76  0.82  0.10  0.42  0.57  0.97  1.20  1.15  0.33  0.77  1.75  1.69  0.81  1.71  0.16  0.93  0.26 
Ireland  1.39  1.87  0.54  0.10  0.15  0.08  0.41  0.11  0.00  0.22  3.06  8.11  0.32  0.25  0.08  0.24  0.70  0.22  0.31  0.02  0.31  0.09  1.65 
Italy  0.92  2.28  0.02  1.36  1.57  2.98  0.54  1.04  1.13  0.85  0.73  1.02  1.37  1.99  1.01  1.76  0.21  1.08  1.83  0.73  0.93  2.42  1.02 
Latvia  1.60  6.03  1.62  1.13  1.13  0.26  21.28  0.86  1.75  0.71  0.51  1.23  1.02  1.84  1.43  1.53  0.45  0.62  0.51  0.63  0.29  2.56  0.47 
Lithuania  1.89  1.47  6.45  1.04  1.36  0.32  3.58  1.08  0.12  4.80  1.28  0.38  1.13  0.87  0.19  1.04  0.23  0.50  0.56  0.69  0.49  5.73  0.39 
Luxembourg  0.95  0.88  6.60  2.32  0.39  0.57  2.38  1.93  0.04  0.02  0.54  0.14  4.12  2.47  4.14  1.24  0.26  0.72  0.75  0.61  0.81  0.16  0.24 
Malta  0.96  0.26  0.02  1.14  0.18  0.13  0.06  0.02  1.10  0.01  0.28  1.52  1.29  0.37  0.06  0.27  3.05  1.33  0.24  0.04  0.91  0.09  1.83 
Netherlands  1.97  1.35  5.34  0.44  0.55  0.60  0.26  0.87  0.21  2.15  1.65  0.94  0.75  0.45  0.62  0.77  1.12  0.55  1.04  0.34  0.38  0.38  0.81 
Poland  1.47  0.46  5.02  0.61  0.71  0.41  2.33  1.57  0.45  0.59  0.71  0.34  1.76  1.54  0.90  1.72  0.71  1.31  0.55  1.67  1.06  4.79  0.29 
Portugal  1.20  3.79  5.09  1.98  2.31  3.12  4.24  2.55  0.90  0.69  0.76  0.38  1.87  3.51  0.63  1.87  0.32  1.00  0.47  1.38  0.17  2.87  0.28 
Romania  0.45  0.26  5.77  1.06  2.25  2.49  4.24  0.33  1.60  1.01  0.50  0.41  1.49  0.54  1.03  1.10  0.57  1.44  0.75  1.88  1.06  3.49  0.27 
Slovakia  0.48  0.37  0.00  0.33  0.58  1.21  1.25  1.15  0.46  0.75  0.40  0.18  1.42  1.08  1.21  1.56  1.31  1.00  0.69  2.28  0.28  1.55  0.32 
Slovenia  0.54  0.59  0.00  0.70  0.42  0.63  2.85  1.83  0.21  0.42  0.87  2.22  1.73  1.57  1.04  2.02  0.21  2.26  0.96  1.62  0.15  2.91  0.46 
Spain  1.64  2.19  0.49  0.80  1.20  1.22  0.79  1.42  0.39  0.59  1.19  1.34  1.21  2.14  1.09  1.30  0.20  0.86  0.67  2.19  1.07  0.78  0.38 
Sweden  0.52  0.89  0.28  0.31  0.33  0.19  3.79  5.50  0.22  1.25  0.68  1.53  0.90  0.61  1.14  1.11  0.79  0.98  1.28  1.05  0.39  1.51  0.49 
United Kingdom  0.71  3.70  0.80  0.52  0.61  0.48  0.18  0.70  1.32  1.31  1.23  2.55  0.92  0.74  0.74  0.79  0.65  0.69  1.09  1.25  1.61  0.39  1.10 
EU-27  1.09  1.71  1.67  0.67  0.74  0.88  1.16  1.35  1.88  0.79  1.16  1.65  1.19  1.15  0.86  1.20  0.57  0.97  1.16  1.28  1.21  1.13  0.77 
USA  0.91  0.75  0.27  0.53  0.15  0.20  0.62  1.20  0.55  1.12  1.48  1.07  1.03  0.76  0.69  0.94  0.98  0.88  1.39  1.01  0.44  0.48  1.59 
Japan  0.09  0.06  0.07  0.40  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.29  0.18  0.34  0.95  0.16  1.08  1.01  1.16  0.70  1.06  1.07  1.94  2.16  1.32  0.15  0.43 
Brazil  5.36  0.11  0.54  0.42  0.04  2.00  1.97  3.15  0.29  0.50  0.93  0.35  0.73  1.12  1.70  0.79  0.10  0.45  0.76  1.08  1.42  0.64  0.17 
China  0.37  0.09  0.16  2.46  2.73  2.50  0.90  0.37  0.18  0.25  0.48  0.22  0.93  1.46  0.51  1.29  1.83  1.44  0.72  0.25  0.88  2.12  1.15 
India  1.15  0.10  0.47  3.12  1.95  1.21  0.10  0.24  0.88  3.50  0.96  0.93  0.57  0.77  1.37  0.85  0.16  0.40  0.41  0.41  1.00  0.32  5.03 
Russia  0.53  0.26  1.17  0.06  0.02  0.11  3.51  1.01  0.14  8.90  1.40  0.05  0.24  0.50  3.28  0.28  0.09  0.20  0.17  0.09  0.67  0.14  0.08 
Source: Own calculations using COMTRADE data. 
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Table 7.9.2: Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M) in manufacturing industries in 2010 - EU countries, Japan and Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
  
Food  Bevarages  Tobacco  Textiles  Clothing 
Leather 
& 
footwear 
Wood & 
wood 
products 
Paper  Printing 
Refined 
petroleum  Chemicals  Pharmaceuticals 
Rubber 
& 
plastics 
Non-
metallic 
mineral 
products 
Basic 
metals 
Metal 
products 
Computers, 
electronic 
& optical 
Electrical 
equipment  Machinery 
Motor 
vehicles 
Other 
transport  Furniture 
Other 
manufacturing 
   C10  C11  C12  C13  C14  C15  C16  C17  C18  C19  C20  C21  C22  C23  C24  C25  C26  C27  C28  C29  C30  C31  C32 
Austria  -0.05  0.53  -0.69  -0.02  -0.43  -0.20  0.43  0.23  -0.26  -0.59  -0.26  0.04  -0.03  0.00  0.04  0.11  -0.12  0.12  0.07  0.05  0.26  -0.17  -0.07 
Belgium  0.15  -0.05  0.03  0.27  -0.01  0.17  0.00  -0.02  0.07  0.03  0.15  0.09  0.07  0.11  0.20  -0.04  -0.17  -0.04  0.05  -0.07  0.04  -0.17  0.06 
Bulgaria  -0.09  -0.17  0.41  -0.45  0.52  0.05  0.19  -0.38  -0.80  0.14  -0.38  -0.23  -0.29  0.13  0.39  -0.31  -0.36  -0.07  -0.17  -0.26  -0.01  0.16  -0.24 
Cyprus  -0.70  -0.88  -0.28  -0.93  -0.92  -0.87  -0.97  -0.91  -1.00  -1.00  -0.75  -0.05  -0.90  -0.97  -0.73  -0.81  -0.51  -0.88  -0.81  -0.94  -0.86  -0.89  -0.52 
Czech Rep.  -0.21  0.09  0.36  0.09  -0.16  -0.25  0.34  -0.05  0.16  -0.14  -0.17  -0.40  0.02  0.26  -0.22  0.18  -0.12  0.14  0.19  0.35  0.20  0.30  0.18 
Denmark  0.28  -0.16  0.52  -0.02  -0.04  -0.22  -0.32  -0.37  -0.09  -0.20  -0.10  0.15  -0.08  -0.13  -0.34  0.05  -0.11  -0.03  0.25  -0.40  -0.43  0.19  -0.07 
Estonia  -0.03  -0.24  -0.58  0.04  0.02  -0.10  0.45  -0.24  -0.71  -0.12  -0.24  -0.69  -0.11  0.04  -0.27  0.14  -0.07  0.04  -0.07  0.04  0.14  0.59  0.04 
Finland  -0.42  -0.42  -0.97  -0.35  -0.68  -0.43  0.55  0.81  -0.48  0.28  -0.01  -0.24  -0.03  -0.10  0.33  -0.01  -0.09  0.18  0.25  -0.48  0.37  -0.59  -0.09 
France  -0.06  0.63  -0.58  -0.14  -0.37  -0.13  -0.36  -0.18  0.19  -0.35  0.03  0.08  -0.11  -0.18  -0.09  -0.12  -0.22  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05  0.29  -0.52  -0.16 
Germany  0.06  -0.04  0.58  0.03  -0.30  -0.29  0.10  0.14  0.33  -0.36  0.14  0.14  0.23  0.19  0.01  0.25  -0.04  0.23  0.40  0.40  -0.03  -0.10  0.07 
Greece  -0.32  -0.39  -0.11  -0.18  -0.37  -0.69  -0.66  -0.71  -0.45  -0.16  -0.52  -0.57  -0.33  -0.22  0.01  -0.37  -0.69  -0.42  -0.63  -0.88  -0.83  -0.82  -0.70 
Hungary  0.13  0.07  -0.74  -0.17  -0.02  -0.07  0.11  -0.07  -0.81  -0.03  -0.07  0.04  -0.01  0.12  -0.30  -0.14  0.07  0.09  -0.07  0.42  0.29  0.42  0.00 
Ireland  0.27  0.22  0.04  -0.34  -0.62  -0.65  -0.01  -0.68  -0.98  -0.50  0.69  0.77  -0.24  -0.29  -0.30  -0.15  0.32  -0.15  0.19  -0.78  -0.60  -0.61  0.55 
Italy  -0.13  0.59  -0.99  0.20  0.11  0.26  -0.42  -0.07  0.09  0.26  -0.21  -0.11  0.25  0.41  -0.12  0.42  -0.48  0.20  0.45  -0.15  0.26  0.63  0.13 
Latvia  -0.23  0.25  -0.35  -0.10  -0.03  -0.57  0.79  -0.43  -0.46  -0.59  -0.41  -0.24  -0.26  -0.03  0.07  -0.01  -0.17  -0.26  -0.23  -0.11  -0.46  0.30  -0.30 
Lithuania  0.13  -0.18  0.56  -0.11  0.27  -0.28  0.29  -0.17  -0.83  0.79  -0.01  -0.41  0.01  -0.12  -0.42  0.05  -0.25  -0.12  -0.08  -0.07  0.24  0.83  0.04 
Luxembourg  -0.30  -0.59  -0.08  0.64  -0.47  -0.18  0.19  -0.05  -0.88  -0.99  -0.39  -0.69  0.35  0.04  0.40  -0.12  -0.34  -0.12  0.01  -0.50  -0.45  -0.86  -0.46 
Malta  -0.46  -0.82  -0.98  0.41  -0.68  -0.74  -0.90  -0.98  -0.49  -1.00  -0.61  0.18  -0.02  -0.74  -0.84  -0.61  0.34  -0.02  -0.52  -0.81  -0.74  -0.91  0.35 
Netherlands  0.27  0.17  0.71  0.08  -0.17  -0.06  -0.54  -0.01  -0.43  0.19  0.24  0.07  0.00  -0.18  0.00  0.02  0.01  -0.02  0.22  -0.19  0.01  -0.34  0.03 
Poland  0.17  -0.10  0.79  -0.30  -0.06  -0.31  0.40  -0.05  -0.35  0.02  -0.26  -0.46  0.05  0.13  -0.07  0.08  -0.17  0.14  -0.27  0.25  0.13  0.75  -0.26 
Portugal  -0.36  0.40  0.58  0.00  0.12  0.17  0.36  0.13  -0.24  -0.14  -0.38  -0.63  0.05  0.34  -0.35  0.11  -0.39  -0.13  -0.34  -0.21  -0.44  0.27  -0.58 
Romania  -0.49  -0.43  0.70  -0.48  0.53  0.08  0.53  -0.63  -0.17  0.11  -0.40  -0.57  -0.23  -0.50  -0.09  -0.33  -0.22  -0.15  -0.27  0.28  0.61  0.61  -0.25 
Slovakia  -0.12  -0.22  -1.00  -0.15  0.09  0.26  0.31  0.18  -0.10  0.26  -0.11  -0.53  0.06  0.08  0.29  0.09  -0.05  0.04  0.07  0.28  0.40  0.32  0.09 
Slovenia  -0.33  -0.17  -1.00  -0.04  -0.31  -0.33  0.11  0.10  -0.74  -0.60  -0.17  0.37  0.12  -0.02  -0.14  0.16  -0.27  0.34  0.11  0.08  -0.19  0.34  -0.07 
Spain  0.02  0.21  -0.80  -0.06  -0.29  -0.13  -0.13  0.00  -0.58  -0.41  -0.09  -0.11  -0.03  0.31  0.10  0.07  -0.55  -0.07  -0.12  0.16  0.17  -0.28  -0.43 
Sweden  -0.31  -0.12  -0.35  -0.20  -0.43  -0.48  0.55  0.70  -0.65  0.14  -0.14  0.39  -0.06  -0.23  0.12  0.09  0.00  0.03  0.17  0.00  0.15  0.08  -0.07 
United Kingdom  -0.45  0.07  -0.40  -0.31  -0.59  -0.58  -0.83  -0.47  0.30  0.08  -0.06  0.16  -0.23  -0.28  -0.14  -0.24  -0.26  -0.24  0.00  -0.17  0.08  -0.69  -0.18 
EU-27  -0.01  0.22  0.05  -0.02  -0.22  -0.08  0.03  0.06  0.08  -0.05  0.04  0.10  0.04  0.08  -0.01  0.10  -0.12  0.07  0.19  0.11  0.10  0.02  -0.02 
USA  -0.02  -0.49  -0.17  -0.36  -0.89  -0.83  -0.43  0.01  0.40  -0.12  0.15  -0.22  -0.16  -0.25  -0.21  -0.16  -0.27  -0.25  0.02  -0.32  -0.43  -0.71  -0.21 
Japan  -0.84  -0.81  -0.95  -0.12  -0.97  -0.95  -0.98  -0.17  0.32  -0.41  0.21  -0.59  0.38  0.30  0.34  0.20  0.16  0.35  0.63  0.79  0.56  -0.62  -0.27 
Brazil  0.79  -0.81  0.90  -0.46  -0.76  0.62  0.87  0.55  -0.25  -0.62  -0.42  -0.63  -0.27  0.07  0.20  -0.16  -0.83  -0.42  -0.41  -0.14  -0.01  0.42  -0.55 
China  0.09  -0.42  0.70  0.70  0.96  0.81  0.36  -0.14  0.29  -0.14  -0.27  0.24  0.37  0.60  -0.14  0.59  0.24  0.31  -0.04  -0.17  0.40  0.92  0.74 
India  0.19  -0.11  0.82  0.65  0.95  0.63  -0.39  -0.51  -0.29  0.55  -0.32  0.45  0.07  0.06  -0.47  0.11  -0.66  -0.26  -0.45  0.27  -0.13  0.07  0.22 
Russia  -0.62  -0.77  0.19  -0.87  -0.97  -0.90  0.64  -0.20  -0.86  0.93  0.10  -0.94  -0.72  -0.49  0.56  -0.71  -0.83  -0.78  -0.82  -0.89  -0.07  -0.78  -0.83 
Source: Own calculations using COMTRADE data. 
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Table 7.10: Revealed comparative advantage index in service industries in 2010- EU countries, US, Japan and Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
  
Communication  Computer and 
information  
Construction  Finance  Insurance  Other business 
services 
Personal, cultural 
and recreational 
Transportation  Travel 
Austria  0.95  0.60  0.83  0.28  0.98  1.05  0.63  1.15  1.49 
Belgium  1.70  0.72  0.76  0.50  0.57  1.49  0.96  1.42  0.49 
Bulgaria  1.20  0.93  1.10  0.06  1.01  0.49  0.85  0.93  2.29 
Cyprus  0.33  0.17  0.23  1.84  0.28  1.17  0.65  1.17  1.14 
Czech Republic  0.96  0.98  1.81  0.04  0.61  0.98  1.21  1.19  1.47 
Denmark  0.34  0.48  0.24  0.15  0.22  0.65  0.92  2.97  0.40 
Estonia  1.65  0.74  1.83  0.28  0.10  0.76  0.41  1.92  1.02 
Finland  0.43  3.93  1.58  0.28  0.19  1.44  0.04  0.54  0.00 
France  1.15  0.18  1.69  0.24  0.40  0.90  1.79  1.21  1.38 
Germany  0.83  1.11  1.91  0.70  1.12  1.27  0.59  1.14  0.61 
Greece  0.41  0.21  0.73  0.06  0.51  0.21  0.65  2.66  1.44 
Hungary  0.88  0.99  0.77  0.11  0.08  1.14  8.49  0.94  1.19 
Ireland  0.28  6.24  0.00  1.10  4.94  1.18  0.00  0.24  0.18 
Italy  2.58  0.34  0.04  0.35  1.38  1.03  0.41  0.72  1.69 
Latvia  0.97  0.59  0.83  0.83  0.35  0.65  0.41  2.40  0.75 
Lithuania  1.03  0.15  0.80  0.12  0.02  0.31  0.51  2.87  1.07 
Luxembourg  1.48  0.19  0.25  8.23  2.49  0.49  3.82  0.25  0.27 
Malta  0.42  0.22  0.00  0.89  0.55  0.63  46.84  0.46  1.13 
Netherlands  1.93  1.08  1.13  0.19  0.31  1.33  0.94  1.30  0.58 
Poland  0.64  0.77  1.57  0.23  0.26  1.16  1.21  1.31  1.26 
Portugal  1.00  0.26  1.11  0.12  0.26  0.74  1.99  1.30  1.87 
Romania  2.42  1.96  2.96  0.19  0.20  0.90  1.39  1.42  0.56 
Slovak Republic  1.22  0.96  1.08  0.10  0.31  0.61  1.54  1.50  1.66 
Slovenia  1.76  0.42  1.24  0.11  0.75  0.67  1.10  1.27  1.81 
Spain  0.64  0.85  1.30  0.50  0.41  0.91  1.83  0.83  1.82 
Sweden  0.98  1.87  0.34  0.23  0.40  1.55  1.11  0.75  0.75 
United Kingdom  1.25  0.89  0.34  2.71  1.59  1.28  3.24  0.60  0.55 
EU-27 TOTAL  1.12  1.16  0.93  1.12  1.13  1.10  1.63  1.04  0.89 
United States  0.78  0.41  0.49  1.65  1.26  0.71  0.00  0.63  1.07 
Japan  0.19  0.12  2.92  0.35  0.42  1.17  0.14  1.34  0.41 
Brazil  0.51  0.11  0.03  0.88  0.61  1.93  0.44  0.76  0.81 
China  0.27  0.88  3.28  0.11  0.47  1.40  0.09  0.97  1.16 
India  0.43  7.48  0.16  0.66  0.67  0.91  0.35  0.52  0.50 
Russian Federation  1.12  0.49  2.26  0.32  0.48  1.11  1.35  1.62  0.85 
 
Source: IMF, OECD 
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The  2012  edition  of  the  European  Competitiveness 
Report  studies  some  of  the  main  driving  forces  of 
globalization and the opportunities it brings for EU 
industries. By looking at international trade, global value 
chains, FDI, energy efficiency of EU exports, clusters and 
networks  and  relations  with  neighbourhood  countries, 
the report provides empirical evidence that the European 
industry is well positioned to benefit from globalization 
and draws the corresponding implications for industrial 
policy.
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